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l)INNOVATION IN AN UNCERTAIN INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
PRIVATE SOFTWARE ENTREPRENEURS IN HANGZHOU, CHINA
The thesis deals with innovation and entrepreneurship in China. Despite an
institutional environment characterized by high levels of uncertainty, innovation thrives
even in the technology-based sectors. The research asks for explanations how innovative
capabilities are developed in such an adverse institutional environment. The thesis is
based on a synthesis of capability, institutional and sectoral approaches to innovation and
2 years of extensive field research in cooperation with 45 Chinese entrepreneurs and
Zhejiang University in Hangzhou. One of the key insights is that innovation, in a broad
understanding, can take place in an environment with institutional uncertainty and limited
formal protection of intellectual property rights. On the one hand, institutional uncertainty
creates both restrictions and incentives for innovation, and, on the other hand, firms are
able to develop specific innovative capabilities that manage sectoral constraints while
fighting off institutional constraints. More specifically, this thesis has four sets of findings.
First, the findings show that Hangzhou has a business environment within the one-party
state of China that is closely resembling a capitalist business environment and provides
incentives for innovative behaviour and entrepreneurship. Second, the Chinese entrepreneurs
remind us that innovation is not necessarily technical innovation but also organizational
innovation and that successful innovation is not restricted to environments with a strong
formal protection of intellectual property rights. Third, sectoral and institutional constraints
on innovation can also set incentives for entrepreneurs to innovate. Fourth, the successful
development of innovation requires a configuration of capabilities that support and
reinforce each other in the integration, building and transformation of critical resources.
The thesis provides insights that can be used by international firms, Chinese entrepreneurs
and policy makers inside and outside of China. International firms should not only consider
China as a factory of the world but as a potential partner in joint innovative activities.
Chinese entrepreneurs should consider the value added of developing and commercializing
non-technical innovations to exploit the opportunities of an emerging market while at the
same time developing a sustainable and coherent set of innovative capabilities. Policy
makers should consider that incentives for innovation can be created in a variety of ways.
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research problem  
Recent studies on sectoral specialization and technological development have shown 
how distinct patterns of technological development and innovation can be explained 
by different institutional arrangements (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Aoki, 2001; Whitley, 
1999, 2002). This research focuses on D VHOHFWLRQ RI WKH ZRUOG¶V HFRQRPLHV HJ
Europe and USA. The fast developing and successfully emerging former socialist 
economies of Eastern Europe and East-Asia ± transition economies ± are qualitatively 
different from the relatively stable, developed market economies. Whereas Western 
European and US economies generally provide a stable institutional frame that 
constrains opportunism, reduces uncertainty, manages conflict and cooperation, 
provides incentives and mobilizes resources (Coriat and Weinstein, 2002; Edquist, 
1997; Crouch, Le Gales, Trigilia and Voelzkow, 2004), former socialist economies 
undergo institutional transition that fundamentally changes the key economic agents1, 
commitments, resources and constraints on opportunism (Peng, 2003).  
 An example of institutional transition is the transformation of 1989-1990 in 
Eastern Europe. It has abolished the previous rules governing economic action, but 
new rules have not yet taken their place (Peng, 2003). In particular, these economies 
have a legacy of state socialism that is still ingrained in current institutions while a 
general distrust of new institutions inhibits the regulation of (market) relationships 
between economic agents (Roth and Kostova, 2003; Peng, 2003; Stark, 2001). 
Moreover, the absence of intermediary organizations that are able to mobilize 
commitments and resources between individuals, business and the state hinders 
economic activity (Czaban and Whitley, 2000). Generally, it is unclear who the 
economic agents are, what their interests are and what kind of resources they mobilize. 
As such, businesses in transition economies faces increased uncertainty, opportunism 
and higher search costs for resources and have reduced incentives for anything more 
than survival, such as innovation.  
 A different picture is seen in China, the largest and economically most successful 
transition economy. Businesses in the IT sectors in the coastal regions of China show 
innovative behaviour of a non-trivial kind2. While indigenous computer companies 
                                                          
1 Economic agents can be individuals, business and the state (departments, ministries, agencies, etc.) 
2  Innovation that is both systematic and successfully enhancing the competitive position of 
companies 
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such as Lenovo and Founder emerged from the state sector, a host of private 
entrepreneurial activities in the software sectors led to the development of new private 
firms like Alibaba, Baidu, Sunyard and AsiaINFO. These innovative businesses are 
being integrated in international value chains, sometimes stock-listed on NASDAQ 
(e.g. AsiaINFO), attract foreign capital and successfully develop and commercialize 
new products and services (Zhou, 2008; White, Gao and Zhang, 2002; Lu, 2000; Gu, 
1999). Moreover, Sino-foreign research and development collaborations are being 
established to perform increasingly complex research activities in IT sectors, which 
indicates the advanced level of capabilities of Chinese IT companies (Liang, 2004; 
Walsh, 2003; OECD, 2007). 
 The question arises why domestic Chinese entrepreneurs were not only able to 
survive but also to innovate while facing constraints from institutional transition. How 
can these firms constrain opportunistic behaviour and make credible commitments to 
innovation? How are search costs for labour and capital lowered? More precisely, this 
thesis addresses the following main question: What kind of capabilities for innovation 
GLGGRPHVWLFSULYDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUVGHYHORSLQ&KLQD¶Vuncertain transition economy?  
 
1.2 Innovation in China: emerging private IT industries 
China is becoming increasingly innovative in particular sectors and regions. 
Interesting examples of recent Chinese break-through innovations are an electronic 
publishing system for pictographic languages, a new 3G mobile telecommunications 
standard (TD-SCDMA) and a new anti-malaria drug. At a more systematic level, 
China started to overtake Europe with respect to the number of new patent 
applications filed (China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, 2004). 
Interestingly, the ratio of patent applications by enterprises increased to 62% in 2003 
(from 30% in 1985), suggesting an upgrade of enterprise capabilities compared to 
universities, R&D institutes and government agencies. Furthermore, China is no 
longer only WKH ZRUOG¶V SURGXFWLRQ IDFLOLW\ IRU ORZ-tech products, on the contrary, 
high-tech exports increased from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 30% in 2005 (OECD, 2007). 
The composition of exports is more sophisticated than that of countries with similar 
*'3SHUFDSLWD+RZHYHUWKHPRVWWHOOLQJHYLGHQFHIRU&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVHGLQQRYDWLYH
capabilities is perhaps the recent surge of European R&D involvement in China with 
Chinese partners (Wu and Callahan, 2005; Yuan, 2007; Zhou and Xin, 2003).  
 Innovation taNHVSODFH LQSDUWLFXODU VHFWRUVRI&KLQD¶VHFRQRP\7KH ,7VHFWRUV
draw our attention with respect to overall success and innovation. The IT industries are 
among the fastest growing industries, surpassing some traditional industries such as oil 
and steel (Liang, 2004). Over the period 1997-2002, the computer hardware sector had 
an average annual growth rate in gross industrial output value (current prices) of 
almost 35%. In the same period, the software sector grew with a steady 30 % (China 
121
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Statistics Yearbook on Science and Technology, 2004). The growth of gross industrial 
output value in high-tech sectors including the IT sectors is 20%, excluding these 
sectors only 12%, suggesting a relatively fast growth of the IT sectors compared to 
other high-tech sectors (1997-2002). 
  OECD and China Statistical Bureau data show that the IT sectors have the 
highest input and output of R&D ± as the only available measures of innovation 
performance ± of the high-tech sectors. For instance, computer sectors have the 
highest R&D intensity of all high-tech sectors and the import and export of IT goods is 
by far the largest (OECD, 2007). Beyond the statistics, examples of successful IT 
innovators can be found in %DWMDUJDO¶VVWXG\RILQQRYDWLYHVRIWZDUHYHQWXUHVLQ
%HLMLQJ DQG /DX /X 0DNLQR &KHQ DQG <HK¶V  LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI ODUJH
successful high-tech firms. Furthermore, Qiwen /XDQG:LOOLDP/D]RQLFN¶VVWXGLHVRI
innovation in the computer hardware industry (e.g. Lu, 2000; Lu and Lazonick, 2001) 
DQG6KXOLQ*X¶VZRUNRQ1HZ7HFKQRORJ\(QWHUSULVHVLQWKH,7VHFWRUV*X 
 Innovation in the IT sectors mostly takes place in the coastal regions of China. 
The geographic distribution of firms in the IT industry over China is unequal: most of 
the best performing firms in the industry are located in the Yangtze River Delta, the 
Pearl River Delta; the Bohai Sea Rim and areas along the Shenyang - Dalian 
H[SUHVVZD\ 2(&'%HLMLQJ6KDQJKDL6KHQ]KHQDQG;LDQDUH WKHFRXQWU\¶V
four best-known high-tech cities. Of these, Beijing has by far the largest high-tech area 
with approximately 8,000 enterprises and 280,000 employees generating 17 % of all 
high-WHFKHQWHUSULVHV¶JURVVRXWSXWYDOXHDQG% of all high-tech exports in 2002. 
Moreover, China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2004) data suggest 
that 60% of total R&D expenditures are found in the six coastal provinces.  
 Innovation is increasingly observed in domestic private enterprises. According to 
the OECD (2007), the main agents of innovation are domestic enterprises. Lu (2000) 
and Zhou (2008) provide further case-evidence of this observation and OECD 
statistics show that the R&D intensity in domestic IT firms is much higher than in 
foreign IT firms that operate in China. Research suggests that it is especially small 
private high tech firms that become increasingly innovative (OECD, 2007; Zhou, 2008; 
Von Zedtwitz, 2004; Tan, 2005). These small firms tend to form innovative networks, 
mostly in Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Guangdong, provinces which are well known for their 
entrepreneurial accomplishments and success of IT sectors (Tan, 2005). Exhibit 1.13 
provides an illustration of a domestic private software entrepreneur in Hangzhou, the 
capital of the coastal Zhejiang province. To put these developments in perspective, I 
will briefly discuss the emergence of IT sectors amidst institutional transformation. 
                                                          
3 Based on http://www.ferrygame.com/  
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1.3 Emergence of IT sectors amidst institutional transformation 
How did the IT sectors emerge and in what context? The initial commitment to reform 
&KLQD¶VVRFLDOLVWHFRQRP\LQYROYHGDQLQFUHPHQWDOUHIRUPRIWKHFHQWUDOSODQDQGWKH
introduction of a market system. The government was reformed through regional 
decentralization and non-state enterprises emerged. Since the mid-1990s a significant 
private sector has emerged in China (Asian Development Bank, 2006; OECD, 2007; 
Krug and Hendrischke, 2007; Tsui, Bian and Cheng, 2006). Instead of mass 
SULYDWL]DWLRQ &KLQD¶V SULYDWH HQWHUSULVHV HPHUJHG µIURP EHORZ¶ initially via the 
Exhibit 1.1 Dressed in a Western suit, laughing out loud, Jin Jin has a rather 
young appearance, exactly that of a university student. However, this 23 year 
old graduate student from China is also the CEO of Hangzhou-based Ferry 
Network Company, a successful 3D online gaming company. Established 
only in April 2005, the company now has a market value of one billion RMB 
($120 million), attracted foreign venture capital in 2007 and employs 300 
employees. Jin Jin turned the company in only 2 years time into the biggest 
online game company in Zhejiang Province, one of the most wealthy and 
entrepreneurial regions of China.   
 Originally from Jiaxing ± neighbouring Hangzhou ± and destined to 
IROORZ LQKLV IDWKHU¶V IRRWVWHSV LQ WKH WUDGLWLRQDO IDPLO\EXVLQHVVKH WUXVWHG
his own vision and decided to jump onto the second wave of investments in 
network gaming in 2005. Travelling between Jiaxing and Hangzhou, he often 
saw the advertisements of the Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship Park. At 
that time, his brother was studying abroad and after Jin Jin saw the ad, he 
wanted to help his brother. However, instead of his brother, Jin Jin grabbed 
the opportunities in Hangzhou and started for himself. Knowing the local 
market environment and being personally involved with gaming, he 
developed a new online 3D gaming environment. With his own initial 
investment of about 5,000 RMB and self-made equipment he managed to 
earn one million RMB in only 3 months. After the early profits, his parents 
provided the next millions, seeing the low risks, low costs and maintenance 
of high-tech investments compared to the investments in traditional 
industries. Two years later foreign capital boosted the market value to one 
billion RMB.  
 +DQJ]KRX¶VEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWSOD\HGDVLJQLILFDQW UROH LQERRVWLQJ
new high-tech industries, such as the animation game business. The available 
talent pool, the high status Zhejiang University and local preferential policies 
for young entrepreneurs promoted and facilitated the development of new 
industries. Jin Jin initially got free office space from the High and New 
7HFKQRORJ\'LVWULFW)XUWKHUPRUHWKH'LVWULFW¶VGLUHFWRUKHOped to overcome 
recruitment problems and provide logistic support. Furthermore, people like 
Ma Yun (43, CEO of Alibaba) and Chen Tianqiao (32, CEO of Shanda 
Interactive Entertainment) set an example for entrepreneurs like Jin Jin.  
143
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township-village enterprises in the rural areas in the 1980s. At the end of the 1990s the 
private sector already accounted for over 40% of GDP. Reforms and ideological shifts 
in the 1990s, such as the Company Law in 1993 and the Sole Proprietorship Enterprise 
Law in 1999, paved the way for private entrepreneurship. Especially entrepreneurship 
in specific sectors was promoted and this facilitated the development of new 
technology enterprises (NTEs) (Gu, 1999) in IT sectors (Lu, 2000; White, Gao, and 
Zhang, 2002). At the same time, emerging high-tech entrepreneurship put enterprises 
at the centre of an emerging innovation system that focused on commercializing newly 
developed technologies (Gu, 1999; Liu and White, 2001; OECD, 2007). 
 In addition to the emergence of private entrepreneurship, the development of IT 
sectors was facilitated by state intervention of a special kind. Usually state 
intervention in a state socialist economy refers to regulation, taxation or resource 
control, all of which serve the purpose to either set hard (budget or regulatory) 
constraints or formulate negative incentives. In the case of the IT sectors, state 
intervention refers to the opposite: deregulation of the sector, liberalisation or positive 
incentives in the form of tax exemptions, if not subsidisations of firms or activities. 
Starting in the 1980s, the state promoted collaboration between public research, the 
VWDWH¶V science and technology (S&T) system and enterprises. Initially, most of the 
resources went to state-owned institutes rather than the potentially more innovative 
non-governmental enterprises (Saxenian and Quan, 2005) and not many new products 
were brought to market. Since the mid-1990s, the focus shifted to upgrading the 
innovative capabilities of enterprises. However, as opposed to public procurement 
policies, which were crucial for the success of IT sectors in for instance the USA, 
there have been policies at aUP¶V OHQJWK For instance, the 973 program (1997), the 
Innovation Fund for Technology-based SMEs (1999) and recognition of private 
ownership (1999), focused on enhancing ILUPV¶ LQQRYDWLRQ FDSDELOLWLHV DQG
commercialization of public research and to put the firms more in the centre of 
attention (OECD, 2007). It is in this context that the IT sectors emerged. this thesis 
will focus on hardware and software sectors as the most interesting IT sectors. 
 In the 1980s, the Chinese computer market basically only existed in Taiwan and 
mainland computer hardware firms mostly assembled imported kits and low-tech 
electronics production. After increased international competition in the 1990s, the 
Taiwanese computer firms moved operations to mainland China. Throughout the 
1990s, Taiwan and Hong Kong were responsible for a large part of the investments 
made in the coastal regions. The involvement of Hong Kong and Taiwanese firms 
enhanced the technology level and management skills (Lu, 2000; Kreamer and 
Dedrick, 2001). The inflow of foreign capital and technologies from Japan and USA in 
the late 1990s, returned overseas Chinese engineers (Saxenian, 2006) and intensive 
state promotion of high-tech development boosted the performance and innovativeness 
154
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of the computer hardware firms such as Lenovo and Stone. According to Lu (2000) 
these successful domestic computer enterprises followed a unique top-down mode of 
technology learning: these firms developed integrated capabilities on the basis of the 
indigenous Science & Technology (S&T) capabilities accumulated during the central 
planning period. Moreover, these enterprises were neither state- nor privately-owned 
but have a collective/public organizational form that allowed extensive managerial 
autonomy, technological learning from foreign joint-ventures and access to state S&T 
UHVRXUFHV µKLGGHQ VXEVLGLHV¶ ,Q VXP LQQRYDWLRQ LQ WKH FRPSXWHUKDUGZDUH VHFWRUV
was facilitated by state support and foreign investment.  
 The development of the Chinese software sectors is based on different basis. The 
VHFWRUVVWDUWHGWRGHYHORSRQO\LQWKHVZLWKRXWOLQNVWRWKHVWDWH¶VUHVRXUFHVDQG
focused on developing Chinese language software serving a growing domestic market. 
The market is skewed with a handful of foreign firms dominating 60% of the market, 
while the rest is left to domestic small private firms. The domestic market is 
expanding rapidly: from 1992 to 2000 with an average annual growth rate of over 30% 
(Saxenian and Quan, 2005; Tschang and Xue, 2005). The global Internet hype of 2000, 
active support from the government, and above all the private domestic and foreign 
entrepreneurs brought financial and knowledge resources to the software industry 
(Tschang and Xue, 2005; IFC, 2005). Especially, the Internet software market has 
developed very fast after 2004 and has produced innovative market leaders such as 
Alibaba, Baidu and Tudou.com that outcompete eBay, Google and YouTube in the 
Chinese market (Tai, 2006). We also see Sunyard in the enterprise resource planning 
software (ERP) market that developed an optical character recognition system for 
Chinese characters on the basis of state-of-the-art university research. These recent 
cases suggest the innovative potential of Chinese software firms.  
 Without a link to state S&T resources nor foreign technologies and capital, 
software firms need to find new ways for doing business, new ideas for re-combining 
productive factors, developing and producing new products or more efficient 
production technologies in order to not only compete with resource-richer SOEs, and 
foreign firms, but also for coping with (in)direct political constraints and limitations in 
resources (Batjargal, 2007; Krug and Polos, 2004; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008; Xin 
and Pearce, 1996). In this context, it is surprising that private software firms can be 
innovative. There are few studies on the Chinese software sector, mostly because the 
software sectors are still considered to be the weakest link in IT (e.g. Brizendine, 
2002). However, the growth rates, case evidence and the few studies on software 
sectors (e.g. Batjargal, 2007; Tai, 2006; Saxenian and Quan, 2005; Tschang and Xue, 
2005; IFC, 2005) suggest that the software sectors are innovative, driven by private 
firms, government support policies and are becoming a domestic business with 
substantial growth prospects.  
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7KLVVWXG\IRFXVHVRQSULYDWHVHFWRUGULYHQLQQRYDWLRQLQ&KLQD¶VVRItware sectors. In 
what follows we will develop a working theory to analyze how and what sorts of 
capability for innovation are developed in response to what kinds of restrictions.  
 
1.4 Key concepts 
Innovation in the context of firms is the ability to create economic value from new 
business models, products, processes, markets and value chains (Schumpeter, 1934).  
 In this study we distinguish incremental from radical innovation because the type 
of innovation will influence the type of capabilities necessary: incremental innovation 
involves refining, improving, and exploiting an existing technological trajectory, 
whereas radical innovation involves disrupting an existing technological trajectory.  
 A second important feature of innovation is the extent to which an innovation is 
systemic, modular or stand-alone (Nooteboom, 2004) because the extent to which an 
innovation can be developed in isolation influences the required capabilities. A 
systemic innovation has high switching costs and limited exploration of new activities 
since the different elements of the product or service system are interconnected 
µLQWHUIDFH¶. In contrast, a modular innovation knows standards on interfaces yet 
allows flexibility and thus has lower switching costs. A stand-alone innovation is 
characterised by autonomy of elements and limited constraints on interfaces resulting 
in low switching costs and extensive exploration possibilities. 
 Institutions legitimate, guide and constrain the coordination of various economic 
actors and the way they solve economic problems in terms of the nature of ownership 
relations, inter-firm connections and governing access to critical resources such as 
labour and capital (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Whitley, 1999). 
 Critical resources refer to tangible and intangible firm-specific assets that are 
available for the firm to own, control and use at the exclusive discretion of the firm 
(Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Nooteboom, 2004). 
Idiosyncrasies in resources, routines, identities and conceptions form the basis of 
specific capabilities of a firm (Buenstorf and Murmann, 2005).  
 Innovative capability in this thesis is GHILQHG DV WKH ILUP¶V DELOLW\ WR LQWHJUDWH
build and reconfigure internal and external resources to develop and successfully 
commercialize new products and services (Chapter 3 will elaborate these key 
concepts). The next section focuses on developing a working theory of innovative 
capability development. 
 
1.5 Innovative capabilities: A working theory 
What sorts of capabilities are necessary to develop in response to what kinds of 
restrictions of an uncertain institutional environment? We will argue that a 
combination of resource-based perspectives and institutional perspectives on 
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capability development is necessary to find an answer to this question in the empirical 
study. In what follows we argue that innovative capability development depends on: 
 
x the critical resource base directly or indirectly available,  
x the nature of the innovative activity pursued in the sector (sector specificity),  
x the institutions in the business environment (institutional specificity). 
 
A working theory for explaining the development of innovative capabilities should 
take into account the technological and institutional conditions of a transition economy. 
The connecting factor here LV µFULWLFDO UHVRXUFHV¶ &DSDELOLW\ GHYHORSPHQW IRU
innovation depends on the set of critical resources necessary for innovation while 
technological conditions affect the requirements of capabilities and institutional 
conditions affect the availability and use of critical resources4. 
 
First, the development of capabilities centres on the use, distribution, allocation and 
governance of critical resources. Critical resources are key factors to explain 
organizational form, behaviour and performance that form the basis of (dynamic) 
capabilities to innovate (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) to learn (Fiol and Lyles, 1984) 
and to evolve (Kogut and Zander, 1992). A capability, in its broadest interpretation, 
enables a firm to grow and take advantage of its opportunities while fighting off 
restrictions (Penrose, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984). Whereas early resource- and 
competence based studies focused on relatively static and stable sources for 
competences, these ideas have recently being extended to explore the dynamics of 
how firms gain and loose competitive advantages (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). 
Current work suggests that idiosyncrasies in resources, routines, identities and 
conceptions form the basis of specific capabilities of a firm5, whether capabilities are 
originating inside or outside the firm or are static or dynamic in nature (Buenstorf and 
Murmann, 2005 7HHFH HW DO¶V  G\QDPLF FDSDELOLWLHV FRQFHSW LV XVHIXO KHUH
because it addresses dynamics and change and stresses the organizational nature of 
FRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHVµWKHILUP¶VDELOLW\WRLQWHJUDWHEXLOGDQGUHFRQILJXUHLQWHUQDO
and external comSHWHQFHV WR DGGUHVV UDSLGO\ FKDQJLQJ HQYLURQPHQW¶ S We 
adopt most of this definition and apply it to the specific context by focusing on 
innovation and critical resources. Innovative capabilities reflect WKH ILUP¶V DELOLW\ WR
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external critical resources to develop 
and successfully commercialize new products and services. 
 
                                                          
4 We do not take deterministic view of either institutional or technological regimes (Chapters 2, 3)  
5 A review of the literature and definitions of competences and capabilities is presented in Chapter 3.  
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Second, sectoral characteristics affect the development of innovative capabilities. The 
sectoral approaches to innovation show that sectors with distinct technologies have 
different innovation patterns. Sectors can be differentiated according to their specific 
technical and market risks, or technological regimes (TRs) (e.g. Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1993; Dosi, 1988; Parker & Tamaschke, 2005). Technological regimes are comprised 
of opportunity and appropriability conditions in addition to characteristics of the 
knowledge base and degree of cumulativeness. These characteristics of technological 
regimes and their knowledge base provide restrictLRQVRQILUPV¶OHDUQLQJFDSDELOLWLHV
and organization and coordination of innovative activities in a sectoral system. 
Different sectors then have different patterns of innovative activities. However, 
innovation leads to economic change only to the extent that agents are successful in 
taking advantage of the opportunities, i.e. agents need to develop capabilities 
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). Those capabilities will differ strongly across 
technological regimes that characterize sectors (Casper and Soskice 2004). 
 The link between technological regimes and capabilities has been studied in case 
studies and statistical exercises. Several statistical studies reveal patterns of innovative 
activities linked to specific technological regimes (e.g. Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000). 
Case study examples of this result are for instance Henderson and Cockburn (1994) 
and Iansiti and Clark (1994) in pharmaceuticals, computers and automobiles in which 
capabilities differ across sectors. The most recent study linking characteristics of 
technological regimes to innovative competence development is Casper and Whitley 
(2004). Generally, research suggests that contrasting patterns of innovation can be 
explained by sectors with different technological risks (Malerba, 2004). Therefore, we 
expect that the characteristics of a technological regime influence the required 
innovative capabilities by demanding specific types and amounts of critical resources.  
 Beyond sectoral constraints, firms face institutional constraints that shape and 
guide capabilities. The sectoral approach to innovation does not downplay the role of 
institutions (see Malerba, 2004) but is generally weak in explaining which capabilities 
are developed under precisely what institutional conditions. How institutional 
conditions affect innovative capabilities is a question to which we turn now. 
 
Third, institutions may either constrain or facilitate innovativeness (Hage and 
Hollingsworth, 2000; Edquist, 1997). For instance, studies on the market economies of 
the US and Europe has shown how distinct patterns of technological development can 
be explained by the different institutional arrangements of various kinds of economies 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Aoki, 2001; Whitley, 1999, 2002). These studies explain that 
institutional regimes affect the dominant logic underlying decision making in 
organizations. On the one hand, they have distinct patterns of resource distribution and 
influence how firms have differential access to critical resources, such as knowledge 
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about new technologies and markets, availability of skilled workers of different kinds, 
and access to capital (Coriat and Weinstein, 2002; Whitley, 2007). On the other hand, 
institutional regimes specify, monitor and control the powers and responsibilities of 
private companies, especially their authority and discretion. Institutional rules and 
constraints vary considerably across societies as for instance, state regulation; 
education systems and extent of unionisation vary considerably across societies and 
over time and influence competitive behaviour of firms ± especially the development 
of innovative capabilities (Whitley, 2007). In short, institutional arrangements affect 
the pattern of resources and constraints on their use. Therefore, we expect that 
institutional regimes influence the development of innovative capabilities by 1) 
distributing and allocating access to critical resources and 2) constraining the 
opportunistic use of these critical resources. 
 
We cannot directly extend these ideas developed in relatively stable, developed market 
HFRQRPLHV LQWR &KLQD¶V WUDQVLWLRQDO HFRQRP\The institutional framework in China 
has two distinct features that influence the way how capabilities are developed: 
institutional uncertainty (unpredictable and incomplete institutions) and variety of 
local institutional systems. First, China has weak economic institutions. The 
institutions are not weak because they have a socialist hue, which is traditionally 
unsupportive of private capitalists, but because institutions inherited from both the 
socialist era and market-oriented institutions co-exist (Krug and Polos, 2004). 
Institutions are incomplete and unpredictable in the sense that they do not provide a 
stable institutional frame (Qian, 2000), which would reduce the uncertainty emanating 
from innovation (Krug and Polos, 2004). Weaker institutions allow greater variety of 
organizational responses and thus a higher uncertainty of outcomes. Therefore, it is 
uncertain which kind of capabilities and strategies are credibly developed.  
 Second, China has a variety of local institutional systems. The heterogeneity of 
&KLQD¶V ORFDO EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW LV D FRQVHTXHQFH RI &KLQD¶V GHFHQWUDOL]HG
government system. Such local variety leads to vertical intergovernmental 
inconsistencies where local governments do not or only partly implement central 
policy. Furthermore, it leads to horizontal competition between local governments 
(Krug and Hendrischke, 2008). However, such local business practices coexist with 
the integration of markets, coherence in political institutions and conformity in 
behaviour (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008). So, in contrast to most comparative 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOVWXGLHVZKLFKWDNHWKHQDWLRQVWDWHDVWKHERXQGDULHVRIDQDO\VLV&KLQD¶V
economy is characterised by a diversity of local business environments at the sub-
national level asking for a local perspective. Therefore, we expect that a changing 
institutional regime will affect the distribution and governance of access to critical 
resources by 1) increasing uncertainty and 2) increasing local diversity.  
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To understand the connections between capabilities, institutions and technological 
conditions, we need to connect the institutional level to the firm level. However, the 
link to the firm level remains an issue in most analyses (Hage, 2003; Whitley, 2006). 
Only few studies directly analyse this link: the conceptual work of Whitley (2003) and 
Hage (2003), and the empirical work on Italian textile districts (Locke, 1995) and 
European biotechnology (Casper and Murray, 2003), career networks of 
biotechnology clusters (Casper and Murray, 2005) and software and biotechnology 
sectors in Germany and the UK (Casper and Whitley, 2004). Contrasting patterns of 
innovation can be explained by comparing varieties in institutional frameworks across 
countries and across sectors where technological risks differ (see in particular Casper 
and Whitley, 2004). In short, the connections between institutions, technologies and 
capabilities are crucial for understanding capability development. 
 
1.6 Research questions and goals 
The main research problem address in this thesis is: What kind of innovative 
FDSDELOLWLHVGLGGRPHVWLFSULYDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUVGHYHORSLQ&KLQD¶Vuncertain transition 
economy? The following sub questions are formulated: First, how do institutions 
govern and coordinate access and distribution of critical resources for innovation in 
the software sectors at the local level? Second, what kind of innovative behavior do 
Chinese software entrepreneurs show? Third, what kind of sectoral and institutional 
constraints influence the development of innovative capabilities by Chinese software 
entrepreneurs? Fourth, what kind of innovative capabilities are developed by Chinese 
software entrepreneurs in response to sectoral and institutional constraints? 
 The thesis then has the following intellectual goals. The study aims to set the 
institutional frame by analysing the features of the key institutions that govern and 
coordinate access and distribution of critical resources for the software sectors. The 
study needs to identify the consequences of dismantling the state socialist economy, 
i.e. institutional transition, at the local level. The analysis sets the institutional frame 
for the investigation of innovative behaviour at the firm level. The core of the study 
aims to analyse the underlying firm-level mechanisms that explain the development of 
innovative capabilities of Chinese private entrepreneurs to fight off sectoral and 
institutional constraints. The goals are threefold: (1) identify and analyse patterns of 
innovative behaviour of Chinese private firms; (2) identify and analyse patterns of 
sectoral ± and institutional constraints on innovation and (3) identify and analyse 
patterns of innovative capabilities in response to those constraints.  
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1.7 Research strategy 
The nature of the research problem and the working theory set four challenges for the 
design of an appropriate research strategy:  
 
1. To take into account and reconcile institutional and firm levels of analysis; 
2. To identify new organizational forms in newly emerging industries; 
3. To embark on a comparative study of specific features of sectors and their 
consequences for innovation by private entrepreneurs;  
4. To take a local perspective that takes into account the specific local conditions 
and development patterns that influence local patterns of organizing and 
coordinating economic activities. 
 
These challenges necessitate a qualitative, inductive research approach. Qualitative 
research refers to the in-depth study of social phenomena in their context, focusing on 
questions of how and why. Inductive research refers to developing general principles 
from specific observations (cf. Uzzi, 1997, Eisenhardt, 1989, Verona and Ravasi, 
2003). The under-theorized connection between the micro-OHYHO ILUP¶V FDSDEilities) 
and macro-level (institutions) necessitate an inductive research method as opposed to 
testing deductively derived hypotheses (Hage, 2003; Whitley, 2006). The purpose of 
the research is to pursue substantive explanatory issues via a detailed empirical study 
to understand how socio-economic mechanisms account for significant phenomena 
(Whitley, 2006). It is productive to study socio-economic mechanisms and their 
particular outcomes in relation to the specific conditions under which they operate. 
Context-specificity does not refer to mysterious residuals or inconvenient noise but is 
the basis for complex multivariate theorizing (Child, 2000). As opposed to testing sets 
of variables and their relations in isolation from these conditions, this thesis will rely 
on systematic explanations of how combinations of causal processes produce distinct 
patterns of economic organization and coordination. 
 It is worth emphasising that socio-economic actors are constituted differently in 
different socio-economic contexts, in which capabilities and interests differ (Sorge, 
2006). Therefore, the nature of institutions, firms and their capabilities differ 
significantly across socio-economic contexts. Even though we identified two distinct 
levels of analysis ± institutional - and firm level ± it is premature to assume that they 
are constituted in the same way in China as in other economies. For instance, the firm 
as a legal entity in China is certainly not the only collective actor that pursues 
economic goals. A variety of organizational forms exist beyond the legally defined 
firm (e.g. Krug and Hendrischke, 2007). Considering these issues, a qualitative, 
LQGXFWLYH DSSURDFK WR WKH VWXG\RI FDSDELOLWLHV DQG LQVWLWXWLRQV LQ&KLQD¶V FRQWH[W LV
warranted (chapter 5 elaborates on the methods and techniques).  
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Innovation takes place in particular sectors and we will focus on the sectors that are 
most interesting for innovation studies, the software sectors, because they are 
completely newly emerging. These sectors are emerging successfully, are surprisingly 
innovative, dominated by private firms and interesting for innovation studies as 
&KLQD¶VHQYLURQPHQWSRVHVDYDULHW\RI UHVWULFWLRQV VXFKDV intense competition and 
high search costs for capital and labour), i.e. unlikely to facilitate innovative behaviour. 
In contrast to the computer hardware sector, innovation in software sectors is private 
sector-driven without strong state - or foreign support (section 1.3). Software sectors 
are unusual as they show both radical as well as incremental processes of innovation 
with various kinds of technical and market risks (Steinmueller, 2004; Casper and 
Whitley, 2004; Ibert, 2004). As proposed in the working theory, we cannot assume 
that innovative activities are similar across sectors with distinct technological and 
market characteristics. A comparative study of distinct sectors is necessary to identify 
capability development for distinct innovation processes.  
 The selection of distinct software sectors, then, is motivated by a) the type of 
software development, i.e. what are the most significant types of software 
development and ± markets; b) the expected dominant innovation pattern in different 
sectors and c) benchmarking other studies of software sectors (e.g. Casper & Whitley, 
2004; Ibert, 2004; Kogut, 2004; Mowery & Nelson, 1999). Three sectors are selected 
for comparative study: Standard application based software (stand-alone, radical 
innovation), middleware (modular, radical innovation) and enterprise software 
(systemic, incremental innovation). On the one hand, these three sectors represent the 
three main software sectors in terms of type of software development (Steinmueller, 
2004). On the other hand, they represent sectors with distinct innovation patterns. This 
allows us to analyse and understand innovative capability development in the most 
important software sectors and at the same time across different types of innovation. 
Considering the importance of the sectoral perspective, Chapter 2 will elaborate on 
these software sectors within the Chinese business environment. 
 
Choosing a location for the research implies selecting an institutional frame. 
Hangzhou has been selected as the location for the empirical study. 7KHµSRSXODWLRQ¶is 
a variety of localities. The selection is driven by the intensive data collection efforts 
necessary for getting familiar with the local context in terms of language, local culture 
and the development of research networks and connections with business enterprises. 
We used four criteria to select Hangzhou as a research location: the presence of a 
successful indigenous software industry; private firm as a dominant form of economic 
coordination and organization; the success of the locality in terms of economic 
prosperity; and the presence of all three software sectors. Considering the importance 
of selecting this research setting, Chapter 4 will elaborate on Hangzhou. 
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 This thesis presents a detailed empirical study of private software firms in 
Hangzhou. The sample consists of 45 software enterprises in three distinct software 
sectors with an average firm age of 5.8 years (1995-2006), on average 75 employees 
(6-260) and between 200.000 (Internet software) and 80 million RMB (large scale 
ERP project for government). Enterprise software firms develop extensively 
customized software using platforms or modules. On average these firms are 6.6 years 
old (1995-2006) and employ 73 employees (6-200). Standard application based 
software firms develop software applications for large homogenous markets. These 
firms are on average 5.6 years old (1996-2006) and employ 46 people (28-100). 
Middleware firms focus on developing interface technologies that link basic 
architecture of digital communication networks to standard application software. 
These firms are on average the youngest with 5.4 years (1995-2006) and employ on 
average the most people, 95 (8-260). 
 
Data were gathered mainly through fieldwork in China. It consists of two extensive 
fieldtrips between 2005 and 2007. The initial fieldtrip was between August 2005 and 
August 2006. During this year the author accumulated Chinese language skills by 
studying at Zhejiang University that proved to be crucial not only to do fieldwork 
interviews but also to develop trust with (potential) interview partners, academic 
partners and assistants and get familiar with the local research context. The second 
goal was to build an extensive research network. This network involved around 90 IT 
professionals, entrepreneurs and managers at small software firms but also at telecom 
firms, computer hardware firms and industry associations. The development of the 
network involved a range of social activities, friend-of-friend introductions and regular 
visits at conferences. Moreover, the research network consisted of two full professors 
of Zhejiang University, two assistant professors, a group of PhD students in the field 
of innovation management and two research teams of graduate students.  
 During the first half of the first year we developed the research instruments, 
trained the assistants and did interviews with local IT industry players. The second 
half of the year we did the first round of interview with software entrepreneurs. The 
second fieldtrip took place between April and December 2007. The main goals were to 
do additional interviews with other entrepreneurs in order to reach saturation and 
create a large enough sample, to establish communicative validity by revisiting several 
enterprises and communicate and discuss initial results with local Chinese professors. 
The constant dialogue between the Chinese entrepreneurs, Chinese professors and our 
research group proved crucial for developing the ideas presented in this thesis.  
  The thesis relies on two data sets: in-depth interview data of 45 Chinese software 
ventures and archival data, statistics, including company websites, industry news and 
publications to complement and triangulate data sources. Furthermore, return visits to 
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a selection of 11 firms allowed us to present and communicate some of our initial 
ideas and gather additional data to strengthen and refine the emerging ideas. Chapter 6 
makes use of data about various economic and institutional actors, historical 
explanations, field data and reconstructs the institutional arrangements that govern 
economic activities in Hangzhou. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 use comparative case analysis, 
which enables a replication logic in which cases are a series of experiments that allow 
(dis)confirmation of inferences drawn from the others. Chapter 9 uses inductive 
analysis of the in-depth interview data with entrepreneurs, which aims at building on 
DQGPRYLQJEH\RQG WKH LQIRUPDQWV¶GHVFULSWLRQV LQDQ DWWHPSW WR LQWHUSUHW IDFWV DQG
information and integrate them in an emerging theoretical framework. Chapter 5 
presents a detailed description of the research techniques. 
 
1.8 Contributions 
The key contribution of this thesis is in the field of innovation management. One of 
the key insights is that innovation is possible in an environment with institutional 
uncertainty and limited protection of property rights because, on the one hand, 
institutional uncertainty creates both restrictions and incentives for innovation, and, 
on the other hand, firms are able to develop specific innovative capabilities that 
manage sectoral constraints while fighting off institutional constraints. Conceptually 
this suggests that an explanation of innovation should combine insights from 
capability theories with institutional analysis and sectoral studies of innovation.  
 There is a set of related contributions in this study. This study provides insights 
into the firm-OHYHO PHFKDQLVPV RI LQQRYDWLRQ LQ &KLQD¶V HPHUJLQJ SULYDWH EXVLQHVV
sector. Research on innovation in China usually stays at the national level (e.g. Liu 
and Buck, 2007; OECD, 2007), explaining developments in innovation systems (Liu 
and White, 2001) and analyzing latecomer strategies and technological catching-up (Li, 
Kozhikode, 2008). Other studies focus on specific features of innovation development, 
such as the study by Batjargal (2007) of social capital in innovative software ventures 
in Beijing or knowledge management in large, successful high-tech firms (Lau, Lu, 
Makino, Chen and Yeh, 2004). Firm level explanations of innovation mechanisms are 
limited to a handful of researchers, most prominently Lu and Lazonick who studied 
the computer hardware industry (e.g. Lu, 2000; Lu and Lazonick, 2001) and Shulin Gu 
who studied New Technology Enterprises (Gu, 1996). None of these studies explore 
DQGRU H[SODLQ LQQRYDWLRQPHFKDQLVPVDW WKH ILUP OHYHO LQ&KLQD¶VHPHUJLQJSULYDWH
sector. This study VSHFLILFDOO\ H[WHQG /X¶V  study of indigenous innovation. 
Whereas Lu focused on non-governmental computer firms with a collective/public 
nature that allowed extensive managerial autonomy and access to state S&T resources, 
this study explores innovation processes of private firms that emerged since the 1990s 
ZLWKRXWDVWDWH¶VVRFLDOLVWOHJDF\ 
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 Furthermore, the study provides insights into the development of innovative 
FDSDELOLWLHV LQ &KLQD¶V HPHUJLQJ SULYDWH EXVLQHVV VHFWRU E\ DFNQRZOHGJLQg 
institutional constraints. The combination of capability (resource)-based and 
institutional perspectives promises valuable insights because it emphasises the 
organizational nature of competitive advantages and the role of management in 
mobilizing and transforming human and material resources (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997), while acknowledging institutional forces which influence the way firms 
manage their resources and determine the value of their resources (Priem and Butler, 
2001; Whitley, 2002; Lazonick, 2007). Especially in transition economies we cannot 
isolate the resource based perspective of firms from changes in the environment to 
which firms need to quickly and flexibly respond (Meyer and Peng, 2005; Wan, 2005).  
 This study extends the focus of these comparative institutional studies into 
transition economies. That institutional arrangements in transition economies are 
substantially different from those in developed economies (Aoki, 2001; Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997, 2000; Whitley, 1999) is well known. In the case of China or any other 
transition economy, we observe frequent institutional change and diversity of ;local 
institutional arrangements (Qian, 2000; Nee, 1992; Krug and Hendrischke, 2008). In 
short, this study incorporates institutional change and local diversity in the analysis of 
innovative capabilities. 
 
1.9 Outline thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 takes a sectoral perspective and discuss 
&KLQD¶V HPHUJLQJ VRIWZDUH VHFWRUV DQG WKH SURYLVLRQ RI FULWLFDO UHVRXUFHV WR WKHVH
sectors. Chapter 3 will further develop the working theory by looking at innovation, 
capabilities and institutions in order to provide a guide for the empirical study. 
Chapter 4 discusses the location of the study, Hangzhou and her key features. Chapter 
5 describes the research methods and techniques. Chapter 6-9 then present the 
empirical findings. Chapter 6 deals with the question how economic activities are 
RUJDQL]HG DQG FRQWUROOHGE\ YDULRXV HFRQRPLF DFWRUV LQ+DQJ]KRX¶V HPHUJLQJ ORFDO
business environment. Chapter 7 provides empirical evidence for innovation and 
patterns of innovation across the three sectors. Chapter 8 then discusses the 
technological and institutional constraints on innovation as they are experienced by 
our sample firms. Chapter 9 presents the results of the inductive study and singles out 
the innovative capabilities that the sample firms developed in response to the 
FRQVWUDLQWVLQ+DQJ]KRX¶VEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQW&KDSWHUdiscusses the findings. 
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Chapter 2 
 
&KLQD¶VVRIWZDUHVHFWRUVopportunities and 
constraints 
 
2.1 Introduction6 
7KH WUDQVLWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V HFRQRP\ LQYROYHV ERWK WKH GLVPDQWOLQJ RI VRFLDOLVW
institutions and introduction of market-based institutions, which produces considerable 
amounts of uncertainty for businesses. It is in this context that the IT sectors emerged. 
Surprisingly, businesses in these emerging IT sectors show innovative behaviour as 
opposed to only survival, as argued in the first Chapter. Computer hardware firms 
benefit from a special governance mode with a collective/public nature that allowed 
extensive managerial autonomy and access to state ± and foreign S&T resources to 
facilitate top-down mode of technology learning. The software sector, on the contrary, 
is dominated by private businesses that lack a VWURQJ FRQQHFWLRQ WR WKH VWDWH¶V
resources and face additional restrictions caused by a low legitimacy, limited access to 
factors markets and no experience to build on. Therefore, it is surprising that private 
software firms show innovative behaviour of a non-trivial kind.  
 In this chapter we will see that a) software sectors are qualitatively different from 
hardware sectors; b) the software industry is comprised of distinct software sectors 
with different characteristics and innovation patterns, i.e. strong sectoral variety, 
necessitating a comparative study of software sectors in order to understand 
innovation in the software industry; c) the institutional arrangements in China pose 
specific opportunities and restrictions to the provision and distribution of critical 
resources for the development of software sectors (i.e. role of the state, human -, 
private -, and foreign capital). 
 
&KLQD¶VVRIWZDUHEXVLQHVVLQDQHYROXWLRQDU\SHUVSHFWLYH 
&KLQD¶V VRIWZDUH EXVLQHVV LV TXDOLWDWLYHO\ GLIIHUHQW IURP WKH Fomputer hardware 
business. Whereas computer hardware development in China originates in military and 
science, software was a by-product of computer hardware. Historically, software was 
custom-developed for specific equipment and even until the 1980s software bundled 
with mainframe or minicomputers continued to characterize software development in 
China, as anywhere in the world. Most producers during the early 1980s were 
                                                          
6 Part of this chapter is published in: *UHHYHQ0-³7KHQHZJUHDWOHDS7KHULVHRI&KLQD¶V
,&7LQGXVWU\´in Barbara Krug and Hans Hendrischke (eds.) &KLQD¶V(FRQRP\LQ the 21st century: 
Enterprise and business behaviour, London: Edward Elgar, Chapter 4. 
276
 &KLQD¶VVRIWZDUHVHFWRUV 21 
 
government institutes, and a handful of spin-off firms from these research 
organizations. In this early period software was regarded as a research activity that 
was concentrated in the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and research institutes 
under the various sectoral ministries. The focus in the 1980s is on Chinese character 
language software processing (Baark, 1990). 
 In the 1980s Chinese software enterprises started to invest in developing 
indigenous operating systems and specific applications. A successful example is 
Founder, established in 1986 by Beijing University, which became the market leader 
in Chinese language typesetting and publishing software (Lu, 2000). Throughout the 
1980s, CAS-driven research continued to be the basis for software development and 
was the origin for many software firms (Tschang and Xue, 2003). The emerging 
software industry remained geographically concentrated around the main research 
institutes and universities. During the 1990s an explosion of computer usage and sales 
and expansion of the telecommunications sector, provided opportunities for domestic 
software firms to capitalize on newly emerging markets. Furthermore, the 
establishment of high-tech parks and software incubators in combination with an 
inflow of foreign investment and management skills generated opportunities for 
software enterprises (Baark and Heeks, 1999). 
  Software development in the last decade is strongly influenced by the revolution 
of the Internet which enabled network computing and more resources for software 
development (Mowery, 1999). The Internet craze during the end of the 1990s resulted 
in a boom of Internet service firms that emerged by the thousands (Wong and Ling, 
2000). The late 1990s also saw a surge of government-driven projects focused on 
promoting the use of software in a variety of sectors, such as the Golden Projects and 
e-Government projects (Lovelock and Ure, 2002). However, the market is still 
influenced by attitudes of users and authorities that attach little value to software 
products, which results in widespread copying of software (Saxenian and Quan, 2005). 
 In recent years we witness an increased attention of multinationals like Microsoft, 
Oracle, Adobe, IBM, Lucent, and Intel to start joint R&D activities in China. Oracle 
and Siemens have expanded and upgraded their R&D facilities in China with Siemens, 
for instance, opening a 3G software R&D centre in Hangzhou. In 2003, SAP 
established one of eight SAP Labs in China in Shanghai Pudong Software Park that 
focuses on creating business software solutions for global local Chinese markets. 
These companies usually work on large-scale, advanced software projects that are not 
intended for the domestic market but for foreign markets (Saxenian and Quan, 2005). 
In sum, the software industry took off late in China but caught-up after the arrival of 
the Internet and the emergence of private entrepreneurship. Now I will turn to discuss 
the peculiarities of software development and required resources in more detail.  
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2.3 Innovation processes and sectoral variety  
Software is a collection of instructions that computers follow in executing the task of 
acquiring, storing and processing data and exchanging them with their human 
operators, as well as the guides and reference information that humans need to specify 
what can be, should be or is done in these processes (Steinmueller, 2004). We can 
distinguish three types of software: generic software, specialized software and 
middleware. Generic software development focuses on mass customers which have a 
need for functionality and proprietary standards for information representation. 
Specialized software usually is custom designed and uses accumulated knowledge that 
cannot easily be transferred. It faces the problems of informing new users of its 
existence and capabilities. Middleware has to follow user specifications (high need for 
functionality), while at the same time customize products via vendor aid and/or 
software consultancy. This involves complex integration for specific user groups. 
0LGGOHZDUH LV OLWHUDOO\ µLQ WKH PLGGOH¶ EHWZHHQ WKH RSHUDWLRQ V\VWHP VXFK DV
Windows Vista) and application software packages (such as SPSS).  
 Several features make software an unusual business. First, software development 
involves limited use of physical resources such as land, machines and factories. 
Second, the most important feature of software development is the importance of 
human resources (Nowak and Grantham, 2000). Software development is highly 
knowledge intensive (Ibert, 2004). Software is R&D intensive and has a large role for 
university-based research and training (Tylecote and Visintin, 2008; Mowery, 1999). 
It requires intangible skills such as creativity, technical experience and managerial 
know-how as well as the capacity for commercialization. Clearly, knowledge 
accumulated in employees of the software firm is a critical resource. Third, software 
also offers market incentives to recycle solutions and to reuse whole components 
because the marginal costs for duplication are negligible compared to development 
costs (Grabher, 2004). Therefore, software has an exceptional position in that it allows 
studying both radical as well as incremental processes of development and innovation 
with varied kinds of technical and market risks (Ibert, 2004).  
 Fourth, the interaction between the computer hardware and software sectors is 
relatively large (Mowery, 1999). Software development involves users, independent 
software vendors and hardware producers (Mowery, 1999). Fifth, even though 
investments in physical infrastructure for production are negligible, investments in 
distribution and commercialization of software are high. Given that these are high, 
various forms of appropriability protection are needed in order to achieve economies 
of scale (Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998). Investments in software are relatively 
uncertain, competitive and unpredictable, which makes the role of venture capital 
investments relatively large (Cusumano, 2004; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008).   
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Innovation in software then has several distinct features. First of all, software faces the 
problem of interdependencies. Software is dependent on both hardware (to run the 
programs on) and standards (to allow interoperability). For instance, changes in 
hardware performance (e.g. quicker processor) affect software development. Secondly, 
two distinct processes of innovation prevail. On the one hand, software development 
in complex systemic contexts with high interdependencies allows only incremental 
changes and improvements. On the other hand, embedded software and Internet 
software development can make use of asymmetry of information and 
server/workstation differences to allow radical breakthroughs. The latter process of 
innovation employs the user interface as a source of innovation, i.e. innovation by 
design and not in exploitation of new scientific knowledge (Steinmueller, 2004).  
 Considering these different processes of innovation (radical, incremental) in 
relation to diverse types of software production (i.e. generic, specialized and 
middleware), a distinction among software sectors is necessary in order to explain 
LQQRYDWLRQ LQ &KLQD¶V VRItware sectors (cf. Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001; Casper and 
Whitley, 2004; Ibert, 2004). In the next section I will argue that a technological 
regimes perspective can help to explain sectoral diversity.  
 
2.4 Technological regimes and sectoral variety: overview of the literature 
In order to understand innovation in the software sectors we need to consider sectoral 
variety. The sectoral systems of innovation (SSI) perspective proves to be useful. The 
main thesis of the SSI approach is that innovation in sectors has specific systemic 
features (Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000; Kaniovski and Peneder, 2002). The 
approach shows that sectors with distinct technologies can be differentiated according 
to their specific technical and market risks, or technological regimes, comprised of 
opportunity and appropriability conditions in addition to characteristics of the 
knowledge base and degree of cumulativeness (e.g. Malerba, Breschi and Orsenigo, 
2000; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Dosi, 1988; Parker & Tamaschke, 2005). These 
characteristics of technological regimes and its knowledge base provide restrictions 
the capabilities of firms for innovation (Chapter 1).  
Attempting to keep the analysis and results comparable to existing studies on 
sectoral specialization in developed economies I follow Casper and Whitley (2004) by 
distinguishing two types of risks: appropriability risk and competence destruction. 
Appropriability risk summarizes the risk of not reaping profits from investments in 
innovative activities, for instance due to imitation by competitors. Competence 
destruction reflects the uncertainty of technical development in terms of the 
technological trajectory taken and market acceptance of the innovation. These risks 
identify some conditions that affect the requisite competences, incentives and dynamic 
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properties of the innovative process (Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000; Kaniovski, 
and Peneder, 2002; Parker & Tamaschke, 2005). 
The link between technological regimes and capabilities has been studied in case 
studies and statistical exercises. Case study examples of this result are for instance 
Henderson (1994) and Iansiti and Clark (1994) in pharmaceuticals, computers and 
automobiles in which capabilities differ across sectors. A recent study linking 
characteristics of technological regimes to innovative competence development is 
Casper and Whitley (2004). The research shows that contrasting patterns of innovation 
can be explained by comparing varieties in institutional frameworks across countries 
and across sectors where technological risks differ. Other studies reveal patterns of 
innovative activities linked to specific technological regimes (Breschi, Malerba, and 
Orsenigo, 2000). Evidence suggests that sectoral characteristics affect innovative 
capability development. Then, the variety of software sectors with distinct 
characteristics and innovation patterns necessitate a comparative study.  
  
2.5 Innovation across software sectors in China 
This study investigates the enterprise software, middleware and standard software 
sectors. On the one hand, these three sectors represent the three main software sectors 
in terms of type of software development (cf. Steinmueller, 2004). On the other hand, 
they represent sectors with distinct innovation patterns. This allows us to analyse and 
understand innovative capability development across the most important software 
sectors and at the same time across different types of innovation (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 ± Characteristics of software sub-sectors* 
* Based on the author, Ibert (2004), Cusumano (2004), Casper & Whitley (2004)  
 Enterprise software Standard software Middleware 
Product/service µ7RWDO-VROXWLRQ¶ Novel product Application 
Customers Few, diverse Many, similar Many, similar 
Cost model Service, sale Sale, licensing User revenues  
Extent of customization High Low Middle 
Innovation pattern Incremental Radical Radical 
Locus of change Systemic Stand alone Modular  
Expected risks of 
competence destruction 
Limited Considerable  High 
Expected imitation  risks Considerable Limited Limited 
Entry barriers High  Medium Low  
Capabilities Knowledge of full 
process; collective  
capabilities 
Creativity; 
individual 
capabilities 
Coordination, 
individual 
capabilities 
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Innovations carry certain expected risks for competence destruction and imitation. 
These expectations are based on certain conditions. The conditions are influenced by 
the characteristics of the technological regimes (e.g. uncertainty of market acceptance, 
uncertainty of investment in technology), the characteristics of the knowledge base 
and to what extent institutional conditions support the accumulation of knowledge, the 
development of business routines, accumulation of legitimacy and the availability of 
visible successful examples in the business environment. These conditions provide 
restrictions on the development of capabilities and the risk of destroying capabilities 
and imitation. Therefore, the effect of innovation on capabilities in the standard 
software and middleware sectors is not necessarily destructive. The following 
discusses innovation patterns, expected risks and conditions across the sectors. 
 
2.5.1 Enterprise software sector 
(QWHUSULVH VRIWZDUH ILUPV W\SLFDOO\ GHYHORS µWRWDO-VROXWLRQ¶ SURGXFWV ([DPSOHV DUH
enterprise resource planning software (ERP), customer relationship management 
(CRM), groupware, systems integration products, or sector specific enterprise tools. 
Chinese examples include Kingdee (Enterprise resource management software) and 
UFSoft. The latter is China's leading producer of accounting and ERP software, the 
only private software company listed on the Chinese stock exchange. The market is 
relatively diverse and customers differ in their requirements. These firms typically 
have a few large customers, ranging from firms to government departments and 
universities. The development of products is coordinated within and across the 
organizational boundaries. Integrated marketing, distribution and other complementary 
DVVHWV OHDG WR FRPSOH[ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO V\VWHPV 7KH µWRWDO VROXWLRQ¶ FKDUDFWer of 
enterprise software development usually results in extensive customization with 
integration of production and knowledge with the customer. Revenues are generated 
by the initial sale, extensive service contracts, and upgrade fees. 
 The innovation system is systemic with tight constraints on interfaces leading to 
relatively high switching costs and limited exploration of new activities of the firm. 
7KHVXQNFRVWVFUHDWHGE\DQGIRUFXVWRPHUFUHDWHKLJKVSHFLILFLQYHVWPHQWVDQGµORFN-
LQ¶ FXVWRPHU DQG HQWerprise software firm. The business relations are therefore 
relatively stable and long-term oriented. Most of the innovative activity is incremental, 
exploiting capabilities and accumulating firm-specific knowledge. Enterprise software 
development is typically organised in cross-functional teams. Projects focus on 
creating collective capabilities and knowledge of the full process of software 
development is crucial (Casper and Whitley, 2004). 
 Innovation is expected to carry limited risks of destroying competences as there 
typically is limited uncertainty about market acceptance and investments in technology. 
Customer requirements are relatively easy to predict and unlikely to change radically 
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due to the extensively customized services and integrated problem solving and 
knowledge sharing routines with close customer contact (Whitley, 2006). The 
innovation process is typically cumulative, building on existing knowledge and skills. 
Radical changes would be undesirable from the side of the customer and unlikely due 
to the systemic nature of the innovation process. However, enterprise software 
development in China faces certain constraints with respect to operational and 
managerial knowledge. The lack of business routines is potentially problematic 
because firms typically have to develop (formalised) routines for managing workflows, 
allocating skills, and monitoring of an ERP project. Difficulties to increase the level of 
management to ensure proper coordination and control from within the firm might 
hinder competence enhancement and organizational commitment (cf. Lyles, Saxton, 
and Watson, 2004; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright, 2000) 
 The imitation risks and uncertainty of appropriability are expected to be 
considerable as the focus is not on developing unique, radically innovative products 
but on developing complete (technological) systems for single customers. Innovation 
is typically cumulative and involves standard skills and knowledge. Whereas such 
imitation and appropriability risks generally can be mitigated by patent and copyrights 
SURWHFWLRQ &KLQD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO HQYLURQPHQW GRHV QRW KDYH IRUPDO PHFKDQLVPV LQ
place that efficiently protect knowledge and intellectual property (Lau, Lu, Makino, 
Chen and Yeh, 2002, IFC, 2005). An overall weak property rights protection enlarge 
the risks of imitation. Enterprises generally try to create complex organizational 
structures and coordinate activities directly and strongly with customers to create 
complementarities that are not easily imitated (Lau, Lu, Makino, Chen and Yeh, 2002). 
However, the unpredictability of the institutional environment does not provide a 
stable frame in which firms can develop and accumulate firm specific competences. 
For instance, incomplete labour markets hinder the accumulation of human resources 
in the organization and increase labour turnover. Furthermore, employers are left 
uncertain to the extent that employees are committed to the organization and willing to 
invest in organization specific capabilities in contrast to individual capabilities. How 
do employers assess their competences? Competence trust is needed, which increases 
the risk of competence destruction (Sako, 1992).  
 
2.5.2 Standard software sector 
Standard software firms develop new products: graphic application software, 
multimedia and computer entertainment software, and computer network application 
software. A Chinese example is Founder, a collective enterprise founded by a Beijing 
University professor. Founder now controls over 80% of China's Chinese language 
desktop publishing system market and it is a dominant supplier to overseas Chinese 
newspapers. The standard software market is relatively homogeneous with many 
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individual customers and users. Standard software is usually not customized for 
individual customers except for interface modifications. Standard software is sold or 
licensed to consumer -, business - and government customers and revenue is generated 
by initial sale or license fees. Innovative activity can be characterised as stand-alone 
innovation with autonomy of development and limited constraints on interfaces.  
 Firms typically innovate radically and take advantage of opportunities to establish 
a dominant design. Standard software products are usually integral products that have 
multiple functions. Switching costs for consumers are relatively low and stand-alone 
innovation allows extensive exploration of possibilities. The product must have unique 
features that customers value to create certain lock-ins to brands or products in order 
to enjoy scale economies and periodic upgrades. A variety of knowledge and ideas is 
necessary to create novel products and therefore the emphasis is on LQGLYLGXDO¶V skills 
and know-how rather than firm-specific capabilities. Moreover, the production of 
standard software involves frequent interaction of technical staff to optimize the 
performance of products (Ulrich, 1995).  
 Innovation is expected to carry considerable risks of destroying competences in 
the pursuit of innovations. In search of the dominant design (McKelvey, 1996) firms 
typically innovate radically. The risks for competence destruction in China are even 
higher because of more uncertainty regarding the technological trajectory taken and 
market acceptance of innovation (cf. Tushman and Anderson, 1986). For instance, a 
lack of market knowledge is a problem for standard software firms because they need 
to figure out what unique features will be valued by the customers. A lack of 
legitimacy will pose certain constraints on attracting a stable customer base, due to 
unfamiliarity and low switching costs and serious constraints on attracting talented 
employees. It is hard to locate good employees and it is hard to attract them, either due 
to the presence of more attractive foreign firms or the lack of reputation. 
 Standard software development typically faces limited imitation and 
appropriability risks (Casper and Whitley, 2004). Copyrights and patents are more 
effective in the case of standard packaged software products then for custom ERP 
software because it is easier to identify WKHµH[SUHVVLRQ¶RILGHDVLHQRWLQWHJUDWHGLQD
larger system. Moreover, new products can enjoy a stronger form of protection related 
to increasing return from learning by using and network externalities (Grimaldi and 
Torrisi, 2001) which might give rise to dominant designs or market standards 
(McKelvey, 1996). Increasing returns also lead to first-mover advantages that in 
combination with continuous innovation and possession of skilled personnel create a 
dynamic appropriability regime (Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998).  
 Whereas standard software firms typically operate best in an environment with a 
VWURQJDSSURSULDELOLW\UHJLPH&KLQD¶VSURWHFWLRQRI,35VLVZHDNDQGVRIWZDUHSLUDF\
especially in game software, widespread, which increases risks of imitation. 
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Furthermore, an incomplete labour market can be problematic for both finding and 
attracting a variety of experts and assessing the quality of the experts. Standard 
software firms typically rely on engineers with standardized training in computer 
languages, but an incomplete formal education system enlarges the uncertainty of 
technical development, i.e. increases competence destruction risks. However, 
considering the large untapped Chinese market, standard software firms focus on 
capturing market opportunities flexibly and quickly. Especially, the small and agile 
Chinese private entrepreneurs might exploit such institutional ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the market by moving around relatively quick and creating niches (Tan 
and Litschert, 1994).  
 
2.5.3 Middleware sector 
Middleware firms develop interface technologies that link the basic architecture of 
digital communication networks to interface application software. Coordination of 
various technologies is a crucial feature of middleware software. Strongly affected by 
the development of the Internet, a middleware firm typically develops secure payment 
systems, (specialized) search engines, or wireless Internet technology. Chinese 
middleware is dominated by e-commerce, which started to flourish in 1999, with dot-
coms such as sohu.com, sina.com, China.com and Netease going public on the 
NASDAQ exchange. Furthermore investment rushed into the Internet sector, as for 
instance, Alibaba.com raised $25 million from Softbank, Goldman Sachs, Fidelity and 
other institutions in 2000 (IFC, 2005). The middleware market is relatively 
homogeneous and consists of many users. Customization is limited to the modification 
of the interface by end-users. The cost model of middleware firms is different from 
enterprise - and standard software firms. The main revenues are generated by the use 
of the service and not by the actual sale or maintenance of the product. For instance, 
an Internet VHDUFK HQJLQH JHQHUDWHV UHYHQXHV E\ µFOLFNV¶ RQ EDQQHUV ZLWK
advertisements (the advertisement company pays), clicks on generated results (firms 
that want to end up high in search results pay) or by registration fees (either directly 
paid by users or the search engine as intermediary for another firm).  
 Innovation in the middleware sector is in a modular system. Modular products 
and services are components that accomplish a function through the combination of 
distinct building blocks or modules (Stone, Wood and Crawford, 2000). By changing 
modules a firm can introduce new products into the market or upgrade products with 
limited effort, lead times and costs (Meyer and Utterback, 1993). Middleware firms 
typically do not develop whole technical systems and there is a common technical 
standard that governs production and interoperability (Casper and Whitley, 2004; 
Kitschelt, 1991). The standards on interfaces are open and allow flexibility with 
limited switching costs. The importance of interdependent technical standards co-
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ordination across firms necessitates knowledge about different technological standards. 
Typically, firms need to follow interface strategies for modular product innovation 
(Chen and Liu, 2005). The key issue is to secure complementarity and compatibility 
by a commitment of interface rules in connecting modules (Kano, 2000).  
 Innovation is expected to carry high risks of destroying competences. Critical 
skills and knowledge are rapidly changing and firms need to quickly learn and employ 
new knowledge. Similar to standard software firms, the middleware firms try to 
capture the market by innovating radically. Innovations are often not stand-alone but 
modular in nature. In this process there is usually coordination risk, created by 
XQFHUWDLQW\DERXWZKLFKHPHUJLQJVWDQGDUGV LQ WKH ILUP¶VFKRVHQ WHFKQLFDO ILHOGZLOO
succeed. This usually depends on large firms (often telecommunication firms), but, in 
WKHFDVHRI VWDQGDUGV VHWWLQJ LQ&KLQDRQ WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQDV WRJLYHZKDW
standard to which telecom firms. Although this lowers coordination risks with other 
firms, it increases coordination risks due to the uncertain impact of choosing a specific 
telecom partner. So, middleware firms will likely exist in the close neighbourhood of 
telecom firms, within technology clusters and develop skills to learn about standards.  
 More specifically, these firms face strong liabilities due to the newness of the 
sector. A lack of knowledge about the business environment hinders locating 
customers and analyzing their requirements. The latter is important because the 
revenues are often generated by the frequency of use. Most important, though, is the 
lack of legitimacy. The middleware market in China is extremely new, with a lot of 
unfamiliar and inexperienced customers that will constrain the creation of legitimacy. 
Especially when foreign firms are present with strong brand names, it will be difficult 
to attract financial resources and talented employees. Firms KDYHQRUHDOµWUDFN-UHFRUG¶
although some of these issues might be resolved by the coordinated development of 
innovative activities. 
 Middleware firms typically face limited imitation appropriability risks because 
the technology is complex and usually property rights are well protected. Considering 
&KLQD¶V UHODWLYHO\ZHDN,35SURWHFWLRQRQHPLJKWH[SHFWDKLJKHUXQFHUWDLQW\DERXW
appropriability. However, middleware firms typically follow a flexible strategy, have 
no need for strong control and coordination mechanisms which enables these firms to 
manoeuvre and benefit from opportunities quickly. Whereas coordination within the 
firm might be small, coordination across the firm boundaries with for instance 
universities, other firms and R&D institutes to mobilize knowledge and (financial) 
resources is considerable.  
 &KLQD¶VHQYLURQPHQWZLWKLQFRPSOHWHIDFWRUPDUNHWVDQGDPELJXRXVUHJXODWLRQV
especially for newly emerging high-tech sectors (DeWoskin, 2001), has two distinct 
HIIHFWV RQ WKH PLGGOHZDUH ILUPV¶ LQQRYDWLYH DFWLYLWLHV 2Q WKH RQH KDQG WKH
coordination across firms of innovative activities on the basis of open standards is 
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facilitated by the lack of strongly enforced ± bureaucratic ± rules and regulations. 
China is often characterised to be particularly strong in mobilizing resources through 
personal networks. Furthermore an incomplete and unpredictable labour market will 
most likely increase labour mobility, which is beneficial for innovative firms that want 
to have access to a variety of knowledge. On the other hand, incomplete financial 
markets do make it difficult for firms to attract investments, which is already difficult 
for new entrepreneurial firms, necessary for R&D and motivating and attracting 
skilled employees. Skill availability can be a serious problem, especially because it is 
hard to assess the quality of employees which increases competence destruction risks.  
 
In sum, these sectors have distinct characteristics and patterns of innovation. The 
remainder of the chapter will discuss opportunities and constraints caused by &KLQD¶V
institutional environment. Theory and empirical evidence suggests that institutions 
play a significant role in facilitating or constraining particular innovative processes 
(Hage and Hollingsworth, 2000). The institutions that govern capital, labour (e.g. 
Lazonick, 2007; Whitley, 1999; Crouch et al, 2004) and knowledge (e.g. Edquist, 
1997; Crouch et al, 2004) are the key institutions for understanding innovation and 
technological development: role of the state, skill development and formal education 
system, and the financial system.  
 
2.6 Role of the state 
The central state initiated reforms and programs to restructure and reform technology 
development within China since 1978. Whereas between 1985 and 1992 the focus was 
on commercializing technologies by promoting collaborations between state research 
and enterprises, it was only in the last decade that indigenous technology development 
was facilitated by inflow of foreign technologies and private entrepreneurship.  
 Computer hardware firms find their origin in the first phase of reform that created 
incentives for new organizational forms such as New Technology Enterprises (Gu, 
1999; Lu, 2000) that focused on commercializing state R&D while upgrading 
technological capabilities and the development of high-technology zones (specifically, 
the Torch Plan of 1988). These endeavours created enterprises with a special legal 
status (Gu, 1996; 1999; Sigurdson, 2004; White, Gao, and Zhang, 2002). In addition, 
WKH RSHQLQJ XS RI &KLQD¶V HFRQRP\ IRU IRUHLJQ WHFKQRORJLHV DQG FDSLWDO SOD\HG D
significant role in the early development of the computer sector. In fact, foreign firms 
dominated the sector in the early 1990s, partly driven by strong market demand and 
liberalization of foreign policy. Throughout the 1990s, Taiwan and Hong Kong were 
responsible for a large part of the investments made in the coastal regions and in the 
process enhanced the technology level and management skill. 
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  Software firms, on the contrary, started to develop in the latest phase of the 
reforms. The industry is dominated by private businesses with few links to the 
government or the state socialist economy. Tschang and Xue (2005) identify state 
intervention as the main factor in software industry growth. However, the 
development of sectors such as the manufacturing sector also boosted demand for 
computer hardware and software products. Not a lot of state investments went to the 
software sectors and public procurement of software remains limited (IFC, 2005). 
However, a host of preferential policies, mostly tax reduction, are intended to facilitate 
the development of the sectors. First of all, Chinese software companies do not have to 
pay taxes during their first two years of operation and receive a 50 percent tax break in 
the third and fourth years. Second, the industry also benefits from simplified 
administrative procedures and relatively fast approval of foreign investment. Third, 
local governments have provided financial support for the construction of software 
parks (World Bank, 2007). 
 
Table 2.2 - Agencies and responsibilities related to the ICT industries 
Agency Responsibilities 
Ministry of commerce Oversees foreign investment 
Ministry of information industry Regulates telecommunications and Internet 
Ministry of public security Enforces commercial and criminal network laws  
National development and reform 
commission 
Formulates macroeconomic plans; Budgets for 
telecommunications infrastructure  
National PeoplH¶s Congress Approves laws 
State Administration of Radio, Film 
and Television 
Regulates broadcasting industry;  
State Council Informatization Office Regulates Internet content and other media 
State Council Informatization 
Leading Group 
Formulates and coordinates national ICT policies 
Source: World Bank, 2007 
 
The government agencies that are responsible for the implementation of the various 
rules and regulations in the ICT industries is large and diverse. Table 2.2 shows the 
variety of decision makers and their areas of responsibility. The consequence is that 
regulatory authority is often vague and overlapping (World Bank, 2007). The newness 
of the industry and the rate of development make it difficult for policy makers to keep 
up. As DeWoskin (2001) observed, sometimes the changes in technology are one step 
ahead of policy, eventually forcing policy to fit the technology. On the positive side, 
entrepreneurs are not burdened by complex sets of rules and regulations that 
characterize the traditional industries. Newly emerging sectors such as the software 
sectors thrive in such an environment. Generally, the government is promoting the 
development of ICTs (World Bank, 2007; Table 2.3 next page).  
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Table 2.3 - Regulatory changes related to the ICT industries (selection) 
Year  Name Coordinated by  Scope 
1993 Golden Projects State 
Informatisation 
Expert Group 
Adaption of IT in key sectors: 
banking, telecom, computer 
networking for foreign trade 
1997 Computer Information 
Network and Internet 
Security, Protection and 
Management Regulations 
Ministry of public 
safety 
Regulation of Internet content 
1997 Interim regulation of 
computer networks 
connection to the Internet 
MII Adoption of Internet protocol 
1998 National Foundation for 
Technological Innovation 
in technology-based SMEs  
State Council First venture capital fund 
1998 Copyright Protection 
Center of China 
State Council Formal protection of 
copyrights 
1999 Contract Law Courts E-commerce: data messages 
defined as written form 
2000 State Council Document 
Number 18 
State council promoting the development of 
software and IC industry 
2000 Resolution on Internet 
security 
Courts Definition of online crime 
2001 10th five year plan State council Software, computers,  
telecommunications identified 
as pillar industries 
2001 The Notification on 
Taxation Issues for 
Encouraging the 
Development of Software 
and IC Industries 
State council Tax reduction and exemption 
to stimulate the development 
of software and IC industries 
2002 Programme of Action for 
Promotion of the software 
industry 
State Council Creating a more viable 
domestic software base and 
extensive exports of software 
2003 Government Procurement 
Law 
State council Procedures for purchases; 
priority on domestic goods 
2003 Great Firewall Ministry of Public 
Security 
&UHDWLQJD&KLQHVHµLQWUDQHW¶ 
2004 Regulation of online audio 
and video programs 
SARFT Regulation of online content 
2005 Electronic signature law MII Legal validation of data 
message and authentication 
Source: World Bank, 2007; Dahlman & Aubert (2001); Feinstein & Howe (1997); Tai 
(2006) 
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The ICT industries have received many forms of preferential treatment and re-
allocation and distribution of resources, often in the form of subsidization rather than 
mere regulation or taxation measures, in contrast to other industries. For instance, Gu 
(1996) investigated new technology enterprises. Encouraged and supported by the 
state, R&D institutes started to commercialize their technology ± often IT related 
technology ± via establishing profit-oriented enterprises or joint ventures with private 
investors. Gu identified the important role of state support and the availability of 
resources from existing institutions. Similarly, studying the software sector, Saxenian 
and Quan (2005) stress the widespread institutional changes and the persistent role of 
the government in the development of the software sector. In the same sector, Yang, 
Ghauri and Sonmez (2005) emphasised the role of government policies in shaping the 
competitiveness of the industry. In general, the regulations for the IT industry are 
relatively broad and there is no clear set of regulations that regulate the IT industry.  
 6WDWH LQWHUYHQWLRQ DOVR FRQVWUDLQV ,&7 LQGXVWULHV¶ GHYHORSPHQW 7he most 
straightforward constraint is that preferential treatment of sectors or even individual 
firms hinders the market process. Only the firms that fall in the categories chosen by 
the central or local governments are supported but this does not mean that firms that 
do not fit the categories are not potentially innovative or successful. In many cases 
funds for creating innovative new software enterprises actually go to state-owned or 
controlled firms ( Saxenian and Quan, 2005). Another example is the high-tech zones. 
In principal these prove to be very beneficial for the enterprises within them, but they 
are also an institutional device of the government to control resources and influence 
decisions. The enterprises were obliged to meet certain requirements, such as the 
number of technical personnel, the allocation of retained earnings and the percentage 
of sales spent on innovation (Lu, 2000). 
 Many of the successful plans, such as merging of state R&D institutes and 
enterprises, did not work as well as the central government had hoped. 
Experimentation led WRWKHIDLOXUHRIILUPVDQGLQKLELWHGILUPV¶RZQLQLWLDWLYHV2QO\
after experimentation, the main bottlenecks came to light: lack of trained engineers, 
scientists and managers, inexperienced users, a general lack of a technical basis for 
economic and social development (Lu, 2000; Saxenian and Quan, 2005). A related 
result of continuous change of policies and regulations is a dynamic but also very 
uncertain institutional environment. Weak institutions do not contribute to the problem 
of reducing high uncertainty caused by the technology, competition or the market 
because ± for instance ± property rights are not clearly defined (Lau, Lu, Makino, 
Chen, and Yeh, 2002). In short, the role of the state is diverse and ambiguous in 
overseeing agents and the implementation of policies for the software sectors.  
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2.7 Human capital: skill development and the educational system 
Human capital is a crucial factor in the development of the software sectors. However, 
as this section will show, human capital seems insufficiently developed for the 
demands of emerging IT sectors. The pre-reform period had left its scars on the 
educational system. Several observers typified it as not sufficient for the development 
of the necessary human capital (Cheng and DeLany, 1999) DQGDV µRYHU-FHQWUDOL]HG¶
(Mok, 2002). A World Bank study has shown that regulation of the labour market and 
the skills of employees were the major constraints of the investment climate in China 
over the past years (World Bank, 2006).  
 
2.7.1 Formal Education: Redefining the Talent Pool  
In order to expand the IT sectors, more and better qualified academics and skilled 
workers were needed. While the latter can be trained in-house, the former have to pass 
the state controlled university system. The challenge was therefore to reform formal 
education so that it produced more academics, upgraded technical university 
programmes and opened new programmes, such as management studies. The results 
are mixed, as the statistics show that: 
 
1. Basic education is well-developed but access to higher education limited, 
2. Technical education is well-developed but management education limited, 
3. A low ratio of students returning from abroad indicates a brain drain, 
4. The management and finance of the formal educational system has 
improved substantially as a result of deregulation. 
 
First, the actual rate of growth of human capital in terms of average years of schooling 
in the population aged 15-64 has declined in the reform period, as compared to the 
pre-reform period (Wang and Yao, 2003). It seems that access to secondary and 
tertiary education is problematic, as indicated by the gross enrolment ratios. This is a 
ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of that age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown (World Bank, 2006). All 
countries (European, North-American and Asian) have a primary school enrolment 
ratio of around 100%; this means that the amount of enrolments is as large as the 
population of the age group that corresponds to that level. However, the secondary and 
tertiary enrolment rates in China are considerably lower than in other countries. The 
statistics show that, compared to other countries, the number of people from the age 
groups that correspond to the secondary and tertiary level that are actually enrolled is 
very low. Access to higher education remains limited in the 1990s (Wang and Yao 
2003) and in recent years: for instance, in 2004 only 12.7% compared to US (71%), 
Korea (78%) and Japan (48%). 
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 Second, the figures indicate that engineering, management and literature are 
attracting the most students and deliver the most graduates (Table 2.4). It is possible 
that engineering subjects attract the most students because these subjects are often in 
the spot-light of government policy; for example the 10th Five-Year Plan focuses on 
engineering and science related topics such as computers, telecommunications, and 
biotechnology. Furthermore, the promotion of high- technology products has increased 
the social legitimacy of such specializations. Management studies are also attracting 
more students: the number of students enrolled in management studies have increased 
by 24% in 2003 and the number of management graduates almost doubled in 2003 
(46%). However, management studies are still ill-developed and ill-promoted and the 
absolute number of management graduates remains low. The level of education and 
management training among Chinese managers continues to be a concern for foreign 
invested enterprises. 
 
Table 2.4 Students per major in 2003 
 Graduates of higher education 
Student enrolment in 
higher education 
  Philosophy   1,196 5,974 
  Economics    88,181 604,135 
  Law          110,416 560,916 
  Education    117,072 592,123 
  Literature   286,889 1,719,230 
  History      13,905 56,673 
  Science      173,031 1,004,506 
  Engineering  644,106 3,693,401 
  Agriculture  50,057 249,671 
  Medicine     111,356 814,741 
  Management 281,283 1,784,272 
  Total        1,877,492 11,085,642 
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook Online, 2008 
 
Third, in order to import new knowledge students are being sent abroad every year but 
the number of students returned remains low. At the beginning of the reforms, in 1978, 
860 students studied abroad and 248 returned (China Statistical Yearbook Online, 
2008). In 2003, the ratio of students abroad to students returned was even more 
unbalanced: 117,307 remained abroad, while only 20,152 returned. If these statistics 
are correct, one may speak of a trend. More people are going abroad than returning; 
and illustrating the so-calOHGµEUDLQ-GUDLQ¶(Cao, 1996), even though it is impossible to 
assess the quality of the students that (did not) return. At least half of Chinese students 
are extending stays or trying to seek permanent residency in foreign countries. The 
Chinese Embassy in the US estimated that from the 160,000 Chinese students that 
421
36 Innovation in an uncertain institutional environment 
came to the US, in the past 20 years, only 20,000 had returned by 1998. However, 
evidence from Saxenian (2006) suggests that these overseas Chinese are part of global 
networks that in fact facilitate the knowledge flow across national boundaries. Such 
reversed brain drain facilitated the growth of for instance the industries in Taiwan.  
 Fourth, the management and financing of the educational system has improved 
considerably as a result of deregulation. A considerable change is the new two-level 
management system consisting of central and local governments with the latter as the 
main management body. The state gave more autonomy to the local government and 
institutions (Mok, 2002). The local government is playing a key role in compulsory 
education, while central and provincial governments are dominant in higher education. 
In occupational and adult education, social partners, including industrial organizations, 
businesses and public institutions, are playing a more important role; suggesting the 
development of on-the-job training. The local governments are also increasingly 
stimulated to develop higher education and enhance the relationship between 
education and regional economic and social development (Mok, 2002).  
 Furthermore, universities are no longer funded exclusively by the government. 
&DOFXODWLRQV IURP WKH &KLQD 6WDWLVWLFDO <HDUERRN LQGLFDWH WKDW WKH VWDWH¶V VKDUH RI
educational funding was 84% in 1990 and dropped to 67% in 2000. This does not 
indicate that the government invests less in education but that there is more investment 
from other sources: the total funds more than doubled every five years, in the last two 
decades. China received educational funds from UNESCO and the World Bank and 
many other international organizations. Furthermore, the government allowed 
privately-funded educational institutions and private schooling. Wang and Yao (2003) 
show that the private financing of education has increased but that the distribution is 
not even and that the distribution of educational funds is even more skewed if one 
takes private financing into account. Furthermore, it must be noted that China only 
spent 2.5% of GNP on education in 2001, whereas other developing countries, such as 
the Philippines, India, South Korea and Singapore spend more than 3% of GNP on 
education (United Nations, 2002).  
 
In sum, the formal educational system is being upgraded but still remains 
underdeveloped to meet the needs of the IT industry. Overall, the size of investments 
in the formal educational system increased and the management improved. There is a 
wide range of curricula available at various levels of education and more ± but still too 
few ± students enter higher education. The large amount of engineers that graduate 
every year suggests a sound human capital base for high-technology firms. However, 
the gross enrolment ratio of students in tertiary education is comparatively low and the 
quality of education is hard to assess. Overall, China has a low percentage of college-
educated employees and lags behind world standards (Heckman, 2005).  
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2.7.2 On the Job Training: Upgrading Management 
On-the-job training has become an important strategy for developing technical and 
management skills (Xiao and Tsang, 1999). The Decision on the Reform and 
Development of Adult Education (1987) stipulated that job-related training should get 
the highest priority as a tool to develop job-specific skills that cannot be provided by 
the formal educational system. This has been implemented in various ways: on-the-job 
training, job-related technical drills, short-cycle training classes, thematic lectures and 
supervised self-study (Xie, 1994).  
 Data on training in Chinese companies is mostly absent, except for some case 
VWXGLHV RQ KXPDQ UHVRXUFH SUDFWLFHV &RRNH¶V  VWXG\ RQ WZR PDQXIDFWXULQJ
companies show two different approaches. One firm, a beer company, obliged 
employees to spend 100 hours on training each year to enhance management skills and 
the production-related skills. The firm had contracts with two universities to provide 
management training, professional and technical training and further education. In 
general, the Chinese State Commission organizes several courses and programs for 
managers and teachers in collaboration with international institutions and 
organizations. Ding, Fields and Akhtar (1997) study of 158 foreign-invested firms in 
the Shenzhen Municipality investigated human resource management practices of 
mainly manufacturing industries and some service and trading industries. They found 
that managers in foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) in the electronics manufacturing 
sector received the most training and in the trading business the least. Overall, more 
than 60-70% of the managers of FIEs in China received training. Of the non-
managerial personnel, approximately 50% received training. The major explanation 
for such high figures is that many FIEs have the obligation to train employees under 
the Labour Law. 
 The limited evidence available suggests that in-house training is often provided 
by firms and that it is directed at upgrading both management and technical skills. As 
a building block of human capital, on-the-job training is important but the 
commitment of firms is unclear.  
 
2.8 Private capital  
The development of IT sectors includes the emergence of new firms producing new 
products: where did the capital for these new firms come from? China witnessed a 
large increase in private capital as is shown by the growth of private capital flows 
(from USD 8.107 billion in 1990 to USD 59.455 billion in 2003) and significant 
increase in savings deposits (from 7.12 billion RMB in 1990 to 103.618 billion RMB 
in 2003). However, an increase in private capital does not necessarily mean an 
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increase in private investment. Figure 2.1 shows private investment7 as a percentage 
of GDP over the period 1980-19998. There is an overall increase in private investment: 
from only 3.7% in 1980 to 17% of GDP in 1999. Especially since the early 1990s the 
share of private investment in the Chinese economy is growing. 
 
Figure 2.1 Private investments as percentage of GDP (1980-1999) in China 
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Source:  IFC (2001)  
 
On the one hand, an increase in private capital boosts demands for new products, as 
FXVWRPHU¶V VSHQGLQJSRZHU LQFUHDVHV On the other hand, it boosts investments. The 
3HRSOH¶V'DLO\   UHSRUWV LQ VHYHUDO DUWLFOHV WKDW GRPHVWLF SULYDWH FDSLWDO
drives the economy. For instance, domestic private capital investment now accounts 
for 50% RI6KDQJKDL¶VWRWDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHFRQVWUXFWLRQLQGXVWU\%HLMLQJKDVVHHQRYHU
60% of housing investments made by private investors. Many transformed Chinese 
firms under high financial pressures look for outside financing to realize growth and 
find private equity investors important partners and an important complement to 
creditors in shaping the incentives of firms.  
 The private capital market, however, remains underdeveloped. Private equity, 
especially venture capital, finds it hard to reach firms, even though most of the venture 
                                                          
7 Private investment = difference between total gross domestic investment and consolidated public 
investment. 
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capital is directed to high-tech industries (Batjargal and Liu, 2004). There are no 
regulations with respect to the legal and organizational structures and would-be 
investors, e.g. local governments, set up limited liability corporations. The Company 
Law, however, inhibits investments of more than 50% of capitalization in subsidiaries 
or other entities, thus preventing firms from investing more than 50% of their assets in 
other things than cash-equivalent securities (Tenev, Zhang, and Brefort, 2002). 
 7KHUHVXOW LV WKDW WKH µFRPPRQ¶ OHJDO IRUPRIYHQWXUHFDSLWDO ILUPV LQDGYDQFHG
economies such as the United States - the limited liability partnership - is thus not 
recognized (Batjargal et al., 2004). The main problem is not that the limited liability 
partnership is the only possible form venture capital firms should DGDSW EXW µDOO
venture capital firms are registered and operate as limited liability companies, adding 
confusion as well as serious risks to the processes by which venture capital firms raise, 
LQYHVWDQGPDQDJHIXQGV¶%DWMDUJDODQG/LXS)urthermore, as Tenev, 
=KDQJ DQG %UHIRUW  REVHUYH µWKH VWDWH VWLOO SOD\V D XELTXLWRXV UROH DV IXQG
VSRQVRU LQYHVWRU DQG PDQDJHU¶ 7HQHY =KDQJ DQG %UHIRUW  S  WKHUHE\
inhibiting risky investments with potentially high returns. Reforms of the legal 
framework should promote the development of private capital and equity markets, but 
still are insufficient.  
 Concluding, with the private capital market still underdeveloped, the 
establishment of new firms needs to fall back on traditional, social forms of money 
raising, such as loans from family members or friends. With most venture capital in 
the hand of local government agencies, access to capital also depends on successful 
lobbying and good relations with such agencies. 
 
2.9 Foreign capital 
Foreign investment is usually viewed as contributing to economic growth by 
facilitating technology transfer and marginal productivity improvements. This occurs 
through the externalities technology transfer may engender - technology transfer in 
this context means the flow of technology from developed to developing countries 
(Berthelemy and Demurger, 2000). Numerous studies find that increased foreign 
investment and international trade had positive effects on economic growth (Chuang 
and Hsu, 2004; Hobday, 1994). Gereffi (1999) argues that better positions in 
international trade networks allowed East-$VLD¶V DSSDUHO PDQXIDFWXUHUV WR XSJUDGH
from labour-intensive assembly to skill-intensive full-package supply of new goods 
and services. However, it remains to be seen whether such upgrading actually takes 
place in the case of China.  
                                                                                                                                                  
8  7KHVH GDWD DUH REWDLQHG IURP WKH ,)& GDWD VHW ³7UHQGV LQ 3ULYDWH ,QYHVWPHQW LQ 'HYHORSLQJ
Countries: Statistics for 1970-´ and do not include more recent years. 
465
40 Innovation in an uncertain institutional environment 
 As several studies on the role of foreign trade and investment in China suggest, 
WKH VWURQJ UHOLDQFH RQ IRUHLJQ LQYHVWPHQW PD\ QRW EH VR IRUWKFRPLQJ WR &KLQD¶V
domestic private entrepreneurs (Huang, 2001; Lardy, 1995). Huang (2001) argues 
quite convincingly that FDI came to China because of the opportunities for foreign 
investors to invest in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) because of the political capital 
necessary to invest in China. Subsequently, China has had rapid export growth rates 
but this has depended highly on foreign invested firms. As Lardy (1995) and Huang 
(2001) conclude, this high reliance on FDI for maintaining export rates and aiding the 
privatization of SOEs, actually inhibited the growth of the private sector, mainly by 
missing backward linkages and low domestic content of exports.  
 The proximity of the southern coastal provinces to Hong Kong and Taiwan is 
especially significant in the IT industry. Taiwan started the electronics development in 
the 1950s (Hobday, 1995) and has many small firm innovation clusters. Technological 
development in Hong Kong, on the other hand, is characterized by laissez-faire, 
market-led industrialization. In the early 1990s, large numbers of firms relocated into 
China, as wages rose. Hong Kong and Taiwan became the largest investors in China 
(Sun, Tong, and Yu, 2002). Both Hong Kong and Taiwan provided domestic Chinese 
IT firms access to the international market, although it is unclear whether this actually 
led to better positions in international trade that helped upgrading the operations. It is 
clear, however, that the economies in the region ± Hong Kong, Taiwan and China ± 
have become more intertwined. Adams and Davis (1994) and Elek (1994) argue that 
this might reduce the significance of government policies. 
 7KHGHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶V,7LQGXVWU\LVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\WKHVWURQJSUHVHQFHRI
Hong Kong and Taiwan firms, as well as multinationals, demonstrating the dramatic 
FKDQJHLQ&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQWUDde policy. Indeed, the statistics show that: 
 
1. FDI increased in response to deregulation of markets, 
2. FDI is often Asian, with Hong Kong and Taiwan playing the leading roles,  
3. Foreign firms tend to establish subsidiaries rather than joint-ventures when 
this became an option, 
4. FDI became a new channel for technology transfer, 
5. )', PLJKW QRW EH µUHDOO\¶ IRUHLJQ OHDGLQJ RQH WR TXHVWLRQ WKH H[WHQW RI
technology transfer and learning of new capabilities. 
 
First, foreign direct investment increased sharply in response to the deregulation of 
foreign investment policy. The total inflow of foreign capital increased from USD 4.5 
billion in 1985 to USD 64 billion in 2004. From the early 1990s onwards, the 
composition of total foreign investment changed. Even though some foreign capital is 
still from loans or other foreign investments, it has become predominantly direct 
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investment (FDI). There has been an increase in investment from USD 1.7 billion in 
1985 to USD 60.63 billion in 2004. There are two phases of FDI inflows (Sun, Tong, 
and Yu, 2002; Yi, Zhang, Men, and Huang, 2004). The first phase is between 1979 
and 1991. In the first half of this phase, FDI is concentrated on particular state-owned 
traditional industries in the coastal regions. In the second half, access was extended to 
a limited amount of other industries and some central regions. During this phase, the 
Open Door policy was predominantly restricted to the coastal region, foreign investors 
had limited access to the Chinese domestic market and the range of industries in which 
foreigners could invest was restricted. In the second phase opening up was extended to 
all regions, the pace was accelerated, the domestic market has been further opened, 
and the direction shifted from a regional to an industry orientation. China maintained a 
strong specialization in traditional industries (for example clothing), but also started to 
build up new, technologically advanced industries (for example computer equipment). 
 
Figure 2.2 Foreign direct investments per world region to China in 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook Online, 2008 
 
Second, most foreign direct investment is coming from the Asian region (Figure 2.2). 
Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore invest approximately 95% of total 
Asian FDI (China Statistical Yearbook Online, 2008). Hong Kong and Taiwan have 
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been particularly important as foreign players in the Chinese IT sectors. Given the 
inequality in population, size and resources they play a remarkable role. China 
received almost USD 60.63 billion of foreign direct investment in 2003. The share of 
Hong Kong and Taiwan of the total amount is 36% (China Statistical Yearbook Online, 
2008). Furthermore, the amount of trade with Hong Kong and Taiwan is substantial. In 
2004, China traded almost 29% of its Asian trade with Hong Kong and Taiwan; 
culminating to almost 17% of the world total. It must be noted that Japan remains the 
largest trading partner with 27% RI&KLQD¶V$VLDQWUDGHDQG% RI&KLQD¶VWUDGH 
 Third, the entry mode changed from cooperative enterprises to subsidiaries with a 
considerably stronger commitment when this became an option. Yi, Zhang, Men and 
Huang (2004) identified four ways in which FDI enters China: joint-venture 
enterprises (JVEs), cooperative operation enterprises (COEs), foreign investment 
enterprises (FIEs) and cooperation development (CD). Until 1992, the total amount of 
FDI was small and the COE and CD entry modes were dominant. The turning-point is 
in the early 1990s. From this point onwards the share of foreign investment enterprises 
increases to almost 50% of total FDI. The share of COE and CD declined when more 
structural investments were allowed and foreign investors were allowed to make 
stronger commitments. The more rights and opportunities were given to foreign 
enterprises, the larger the inflow of investment. 
 Fourth, foreign investment became a new channel for technology import besides 
capital accumulation and importing management skills (Wang, Wu, and Li, 1998; 
Zhao, 1995). During the process, localities got more authority and enterprises were 
given more responsibility through various policy reforms. As Piek (1998, p. 35) 
REVHUYHGµGHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQRILQVWLWXWLRQVDQGOLIWLQJRIVWDWH¶VPRQRSRO\LQWKHIRUHLJQ
VHFWRUVWLPXODWHVGRPHVWLFHQWHUSULVHVWRHQWHUWKHZRUOGPDUNHW¶)RUPDQ\,7ILUPV
foreign investment had positive effects by increasing investments, transfer of 
knowledge and new markets. 
 Fifth, although a large stock of FDI has entered China, the story is perhaps not as 
rosy as the figures suggest. The FDI per capita is not large, compared to other Asian 
countries. For example, stock per capita in China is USD 160 (approximately 860 
RMB), in Thailand USD 320 and in Malaysia USD 2000 (World Development 
Indicators, 2006). The distribution of FDI is very uneven with a concentration in the 
coastal provinces. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent FDI is actually really 
µIRUHLJQ¶DQGVXEVHTXHQWO\WRZKDWH[WHQWWUDQVIHURIWHFKQRORJ\WDNHVSODFHWKURXJK
foreign investment. Graham and Wada (2001) argue that (unspecified) parts of Hong 
Kong FDI, the largest source of FDI, is in fact of domestic Chinese origin, which is 
µURXQG-WULSSHG¶WKURXJK+RQJ.RQJRU:HVWHUQQDWLRQVDQG7DLZDQWKDWHQWHUV&KLQD
through Hong Kong intermediaries. Huang (2001) argues that round-tripping of 
foreign capital was actually promoted by the foreign investment policies of the 
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government which favoured foreign enterprises over domestic enterprises. 
)XUWKHUPRUHKHILQGVDV/DUG\GLG WKDW&KLQD¶VKLJKUHOLDQFHRQ)', LVQRW
healthy because it inhibits the private sector by creating more competition and giving 
more preferential treatment to such foreign invested firms and protection of SOEs, 
thereby inhibiting productivity growth. The main problem of round tripped foreign 
capital is that it does not involve technology transfer and learning of new capabilities, 
which questions the benefits from the increase in FDI. 
 
2.10 Summary and discussion 
Software sub sectors show considerable variety in technologies, markets and 
institutional requirements. Therefore, it is necessary to take a comparative sectoral 
perspective on innovation in the software industry. More precisely, I choose to study 
the following three sectors: standard (generic), enterprise (specialized), and 
middleware. On the one hand, these three sectors represent the three main software 
sectors in terms of type of software development. On the other hand, they represent 
sectors with distinct innovation patterns. This allows us to analyse and understand 
innovative capability development not only across the most important software sectors 
but also across different types of innovation. The sectoral systems of innovation 
perspective suggests that we can compare sectors on their specific technological 
regime. I have shown that the three software sectors have qualitatively different 
technological regimes. Therefore, the three software sectors are expected to require 
different capabilities for innovation. In short, innovation involves developing 
capabilities that can mitigate sectoral constraints.  
 Furthermore the chapWHU SURYLGHG DQ DQDO\VLV RI &KLQD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQV WKDW
influence the development and provision of critical resources for IT sectors. The 
analysis shows that in China during the past three decades resources were created and 
mobilized that facilitated the growth of IT industries in general and software in 
particular. Specifically, I focused on the provision and distribution of critical resources 
for software development in China: state, human -, private - and foreign capital. It is 
useful to summarize the main findings.   
 First, an increase in foreign investment inflow, a growing ± although still very 
limited ± venture capital market and an increase in private savings as a result of 
deregulation of foreign and capital policy have boosted investment and competition. 
Whereas the central government sets the overall targets, individual firms are 
increasingly in control of the management of foreign capital inflow, coming 
predominantly from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. Accumulation of private capital 
in combination with increasing legitimacy of information products and services in the 
domestic market boosted private investments. However, the constraints on financing 
are considerable. The state dominates banking and makes it difficult for non-state or 
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non-favoured firms to get loans. Moreover, there is a large competitive pressure for 
financing with an uneven or unequal reception of foreign and state investments; 
ambiguity and preferential treatment increases the difficulty of private financing. The 
key issue for private software firms is: how to attract committed financial capital? 
 SecondWKHJRYHUQPHQWDWWHPSWVWRXSJUDGH&KLQD¶VKXPDQFDSLWDOEDVHWKURXJK
a thorough reform of the formal educational system and increased emphasis on on-the-
job training in combination with imported foreign expertise. The state is no longer the 
sole provider of education and training and there is an increasing role (and demand) 
for HPSOR\HU¶VWUDLQLQJ. The overall investment in the formal educational system has 
increased but it remains too weak to supply the demand for innovation in the IT 
industry. It has to be noted that there is general scarcity in skilled labour and a large 
extent of geographical variety. Therefore, the challenges for the software sectors 
remain relatively large: how to find and commit suitable employees? 
 Third, one of the major goals of state intervention was the promotion of 
HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS 7KH VWDWH¶V DUP¶V OHQJWK DSSURDFK WR UHJXODWLRQ DQG SURPRWLRQ ± 
often direct subsidisation - of specific IT initiatives has created many incentives for 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV)XUWKHUPRUHWKHVWDWH¶VNQRZOHGJHVKDULQJLQLWLDWLYHVLQYROYLQJ5	'
institutes, banks and (regional or sectoral) technology zones, has resulted in new forms 
of profit-oriented SOEs; collective or collective-private enterprises subordinate to 
specific R&D institutes. However, it is noteworthy that the enforcement of the various 
regulations and policies is somewhat vague and ambiguous, as a consequence of a 
variety of responsible authorities.  
  
These opportunities and restrictions show local and sectoral variety. For instance, the 
state has both regional and industrial policies to economic development; there is 
geographic variety in the provision and quality of human resources and foreign 
investment is unevenly received by different sectors and regions. The next step is to 
explore how firms actually have dealt with and used these opportunities and 
restrictions. How capabilities are built, maintained and used needs to be further 
explored and is the subject of the next chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Innovative capabilities and institutional regimes in 
China: Towards an analytical guide 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter described the innovation patterns and associated technical and 
market risks of three software sectors in China. Furthermore, the chapter presented the 
opportunities and constraints for software development in China. However, these 
FRQVWUDLQWVDUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\µKDUG¶FRQVWUDLQWVThis chapter explores the literature to 
develop an analytical guide for my empirical study to understand how Chinese private 
software entrepreneurs have overcome constraints arising from technologies, market 
and institutions. The focus is on what kinds of capabilities for innovation are 
developed in response to what sorts of restrictions. We will explore the key concepts 
and apply them to China¶VFRQWH[W. What is the nature of innovation in China? What 
are innovative capabilities? What are the features of institutional regimes and how do 
they relate to innovative capability development? Moreover, what are the features of 
&KLQD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHJLPHV"$QVZHUV WR WKHVH TXHVWLRQVZLOO SURYLGH D IUDPHZRUN
for designing the empirical study. The chapter concludes by outlining the main 
intellectual goals of this study. 
 
3.2 Innovation 
Innovation can be described as a first attempt to carry out an idea for a new product or 
process into practice. More specifically, in this study I consider innovation to be 
introductions of new knowledge or new combinations of existing knowledge. 
Innovation can be usefully classified according to types, with the most prominent 
categorization being the following: new product and methods of production, new ways 
of organizing the value chain, opening new markets for goods and services and new 
ways to organize business (Schumpeter, 1934). The focus in innovation studies has 
been on the first two: product and process innovation (Fagerberg, Mowery and Nelson, 
2007). Most studies investigate innovation in relatively developed economies which 
are at the forefront of technological advancement in the last century. However, China 
and other developing countries are currently catching-up in which upgrading and 
adapting of technologies and capabilities has the focus. This is not to say that China 
shows no innovative behaviour in product or process technologies, take for example of 
3G and 4G mobile telecommunications research or the pictographic-language 
electronic publishing systems (Lu, 2000). It also doesn´t mean that China has not been 
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innovative in the past, being the originator of many breakthrough innovations. 
However, &KLQD¶VVFLHQWLILFDQG WHFKQRORJLFDOdevelopment did suffer a severe blow 
GXULQJWKH&XOWXUDO5HYROXWLRQZKLFKSXVKHG&KLQD¶V6cience & Technology system 
back. This might mean that China is likely to be less successful in product and process 
innovation due to the lack of competitive technological bases and suggests that the 
ODWWHUWKUHHFDWHJRULHVRI6FKXPSHWHU¶VFDWHJRUL]DWLRQRILQQRYDWLRQPLJKWKDYHPRUH
VLJQLILFDQFHLQWKLVVWDJHRI&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFGHYHORpment.  
 A similar argument has been put forth by Hobday (2000) who argues that 
economic and technological development has not only relied on simple imitation of 
µ:HVWHUQ¶ WHFKQRORJLHV EXW DOVR RQ LQQRYDWLRQ E\ LQWURGXFLQJ LQQRYDWLRQV LQ QHZ
contexts. Similarly, Fagerberg and Godinho (2007) argue that successfully catching-up 
KLVWRULFDOO\DOVRLQYROYHGLQQRYDWLRQµSDUWLFXODUO\RIWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDONLQGDQGZLWK
LQURDGV LQWRQDVFHQW LQGXVWULHV¶ S7RSXW WKLV LQDQHYHQEURDGHUSHUVSHFWLYH
historical studies on the economic and technical success of the United States in the 
first half of the last century show that many of the innovations involved new ways to 
organization production and distributions (Bruland and Mowery, 2004). Therefore it is 
crucial to understand innovation in technology and organization.  
 
3.2.1 Technical innovation 
The technology-focused innovation literature distinguishes innovations in terms of 
types, technical characteristics and competence effects. A common distinction is 
between radical and incremental innovation (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Damanpour, 1991; Ehrnberg, 1995). The former improves price/performance within 
the existing technical trajectory. The latter improves the price/performance frontier by 
more than the existing rate of progress of technology. Closely related is the distinction 
between competence-enhancing and competence-destroying innovations (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1990). Whereas the former builds on existing competences, the latter 
innovations require new skills, abilities and knowledge in the development and 
production of a product or service, i.e. the innovation renders obsolete the expertise 
required to master the technology that it replaces (Henderson and Clark, 1990).  
 Radical innovation can have both HQKDQFLQJ DQG GHVWUR\LQJ HIIHFWV RQ ILUP¶V
FRPSHWHQFHVGHSHQGLQJRQWKHILUP¶VKLVWRU\DQGFRQWH[W$OWKRXJKWKHVHGLPHQVLRQV
are independent, radical innovations are often riskier with higher returns and have 
PRUHSURIRXQGHIIHFWVRQILUP¶VFRPSHWHQFHV Whan incremental innovation (Gatignon 
et al, 2002). Christensen and Bower (1995) focus on the market effects of innovation. 
Disruptiveness of innovations depends on the resistance of current customers and the 
way resources are allocated to innovation that is associated with new customers. 
Chandy and Tellis (2000) look at both customer and technological factors and argue 
532
 Innovative capabilities and institutional regimes 47 
 
that radical product innovation involves both a substantially different core technology 
and substantially higher benefits for customers relative to existing products. 
 A slightly different approach is offered by Abernathy and Clark (1985) who see 
products as hierarchies of subsystems. Central sub systems are more tightly coupled 
and integrated and they drive the more loosely coupled peripheral subsystems. 
Innovation can then be defined according to market-customer ± and technology-
production linkages. Henderson and Clark (1990) extend this argument by 
distinguishing innovations that change core systems (generational innovation) from 
those that change the linkages between systems (architectural innovation). 
Interestingly, this kind of innovation is often associated with strong organizational 
effects, in contrast to technological effects. Changes in components of the system are 
then referred to as modular innovation. Generally, modular innovation is seen as 
allowing a firm to exploit certain technical opportunities to improve parts of their 
product, differentiate or adapt to quickly changing customer demands, i.e. leaving the 
ILUP¶VLQQRYDWLRQUDWKer flexible within a set frame. 
 In sum, innovation can be radical or incremental compared to the existing 
technological trajectory and set of product offered to customers and can be more or 
OHVV FRQQHFWHG WR RWKHU µFRPSRQHQWV¶, such as customers and the organization. 
Whereas the consequences of innovation for the competences of a firm can be 
destroying or enhancing, the characteristics of innovation are independent of its 
consequences for capabilities.  
 
3.2.2 Organizational innovation 
At least as important as the technical and market oriented innovations are 
organizational innovations. They are commonly defined as the creation or adoption of 
an idea or behaviour new for an organization (Hage, 1999). Technical and 
organizational innovation is to a large extent intertwined, as the effects of technical 
innovation on organizations cannot be ignored. Organizational innovation involves not 
RQO\ SURFHVV LPSURYHPHQWV ZLWKLQ D JLYHQ ILUP EXW DOVR LQFOXGHV µDUUDQJHPHQWV
across firms such as the reorganization of entLUHLQGXVWULHV¶S8VXDOO\WKHUHVHDUFK
on organizational innovation explores to what extent an organization is possible to 
innovate. As the review of Lam (2007) shows, most research has focused on 
organizational structure that, in contingency theory parlance, focuses on best fits 
between structure, contexts and innovative activities.  
 7ZRVWXGLHVVWDQGRXW7HHFH¶VH[SORUDWLRQRIRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶VWUXFWXUHDQG
VWUDWHJ\ DQG QDWXUH RI WHFKQRORJLFDO LQQRYDWLRQ DQG /D]RQLFN¶V  WKHRU\ RI
innovative enterprise. Teece distinguishes two main types of innovation: systemic and 
autonomous innovation. By identifying four types of corporate governance modes 
based on organizational requirements for innovation he argues that different types of 
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innovation require different organizational modes. Systemic innovation requires 
complex coordination amongst various subsystems, whereas autonomous innovation 
does not require substantial modification of related products and processes with 
relatively simple coordinatLRQ/D]RQLFN¶V WKHRU\RI LQQRYDWLYHHQWHUSULVHIRFXVHVRQ
the role of strategizing, financing, and organizing. Drawing attention to the 
organizational integration hypothesis, Lazonick points at the social structure and 
internal organizational coherence as determinants of innovative enterprise.  
 In sum, it is innovation in organizational structures ± often in connection to 
technical innovations - that can be the source of competitive advantage of a firm.  
 
3.2.3 Features of innovation 
Considering the literature on technical and organizational innovations, innovations are 
usually described in terms of how radical and how autonomous the innovation is. This 
distinction is useful for the purpose of this study as software involves both radical and 
incremental processes of innovation with varying degrees of autonomy (Chapter 2). 
Moreover, since we are interested in identifying capabilities for innovation without 
assuming the consequences of those innovations on capabilities, we do not 
differentiate competence enhancing versus destroying innovations.  
 Some firms pursue incremental innovation involving refining, improving, and 
exploiting an existing technological trajectory and offering products and services that 
differ only marginally from existing products and services, whereas other firms follow 
radical innovation disrupting an existing technological trajectory, i.e. substantially 
different core technology, and offer substantially different product/services for 
customers relative to existing products/services in the industry. Furthermore, 
innovations can differ in their systemic features: systemic, modular or stand-alone 
(Nooteboom, 2004). A systemic innovation has tight constraints on interfaces (e.g. 
telecom industry, enterprise resource planning software) leading to high switching 
costs and limited exploration of new activities. A modular innovation has certain 
standards on interfaces but they allow flexibility and thus has limited switching costs 
(e.g. consultancy, middleware software). A stand-alone innovation is characterised by 
autonomy of elements and limited constraints on interfaces (e.g. application based 
software) resulting in low switching costs and extensive exploration possibilities. 
 
To be able to innovate, firms require capabilities (Branzei and Vertinsky, 2006). Such 
capabilities help to organize the search and combination of resources for new 
technologies. Innovative capabilities can become a source for competitive advantage 
(Whitley, 1999; Coriat and Weinstein, 2002). The next section deals with the nature of 
capabilities and main features of innovative capabilities. 
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3.3 Capabilities for innovation 
What are innovative capabilities? Whereas early resource- and capability studies focus 
on relatively static and stable sources for capabilities, these ideas are recently being 
extended to explore the dynamics of how firms gain and loose competitive advantages 
(Teece et al., 1997). A capability, in its broadest interpretation, enables a firm to grow 
and take advantage of its opportunities (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). It is useful 
to single out the main features of capabilities in order to define innovative capability.  
 Penrose (1959) formulated a theory of the firm that sees it as an organization that 
coordinates a collection of human and physical resources, in which learning to use 
resources is a key process. Wernerfelt (1984) extended this work and drew attention to 
strategic thinking to balance the use of existing resources and the development of new. 
A further extension is the distinction between tradable and non-tradable resources by 
'LHULFN[DQG&RROZKLFKDOORZVDQDO\VLVRIµVRIW¶UHVRXUFHVVXFKDVUHSXWDWLRQ
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) argue that firms strategically respond to the 
existence of excess resources and that such resource heterogeneity may lead to 
competitive advantages. In the same year Barney suggests that firms in search for 
competitive advantages need to focus on those resources that are valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable, assuming path dependence, causal 
ambiguity, and social complexity (Barney, 1991). The basic contention is that firms 
achieve a competitive advantage by focusing on specific organizational capabilities 
that can be achieved through combinations of unique, non-replicable resources.  
 The dynamic capabilities perspective has extended these ideas to an alternative to 
uniqueness of resources. Instead of being based on unique resources, the dynamic 
capabilities approach focuses on managerial competences and difficult to imitate 
combinations of organizational skills (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). In this sense 
not only markets (for resources) are flexible and dynamic but also capabilities. 
Capabilities are collective and socially embedded in the organization and allow a firm 
to mobilize and transform resources in a more or less reliable way to achieve a certain 
desirable goal (cf. Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000; 
:KLWOH\'\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHVWKHQUHIHUWRWKHILUP¶VµDELOLW\WRLQWHJUDWHEXLOG
and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
HQYLURQPHQW¶7HHFHHWDOSSimilarly, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) see 
such capabilities as identifiable organizational processes through which managers integrate, 
combine and utilize resources to develop value-creating strategies. Dynamic capabilities 
are contingent on path dependencies, market positions, environmental shifts and the 
crucial role of strategic managers to adopt, integrate and re-configure skills, resources 
and competences (Teece and Pisano, 1994).  
 Teece and Pisano (1994) distinguish three types of collective capabilities: 
coordination, organizational learning and reconfigurational capabilities. These 
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capabilities vary in the extent of flexibility and can result in incremental or more 
radical changes in competences, depending on different technological and market 
VLWXDWLRQV$QRWKHUH[DPSOHRIDFDSDELOLW\LVDILUP¶VDEVRUSWLYHFDSDFLW\&RKHQDQG
Levinthal, 1990). Prior related knowledge confers an ability to see the value of new 
information, absorb that information and apply it in novel ways. Similarly Henderson 
DQG&RFNEXUQDUJXHWKDWDUFKLWHFWXUDOFRPSHWHQFHVFRQYH\WKHILUP¶VDELOLW\WR
use component competences and integrate them effectively and develop fresh 
component competences as they are required. They include knowledge about 
communication channels, information filters and problem solving and are contingent 
on organizational characteristics. A slightly different approach is taken by Leonard-
Barton (1992) who considers employee knowledge and skills, technical and 
managerial systems and wider norms and values as constituting core capabilities. 
Collective capabilities are predominantly seen as µSUREOHPVROYLQJURXWLQHV¶ WKDWDUH
based on firm specific skills and characteristics. 
 Kogut and Zander (1992) take a knowledge-based perspective and argue that 
knowledge is held by individuals but also can be found in regularities in groups, which 
implies organizational learning. They theorize that organizations have both internal 
and external learning processes by which firms synthesize and acquire knowledge 
resources and generate new application from those recourses: combinative capabilities. 
Similarly, Grant (1996) sees capabilities as the outcome of knowledge integration by 
complex team-based productive activities. Dyer and Singh (1996) extend the 
knowledge based by DUJXLQJWKDWDILUP¶VFULWLFDOUHVRXUFHVPLJKWVSDQWKHERXQGDULHV
of the firm. They propose to look at inter-organizational competitive advantages 
arising from relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary 
capabilities and effective governance. These approaches emphasize the role of 
external knowledge resources and the mechanisms of combining knowledge resources. 
 More recently, Helfat and Peteraf (2003) introduced the capability life cycle that 
shows that there are general patterns and paths in the evolution of capabilities over 
time. Certain organizational and environmental conditions influence their founding, 
development, maturation, and alteration but it is managerial decisions that are critical 
antecedents of capability transformation (Adner and Helfat, 2003). Similarly, Teece 
(2007) extends the dynamic capabilities framework by explicating the micro-
foundations and associated capabilities in a process model. Crucial capabilities 
become sensing, seizing and managing threats. Enterprises with dynamic capabilities 
are very entrepreneurial and do not only adapt to business environments but also 
transform them through innovation and collaboration (Teece, 2007). These recent 
studies emphasise the agency of managers in forming dynamic capabilities and the 
role of risks in the business environment that shape dynamic capabilities.  
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 This set of studies suggests that capabilities are neither vague nor unfocused 
processes but specific processes that PDQLSXODWH D ILUP¶V UHVRXUFHV EDVH 0RUH
precisely, the previous studies on capabilities suggest that capabilities combine unique, 
non-replicable resources (Amit and Schoemaker (1993); adopt, integrate and re-
configure skills, resources and competences (Teece and Pisano, 1994); solve problems 
based on firm specific skills and characteristics (Henderson and Cockburn, 1990; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992); are mechanisms of mobilizing and combining (knowledge) 
resources across firm boundaries (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Dyer and Singh, 1996); 
respond to risks and threats in the business environment (Adner and Helfat, 2003; 
Teece, 2007). Therefore, we define innovative capabilities as WKH ILUP¶V DELlity to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external resources to develop and 
successfully commercialize new products and services. 
 
3.4 Antecedents to innovative capabilities  
Not all organizational processes can be transformed into innovative capabilities that give 
the firm a competitive advantage (cf. Teece et al, 1997). Where do innovative capabilities 
come from? The literature on dynamic capabilities suggests that it is important to identify 
the antecedents to capabilities. An antecedent is here understood as a cause or origin of 
capabilities (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). While an understanding of the antecedents 
to factors associated with performance is important, it is not often researched 
(exceptions are Cockburn et al, 2000; Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Cattani, 2005). Recent 
theoretical studies suggest that antecedents to dynamic capabilities can be found at the 
individual, firm, or network level (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter 
2002). More recently, empirical studies such as Hsu and Lim (2006) and Rothaermel 
and Hess (2007) confirm that antecedents to dynamic capabilities can indeed be found 
at different levels. In this thesis, we define antecedents to innovative capabilities as 
those organizational processes that provide resources (originating in individual, firm 
or network) to the firm that can give a potential competitive advantage in successfully 
developing and commercializing new products and services. For instance, hiring 
talented engineers, acquiring a new technology and inviting experts to give a training 
are all antecedents. However, these antecedents do not necessarily add up to 
innovative capabilities.  
 Eisenhardt and Brown (1999) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) provide the best 
available criteria for understanding when antecedents become capabilities. They 
investigated how specific organizational processes became dynamic capabilities: only 
if processes combine and deploy resources to generate value-creating strategies and 
which are able to span and support multiple lines of business of the firm, i.e. 
organization-specific. These processes are the drivers behind the creation and 
combination of existing resources into new sources of competitive advantage, i.e. 
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antecedents to capabilities (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). Following our definition, 
capabilities involve integrating, building and reconfiguring internal and external 
resources to successfully develop and commercialize new products and services. 
Antecedents add up to a capability only LI WKH\DOWHU WKH ILUP¶V UHVRXUFe base to the 
extent that they generate organization-specific, value-creating strategies for innovation. 
Antecedents to a specific capability are all aspects of the same capability but refer to 
different organizational processes that together generate organization-specific abilities 
of the firm to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external resources. In our 
example, mobilizing external knowledge could be a capability and the three 
organizational processes antecedents.  
 Generally, innovation relies to a large extent on external sources and it depends 
on extensive interaction with its environment (Fagerberg, Mowery and Nelson, 2007). 
A combination of internal and external drivers become the source for innovation. For 
LQVWDQFH µDEVRUSWLYH FDSDFLW\¶ of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), an internal 
driver, is necessary to reap the benefits from new knowledge from external sources. 
Together they allow a firm to combine its entire knowledge base when confronting 
new challenges (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).   
 In total there were 212 unique antecedents of successful innovation identified in 
the literature. These antecedents were categorised according to topics. From these 212 
potential antecedents, 16 categories emerged. The criteria for reducing the 212 
potential antecedents to 16 were the following: 1) theoretically meaningful categories 
that match the conceptual definition of innovative capability; 2) deletion of 
overlapping or strongly related antecedents (e.g. business ties, business group, 
cooperaWLRQ ZLWK XQLYHUVLW\ ZHUH FRPELQHG LQWR µH[WHUQDO SDUWQHU¶  GHOHWLRQ RI
antecedents that were only mentioned once. However, most important was the 
confrontation of the set of antecedents with the conceptual literature and the research 
problem under investigation in this study. 
 Several studies suggest the importance of acquisition of new technology from 
other firms or institutes. For instance, firms can assemble a changing set of products 
and technical know-how that drives superior performance. Acquiring external 
technical know-how can supplement internal knowledge development (Rothaermel 
and Hess, 2007). Moreover, the use of external partners for joint research projects, 
extensive information flows and access to a variety of knowledge is often stressed 
(Damanpour, 1991; Whitley, 2002). Employees with diverse expertise backgrounds 
and attracting new talents are crucial for firms pursuing more radical innovation 
strategies (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). Besides using inter-firm collaborations to 
access and mobilize resources, the coordination of networks of resources is also often 
seen as an important advantage. So-called innovation networks are then viewed as 
ORRVHO\ FRXSOHG V\VWHPV RI DXWRQRPRXV ILUPV LQ ZKLFK KXE ILUPV µRUFKHVWUDWH¶
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network activities (Dhanaraj and Parke, 2006). Next, access to finance is crucial for 
capital-intensive innovative activities. This refers to the availability of funds within 
the firm but also to the effectiveness of (venture) capital funding (Lee, Lee and 
Pennings, 2001). Lastly, reputation is important for firms to overcome imperfections 
in knowledge markets (Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2006; Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994). Table 3.1 presents a summary. 
 
Table 3.1: Potential antecedents to innovative capabilities 
Antecedent Studies  
Developed economies  
External  
Acquisition of new 
technology  
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Rothearmel and Hess, 2007 
Use of external partners 
for new knowledge 
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Whitley 2002; Kogut and Zander, 2002; Rothearmel and Hess, 
2007; Damanpour, 1991 
Expert employees with 
diverse backgrounds 
Souitaris, 2002; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1994; Damanpour, 1991 
Coordination of 
innovation networks 
Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Lorenzoni and 
Lipparini, 1999; Brusoni, 2005; Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006 
Access to finance Lazonick, 2007, Lee, Lee and Pennings, 2001; Souitaris, 2002; 
Florida and Kenney, 1988; Kortum and Lerner, 1998 
Reputation  Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2006; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994 
  
Internal  
Technical capacity Rothaermel and Hess, 2006; Lee, Lee and Pennings, 2001; 
Damanpour 1991; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994 
Flexible strategy Casper and Whitley, 2004, Whitley, 2002, Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Lazonick, 2007, Lado and Wilson, 1994 
CEO experience  Lynskey, 2004; Souitaris, 2002, Grabher and Ibert, 2006 
Firm-specific knowledge   Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Whitley, 2003; Damanpour, 
1991; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 1992  
Innovation orientation  Gavetti, 2005; Souitaris, 2002; Zollo and Winter, 2002; 
Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001 
  
China  
Formal/informal external 
partners 
Xin and Pearce, 1996; Tan, 2005; Krug, 2004; Peng and Luo, 
2000; Tsang, 1996; Wang, Lo and Yang, 2004;  
Interaction with 
government 
Saxenian and Quan, 2005, Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2002; Peng 
and Luo, 2000, Wan, 2005 
Strategic swiftness Meyer and Peng, 2005; Tan, 2005; Lyles, 2004; Krug, 2004 
Founder network Peng, 2003; Batjargal, 2007, Lyles, 2004 
Technical capacity Wan, 2005; Tan, 2005; Yam, Guan, Pun and Tang, 2004 
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Studies also suggest internally-oriented antecedents for successful innovation. A 
strong technical capacity and large pool of competent experts is traditionally one of 
the major sources of innovation success (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). Strongly 
related to internal capability development is the extent of organizational integration or 
firm-specific expertise (Damanpour, 1991; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Whitley, 
2003). To what extent firms develop firm-specific knowledge and learning depends on 
the type of innovation and type of strategy the firm pursues. For more radical 
innovation a flexible strategy is preferred. This refers to be able to respond quickly to 
customer demands and opportunities in new technologies (Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Whitley, 2002). Closely related to the strategic direction of the firm is the orientation 
of the firm towards innovation. On the one hand, this refers to the extent to which 
firms are entrepreneurial. On the other hand, it refers to the experience of the firm in 
innovation. Usually this involves local knowledge and experience (Damanpour, 1991; 
Gavetti, 2005). Related to this is the role and experience of the CEO-founder in 
innovation and entrepreneurship and the knowledge and networks brought to the firm 
(Lynskey, 2004; Grabher and Ibert, 2006). 
 
Studies focusing on Chinese innovation, stress the role of various kinds of formal and 
informal business networks in overcoming the constraints of a weak institutional 
environment (Peng and Luo, 2000; Tan, 2005; Xin and Pearce, 1996). Furthermore, 
coordination and interaction with the government appears to be another crucial 
advantage for securing financial resources but also for getting access to the market (Li 
and Atuahene-Gima, 2002; Saxenian and Quan, 2005). Several other studies show the 
importance of strategic swiftness and flexibility (Meyer and Peng, 2005, Tan, 2005, 
Yam, Guan, Pun and Tang, 2004). Important is opportunity recognition, customer 
involvement, and localization. In terms of internal capabilities, the role of the founder 
remains significant, both in terms of experience and social connections (Batjargal, 
2007; Peng, 2003). However, technical capacity cannot be overlooked either; 
especially the absorptive capacity of the firm for (foreign) technology (Wan, 2005).  
 
In sum, antecedents to innovative capabilities in our definition are those organizational 
processes that provide resources (originating in individual, firm or network) to the 
firm that can give a potential competitive advantage in successfully developing and 
commercializing new products and services. The previous discussion of potential 
antecedents provides a potential set of specific and identifiable processes that can be 
usefully employed to develop empirical indicators. However, the factors presented 
here are a range of potential antecedents but is by no means an exhaustive list.  
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3.5 Institutions and capabilities 
3.5.1 Institutional structuring of capabilities 
The viability and success of a capability is contingent on the institutional context, as 
argued in Chapter 1. Any capability developed is to a large extent influenced by the 
specific arrangements in the economic context of the firm. Combining insights from 
institutional analysis with the work on organizational capabilities provides insights 
into the mechanisms that link institutional regimes and capabilities.  
 The comparative business system approach has argued how institutions governing 
capital, labour, product markets, and the public science system crucially affect the 
development of capabilities (e.g. Whitley, 2002; Casper and Whitley, 2004; Whitley, 
2003). More specifically, Whitley (2002) has discussed how the strength of business 
associations and involvement with public training systems, the organization of the 
financial system and the public science system crucially affect the development of 
innovative capabilities. A similar reasoning can be found in the historical analyses of 
Lazonick (2007) on the social conditions of innovative enterprise. Lazonick argued 
with both historical examples from Europe and US (Lazonick, 2007) and 
contemporary examples from China (Lu and Lazonick, 2001) that innovative 
enterprise depends on organizing strategizing and financing, which are all crucially 
affected by the societal institutions that govern capital, labour and knowledge. 
Tylecote and Visintin (2008) recently put emphasis on the role of finance and 
corporate governance in explaining technological advantages of nations. 
 The link to the micro-level is analysed in the conceptual work of Whitley (2003) 
and Hage (2003), and the empirical work on Italian textile districts (Locke, 1995) and 
European biotechnology (Casper and Murray, 2003), career networks of 
biotechnology clusters (Casper and Murray, 2005). A good example is the recent study 
of Casper and Whitley (2004) that explains why platform biotechnology and ERP 
have been relatively more successful industries in Germany, whereas therapeutics and 
standard software industries are successful in England. The study suggests that the 
coordinated market economy of Germany, with its large firms in networks of powerful 
trade and industry associations and labour organizations support competence 
enhancing innovation strategies. The institutional arrangements supported industries 
where more complex organizations are effective, as is the case in ERP and platform 
biotechnology. The liberal market economy of England, on the other hand, with 
largely deregulated financial and labour markets and overall weak power of collective 
actors supported competence destroying innovation strategies. These institutional 
arrangements were supportive of entrepreneurial firms that focus on radical 
innovations, such as standard software and therapeutics.  
 In short, institutions support or constrain the development of capabilities for 
innovative activities (Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). To extend 
621
56 Innovation in an uncertain institutional environment 
the ideas from comparative institutional studies and the institutional structuring of 
capabilities to China, we need to consider that China is a transition economy with as a 
key feature institutional change (see working theory Chapter 1). Although the analyses 
of Whitley (2007), Coriat and Weinstein (2002), Sorge (2006) and more recently Aoki 
(2008) start to account for institutional change, this is limited to incremental 
institutional changes. The situation in China is different in two ways: rapid 
institutional transformation in which two ± often-conflicting ± institutional regimes 
co-exist: socialist ± and market institutions (Qian, 2000). Next to that, there is 
institutional diversity within the national economy as a result of the decentralized 
nature of government in China (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008). The comparative 
institutional approaches have not yet started to incorporate such institutional set up. 
Before considering the features of a transition economy, first a note on institutions.  
 
3.5.2 A note on institutions 
Our assumption about institutions is that pragmatic agents construct institutions to 
cope with various problems under the specific circumstances of the time and context 
(Whitley, 1999; Sorge, 2006). Institutions thus are socially constructed and they 
function according to what meaning different groups of dominant actors attribute to 
them in specific environments and situations (Sorge, 2006). Instead of economic 
interpretations such as 1RUWK¶V  µUXOHV RI WKH JDPH¶ DQG:LOOLDPVRQ¶V 
µJRYHUQDQFH RI WUDQVDFWLRQV¶ this thesis employs an empirically more workable 
definition: Institutions constrain the distribution and allocation of critical resources 
and influence how firms have differential access to these critical resources, such as 
labour, capital and knowledge (Coriat and Weinstein, 2002; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 
1997; Whitley, 2007).  
 I do not adopt a deterministic or static view of institutions. The comparative 
institutional approach has been criticized for being too deterministic and static (see for 
example Deeg and Jackson, 2007 and Lundvall, 1999). However, comparative 
institutional studies single out and make explicit several of the crucial institutional 
mechanisms underlying the organization and coordination of economic activities. This 
usually translates in ideal-typical representations of socially complex realities. These 
µVLPSOLILFDWLRQV¶ LQGLFDWH ZKLFK VRFLHWDO LQVWLWXWLRQV JRYHUQ HFRQRPLF behaviour in 
what way in a particular environment (usually national, but also sectoral or regional). 
7KLVPHUHO\PHDQVWKDWVXFKLQVWLWXWLRQVµFUXFLDOO\DIIHFW¶DQGQRWGHWHUPLQH behaviour 
(cf+DPLOWRQ0RUHRYHUWKH\SURSRVHDVHWRIµVROXWLRQV¶LQWHUPVRIVWUDWHJLHV
capabilities, innovative activities, etc. that are more likely and more credible to be 
developed in the specific environment. Perhaps the best way to view institutions is to 
assert that they create regularities (Coriat and Weinstein, 2002).  
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3.6 Institutional regimes in China 
3.6.1 Institutional features of transition economies 
Strategic decisions are not straightforward when the rules of the games are being re-
written. The business environment of a transition economy is different from stable 
environments such as the US and Western Europe. A North-like understanding of 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO WUDQVLWLRQ LV µIXQGDPHQWDODQGFRPSUHKHQVLYHFKDQJHV LQWURGXFHG WR WKH
formal and informal UXOHVRIWKHJDPHWKDWDIIHFWRUJDQL]DWLRQVDVSOD\HUV¶3HQJ
p. 275). Institutional transition fundamentally changes in who provides what kinds of 
resources and what kinds of constraints that OLPLW DJHQWV¶ RSSRUWXQLVP ,QVWLWXWLRQDO
transitions in emerging economies are qualitatively different (Peng, 2003). Whereas 
some countries used a big bang approach changing overnight from central planning to 
market economies ± as in Russia and Eastern European economies ± others have taken 
a more gradual approach, e.g. China and Vietnam. The former focused on central state 
level policy initiatives like sweeping movements of liberalization and privatization in 
WKH YDLQ KRSH WKDW ILUPV ZLOO µDXWRPDWLFDOO\¶ DGDSW DQG WKDW PDUNHW IRUFHV ZRXOG
emerge.  
 7KH ILUVW µW\SH¶ RI WUDQVLWLRQ FDQ EH LOOXVWUDWHG E\ WKH H[SHULHQFHV RI (DVWHUQ
European economies in the 1990s. The transformation of 1989-1990 has abolished the 
SUHYLRXV µUXOHV RI WKH JDPH¶ JRYHUQLQJ HFRQRPLF DFWLRQ \HW QHZ UXOHV KDYH QRW \HW
taken their place (Whitley and Czaban, 1998). Roth and Kostova (2003) show in their 
study of 22 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States 
WKDW WKHUH DUH WZR HOHPHQWV LQ WKHVH FRXQWULHV LQVWLWXWLRQDO XSKHDYDO µLQVWLWXWLRQDO
LPSHUIHFWLRQ¶RU WKHJDSEHWZHHQGHVLUHGDQGH[LVWLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQVDQG µLQVWLWXWLRQDO
EDJJDJH¶ RU WKH OHJDF\ RI VWDWH VRFLDOLVP WKDW LV VWLOO LQJUDLQHG DQG SHUYDVLYH LQ
current institutional arrangements. State socialism has left the countries with a) a 
distrust of formal institutions that regulate relationships between social and economic 
actors; b) an absence of intermediary organizations that are able to mobilize 
commitments between individuals and the state; and c) vertical dependence of the state 
(Whitley, Henderson, Czaban, and Lengyel, 1996). So, it is unclear who the key actors 
are whose interests and actions have to be taken into account in making strategic 
decisions; increasing uncertainty instead of reducing it (Czaban and Whitley, 2000). 
 7KH VHFRQG µW\SH¶ RI WUDQVLtion is exemplified by China. The process of 
transformation is qualitatively different from the Eastern European one. One of the 
EHVW DQDO\WLF GHVFULSWLRQV RI &KLQD¶V WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ XS WR  LV given by Qian 
(2000). According to him there are two stages LQ ZKLFK &KLQD¶V WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
evolved. The first stage (1979-1993) involved an incremental reform of the central 
plan and allowed the emergence of a market in resource allocation. The government 
was reformed through regional decentralization and the emergence of non-state ± 
though mostly local government ± enterprises. The second stage (after 1994) involved 
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the construction of market supporting institutions, while retaining the old institutions. 
The tax system was reformed resulting in a dual track system, state-owned enterprises 
were restructured and privatized and the government bureaucracy was further 
downsized (e.g. decreasing number of committees and ministries). In this process, 
economic reform did not involve democratization and liberalization proceeded slowly, 
just as privatization.  
 
$VDUHVXOWRI&KLQD¶VGLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKWRHFRQRPLFWUDQVLWLRQZHKDYHWRQRWHWZR
FRQVHTXHQFHVRI&KLQD¶VWUDQVLWLRQIRULQQRYDWLRQ2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHFR-existence 
of two institutional systems affects the amount and quality of labour, capital and 
knowledge resources in the Chinese economy (i.e. underinvestment in resources 
problem). At the same time, the dismantling of the state socialist institutions and the 
emergence of and experimentation with market institutions causes considerable 
uncertainty for economic agents. On the other hand, local institutional variety causes 
wide differences in local resource bases and local governance mechanisms and 
increases horizontal competition of resources across localities. In general, changes in 
institutional regimes affect who specifies, monitors and controls the powers and 
responsibilities of private companies (i.e. uncertainty of governance of resources 
problem). Moreover, these changes affect who provides knowledge about technologies 
and markets, quality standards, labour ± and capital market access. When institutional 
regimes change, as is the case in Eastern Europe and China, strategic agents, collective 
resources and incentives and constraints of firms change. The next sections will 
analyse how &KLQD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO FKDQJH DIIHFWs innovative capability development: 
underinvestment in resources and uncertainty of governance of resources.   
 
3.6.2 Underinvestment in resources in China 
An underinvestment in resources affects innovation and entrepreneurship in many 
ways. Entrepreneurship is affected by formal institutions such as the quality of 
commercial code and the strength of legal enforcement. Such institutions are 
mechanisms to reduce uncertainty caused by technology, competition or the market. 
2QHH[DPSOHLV&KLQD¶VZHDNSURWHFWLRQRILQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\ULJKWVWKDWGHSHQGVRQ
the strength of legal enforcement which hinders some innovating firms (Lau, Lu, 
Makino, Chen and Yeh, 2002, IFC, 2005). Private agents in China that are faced with 
a weak appropriability regime caused by a weak legal system, are expected to develop 
complementary assets. In the case of brand names, for instance, firms may have to rely 
more on status and collective reputation of the firm instead of legal protection. This 
suggests that private agents in China might actually have incentives to innovate their 
business model in order to mitigate the risks of imitation (cf. Teece, 2006).  
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 Another example is an incomplete labour market. There is the general labour 
scarcity, i.e. availability of qualified labour as opposed to unqualified labour. Such 
shortage will lead to heavy competition on the factor market side. This will increase 
labour mobility and labour turnover in firms. Moreover, skill availability problems 
create uncertainty for employers as to the competences of the employee. An 
unpredictable and dynamic labour market leaves employers uncertain with respect to 
DQHPSOR\HH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRLQYHVWLQRQHMRERUILUPDQGWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLUVNLOOV
How do employers assess their competences (Sako, 1992)? Strategies for attracting 
and keeping employees become crucial. One strategy is to have formal labour 
contracts, however, with incomplete and ill-functioning labour law enforcement, this 
does not provide good guarantees. Then, there are three alternatives: creating 
competence trust (cf. Sako, 1992); develop work arrangements that commit the 
employees to the firm; or use innovative corporate governance models to commit 
employees, all of which increase the risks for firms. 
 Since this study is concerned with explaining the underlying mechanisms at the 
ILUPOHYHOLWLVXVHIXOWRµWUDQVODWH¶WKHODFNRIUHVRXUFHVWRFRQVHTXHQFHVDWWKHILUP
level. The literature on the liability of newness is relevant here as helps to explain the 
consequences of a lack of resources at the firm level. Studies have suggested a 
QHJDWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHRI µQHZQHVV¶IRU WKHQHZO\HPHUJLQJSULYDWHVHFWRU.UXJand 
Polos, 2004). Newness is often seen as a liability referring to new fLUP¶V resource 
poverty, lack of legitimacy, and weak ties to external actors provide them with 
reduced capacity when competing with established players (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).  
 However, other studies have stressed the advantage of newness. New firms are 
innovative because their innovative efforts require the destruction of their existing 
competences and they are not hindered by ill-suited organizational routines and 
structures (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson & Clark, 1990). Barron, West 
and Hannan (1994) show that the hazard of mortality rises with age (controlling for 
size). Furthermore, the literature on first-mover advantages suggests that new early 
entrants may pre-empt resources, such as a customer base and hence benefit from 
newness (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). A lack of resources can have the 
following consequences at the firm level: 
 
x Lack of business routine makes it difficult to locate talented employees, business 
agents such as potential co-operators and banks, and procedures to follow, copy or 
EHQFKPDUN 2Q WKH RQH KDQG WKH ILUP¶V LQDELOLW\ WR LQFUHDVH WKH OHYHO RI
management to ensure proper coordination and control from within the firm, 
which might hinder competence enhancement 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH ILUP¶V
inability to accumulate and develop technical skills necessary for innovative 
competence development might hinder attracting a variety of knowledge for 
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radical innovative activities. Such expertise can hardly be bought or learned 
through formal or informal education and training. 
x Lack of a blueprint: there is no general understanding of how things should go 
right or wrong and where there is no past experience. In a business environment 
with few examples of successful firms or few firms in general that could serve as 
a benchmark, the only way to learn how to run a business is by trial and error, 
giving rise to risky decisions.  
x Lack of knowledge about the business environment: no general knowledge about 
demand, prices, or income levels makes it difficult to do systematic research to 
calculate risks. In radically innovative sectors, where the risk of competence 
destruction is already considerable, this is less an issue than in incrementally 
innovating sectors where a lack of understanding market dynamics and procedures 
to analyse such dynamics, gives rise to additional risks. Especially in a newly 
emerging industry it is hard to predict which investments are worthwhile. 
x Lack of legitimacy: refers to the lack of familiarity and credibility of new 
activities that constitute the fundamental basis of interaction. In an advanced 
economy setting, a lack of legitimacy can be interpreted in terms of not 
understanding fully the nature of the new venture and their conformity to 
established institutional rules. However, emerging economies usually lack such 
clearly established institutional rules. It is hard for firms to create such familiarity 
and credibility in a setting in which it is hard to predict even the overall rules of 
the game. Especially the unfamiliarity of the market with the new venture and the 
lack of skills of the customer lead to higher uncertainty of market acceptance. 
  
3.6.3 Uncertainty about the governance of resources in China 
The reforms since 1978 have resulted in local diversity and heterogeneity of local 
business environments (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008; Goodman, 1997; Wong, 2002). 
A local business environment here refers to a distinctive pattern of economic 
organization at the local level. Such distinctive pattern can only exist if there is 
considerable autonomy at the local level with respect to political and economic 
decisions. Local autonomy depends on a weak central state, which obviously is the 
FDVHLQ&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFDQGILQDQFLDOVHFWRU:RQJ:RUOG%DQN7KH
central government is in charge of designing and developing formal institutions and 
policies. On a national level, the result is often sectoral variation (Chen 2007). For 
instance, private firms have only been allowed to enter high-tech sectors only since the 
mid-1990s (Lau et al, 1998; Liu, 2004). However, there is a considerable degree of 
independence at the local level with regard to the implementation.  
 Local variety is caused by two factors. On the one hand, there are different 
degrees of independent decision-making at different local governments (Bird and 
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Chen, 1998). The extent of toleration and encouragement of collective semi-
autonomous organisation and networks beyond part-state is one example. For instance, 
how strong is the cHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VGRPLQDWLRQRIRUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGDVVRFLDWLRQV 
More specifically, the strength of interaction between local-central governments varies 
across localities. On the other hand, different local governments react differently to 
central policies and directives (Krug, 2004). Most important is a VWDWH DJHQF\¶V 
involvement in local private economic development. More specifically, what are the 
goals and strategies of local policies for state supported enterprises, foreign enterprises 
and non-governmental enterprises. There is considerable local and vertical variety in 
such strategies and goals. 
 One of the key insights about local variety in the recent literature is the concept of 
federalism, i.e. the interplay of different types and levels of firms and governments 
(Qian and Weingast, 1997). Fiscal reforms and partial decentralization of the tax 
system have led to a system of fiscal federalism (Qian, 2000; Qian and Weingast, 
1997). Fiscal federalism in China refers to co-existence of a national tax system, with 
formal national legislation and tax farming linked to different layers of government, 
without formal legislation. This system shaped the privatization of assets and led to 
jurisdictional competition (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Walder, 1995). 
  Tax farming refers to tax contracts between lower and higher levels of 
government agencies and between economic actors and local government agencies 
(Krug, 2007, p. 129). The consequences for local economic development were far-
reaching. In the system of tax farming, local governments are the claimants of 
marginal tax revenue (Oi, 1992; Wong, 1992). In other words, they keep the surplus 
tax, so they have incentives to increase revenues in their jurisdictions, i.e. help local 
entrepreneurs and spur economic development (Gregory, Tenev and Wagle, 2000; Oi, 
1992; Walder 1995). As a result, localities offer a local resource base outside central 
control (Zhu, 2007). Generally, a system with local jurisdictions competing for 
business promotes local economic development (Dougherty and McGuckin, 2008). 
 Another consequence is the increased interaction between local business 
communities and local governments. The literature on local state corporatism (Oi, 
1995 and Walder 1995) and state entrepreneurship (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008; 
Gold, Guthrie and Wank, 2002; Oi, 1995) has described how formal and informal 
negotiations have led to strategic alliances between local firms and local governments 
(Zhu, 2007). A feature of this system is the use of incentive contracts, also called crop-
sharing contracts. These contracts reward managerial talent, mobilize financial and 
VRFLDOFDSLWDODQGDOLJQJRYHUQPHQWDQGHFRQRPLFDJHQWV¶ LQWHUHVWV2QHRI WKHPDLQ
benefits of this system is that it provides incentives to innovate (Stiglitz, 1999).  
 Generally, economic actors have the choice to do something alone or collectively. 
However, with ill-functioning markets and shrinking coordination of state socialist 
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institutions as a result of dismantling the state socialist economy, private cooperation 
offers higher rent (Ostrom, 1990; Krug, 2007). The alliance of economic ± and 
government actors in networks has the clear purpose of pursuing and developing 
economic interest, i.e. they are business networks (Hendrischke, 2004, 2007). The 
actors in these networks are domestic firms and local governments but also foreign 
investors. Foreign investors are not only carriers of FDI but become part of the local 
business environment. Cooperation with local institutions and the ability to manage 
local knowledge in combination with foreign technology, management skills and 
capital is crucial for foreign firms (Child and Yan, 2003; Peng and Luo, 2000). 
 Considering the importance of business networks, it is useful to outline the main 
functions of Chinese business networks (outlined by Krug and Hendrischke, 2007). 
First, they help to overcome resource constraints. Given limited expertise, nobody to 
imitate, to copy, liability of newness, and no collective memory, i.e. a general 
underinvestment in resources, firms need to rely on skills outside the firm, such as the 
formal education system, the Party nomenclature  (Nee, 2000) or business networks. 
Second, networks help to overcome institutional weakness (Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Wank, 1996; Xin and Pearce, 1996). Third, networks can help to overcome the 
problem of underinvestment in resources. Networks can function as a collective 
resource, i.e. a reduction of the relational risk in business deals. Individual actors will 
invest in networks as the actor expects to produce a benefit that it can appropriate. 
Networks are a social mechanisms for coordinating economic activities in 
ZKLFK¶PXWXDO WUXVWDIILQLW\QRUPVRIUHFLSURFLW\DQGUHSXWDWLRQOLPLWPRUDOKD]DUG¶
(Krug, 2007, p. 134). Fourth, networks can fill the institutional vacuum caused by 
negotiation between economic actors and local governments in the search for suitable 
rules and regulations (Hendrischke, 2004; Oi 1995; Walder 1995). 
 In sum, critical resources are governed by a variety of actors and it is unclear who 
is governing exactly what. The role of the national government is relatively small as 
systems like fiscal federalism and revenue sharing contracts decentralize decision 
making power to local governments and business communities. Moreover, public-
private partnerships and collusion of interests between local governments and private 
business decrease the transparency of governance. The economic realm is occupied by 
informal business networks with specific informally agreed upon rules of enforcement.  
 
3.7 Summary and goals 
In order to find an answer to the research problem and facilitate the empirical study, 
we have selected criteria to distinguish innovations, singled out antecedents of 
successful innovation and identified the main features of capabilities. Moreover, we 
explained how institutional arrangements can facilitate or constrain the development 
of particular innovative capabilities, while singling out several specific features of 
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&KLQD¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQGLWLRQVIn particular, we identified institutional constraints on 
innovation, namely underinvestment in resources and uncertainty of governance of 
those resources (i.e. availability and use of resources, Chapter 1). Combined with the 
sectoral (technical, market) constraints identified in Chapter 2, innovation in China 
requires capabilities that manage technical, market and institutional constraints. 
Figure 3.1 provides a graphic representation of the working theory. 
 The following intellectual goals can be singled out for the empirical study. The 
study starts with setting the institutional frame for innovation by analysing the features 
of the key institutions that govern and coordinate access and distribution for critical 
resources for the software sectors. In particular, the study needs to identify the 
consequences of institutional transition at the local level. Subsequently, the core of the 
study proceeds to analyse underlying firm-level mechanisms that explain the 
development of innovative capabilities of Chinese private entrepreneurs in that 
institutional frame. More specifically, the analysis aims to: (1) identify and explain 
innovative behaviour of Chinese private software firms; (2) identify and analyse 
sectoral ± and institutional constraints on innovation and (3) analyse the development 
of innovative capabilities in response to those constraints. The next chapter will 
introduce the research setting. 
 
Figure 3.1: Working theory for innovative capability development in China 
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Chapter 4 
 
Economic prosperity, private business and three 
software sectors in Hangzhou 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The development of successful IT sectors ± and software in particular ± is regionally 
concentrated in China. The geographic distribution of innovating firms in the IT 
sectors is unequal: most of the best performing firms are located in the Yangtze River 
Delta, the Pearl River Delta and the Bohai Sea Rim (OECD, 2007). Furthermore, 
innovation is increasingly observed in domestic private enterprises (OECD, 2007; Lu, 
2000; Zhou, 2008). Considering these two features of innovation in China, the 
selection of an appropriate location involves several criteria: the location needs to have 
strongly developed software sectors in a coastal region and private business as 
dominant form of organization in the software sector. Moreover, the location should 
be relatively prosperous compared to the national average as to function as a 
benchmark for other locations.  
 Beyond choosing a location for the research, the selection of a location reflects 
WKH VHOHFWLRQRID ORFDO LQVWLWXWLRQDO IUDPH7KH µSRSXODWLRQ¶ is a variety of localities 
across China. The choice of location thus becomes important, as the fieldwork has a 
strong local bias and defines the scope of generalization. The selection of one location 
takes into consideration the intensive data collection efforts necessary for getting 
familiar with the local context in terms of language, local culture and developing local 
networks with research partners and business enterprises. Therefore a more detailed 
description of the research setting is warranted.  
 Whereas the majority of studies focuses on BeiMLQJ¶V =KRQJJXDQFXQ DUHD RU
general overviews of the software sectors across Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Dalian 
and Guangdong (e.g. Zhou, 2008; Tschang and Xue, 2005; IFC, 2005), we choose to 
study the software sectors in Zhejiang province, Hangzhou district. I used four criteria 
to select Hangzhou. First, the presence of a significant indigenous software industry. 
The software industry in Hangzhou is emerging successfully: 23.7 billion RMB in 
2005 sales revenues of software products 9 , 300 million dollars software product 
exports (Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008). Software development, as I will show in 
this chapter is predominantly local and indigenous, i.e. not focused on outsourcing or 
sales. Therefore, the setting allows studying the emerging indigenous software sectors 
                                                          
9 Note that this is the majority of the Zhejiang province total of 25,1 billion RMB. 
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and its capabilities. Second, the private firm as a dominant form of economic 
FRRUGLQDWLRQDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQ+DQJ]KRX LV RQHRI WKH FHQWUHV IRU&KLQD¶V ERRPLQJ
private sector. The significant share (95%) of enterprises of other types of ownership, 
i.e. non-governmental enterprises and 90% contribution to gross industrial output of 
the city, illustrate this point (Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008).  
 Third, the success of the locality in terms of economic prosperity and business 
prospects. The latter is important because then the locality is more likely to function as 
a benchmark for other localities and thus enhances the generalizability of this study. 
Hangzhou is the capital of Zhejiang Province, a south-east coastal province. At the 
forefront of economic development, it offers one of the best business climates in China 
HJ:RUOG%DQN)RXUWKSUHVHQFHRI DOO WKUHH VRIWZDUH VHFWRUV+DQJ]KRX¶V
software industry is structured as follows: standard software (33%), enterprise 
software (32%), newly emerging middleware (18%, but especially growing fast last 2 
years, i.e. many new firms are not included in CSIA yet) and others (18%).  
 This chapter will elaborate on these four features of Hangzhou by discussing the 
economic prosperity of Hangzhou, industrial structure, the role of the private sector in 
the local economy and software sectors.  
 
4.2 Success and economic prosperity 
Hangzhou is the capital of Zhejiang Province, a south-east coastal province. At the 
forefront of economic development, Hangzhou has been praised for offering the best 
EXVLQHVV FOLPDWH LQ &KLQD :RUOG %DQN  $V &KLQD¶V th largest exporter, it 
DFFRXQWVIRUDOPRVWKDOIRI&KLQD¶VWUDGHVXUSOXV7KHLQGXVWULDODQGFRPPHUFLDOIRFXV
is on light industries, such as IT, tourism, textiles and trade. Zhejiang is home to 
VHYHUDO &KLQHVH LQGLJHQRXV EUDQGV VXFK DV :DKDKD VRIW GULQNV DQG $OLEDED¶V H-
commerce model. Hangzhou, though relatively unknown outside China for its 
prosperous economic development, is part of the rich and dynamic Shanghai-Nanjing-
Hangzhou triangle which account for over 20% of national GDP. It has 6.5 million 
inhabitants, a mid-sized city in China, with a total GDP of 340 billion RMB or 51,000 
RMB per capita in 2006 (cf. Zhejiang Province: 1,350 billion RMB and 29,000 RMB 
respectively). GDP growth since 1978 is on average 19% per year; the lowest growth 
being 7% in 1982 and the highest growth being 46% in 1993. 
 Hangzhou is prosperous and that shows in the relatively high GDP per capita, 
annual average income per capita and living expenditures per capita. Table 4.1 (next 
page) compares Hangzhou on these indicators with the national averages. Over the 
period 1990- +DQJ]KRX¶V SHU FDSLWD *'3 KDV QRW RQO\ LQFUHDVHG IURP ,310 
RMB to 51,878 RMB, it also has grown from two times the national average to three 
times in 2006. Annual gross income has increased tenfold and in 2006 is twice the 
national average. However, the living expenditures have also risen significantly and 
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are also almost twice the national DYHUDJH$OO LQ DOO+DQJ]KRX¶V LV VXUSDVVLQJ WKH
national average economic growth indicators on all fronts and can be considered a rich 
and prosperous city.  
 
7DEOH+DQJ]KRX¶VSURVSHULW\FRPSDUHG (RMB) 
GDP per capita Annual income Living expenditures 
Year Hangzhou China Hangzhou China Hangzhou China 
1990 3,310 1,644 1,999 1,510 1,685 1,279 
1995 12,797 5,046 9,121 4,283 5,559 3,538 
2000 22,342 7,858 9,709 6,280 7,790 4,998 
2005 44,853 14,103 18,762 10,493 13,438 7,943 
2006 51,878 16,084 21,367 11,759 14,472 8,697 
Source: Hangzhou and China Statistical Yearbooks Online, 2008 
 
4.3 Industrial structure: towards tertiary industries 
Hangzhou has a strong foreign trade and investment orientation, high proportion of the 
population is educated ± benefits shared with Beijing and Shanghai ± and is home to 
RQH RI &KLQD¶V OHDGLQJ VFLHQFH DQG WHFKQRORJ\ LQVWLWXWHV =KHMLDQJ 8QLYHUVLW\ 7KH
local economy has a strong white-collar and tertiary industry character with a focus on 
science and education. These traits are the result of a long-standing academic tradition 
± with Zhejiang University centre-stage ± and traditional focus on light industries, as 
argued in the previous section. In combination with recent advancements in physical 
and digital infrastructure, Hangzhou has become a centre for science and engineering 
in the fields of electronics, food stuffs and textile.  
 In official parlance, Hangzhou has five backbone industries ± electronics and 
information, textiles and garments, machinery and manufacture, medicine and 
chemical engineering, and food and beverage. This reflects a focus on secondary and 
tertiary industries. Traditionally Hangzhou had, with limited resources and farmland, 
limited agricultural production capabilities, and an underdeveloped primary industry 
compared to the other industries. The secondary and tertiary industries were dominant 
LQFRQWULEXWLRQWR*'3DQGKRZDJULFXOWXUHZDVQHYHUUHDOO\LPSRUWDQWWR+DQJ]KRX¶V
GHYHORSPHQWLQWHUPVRI*'37RFRPSDUH&KLQD¶VQDWLRQDO*'3ZDVVWLOOPDGe up 
of primary industry for 12% in 2005, 18% in 1997 and 25% in 1989. Nevertheless, 
Hangzhou is the source for several famous agricultural products, like the Longjin 
green tea and silk production ± biggest in China ± and which provides input for the 
booming garment industry. The realized value added of the secondary and tertiary 
industries in 2006 was 174,199 billion RMB and 154,408 billion RMB. In the 
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secondary industries most output came from high-tech manufacturing enterprises, 
about 116,532 billion RMB, up by 45.6 percent over the previous year.  
 However, it is the tertiary industry that attracts our attention. The overall 
development sped up in all of the following sectors: Post and Telecommunications, 
Domestic Trade, Market of Production Means, Banking and Insurance, Real Estate, 
Tourism, and Information Industry. Hangzhou has a strong garment industry and the 
local government has been putting emphasis on design, manufacturing and trading 
ZRPHQ¶VZHDUDOUHDG\UHDFKLQJDQRXWSXWRIELOOLRQ50%LQ02 and establishing 
EUDQGVRIZRPHQ¶VZHDU$SDUWIURPWKHVHLQGXVWULHV+DQJ]KRXDOVRKDVDVWURQJ
IT sector with international IT giants such as Microsoft. ,Q  +DQJ]KRX¶V
information industry had a total income of 128 billion RMB, of which the sales 
income of software products was over 23 billion RMB. It is noteworthy that the 
development of such IT sectors is strongly influenced by the presence of large firms, 
such as China Telecom, China Mobile, Alibaba and UTStarcom. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that local firms enter into long-term customer and/or supplier relationships 
with large firms.  
 
4.4 Changing ownership patterns: towards private entrepreneurship 
The secondary and tertiary industries are dominated by private enterprises. Moreover, 
HangzKRXLVRQHRIWKHFHQWUHVIRU&KLQD¶VERRPLQJSULYDWHVHFWRU7KHRWKHUVEHLQJ
Nanjing/Suzhou, Shenzhen and Shanghai (China Statistical Yearbook Online, 2008). 
:KHUHDV WKHVHDQGRWKHUFLWLHV¶SURVSHULW\ LVGULYHQE\ WKHSUR[LPLW\ WR+RQJ.RQJ
(e.g. Shenzhen) and heavy inflow of investments from Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs and investors (e.g. Nanjing/Suzhou), Zhejiang province developed more 
indigenously, relying on domestic key resources. At the end of the state socialist 
economy era, the province had not many large state-owned companies that drew 
resources and attention from the central government. Moreover, due to the lack of 
natural resources and limited farmland, the central government more or less 
µQHJOHFWHG¶WKLVUHJLRQ=KHMLDQJORFDOVWKXVwere relatively independent.  
 Figure 4.1 (next page) illustrates the significant share of enterprises of other 
types of ownership, i.e. non-governmental enterprises which includes all firms that are 
not exclusively owned by the state or majority foreign investment: TVEs, household 
enterprises, private enterprises, SOE spin-offs, publicly listed joint stock companies 
(Tsui, Bian and Cheng, 2006). The contribution of non-governmental enterprises to 
gross industrial output shows a similar pattern. Moreover, from the 5.1 million 
workers in Hangzhou, 1.9 million work in the private sector (Hangzhou Statistics 
Online, 2008). From these figures and the historical developments we can draw the 
conclusion that private enterprise is the dominant form of economic organization and 
coordination in Hangzhou. 
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Figure 4.1: shift toward private ownership  
Number of industrial enterprises according to 
ownership in Hangzhou (1978-2006)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
78
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
SOEs Collectives other ownership TVEs
 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008.  
 
Private business in Hangzhou clearly shows a sectoral concentration. The private 
sector employs in total 1.9 million people of the 5.1 million available workers. Most of 
these employees work in wholesale & trade (650,000) and manufacturing (640,000) 
sectors. Over 57% of the private enterprises are in wholesale and trading business with 
31% of total registered capital and 35% of total employees. Manufacturing has only 
14% of private enterprises but employs 34% of total employees and has 30% of 
registered capital. The IT sectors do not show up in the statistics as a separate category 
EXW EHORQJ WR µPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶ IRU FRPSXWHU - and telecom hardware) and 
µ,QIRUPDWLRQ 7UDQVPLVVLRQ FRPSXWHU VHUYLFHV DQG VRIWZDUH¶ )XUWKHUPRUH WKH
interviews suggest that a part of the IT industries is recorded and registered under 
µWUDGH¶ ,Q JHQHUDO WHQWDWLYH HYLGHQFH EDVHG RQ WKHVH VWDWLVWLFV DQG WKe interviews 
suggests that there is a strong sectoral concentration of the private sector in Hangzhou 
and that many private enterprises operate in IT sectors. Table 4.2 (next page) 
summarizes the main features of the private sector according to sector in 2006. 
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7DEOH7KHVHFWRUDOFRQFHQWUDWLRQRI+DQJ]KRX¶VSULYDWHEXVLQHVVHV 
Sectors units employees 
registered 
capital (RMB) 
Total 384,763 1,891,113 19,674,630 
Wholesale and Retail Trade & Catering Services 218,650 658,976 6,117,439 
Manufacturing 52,337 648,170 5,855,175 
Service for the Residents and Other Service Sector 40,670 157,721 1,177,057 
Accommodation and Catering 23,154 79,640 383,149 
Transportation, Storage and Post 14,714 44,691 346,565 
Renting and Business Service 10,664 87,296 1,085,760 
Information Transmission, 
Computer Services and Software 6,169 56,647 630,465 
Others 5,955 39,271 1,177,778 
Farming 4,028 27,710 156,242 
Construction 3,819 49,707 1,117,368 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 1,788 8,066 73,170 
Real Estate 1,633 20,827 1,392,934 
Mining and Quarrying 510 6,098 44,454 
Health Care, Sports & Social Welfare 337 2,415 23,530 
 Electricity, Gas and Water 335 3,878 93,544 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008.  
 
4.5 Software sectors 
4.5.1 Indigenous software 
Graduates of Zhejiang University and other local universities started setting up 
software and other IT companies in the early 1990s. These entrepreneurial firms were 
complemented by larger companies like Eastcom and UTStarcom, which developed 
and manufactured telecommunications equipment. Hangzhou was the third city in 
China, after Beijing and Shanghai, to open connections to the Internet, in October 
1995. At the end of the 1990s e-commerce firms started to move into the scene. The 
FRXQWU\¶VPRVWVXFFHVVIXOGot-com ± Alibaba - opened its doors in 1999 when it chose 
Hangzhou as its R&D centre and headquarters. The company is unique among 
Chinese Internet services in that it has few equals. Whereas Sina.com, Sohu.com, 
Netease.com, and Tom.com all compete for the same Chinese Internet consumers by 
providing similar services, Alibaba is unrivaled in China. Alibaba is different in that it 
focuses on Internet-only activity. 
 Hangzhou is home to several successful but less well-known software firms: 
Hangzhou Handsome, Hangzhou Sunyard, Singlee Software, Zheda Supcon, Zheda 
Qware, Zheda Lande, Zhejiang Dahua Information and Hangzhou Newgrand. These 
firms all have an annual turnover of RMB 100 million or more. Some of them even 
have a turnover of over RMB 500 million. These firms are part of an emerging group 
of successful indigenous software firms in Hangzhou. Hangzhou is the 4th software 
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national industry base in China after Beijing, Shenzhen and Shanghai. Moreover, it 
saw growth rates of over 40% in the last years10.  
 The software industry in Hangzhou is emerging successfully: 23.7 billion RMB in 
2005 sales revenues of software products (of the Zhejiang province total of 25.1 
billion RMB), 300 million dollars software product exports (Hangzhou Government 
Online, 2007; Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008). Compare these numbers to other 
sectors in Hangzhou and we can only conclude that the software business is taking up 
a substantial part of the industrial landscape and has a solid position: retail/wholesale 
33.7 billion RMB; banking 25 billion RMB, real estate 21 billion RMB. The growth of 
the software industry is largely dependent on the presence of large firms such as China 
Mobile, China Telecom, Alibaba and UTStarcom. Many software entrepreneurs are 
former employees of Alibaba and UTStarcom.  
 The software sector has not only been growing in the past and has established 
LWVHOIDPRQJ+DQJ]KRX¶VVHFWRUV LW LVDOVR OLNHO\ WKDW LWZLOOFRQWLQXH WRJURZLQ WKH
future. A census among entrepreneurs by the Hangzhou Statistics Office shows that 
the software sector (and information transmission and computer service sectors) had 
the highest expectation rate (178 points) of all industries, leaving industry, 
construction, retail, real estate and tourism (on average 124 points) far behind. Only 
social services were seen as another booming sector (162 points). Besides an 
indigenous software industry there is a foreign software market. 
 
4.5.2 Foreign software firms 
The software industry has attracted multinationals like Microsoft, Oracle, Adobe, IBM, 
Lucent, and Intel. They all have software and computing related R&D centers and 
joint ventures with local companies in China. More recently, Oracle and Siemens have 
expanded and upgraded their R&D facilities in China. Siemens for instance, opened a 
3G software R&D centre in Hangzhou. More than 600 employees carry out research in 
solutions for 2.5G, 3G, Wimax and I-HSPA mobile telecommunication technologies 
as well as develop software platforms. Infosys has an R&D lab in Hangzhou hiring 
local software engineers. Motorola has acquired the respective set-top box assets of 
Zhejiang Dahua Digital Technology Company and Hangzhou ImageSilicon 
Technology Company. Intel Corporation opened a software innovation and support 
centre in 2007. Intel Capital, its global investment arm, approved an investment of 
US$10.5 million in a local industrial automation technology provider. The investment 
will help Zhejiang Supcon Technology Co, a subsidiary of Hangzhou-based Supcon 
Group, to further penetrate the market and enhance its ability to provide automation 
solutions worldwide. Acknowledging Hangzhou as an e-commerce centre, IBM, who 
                                                          
10 http://www.tdctrade.com/alert/cba-e0504sp1.htm 
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established a branch office in 2005, announced in 2008 to set up their global e-
commerce platform in Hangzhou. Yahoo! China was recently bought by Alibaba and 
now has its headquarters in Hangzhou as well. In sum, foreign software firms have set 
up R&D labs in Hangzhou and have engaged in local joint research.  
 
4.5.3 Market structure 
Though the statistics and information regarding the software industry is increasingly 
elaborate and consistent, it is hard to assess how many software firms exactly operate 
in Hangzhou. The official statistics of China Software Industry Association (CSIA), 
where every software firm is supposed to register in order operate legally 
mentions about 180 firms in Hangzhou in 2005. Only the CSIA provides information 
about products, assets and employees. However, there are indications that this list is 
incomplete. One paper on the software industry in Hangzhou mentions 324 software 
firms in July 2002. However, they do not mention how they constructed this list. 
Furthermore, the People's Daily speaks of 400 software firms in 2001. The official 
website of the Hangzhou government (and the local Statistics Bureau) even states 
2000 software firms. Another government website, focused on the local IT industry, 
lists 281 software firms11 in 2007. These numbers may diverge because of delay in 
registration, registration of groups of firms versus single firms and the difference 
between firms related to software (maybe even only sales) versus 'real' software firms, 
i.e. which are independent software developers. However, only the CSIA data has data 
on number of employees, registered capital and products. Following the same statistics, 
China has about 8000-10.000 registered software firms. Most of those are located in 
Beijing, Guangdong, Zhejiang or Shanghai. The majority ± as far as can be derived 
from the data ± is either private or foreign. A recent IFC (2005) study shows that the 
Chinese software market can be divided into three segments: products (51%), systems 
integration (33%) and IT services (16%). A handful of these firms are large but the 
majority, 95% is an SME12. 
 
Table 4.3: Zhejiang software market structure (RMB) 
Sector  Employees  Average number 
of employees 
Asset value 
range million  
Average total 
assets million  
Enterprise software 5-848 83 employees 0.5-45  6.6 
Middleware 5-2,244 165 employees 0.5-40 11 
Standard software 7-1,241 138 employees 0.5-100 10 
Source: China Software Industry Association (2007) 
 
                                                          
11 http://www.hangzhouit.gov.cn/cyfwpt/news/QYWZ_478/200512223294.aspx  
12 Unfortunately detailed comparative data for the sub sectors is not available 
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According to the CSIA there are 245 approved software firms in Zhejiang province 
and about 180 in Hangzhou, or about 75%. According to the president of the Zhejiang 
Software Industry Association over 90% of the software business is located within the 
Hangzhou locality. Total employment in these registered firms is 31,250 persons and a 
WRWDO DVVHW YDOXH RI  ELOOLRQ50%$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH&6,$+DQJ]KRX¶V VRIWZDUH
industry is structured as follows: standard software (33%), enterprise software (32%), 
newly emerging middleware (18%, but especially growing fast last 2 years, i.e. many 
new firms are not included in CSIA yet) and hardware/software combination (18%). 
According to the CSIA data most firms are SMEs (87% less than 200 employees) and 
have on average 139 employees and average total asset value of 9,300,000 RMB (see 
range and average for each sector in Table 4.3). The focus is on application software, 
systems integration services and embedded software and systems (e-commerce and 
network platform software, information system control). The main software markets in 
Hangzhou are presented in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Main software markets in Hangzhou 
Industry Examples 
Banking, securities, 
funds and finance 
Hangzhou Handsome, Hangzhou Sunyard, Singlee Software and 
Hangzhou Newgrand. The securities software produced by 
Handsome has a 46% share of the national market. The company's 
banking software has the second largest market share in China. 
Sing Lee Software, Hangzhou Sunyard System Engineering and 
Handsome Electronics accounted for 70% of the total market 
Medicine and health Major companies include the Hangzhou Chuangye Software. Its 
products are used in more than 300 hospitals on the mainland 
Printing, dyeing and 
garment-making 
Kaiyuan Computer Technology, Iechosoft Computer Technology, 
Honghua Digital Computer Technology 
Taxation, industry 
and commerce, and 
public security 
Major companies producing software for taxation and industrial 
and commercial administration systems include Hangzhou Jinshui, 
Hangzhou Hangjiahu, Hangzhou Speed 
E-commerce Alibaba, R&V, Kadang Net and Netsun are provide online 
platforms for consumers, business firms and local governments to 
interact, exchange information and close business deals.  
 
4.6 Summary 
The research setting for the empirical study is Hangzhou district. Hangzhou is one of 
the most prosperous regions of China in terms of GDP, income and wages. 
+DQJ]KRX¶VJRYHUQPHQWDSSHDUVWRZRUNµDWDUP¶VOHQJWK¶LHDQRQ-intervening local 
government. Moreover, private firms are the dominant economic actors. The focus of 
the local development strategy is on innovation via high-tech zones and private 
entrepreneurship. The service and high-tech industries are the successfully developing 
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industries. More specifically, the three software sectors that are subject to this study 
have developed successfully in Hangzhou. In short, Hangzhou is an appropriate 
research setting for the purpose of this study. The next chapter will discuss the 
research methods and techniques of my empirical study. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Research method and techniques 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the study is to explain what kinds of innovative capability Chinese 
private entrepreneurs in the software sectors developed in response to what kinds of 
VHFWRUDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWVLQ&KLQD¶VWUDQVLWLRQHFRQRP\ The nature of the 
research problem and the analytical framework set several challenges for the design of 
an appropriate empirical study. First, institutional transformation by definition brings 
along complexity, uncertainty and instability. It involves profound changes in 
institutional architecture, key strategic actors and dominant logics of coordination and 
organization of economic activities. Second, the study needs to take into account and 
reconcile two levels of analysis for studying the software sectors: the institutional ± 
and firm level. The empirical study will need to analyse both levels of analysis and 
identify crucial connections. Lastly, &KLQD¶VWUDQVLWLRQHconomy has specific research 
challenges. Whereas topics such as innovation and capabilities have been studied 
extensively in advanced economies, we cannot assume that the underlying 
mechanisms or even the understanding of these concepts is similar in China. In 
response to these challenges, a qualitative, inductive research approach is warranted. 
The study focuses on three newly emerging software sectors (Chapter 2) in one local 
institutional regime, Hangzhou (Chapter 4). In this chapter we will discuss the 
research techniques, data collection and analysis.  
 
5.2 The approach in this study: two types of case studies  
The empirical study rests on two types of case studies and follows a multiple case 
study design. The case study as a research method is one form of qualitative research13. 
In the broadest sense it refers to the in-depth study of a single instance of a social 
phenomenon. Case studies may help in both improving idiographic understanding of a 
particular case or form the basis for nomothetic theories14.  ³,QJHQHUDOFDVHVWXGLHV
DUHWKHSUHIHUUHGVWUDWHJ\ZKHQµKRZ¶DQGµZK\¶TXHVWLRQVDUHEHLQJSRVHG«DQGZKHQ
the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-OLIH FRQWH[W´ <LQ
2003:1, 6). Case studies are typically rich in data, preserve the QDUUDWLYHµZKROH¶LH
include the context), involve interpretative analysis, allow for the study of causal 
                                                          
13 The other forms for instance being ethno-methodology, grounded theory, institutional ethnography, 
participatory action research, etc. (Babbie, 2004) 
14 Therefore, case studies are neither limited to theory-building nor to theory-testing 
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complexities, multilevel analysis, and often involve concept formation or modification 
(Babbie, 2004; Ragin, 1987).  
 Four key features of case study research can be singled out (Ragin, 1987). First, 
uncovering patterns of invariance and constant association beyond statistical 
probabilities as evidence for causal relationships. Second, case studies are relatively 
insensitive to sampling and sampling distributions, the variety of meaningful patterns 
is more important. Third, cases are seen as whole entities, not as collections of 
variables. It is the different conditions together that constitute a single situation or 
phenomenon. Last and one of the key points, case study research involves a rich 
dialogue between empirical data and ideas. Few simplifying assumptions are made 
which prevents restricted or constrained examination of the evidence. Referring back 
to the challenges outlined in the introduction of this chapter, the case study method is 
appropriate for the current study as the research question under investigation involves 
multiple levels of analysis, complex causal connections and aims to improve our 
understanding of underlying social mechanisms in a specific sectoral - and locally 
constrained research context. The nature of the research question of this study suggests 
that case studies are the preferred research strategy.  
 
Two types of case study are used in this thesis: 
 (1) The first type of case study aims to set the institutional frame by identifying 
and analyzing the key institutions that provide and distribute critical resources for 
software development in Hangzhou. In particular: the role of the state, skill 
development and formal education, and the financial system. The case considered here 
is one locality in China, Hangzhou. The case study aims to capture the complexity of 
local institutions in terms of opportunities and restrictions. On the one hand, we need 
to identify those key factors that play a significant role in the dismantling the state 
socialist economy. On the other hand, we need to analyse the consequences of such 
dismantling as caused by these factors. The analysis sets the institutional frame for the 
investigation of innovative behaviour at the firm level. 
 
 (2) The second type of case study analyses the underlying firm-level mechanisms 
that explain the development of innovative capabilities of Chinese private 
entrepreneurs to fight off sectoral and institutional constraints. Referring back to the 
main research problem and Chapter 3, the goals of this case study are threefold: 1) 
analyse innovative behaviour of Chinese private firms; 2) identify and analyse sectoral 
± and institutional constraints on innovation and 3) identify and analyse the 
development of innovative capabilities in response to those constraints. Evidently, the 
aim is to identify patterns of behaviour. A multiple-case study is the most appropriate 
method to capture sectoral variety and patterns of innovative capability development.  
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 A multiple-case study has the following distinguishing features: First, a cross-
case research design focuses on finding patterns across a set of cases. Next, it enables 
a replication logic in which cases are a series of experiments that allow 
(dis)confirmation of inferences drawn from the others (Yin, 2003). Next, a key feature 
of interpreting cases in a cross-case analysis is the confrontation of the cases with 
concepts and theories as developed in Chapter 3 (Maeki, 1993). Therefore the 
multiple-case study does not follow a linear process of data collection and analysis. 
Last, there is no strict guiding principle for the number of cases. Multiple-case studies 
follow a saturation principle, i.e. no more new cases are added whenever a saturation 
point is reached. The saturation point is defined as that number of cases beyond which 
adding an additional case causes no significant change in the identified pattern. 
Concluding, the results are typically more generalizable and better grounded than 
single-case study designs (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). Before discussing the data 
collection and analysis strategies I will describe the sampling strategy and the sample 
of firms in this study. 
 
5.3 Sample of the multiple case study 
We need to QRWH FHUWDLQ VDPSOLQJ LVVXHV UHODWHG WR &KLQD¶V FRQWH[W %H\RQG WKH
problems associated with sampling for China-wide research, there are several 
problems associated with the sampling within smaller research settings, such as 
provinces and cities. What type of sample selection is appropriate? Considering the 
aim of this empirical study to compare three sectors, stratified sampling seems to be 
more appropriate than random sampling. The second issue is how to define the 
population. Although it is possible to obtain lists and directories of organizations to 
take samples, there are at least two problems. First, how up-to-date are these lists? 
Second, how independent are the lists? The costs of accessing respondents via 
intermediaries and state authorization make it already difficult to assess the 
characteristics of the population under consideration. Not paying attention to these 
LVVXHV PLJKW OHDG WR µFRQYHQLHQFH¶ VDPSOLQJ 7KHUHIRUH LW LV YHU\ LPSRUWDQW WKDW D
researcher understand the system in which he does his study and is aware of the 
different parties and interests (Roy, Walters, Luk, 2001). The representativeness of the 
sample is determined by the research problem, the analytical framework and it is the 
researcher that needs to assure representativeness in the field. 
  The selection criteria for firms in this study were as follows: (1) small or medium 
size (1-300 employees), (2) privately owned, (3) independent software developers, i.e. 
firms focused on software development rather than other businesses and (4) in one of 
the three software sectors. The size of the sample was not determined beforehand. The 
main criterion was the saturation criterion. This is neither a consensus-based cut-off 
point, as is usual in social science research, nor a convenience criterion but a 
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theoretical criterion. It means that past the saturation point, an additional case does not 
add much explanatory power. The classification of firms into the three sub sectors was 
relatively straightforward since firms often identify themselves as working in one of 
the three sectors. To ensure that each firm was classified correctly I also used three 
TXHVWLRQV LQ WKH LQWHUYLHZ  GHVFULSWLRQ RIPDLQ SURGXFWV  VHUYLFHV  WKH ILUP¶V
main competitive strategy; 3) the extent of customization.  
 The sample consists of 45 software firms in three distinct software sectors with an 
average age of 5.8 years (1995-2006), on average 75 employees (6-260) and, if 
making sales revenues, between 200,000 (Internet software) and 80 million RMB 
(large scale ERP project for government). Enterprise software is extensively 
customized software using platforms or modules. On average these firms are 6.6 years 
old (1995-2006) and employ 73 employees (6-200). Standard application based 
software is written for large homogenous markets. These firms are on average 5.6 
years old (1996-2006) and employ 46 people (28-100). Middleware is a new sector 
focusing on interface technologies that link basic architecture of digital 
communication networks to standard application software, thereby coordinating 
various technologies. These firms are on average the youngest in the sample with 5.4 
years (1995-2006) but employ the most people, 95 (8-260).  
 
Table 5.1: sample versus population size characteristics 
 Population Sample (45) 
Standard software Mean: 65; sd*: 53 Mean: 46; sd: 27 
Middleware Mean: 75; sd: 61 Mean: 95; sd: 85 
Enterprise software Mean: 62; sd: 79 Mean: 73; sd: 62 
All Mean: 67; sd: 64 Mean: 71; sd: 58 
*sd = standard deviation 
 
The only way to show how representative this sample is for the population of software 
firms in Hangzhou is by comparing the size characteristics. A lack of systematic data 
for the population of software firms in Hangzhou is one of the data restrictions 
researchers in China have to deal with. AccordLQJWRWKH&6,$+DQJ]KRX¶VVRIWZDUH
industry is structured as follows: standard software (33%), enterprise software (32%), 
newly emerging middleware (18%), and hardware/software combinations (18%). 
Especially the middleware sector is growing fast last 2 years and many new firms are 
not included in CSIA yet15. Most firms are SMEs (87% less than 200 employees) and 
these have on average 67 employees and average total asset value of 9.300.000 RMB. 
Table 5.1 compares the size characteristics of our sample with the population of 
software SMEs Hangzhou. The results suggest that the sample is representative for 
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Hangzhou, at least in terms of size, as the averages and standard deviations do not 
show a different pattern. 
 We note here two sample selection biases. The first is that the study is limited to 
successful firms, i.e. firms that still operate and have products on a market. The 
consequence is that we cannot compare our findings with firms that have not been 
successful in innovation. Therefore we cannot check if firms that are not successful 
innovators indeed lack the capabilities we identify. Hence we cannot know if the 
capabilities we identify are all necessary and sufficient for successful innovation. 
However, we can at least assume that these capabilities are sufficient for innovation if 
we find systematic patterns across the sectors. The second bias is that access to these 
enterprises was sought via Zhejiang University, the University Science Park and 
GLUHFWO\YLDWKHDXWKRUV¶SHUVRQDOQHWZRUNV:HWDNHQRWHof the fact that this might not 
be considered representative by the usual social-scientific standards of Western 
research practice because all mediators were likely to have applied their own filters to 
the sample. We could run the risk that our mediators have selected the most successful 
firms in terms of innovation. This is a context specific research limitation, faced by 
every researcher in China doing in-depth field interviews (cf. Krug, 2004). However, 
we believe that we have mitigated the majority of the selection biases by not using 
HYHU\µVXJJHVWHG¶ILUPGRLQJEDFNJURXQGUHVHDUFKRQWKHVHOHFWHGILUPGHYHORSLQJD
trust-based relationship with local mediators and only surveying firms that fit our 
theoretical criteria. Altogether, we suggest that the combined information is rich and 
unique and allows us to learn about firm-level innovation in China. 
 
5.4 Data collection 
As discussed in section 2, this study has two types of case studies. The first case study 
sets the institutional frame by analyzing the institutional arrangements in Hangzhou. 
The second case study is a multiple case study of Chinese software firms in three 
sectors in order to analyse the development of innovative capabilities in response to 
sectoral and institutional constraints. The data requirements and strategies for these 
two case studies are different. Before we go into detail with the data collection 
strategy, it is useful to note several specific aspects of research design in the Chinese 
context that need to be considered.  
 The following aspects in research design have to be reckoned with: measurement 
equivalence, language issues, interpretation of concepts (Malhotra, Agarwal, 1996). 
Do Likert-scales have the same meaning for Chinese? Open questions might lead to 
more reliable ansZHUV'RFRQFHSWVVXFKDVµZDUUDQWLHV¶DQGµOHJDOVHFXULWLHV¶KDYHWKH
same meaning for Chinese? Could you ask Chinese to answer hypothetical questions? 
                                                                                                                                                  
15 Interview with the president of Zhejiang Software Industry Association, September 26, 2007 
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Bond and Hwang (1986) show that Chinese have problems with hypothetical 
situations. Shenkar (1994) for instance shows that managers often have to interact with 
VWDWH RIILFLDOV ZKLFK PDNHV WKHLU µDXWRQRPRXV¶ PDQDJHPHQW GHFLVLRQV OHVV
autonomous. Finally, translation of questions to the Chinese language is a very 
important step in the research design. Fortunately, established back-translation 
procedures make things manageable (Brislin, 1970). In all cases it is important to 
know who your respondents or interview candidates are and what the system is in 
which they live and work (Krug, 2004). Considering topic sensitivity, social 
acquiescence and researcher response bias is especially important when a researcher 
carries out the research himself. 
 
5.4.1 Documentary data and interview data for the Hangzhou case study 
A variety of sources is necessary to reconstruct the institutional influences at the local 
level in Hangzhou. The starting point of the study was the Hangzhou Statistical 
Yearbook that provides the most comprehensive data. However, there are limitations 
to the use of such secondary data published by the government (Roy, Walters, Luk, 
2001). For instance, data sources most often provide only data on the macro-level. 
Even though the state has recognized the crucial role of good information for policy 
decisions, and has improved the statistical system, there are many problems with the 
data that could lead to inferential errors. Data collection by the state is often 
inconsistent among the different bureaus, provinces and cities. Furthermore, data is 
often inaccurate, obsolesce and subjective ± in the sense that local party officials want 
to sketch a more positive picture of their locality for the central government. Therefore, 
when using secondary data, incompleteness and inaccurateness of the data needs to be 
considered.  
 Next to that, the government still has strong control over data. How to get access 
to the relevant statistics? Even though the opening-up of the economy led to more 
open research and sharing of information, it is often unclear what is restricted 
information and what types of research are permitted. Cooperation with local 
researchers or institutions is crucial. However, problems of self-censorship, sanction 
H[SRVXUH :HVWHUQ UHVHDUFKHU¶V OLPLWHG DFFHVV WR LQIRUPDWLRQ WUDGLWLRQ WR SURYLGH
macro-level data, lack of control over data collection activities and lack of 
transparency are not be underestimated. Therefore, the political issues surrounding 
organization research are substantial and need to be made explicit. Even in the case of 
numerical research involving statistics, we cannot assume the quality and reliability of 
the data. Therefore, limitations of secondary data necessitate researchers to visit China 
and assure the quality and reliability of data collection methods and representativeness. 
Therefore, after an initial assessment of the data available in the Statistical Yearbook, 
significant additional data collection efforts were necessary.  
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 The data set that forms the basis for the case study on Hangzhou is based on in 
total six different sources. The first is the Hangzhou Statistical Yearbook since 2000 
available online. The second is a collection of news items in English and Chinese from 
news websites. Third, historical background information from a variety of historical 
VRXUFHVRQ=KHMLDQJ¶VDQG+DQJ]KRX¶VKLVWRU\)RXUWKJHQHUDO LQformation websites 
from the Hangzhou government. Furthermore, especially detailed information on 
human resources was missing in the preceding data sources. Therefore, my fifth source 
is based on new data from a unique database of Zhejiang University alumni and 
supplemented with firm level data on human resource issues in Hangzhou. The former 
is obtained with the help of a personal contact in the Zhejiang University Career 
Development Centre. The firm-level interview data will be described in more detail in 
the next section. Summarizing, the data for analyzing +DQJ]KRX¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDO frame 
is obtained from documentary data sources supplemented with interviews. 
 
5.4.2 Firm-level background ± and interview data for the multiple case study 
The multiple case study is based on firm-level in-depth interviews and triangulated 
with background information. Prior and after the firm interviews I collected data on 
WKH ILUPV IURP D YDULHW\ RI VRXUFHV )LUVW WKH ILUP¶V ZHEVLWH XVXDOO\ LQ &KLQHVH
provides relatively detailed information on history of the firm, products, news 
announcements and partnerships with other firms, universities or government agencies. 
Second, local investment firms provide detailed information on firms and news for 
selected industries. A good example is the commercial private local Hangzhou Hexun 
website that offers up-to-date local business information in Chinese. Next, together 
with a group of graduate students from Zhejiang University we did a news search in 
local and national news websites to supplement the cases. Fourth, we contacted the 
Zhejiang Software Industry Association and obtained a list of software firms in 
Hangzhou with product, personnel size, asset value and website information. These 
sources together form part of each case study. 
 However, the main data source was the in-depth interview in the firms. In a 
society characterised by a large role of informal institutions, as opposed to formal 
UXOHV DQG UHJXODWLRQV DQ LQIRUPDO LQWHUYLHZ ZLWK FRQVLGHUDEOH WLPH WR µGLJ-XS¶ WKH
story is preferred. The interviews also allowed the respondents to express their 
understanding in their own terms which allows unambiguous communication and 
establishes communicative validity. The semi-structured interviews were done with 
either founders or senior managers. All interviewees have a background in engineering 
ZLWKDW OHDVW D%DFKHORU¶VGHJUHH$OWKRXJK WKHUHPD\EHDELDV LQ WKHDQVZHUVDV D
result of the types of informants, we believe that the information is reliable due to the 
use of alternative sources of information, comparison of answers to equivalent 
questions and discussion during the interviews.  
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Table 5.2: Interview questions 
Topic Number of questions Questions in interview 
(I) Innovation & capabilities 31 1-26 
Strategy  3 1,2,5 
Innovation process 9 8-16, 26 
External partners 11 17a-17k 
HRM 8 18-25 
(II) Sectoral constraints 15 27-41 
Competition 5 27-31 
Customers 5 32-36 
Technology  5 37-41 
(III) Institutional constraints 16 42-57 
Uncertainty 12 42-53 
Lack of resources 4 plus 3 in (I) 54-57 
Total 61 1-58 
 
5.4.3 Designing interview questions 
The interview covers the three topics of this study: innovative capabilities, sectoral 
constraints and institutional constraints. I will discuss each of these general themes 
and how they are represented in the interview schedule (Table 5.2). The questions for 
the interview were developed in close connection to the research problem and the 
analytical guide developed in Chapter 3. An English and Chinese version of the 
interview protocol can be found in the Appendix. 
 
(I) Innovation and innovative capabilities 
Innovation is here understood as a first attempt to carry out an idea for a new product 
or process into practice involving new knowledge or new combinations of existing 
knowledge. In this empirical study we investigated different aspects of innovation 
(Chapter 3): type, characteristics and systemic features. First, we singled out 5 types of 
innovation: new product and methods of production, new ways of organizing the value 
chain, opening new markets for goods and services and new ways to organize business. 
A set of questions (8-16, 26) deals with the innovation process and focuses on several 
examples of innovation, chosen by the entrepreneur. By using real-life examples the 
discussion is more focused and also allowed us to get a better understanding of the 
type of innovation process. Second, innovations can be incremental or radical. The 
assessment of innovations considered two aspects: substantially different core 
technology (as compared to the technological trajectory in the industry ) and 
substantially different product/services for customers relative to existing 
products/services in the industry. This is captured in the interviews with a series of 
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questions about the innovation process (questions 8-16), technological developments 
in the industry (questions 37-41) and customers/market (question 32-36). Third, 
innovations can differ in their systemic features, i.e. from systemic or modular to 
stand-alone. The assessment of innovations considered two aspects: switching costs 
and modularity, i.e. the interdependence of the innovation with other parts of 
organizing the economic activities done by the firm. A combination of questions about 
the innovation process, customers (32-36) and technology (37-41) was employed to 
capture this characteristic of innovation.  
 
Table 5.3: 16 categories of question topics about innovation and capabilities 
Categories ± developed economies literature Categories ± China literature 
Acquisition of new technology  Formal/informal external partners 
External partners for new knowledge Interaction with government 
Expert employees with diverse backgrounds Strategic swiftness/opportunism 
Coordination of innovation networks Founder network 
Access to finance Technical capacity 
Reputation in knowledge markets  
Technical capacity  
Flexible strategy  
CEO experience in entrepreneurship and innovation  
Firm-specific expertise  
Innovation orientation   
 
The questions about innovative capabilities started with a survey of capabilities and 
antecedents in the literature. Antecedents to innovative capabilities are those 
organizational processes that provide resources (originating in individual, firm or 
network level) to the firm that can give a potential competitive advantage in 
successfully developing and commercializing new products and services. In total 212 
unique antecedents are identified in the literature. Many of these antecedents were 
overlapping or related to the same topic. Therefore, these 212 antecedents were 
categorised according to topics. From these 212 potential antecedents 16 categories 
emerged (Table 5.3). The criteria for reducing the antecedents to these categories are: 
1) theoretically meaningful categories that match the conceptual definition of 
innovative capability; 2) deletion of overlapping or strongly related antecedents (e.g. 
business ties, business group, cooperation with university were combined into 
µH[WHUQDO SDUWQHU¶  GHOHWLRQ RI DQWHFHGHQWV WKDW ZHUH RQO\ PHQWLRQHG RQFH
However, most important was the confrontation of the set of antecedents with the 
conceptual literature and the research problem under investigation in this study.  These 
16 categories formed the basis for question development. The design of questions was 
eventually determined by the fit with the research problem and the working theory. 
 
898
 Research methods and techniques 83 
 
(II) Sectoral constraints 
The questions on sectoral constraints were based on ideas and studies from the sectoral 
innovation system literature. This literature argues (Chapter 2) argues that factors such 
as competition, market acceptance and technological characteristics best describe and 
distinguish sectors. These technological regimes have specific technical and market 
features. Sources for questions about these topics were, among others, the studies by 
Malerba (2004), Casper and Whitley (2004), Edquist (1997) on systems of innovation. 
Especially the ideas of the sectoral innovation system, as outlined in Chapter 2, proved 
useful for designing questions. This literature measures the characteristics of 
technological regimes in terms of: Opportunity conditions, appropriability conditions, 
(changes in) the knowledge base, and degree of cumulativeness (e.g. Malerba, Breschi 
and Orsenigo, 2000; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Parker and Tamaschke, 2005). 
 The characteristics of the knowledge base can be understood in terms of 
specificity, tacitness, complementarities and independence of knowledge (Dosi, 1988). 
However, instead of focusing on the technical details of certain technologies and their 
specific knowledge bases, the focus is on how changes in the knowledge base pose 
constraints. The research problem is concerned with innovation, defined as 
introductions of new knowledge or new combinations of existing knowledge (Chapter 
2). Therefore, we are more interested in how changes in the knowledge base pose 
constraints in contrast to the specifics of the current knowledge base. These four 
features form the basis for designing questions about sectoral constraints.  
 
(III) Institutional constraints within Hangzhou 
The questions on institutional constraints focused on the lack of resources and the 
uncertainty caused by the governance problem of who is providing what kind 
constraints on the use of these resources. Two sets of questions were developed. 
 The first set of questions is related to institutional uncertainty. The development 
started with a literature survey of the consequences of institutional transformation with 
a focus on constraints. This survey included empirical and conceptual studies from 
management, economics, sociology and Asia/China-specific academic journals. Here 
we will shortly summarize them: (1) Unpredictability of institutional change; (2) 
Limited legitimacy of private firms; (3) Competing levels of government; (4) 
Decentralization of government leading to ambivalent rules; (5) Hybrid institutions; (6) 
Weak IPR protection; (7) Lack of transparency (e.g. Manolova and Yan, 2002; Krug, 
2004; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Tan, 2005; Qian, 2000). The questions were developed 
in comparison to other studies in transition economies, like Krug (2004).  
 The second set of questions is related to the lack of resources in the institutional 
environment (Chapter 3): (1) lack of business routines; (2) lack of a blueprint; (3) lack 
of knowledge about the business environment; (4) lack of legitimacy (Krug and Polos, 
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2004; Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). It must be noted that we rely on 
subjective measures of institutional constraints (cf. Krug and Hendrischke, 2008). 
Such a perceptual measure allows us to view thH ILUP¶V HQYLURQPHQW IURP WKH
perspective of the respondents instead from standardized or archival measures of 
environment (Tan, 2001). This is especially important since we are interested in how 
the uncertain institutional environment constrains strategic decisions of the managers. 
In the interview we XVHG TXHVWLRQV OLNH µIs it clear who the supervisory 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHOHJDODJHQWRI\RXUVHFWRULV"¶RUµ+RZGHSHQGHQWLV\RXUILUPRQVWDWH
DFWLRQV DQG SROLFLHV"¶. The next section describes how the interview protocol was 
translated and transformed into Chinese. 
 
5.4.4 Designing and testing the Chinese interview protocol 
After having developed the sets of questions for the main research topics, the 
questions were organized according to the following categories: strategy, innovation, 
external partners, organization of work, customers, competitors, technology and 
knowledge base, legal and administrative environment, new industry, challenges. The 
interview consists of mostly open-ended questions and included four types of 
questions: essential questions, extra questions (more or less equivalent to the essential 
questions, to control for reliability and wording), throw-away questions (to develop 
rapport, set pace, and change focus), and probing questions.  
 Next, we discussed the questions with China-experts. They have several decades 
of experience of research in China. These colleagues have focused on studying private 
entrepreneurship and institutional change. They were especially helpful in terms of 
adjusting the questions to the appropriate level and way of understanding of a Chinese 
entrepreneur. In order not to become too China-specific and keep the results of the 
study comparable and within the language of leading research, we consulted 
colleagues with expertise in innovation and capability research. They have long term 
experience doing fieldwork in different US American and Western-European 
economies on innovation and the development of capabilities. Their experience in 
designing interview questions and knowledge about the current ideas on innovation 
and capabilities proved useful in revising the interview schedule. 
 In the last step, I developed the Chinese language semi-structured interview 
protocol in cooperation with a team of Chinese graduate students from Zhejiang 
University. We started with the list of questions and started discussions about the 
questions, the question-order, wording and lay out to ensure that the concepts were 
clearly understood before translation. After the first translation, the protocol was tested 
in a pilot interview with two IT managers. During this pilot we checked for the 
following: topics, length, type of questions and overall structure. Moreover, we 
checked if all questions were included, if they elicit anticipated responses, if the 
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language level is meaningful, and if the interview motivates active participation in the 
discussion. We revised the protocol where appropriate to better fit the language and 
understanding of an IT professional. Following such intensive procedure, we believe 
the resulting interview protocol is more appropriate for gathering in-depth detailed 
interview data in a Chinese context (Krug and Polos, 2004). The Chinese version of 
the interview protocol can be found in the Appendix. 
 
5.4.5 The interviews  
In the period from February to June 2006 the author and a research team of Chinese 
graduate students interviewed software entrepreneurs in Hangzhou. The graduate 
students were all trained and sat-in at least one interview to get familiar with the 
procedure. The students all are fluent in English which facilitated communication with 
the author. The interviews were done in Chinese. The author ± with basic Chinese 
language skills - was always present and the interviews were done in tandem. The 
questions were asked by the students whereas both researchers took notes. The author 
participated in discussions and asked follow up questions where necessary. The 
interviews were not allowed to be recorded. Therefore, both interviewers took detailed 
notes, discussed the notes dLUHFWO\DIWHUWKHLQWHUYLHZDQGFRPSDUHGHDFKRWKHU¶VQRWHV 
 During the interviews nondirective items to probe (sensitive) issues were used, 
IRUH[DPSOHµFDQ\RXWHOOPHPRUHDERXWWKDW¶µLVWKHUHDQ\WKLQJHOVHWKDWLVLPSRUWDQW
LQUHODWLRQWRWKDW¶RUµWKDWLVDQLQWHUHVWLQJLVVXH\RXUDLVHFDQ\RXHODERUDWHRQWKDW¶
In addition, we had lists of examples of the concepts used in the interview protocol in 
case the interviewee required examples. The interviews on average took 1 hour and 15 
minutes, even though one interview lasted over three hours.  
 As discussed before, multiple-case studies do not follow a linear process of data 
collection and analysis. After the first round of interviews I started analyzing and 
drafting the first ideas, conferring with colleagues and industry experts and presenting 
our initial ideas. After having drafted the first ideas I went back to the field to do 
return visits to some of the firms (11) and several more interviews with other 
entrepreneurs from September to November 2007. This allowed us to present and 
communicate some of our initial ideas to the entrepreneurs, ask additional focused 
questions on topics that proved worthwhile to pursue after the initial analysis and 
gather additional data to strengthen and refine the data until saturation was reached, i.e. 
adding more cases would not have changed the patterns in the data. 
 
5. 5 Data analysis 
The last decision in developing the research strategy for the empirical study involved 
the methods of analysis. The study analyses firm behaviour in an institutional frame. 
7KHUHIRUHWKHILUVWFDVHDQDO\VLVLQYROYHVVHWWLQJWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHRI+DQJ]KRX¶V
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business environment. The documentary data supplemented with interview data is 
analysed according to the following factors: role of the state, human capital, private 
capital, and foreign investment. The analysis is based on a variety of macro-economic 
data and was supplemented with firm-level data on human capital development. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of this analysis in a case study of Hangzhou.  
 
The second level of analysis involves the interviews which lie at the core of this 
research. The general aim of the data analysis of the cases is to build on and move 
beyond the respondents¶GHVFULSWLRQV)RUHYHU\ILUPZH build individual case studies, 
synthesizing the interview data with archival, news and website data (Eisenhardt, 
1989). A triangulation between interview data and archival data creates a richer and 
more reliable account. The individual case studies were written according to the main 
structure of the interview schedule (i.e. strategy, innovation, HRM, external partners, 
competition, customers, technology, institutional uncertainty and underinvestment in 
resources). At this stage similarities and differences across cases are noted but further 
analysis was left until completing all the cases to maintain the independence of the 
replication logic (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). 
 After finishing the individual cases we used cross-case analysis to identify 
patterns in the data across the cases. Cross-case analysis involves the search for similar 
constructs and relationships across multiple cases. The confrontation of the data with 
existing theoretical development is a crucial feature of cross-case analysis (Maeki, 
1993). The identification of systematic features and confrontation of these with 
existing knowledge strengthens emerging ideas. As discussed before, the analysis 
involved two steps: first, an analysis of the first 30 cases, then back to the field for 
additional interviews and then a second analysis of all 45 cases. Basically, in the first 
step I examined pairs of cases on similarities and differences. As patterns begin to 
emerge, certain evidence may stand out as being in conflict with the patterns. Then we 
went back to China for more interviews and follow-ups interviews to confirm and/or 
correct the initial data in order to connect the evidence to the findings. If patterns 
emerge which match an empirically based pattern, "the results can help a case study to 
strengthen its internal validity" (Yin, 2003, p. 103). 
  
The focus in the cross-case analysis is on (1) firm-level processes and activities that 
PDQLSXODWH WKH ILUP¶V UHVRXUFH EDVH LQ RUGHU WR LQQRYDWH DQG  VHFWRUDO - and 
institutional constraints that influence these processes. In particular, considering the 
three goals of this comparative case study, the focus was on identifying three sets of 
features and patterns.  
 The first goal was to identify patterns of innovative behaviour of Chinese private 
software firms. The analytical framework developed in Chapter 3 provides several 
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useful classification schemes. First, five types of innovation are singled out in the 
literature: new product and methods of production, new ways of organizing the value 
chain, opening new markets for goods and services and new ways to organize business. 
Next, the drivers or sources of innovation are: technology, market, government, 
enterprise. Next, radical versus incremental innovation. Last, stand-alone, modular and 
systemic innovation. The case analysis involves the identification of systematic 
features and patterns of these four characteristics of innovation. Chapter 7 presents the 
analysis of innovative behaviour of Chinese software entrepreneurs.  
 The second goal was to identify and analyse sectoral ± and institutional 
constraints on innovation. The analytical framework in Chapters 2 and 3 provide the 
structure for analyzing the cases. Sectoral constraints are those constraints determined 
by the technological regimes in each sector investigated. The institutional constraints 
refer to uncertainty and underinvestment in resources. More specifically, the resources 
under consideration here are capital, labour and knowledge. The case analysis involves 
the identification of patterns in these two sets of constraints. Chapter 8 presents the 
results of the sectoral and institutional constraints for Chinese software entrepreneurs.  
 Chapter 9 then presents the results of an inductive study on the development of 
innovative capabilities that fight off the constraints identified in Chapter 8. The 
antecedents identified in previous conceptual and empirical research guide the search 
for innovative capabilities. The focus was on processes, activities and structural 
features in all parts of the innovation process. More precisely, a set of antecedents for 
successful innovation is singled out per firm, which was then aggregated to the sector 
level (see Chapter 9). These antecedents refer to resources and activities that give 
firms potential competitive advantages for developing and commercializing new 
product and services. Whereas antecedents refer to resources and activities, 
capabilities refer to abilities to use those resources and activities. Subsequently, 
similar processes and antecedents across multiple cases are analysed to identify 
innovative capabilities. The analysis and the results are presented in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 6 ± Findings 1 
 
Skill development and education, the financial 
system and the role of the state in Hangzhou 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The chapter presents a case study of Hangzhou that sets the institutional frame in 
which software entrepreneurs pursue innovative activities. In Chapter 2 I argued that 
the transformation of institutions in China resulted in the mobilization of resources for 
,7 LQGXVWULHV¶ GHYHORSPHQW KXPDQ ± and private capital, foreign investment, 
entrepreneurship and knowledge sharing. Chapter 3 provided an analytical framework 
for studying the institutions that produce and govern such critical resources. This 
chapter will LGHQWLI\V\VWHPDWLFIHDWXUHVRI+DQJ]KRX¶VORFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW
The chapter analyzes the provision and distribution of critical resources for software 
development in Hangzhou: the role of the state, skill development and formal 
education, and the financial system.  
 The findings presented here are based on a variety of unique sources. First of all, 
historical sources and publicly available statistics. Second, extensive interviews with 
45 entrepreneurs that provide unique information on skill development and private 
capital accumulation (sections 6.5.2 and 6.6). Third, I got access to a unique database 
with first jobs of university graduates of Zhejiang University that provides information 
about the type and location of their first job (section 6.5.5). Fourth, informal 
discussions and interviews with students from Zhejiang University across a variety of 
majors (humanities and science) in the 2006-2008 period provide anecdotal data and 
valuable insights into the local labour market and job hunting practices of fresh 
graduates (sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.5). Before discussing the key institutions of 
+DQJ]KRX¶VORFDOEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQW, I will summarize and extend the main claims 
about institutions in Chapter 3.  
 
6.2 Resources and institutions: overview of the literature 
As state socialist institutions no longer allocate and distribute resources in the 
economy following a central plan, new economic institutions have to take over that 
function. The dismantling of state socialist institutions and the development of new 
institutions causes opportunities and restrictions. The reforms since 1978 have resulted 
in local diversity of institutional regimes in China (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008; 
Goodman, 1997; Wong, 2002). 
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 The local production system approach of Crouch and colleagues (2001, 2004) 
provides an appropriate framework for studying local economic development and 
institutional regimes as they explicitly studied SMEs in European economies at a 
sectoral level. Studies like Le Gales and Voelzkow (2001) and Crouch, Le Gales, 
Trigilia and Voelzkow (2004) provide a basic framework that includes both aspects of 
institutional regimes. It is useful to distinguish two functions of these new institutions 
(cf. Coriat and Weinstein, 2002; Crouch et al, 2004; Whitley, 2007): the provision or 
allocation and distribution of critical resources and the constraints posed on 
opportunism by key economic agents. Their work suggests that for high-tech sectors in 
Europe access to research and university facilities, availability of specialized suppliers 
of goods and services and quality of the local context (physical and social 
infrastructure) are crucial resources (Trigilia, 2004). 
 In Chapters 2 and 3 we argued that the critical resources for successful innovation 
of private software entrepreneurs (SMEs) are capital, labour and knowledge. A set of 
relevant studies supports this claim. The comparative business system approach has 
argued how institutions governing capital, labour, product markets, and the public 
science system crucially affect the development of innovative capabilities (e.g. 
Whitley, 2002; Casper and Whitley, 2004; Whitley, 2003). More specifically, Whitley 
(2002) has discussed how the strength of business associations and involvement with 
public training systems, the organization of the financial system and the public science 
system crucially affect the development of innovative capabilities. A similar reasoning 
can be found in the work by Lazonick (e.g. 2007) on the social conditions of 
innovative enterprise. Lazonick argued with historical examples from Europe and US 
(Lazonick, 2007) and contemporary examples from China (Lu and Lazonick, 2001) 
that innovative enterprise depends on organizing, strategizing and financing, which are 
crucially affected by the institutions that govern capital, labour and knowledge.  
 More specifically, the innovation system approach has emphasized the central 
role of knowledge, a point found in the evolutionary literature and work on 
knowledge-based economies (Edquist, 1997). Consequently, the institutions that 
govern access to and distribution of knowledge resources are crucial for understanding 
innovation. Tylecote and Visintin (2008) recently put more emphasis on the role of 
finance and corporate governance in explaining technological advantages of nations, 
which included China. Based on these studies, we can usefully distinguish the 
institutions that govern capital, labour (e.g. Lazonick, 2007; Whitley, 1999; Crouch et 
al, 2004) and knowledge (e.g. Malerba, 2007; Edquist, 1997; Crouch et al, 2004) as 
the key institutions for understanding innovative capability development in the 
software sectors in China: role of the state, skill development and formal education 
system, and the financial system (role of private and foreign capital). The subsequent 
sections will discuss each of these institutions in more detail.  
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6.3 Some remarks on path dependency: role of the state16 
Institutional regimes in China did not change only exogenously, but also 
endogenously and carry a certain extent of historical continuity (Krug and 
Hendrischke, 2007; Tsai, 2007). The broad features and mechanism of institutional 
regimes are unlikely to change rapidly. This section shows that the role of the state in 
Zhejiang province is significantly influenced by dominant institutional logics that stem 
from: the Southern Song period (1138-1276), Treaty of Nanjing (1842) and the 
Central planning era.  
 
6.3.1 Southern Song (1138-1276) 
Zhejiang province is diverse with the North-East flat, developed, industry-oriented, 
home tR&KLQD¶VHDUOLHVWFLYLOL]DWLRQDQGFRQQHFWHGZLWKWKH1RUWKYLDWKHFDQDOVDQG
the South-West mostly mountainous and undeveloped17. The countryside was called 
WKH µODQG RI ILVK DQG ULFH¶ ZLWK WRZQV ZLWK KDQGLFUDIW SURGXFWLRQ DQG PDQ\ VPDOO
markets. Hangzhou ± the capital of Zhejiang province - was established during the Qin 
(222 BC) and emerged as a commercial centre with the construction of the Grand 
Canal (610 AD) that connected Hangzhou to Beijing. During the Southern Song 
dynasty (1138-1276 AD), Hangzhou was the capital of China. The shipbuilding 
industry emerged and led to the development of overseas commercial trade. Ningbo, 
Wenzhou and Hangzhou were exporting agricultural and industrial products such as 
silk and ceramics to neighbouring countries. During the Qing and Ming dynasties 
farmers started to specialize in commerce and handicraft industries. Especially paper 
making and printing and commerce flourished. Moreover Zhejiang had already many 
large-sized factories in the early Qing period. At the time Hangzhou was the largest 
and most commercial city in China. The developed part of the province was home to 
many educational institutions and had a fair deal of intellectuals promoting commerce 
DQGFDSLWDOLVPVXFKDV<RQJMLD6FKRRO¶V<H6KL0RUHRYHUVLnce the development of 
education in the Song dynasty, Zhejiang became the main supplier of bureaucrats 
during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Hangzhou was the centre of intellectual pursuit 
and education, next to a centre of commerce and overseas trade and remained so for 
hundreds of years. 
 
6.3.2 Treaty of Nanjing (1842) 
The expansion of capitalism into China started with the First Opium War (1840). The 
Treaty of Nanjing (1842) signed by the British ceded Hong Kong to Great Britain and 
                                                          
16 This overview is based on: Zheng, 2007; Forster, 1997; Wei and Ye, 2004; Forster and Yao, 1999; 
Wei and Li, 2002; Wei, 2005; Forster, 1990; Wei, Leung, Li and Pan, 2008; Hartford, 2003. 
17 There is no strong provincial identity because of the mountains, backward communications and 
particularistic loyalties (Forster, 1997). 
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forced the opening of fRXU SRUWV DPRQJ ZKLFK =KHMLDQJ¶V 1LQJER DQG :HQ]KRX
Though historically unfair18, it caused an invasion of Western capitalism in China and 
with it modern industries, capital and knowledge were introduced to mainly Ningbo, 
Wenzhou and Hangzhou. A class of entrepreneurs came into being that would lead to 
the emergence of modern industry in Zhejiang. For instance, the so-FDOOHG µ1LQJER
EDQJ¶RU1LQJEREXVLQHVVSHRSOHZRXOGODWHUSOD\DVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQWKHHPHUJHQFH
of Shanghai and Hong Kong. Zheng (2007) reports that between 1887 and 1913 the 
Zhejiang businessmen established 32 modern enterprises in Zhejiang and 45 in other 
provinces. In 1921 already 128 enterprises and various private financial institutions 
were established in the major cities of Zhejiang. 
 Zhejiang became a bridge between on the one hand Shanghai and the wealthy 
South but on the other hand, between China and Europe (mostly due to the Wenzhou 
migrants). Many Zhejiang locals immigrated to European countries to explore 
business opportunities. Such emigration would prove to be important for Zhejiang 
economic development because these businessmen would often return to China with 
accumulated capital and open businesses, for instance in Wenzhou. Zhejiang became 
at the same time integrated in global entrepreneur networks and developed a strong 
and independent local business elite. The late 19th century was an intense period for 
the Imperial state due to the external invasions but also as a result of internal struggles. 
There was a constant conflict between the imperial state and the local business elite. 
7KHVWDWHZDQWHGWRLQFRUSRUDWHWKHHOLWH¶VPDQDJHPHQWVNLOOVLQWRWKHHPSLUHZKHUHDV
the elite wanted to gain greater autonomy and authority. The increasing power of the 
merchant elite became a µIRUFH IURP EHORZ¶ WR FRQVLGHU LQ WKH FRPLQJ GHFDGHV
However, economic development was put to a halt during the next few decades.  
 
6.3.3 Central planning era (1949-1978) 
Hangzhou was a nationalist (GMD) stronghold in the early 20th century, being the 
capital of the province where Jiang Jieshi was born. After the Anti-Japanese War 
(1938-1945) and the succeeding civil war during which the province and Hangzhou 
were destroyed19, the communist party had a difficult time to establish itself. In 1949, 
the ChinesH &RPPXQLVW 3DUW\ &&3 WRRN RYHU WKH µSDUDVLWLF FRQVXPHU FLW\¶ DV
Hangzhou was called.  The CCP first needed to build a strong political structure that 
would obey central development directions. Their main strategy was to appoint 
                                                          
18 The Treaty of Tianjin (1858) legalized opium trade, allowed free traveling for foreigners, and 
introduced Christianity to China. The Treaty of Beijing (1860) marked the fall of Beijing and the end 
of the opposition of the Manchus. Land division and concessions followed and every foreign power 
took the opportunity to take pieces of land. 
19 The area around Hangzhou was important in the Anti-Japanese War. Shouxiang, a town near 
Hangzhou, was an important army base for Japanese troops and the location of the surrendering 
ceremony of the Japanese troops stationed in Zhejiang province in 1945 (Siegerist, 2007). 
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outsiders to cadre positions instead of native Zhejiang people. These outsiders were 
selected for their loyalty to the central leadership despite their low education. They 
met a lot of opposition because they trained young locals to become compliant cadres.  
For the next years Hangzhou did not profit from the infrastructure policies, neither was 
it included in the food policy because it was a risky flooding region. The role of the 
central government in economic development was limited. Hangzhou was mostly 
known for sophisticated life styles, the famous Longjin green tea, silk and light 
industrial sectors and caused the leaders to see it is a scenic relaxation city.   
 From the beginning there was tension between central government, provincial 
economic policy and local autonomy. The first measure at the provincial level was to 
change the ownership structure of the industries. Nevertheless, the private sector 
continued to play an important role until the mid-1950s. Moreover there was 
considerable resistance from individual households. Even when local governments 
used coercive political measures to implement central policies, they were generally 
ineffective. It is worth noticing that one compromise found which could reconcile 
private rejections with collective ownership was to establish a household 
responsibility system in Yongjia county (an institution that would re-emerge in the 
early 1980s, Zheng, 2007). Yet this initiative was heavily criticized by Mao who since 
1955 promulgated the collectivization movement of agriculture. 
 The Great Leap Forward (1957-59) drew the attention of the central government 
to Hangzhou and led to the purge of many local officials that would allow or even 
propose the household responsibility system20. Soviet style policy stressing heavy 
industries, national dHIHQFHDQGµFODVVVWUXJJOH¶ZDVWUDQVIRUPLQJ+DQJ]KRX:KHQLW
became obvious that heavy industry development was hindered by lack of raw 
material and local energy supply, the leadership responded by limiting the number of 
large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but tolerating collectively owned enterprises 
(COEs) in the light industrial sectors. Furthermore, the socialization of industry and 
commerce targeted the capitalist class. The Great Leap Forward caused a migration 
wave with many Ningbo, Wenzhou and Shaoxing business people from the financial 
and industrial classes migrating to Taiwan, Hong Kong, further into South-East Asia 
and even Europe and the United States.  
 The Cultural Revolution (1966-1978) had the following consequences for 
Zhejiang. First, the silencing of the intellectual class. Second, the party leadership 
redesigned its defence strategy. As Zhejiang was considered the First Front for 
invasions from the Pacific, no further investment was allocated to Zhejiang. Third, 
chaos and disunity went hand in hand, especially in economic policies. For instance, 
                                                          
20 For instance, Zheng (2007) reports on Chen Xinyu, a local state official in Xinchang county that 
defended the Household responsibility system and how it would promote agricultural growth. Of 
course, Chen and his ideas got heavily attacked by the centre.  
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there was strong opposition towards the agricultural policy. Fourthly, the self-reliance 
policy reduced maritime trade to the detriment of coastal cities, such as Wenzhou, 
Ningbo and Hangzhou.  
 One consequence of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in 
Hangzhou, as in the rest of China, was the emergence of an informal sector. Then, for 
example, it is worth emphasising that some authors such as David Wank claim that 
only at this time the word guanxi (network) made its appearance. Here guanxi refers to 
a local business community that, appalled by formal policy, organized the business 
relations outside the official business system (Wank, 1999; Wei and Ye, 2004)21.    
In the early 1970s a new pragmatic leadership realized the destructive nature of the 
Cultural Revolution and focused on developing new industries and the return of urban 
youth. However, the urban youth returned from the country side during the late 1970s 
that often meant unemployment. Controlling migration and urbanization became 
crucial; especially considering the pressure on food, jobs and urban services. The 
promotion of rural industries and the performance of the collective rural sector started 
to stimulate economic development in the late 1970s.   
 7R VXP XS WKH *UHDW /HDS )RUZDUG DQG &XOWXUDO 5HYROXWLRQ OHIW +DQJ]KRX¶V
economy with a comparative disadvantage: shifting central investment decisions, 
VHFWRUDO DQG UHJLRQDO SROLFLHV GHWULPHQWDO WR +DQJ]KRX¶V QDWXUDO FRPSDUDtive 
advantages such as an agricultural policy favouring grain production instead of cash 
crops; heavy industry focus; and reduction in maritime trade. However, local 
autonomy and the informal business sector ensured the survival of small scale 
enterprises, low bureaucratic intervention and a strong awareness of commodities. All 
this together paved the way for market-oriented reforms and the development of non-
state enterprises.  
 
6.3.4 Reform period: dismantling the socialist economy 
The reforms focused on decentralization and marketization as well as opening up to 
the outside world. However, Zhejiang was not leading the reform movement in China. 
As was shown by Forster (1990), factionalism in Zhejiang during the Cultural 
Revolution had divided the provincial party cadres and resulted in power struggles that 
ZRXOGQRWHQGZLWK0DR¶VGHDWK7KHVHSROLWLFDOGLYLVLRQVFDXVHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW WR
mostly fail in the implementation of committed developmental strategies. Such as the 
resource policy debates - basic heavy industries versus light industries - or the opening 
up to international trade. As a result the province was rather slow in liberalizing 
international trade. 
                                                          
21 Economic historians on the other hand claim that guanxi already emerged in the 19th century (e.g. 
David Faure, 2006).  
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 Fiscal federalism22 (Qian, 2000; Qian and Weingast, 1997) in 1980 changed the 
tax structure and allocated budgets to the local level. This decentralization of taxation 
led to local autonomy and diversity of local business systems. Local provincial 
officials now had a strong incentive to expand the amount of investment. Hangzhou 
profited immensely from fiscal decentralization. The collusion of local government 
and business community interests ± increasing revenues - more or less resolved 
previous issues. One consequence was the emergence of the private sector. The COEs 
were reformed to TVEs behind which often enough private firms were hidden. The 
private sector was thus slowly being restored and decision making power was 
decentralized to the enterprise level. The local economy saw a spur in development 
and growth. Fast local economic development had also dramatically increased the 
SHRSOH¶V OLYLQJVWDQGDUGVEDQNVDYLQJVDQGFDVKGHSRVLWV7KLV IXUWKHU LQFUHDVHG WKH
demands for commodities, raw materials and energy in Zhejiang. For that reason, the 
local government went to great lengths to promote horizontal economic cooperation. 
+RUL]RQWDO FRRSHUDWLRQZDVKLVWRULFDOO\ LPSRUWDQW EHFDXVHRI=KHMLDQJ¶V VKRUWDJHRI
raw materials and energy. Since 1985, Zhejiang became integrated within the rest of 
China by providing financial resources and technologies in exchange for raw materials 
and energy.  
 International trade did not take off until the mid-1980s when the 7th Five Year 
Plan had given foreign trade high priority. After the political turmoil of the Tiananmen 
Square Incident the tides really turned23. Many favourable policies for foreign business 
were put in place, such as tax holidays, free land, preferential access to resources and 
free access to workers. The end of the 1980s and early 1990s saw the establishment of 
various development zones attracting and promoting foreign enterprises. With eased 
restrictions, simplified approval procedures and globalization of the Yangtze Delta and 
Shanghai, Hangzhou and Zhejiang in general became magnets for FDI. 
 As part of the economic policy aiming at the integration of Hangzhou in China, 
the government first established a variety of development zones, such as the Hangzhou 
and Xiaoshan economic and technological development zones (1993). Hangzhou is 
currently home to the High Technology Development Zone, national software 
industrialization base, the IC design industrialization base, the national electronic-
information industry base and the national animation industry base. Second, firms 
were increasingly being assessed by economic performance instead of political loyalty 
and reaching quotas. Thirdly and crucial for the IT industry I am concerned with here 
the national policy with respect to information and communication is reformed. 
                                                          
22 6HH&KDSWHUIRUDQH[WHQVLYHWUHDWPHQWRIµILVFDOIHGHUDOLVP¶LQWKH&KLQHVHFRQWH[W 
23 Especially after the visit of leading reformer Zhao Ziyang, the then General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China (1987-1989) who was purged for his support of the Tiananmen students 
and succeeded by Jiang Zemin. 
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Changes in communication policy can be seen in the national Golden projects (1993) 
and was soon followed by a Work Leading Group (1996) and the Number One Project 
(2000) on a local level. At the national level the push for informatization involved e-
government (1999), enterprises online (2000) and households online (2001) campaigns. 
The local Number One Project was a ten-year plan for developing the Hangzhou high-
tech sectors. The focus sectors were software and telecommunications equipment and 
IRXU ILUPVZHUHFKRVHQ WR µOHDG WKHGHYHORSPHQW¶(DVWFRP876WDUFRP:HVW/DNH
Electronics Group and Great Nature (Hartford, 2003). There were 15 local projects, 
with limited central coordination, no government commitment to funding beyond 
those directly related to government functions and the clear expectation that firms 
would make their own investments. This strategy allowed for competition, non-
intervention and variety of ownership forms and eventually led to the development of 
new sectors such as e-commerce and financial transaction products and services.  
 
Hangzhou developed into a local business system24 with specific features (Krug and 
Hendrischke, 2008; Wei and Ye, 2004): First, non-intervention management25, to 
choose a local economic regime that is characterized by low levels of government 
involvement and considerable freedom for market exchanges and transactions. Second, 
presence of institutional mechanisms to promote the development of high-tech sectors 
locally in the form of development zones. The overall output of IT products in these 
zones accounts for one-third of Zhejiang province. A closer look at such institutional 
mechanisms is warranted (section 6.4). 
 Third, the rapid development of a private sector. Being a relative failure during 
the Mao years resulted in an advantage during the beginning of reform. The reforms 
were easier because of the relatively small role of the traditional socialist plan, not too 
much overregulated industries, and most of all, the restructuring of the few SOEs left 
the province with relatively few unemployed. The strong commodity economy 
tradition and the underground µSULYDWH¶HFRQRP\GXULQJWKH0DR\HDUVFDXVHGWKDWLQ
1984 already the state sector was no longer the biggest and since 1997 private 
enterprises were the dominant economic actor. Fourth, Hangzhou became attractive 
for foreign investment. The province was relatively slow in opening up in the 1980s 
and therefore not really influenced by the Tiananmen Incident. The mid-1990s brought 
a wave of FDI. Especially global networks of Chinese immigrants ± that left China 
                                                          
24 A local business system is here understood as an distinctive patterns of economic organization at 
the local level with a specific mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities and 
interconnections between owners, managers, experts, and other employees (cf. Whitley, 1999). The 
ZRUGµV\VWHP¶LPSOLHVDUHODWLYHVWDELOLW\RIWKHVHIHDWXUHVEXWLWKDVWREHQRWHGWKDWLQWKLVVSHcific 
FRQWH[W LW UHIHUVWRµGLVWLQFWLYHSDWWHUQV¶ZKLFKDUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\VWDEOHEXWVXJJHVWSURFHVVHVDQG
features after 30 years of reform in Hangzhou.  
25 The Chinese government uses a specific term for a non-intervening government: wuwei erzhi 
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during earlier periods, especially from Ningbo, Wenzhou and Shaoxing ± played an 
increasingly significant role by transferring knowledge and other resources to China. 
 
7KHUROHRIWKHORFDOJRYHUQPHQWLQ+DQJ]KRXKDVEHHQDWDUP¶VOHQJWK+RZHYHUWKH
only significant exception is the establishment of technology zones and parks which 
function as institutional mechanisms to facilitate the development of high-tech 
industries for instance via tax reductions and provision of telecommunications 
infrastructure. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the role of the state in high-
tech development zones (6.4), the skill development and formal education system (6.5), 
the private capital (6.6) and foreign investment markets (6.7). 
 
6.4 Research institutes, Technology Zones and Parks 
In the diffusion and commercialization of public knowledge, research institutes, 
technology zones and science parks stand out as institutional mechanisms to promote 
,7 LQGXVWULHV¶ GHYHORSPHQW %\ WKH HQG RI  +DQJ]KRX KDV  5	' FHQWUHV
including 92 provincial-level R & D centres, 168 municipal-level R&D centres. There 
were 65 enterprises authorized as state-level high-tech enterprises, 895 provincial-
level high-tech enterprises and 139 municipal-level high-tech enterprises (Hangzhou 
Statistics Online, 2008). In 2006, a total of 6.164 billion RMB had been invested into 
R&D projects in the enterprises, up by 21.8 percent over the previous year. 
Furthermore, the city had 30 enterprise incubation parks with more than 1,000 square 
meters, covering a combined space of more than 665,000 square meters. A total of 
10,719 patent applications were submitted and 5,742 patents were authorized, up by 
13 percent and 41.0 percent over the previous year respectively. Many of those 
research institutes are part of a technology zone or science park. 
 Zones and parks do not refer to geographic areas but to administrative units. 
Usually the zones have many locations spread across the city. Furthermore, such zones 
can include several other administrative levels and incorporate other zones. Hangzhou 
has a special position by having several large state level development zones. Three 
stand out. The Hangzhou Economic & Technological Development Zone (HETDZ) is 
established in 1993. It focuses on four industries, such as electronics and information 
industry, biology and medicine industry, machinery and manufacturing industry as 
well as foods and beverage industry. Recently, the Xiasha High Education Park, the 
largest scale in Zhejiang province, and the first experimental unit in China, Hangzhou 
Export Processing Zone, were constructed. The Xiaoshan Economic and 
Technological Development Zone (XETDZ) was established in 1993. Within the Zone 
are the Japan Sizuoka Industry Park, Taiwan Mechanical Industry Park, Province-level 
High-Tech Industry Park and Chinese Woman¶V'UHVV,QGXVWU\3DUN3LOODULQGXVWULHV
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had currently been formed in textile and clothing, machinery and hardware, 
architecture and building materials, electronics and chemical engineering (Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1 ± Features of key development zones in Hangzhou (2006) 
  Total HETDZ HHNTIDZ XETDZ 
Area of Development(sq.km) 76.39 34 12.64 22.2 
Investments in Infrastructure(100 million RMB) 144.55 47.76 51.67 36.45 
Number of Enterprises Approved(unit) 4828 1572 2500 697 
Foreign Investments Enterprises(unit) 1361 426 475 410 
Number of Enterprises in Production or Operation(unit) 2843 1176 950 697 
Sales Revenue(100 million RMB) 2,615.44 1,201.44 1047 363.2 
Gross Industrial Output Value(100 million RMB) 2,262.7 1,113.4 804.9 344.4 
Fulfilled Profits and Tax(100 million RMB) 186.67 70.59 80.6 35.2 
Financial Revenue(100 million RMB) 92.73 32.57 42.8 16.27 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008 
 
Lastly, the Hangzhou High & New Technology Industry Development Zone 
(HHNTIDZ) was established in 1990. It covers three main areas: River North, River 
South (Binjiang) and Xiasha. The zone focuses on telecommunication and software 
industries, integrated circuit and digital television industry and the promotion of two 
new industries: animation and network game industries. It administers another eight 
state-level bases and state-level career & service centres, such as the Software Industry 
Base, the Returned-student Careering Park, the Telecommunication Industry Base, the 
National Export Software Creation Base and the Experimental Base of Software 
Engineering Exports to Europe & America. Exhibit 6.1 provides an example of the 
East Software Park, one of the Parks that is part of the HHNTIDZ.  
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6.1 ± The East Software Park 
The East Software Park is situated in the center of Hangzhou, inside the national 
hi-tech industrial development zone. They have about 200 members, among 
which Alibaba, AsiaINFO, WebEx and Huawei. The main purpose of this 
software park is to provide office space with telecom infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the ESP provides services and management assistance. The main 
issues they help with are related to employee recruitment and management skills. 
Furthermore, they provide their customers with up-to-date information regarding 
new rules and regulations from central or local government agencies. ESP 
cooperates with governments and firms. 
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Four features of the HHNTIDZ are noteworthy. First of all, firms in the zone enjoy 
special preferential policies. Tariffs on equipments, 2 years tax exemption and 3 years 
half deduction of taxation provide incentives for re-investment, foreign investment, 
technology transfer and investments in software sectors. HHNTIDZ is an 
administrative district and thus performs all the functions of a government and is 
endowed by Hangzhou Municipal Party Committee and Hangzhou Municipal 
Government with a specific policy of administrative affairs handled within the district. 
The revenues can be used by the district at will. Second, HHNTIDZ is close to the 
Hangzhou Xiaoshan International Airport and borders Shanghai-Hangzhou-Ningbo 
Expressway. Furthermore, the municipal administration centre will move near the 
HHNTIDZ districts. Third, HHNTIDZ has established a long-term cooperative 
relationship with higher educational institutions such as Zhejiang University and 
scientific research institutes such as Chinese Academy of Sciences. Fourth, the zones 
accommodate nearly 5,000 enterprises of which 445 are foreign-funded enterprises 
with a total investment of US$ 2.7 billion.   
 Next to the state-level development zones, there are also several university 
Science Parks. The most dominant is the Zhejiang University Science Park (ZUNSP). 
The ZUNSP is one of the 15 national university science parks approved by Ministry of 
Science and Technology and Ministry of Education. The ZUNSP is founded by the 
provincial and municipal government together with Zhejiang University. The Science 
Park has 3 subsidiaries: Nanchang, Ningbo and Hangzhou Binjiang District. The focus 
is on new technologies in IT, life science and modern agriculture, new materials and 
nano-materials industries. 
 
In short, the state plays an active role in technology zones and parks. In order to 
expand the software sectors, more and better qualified academics and skilled workers 
were needed. While the latter can be trained in-house, the former have to pass the state 
controlled university system. Basically, the software sectors asked for new work 
profiles; how would these fit with the formal education that workers get? The software 
sectors need academic and non-academic training. 
 
6.5 Education and training (critical human and knowledge resources) 
6.5.1 Formal education 
The education system follows the national model: regular education, higher education, 
adult, civilian and special education26. In 2006 there were 36 general colleges and 
universities with 349,976 students and 80,069 graduates. The gross enrolment rate of 
colleges and universities was 48.55% per year, which is much higher than the national 
                                                          
26 The following statistics are derived from the Hangzhou Statistics Online website. 
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average. The average student/teacher ratio in Hangzhou is similar to the national 
average with about 16 students for each full time teacher. However, the top university 
in Hangzhou, Zhejiang University scores much better, with only 7 students for each 
teacher. Of the 36 colleges and universities, 7 stand out in terms of numbers of 
students and prestige (Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.2 ± Universities in Hangzhou and key indicators (2006) 
  students graduates total 
teachers 
full time 
teachers 
student/
teacher 
Zhejiang University 23,668 6,115 8,504 3,531 7 
Zhejiang University of  
Technology 20,839 4,282 2,363 1,383 15 
Hangzhou Electronics  
University 15,560 4,288 1,348 851 18 
Zhejiang Gongshang  
University 13,479 2,752 1,541 860 16 
Hangzhou Applied  
Eng. College 12,597 1,990 1,110 675 19 
Zhejiang SciTech  
University 11,499 2,122 1,179 742 15 
Zhejiang University  
City College 11,495 2,529 802 595 19 
Total 349,976 80,069 36,929 21,375 16 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008 
 
Zhejiang University plays a significant role in Hangzhou, not only in academics and 
teaching but also in business. Many of the enterprises in Hangzhou are related to 
Zhejiang University, either via the strong alumni networks or via collaborations of 
various kinds. All the enterprises in my sample are connected to Zheda in one way or 
the other. Zhejiang University has its origins in the Qiushi Academy (1897) one of the 
oldest institutions of higher learning in China. However, the current form and structure 
of Zhejiang University is relatively new. In 1998, with the approval of the State 
Council, the new Zhejiang University was established as a combination of four major 
universities: Zhejiang University, Hangzhou University, Zhejiang Agricultural 
University and Zhejiang Medical University. 
 Zhejiang University is a comprehensive university, which covers all the academic 
fields: philosophy, economics, law, education, literature, science, history, engineering, 
agriculture, medicine and management. However, it is widely known as a technical 
university and considered one of the three best technical universities in China. It is a 
major research university comprised of 24 colleges with 112 fields of undergraduate 
study, 317 fields for master degree study and 14 fields for professional master degree. 
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The university always had a high status and became known as the Cambridge of the 
East. Although that title might be a bit premature, it is a fact that Zheda is among the 
top universities in China. It is ranked no two in China in terms of scientific papers 
published. Furthermore, the business school has international AMBA accreditation 
and was ranked number 3 after Tsinghua University and Beijing University by the 
China Academy of Management. 
 
Exhibit 6.2 introduces the three relevant colleges for IT and high-tech related studies: 
the recently established Zhejiang Institute for Innovation, International; the college of 
computer science (including the national level software engineering college) and 
College of Information Science & Engineering. 
 
 
  
 
Exhibit 6.2 ± Computer Science, Information Science & Engineering and 
Institute for Innovation 
 
The first major (Electronic Computer) in computer science was established in 
1973; the first major in software in 1973 by the Department of Applied 
Mathematics. Then in 1978 the Computer Science Department (education and 
research), covering both software and computer technology, was established. 
Software Technology College is affiliated to the Computer Science College 
but is since 2001 a National Model College of Software Technology; 
receiving extra finances and being under state supervision (Ministry of 
Education and National Development Planning Committee). 
The College of Information Science & Engineering was established in 
1999. The College has three departments: the Dept. of Optical Engineering, 
Dept. of Information and Electronics Engineering, Dept. of Control Science 
and Engineering. The College has strong capabilities in the fields of control 
theory and industrial processing control, optical engineering and electronic 
science and technologies. The college has four National research bases and 
one provincial key laboratory.  
Then in 2007, Zhu Min (see Exhibit 6.3) founded the Zhejiang Institute 
IRU ,QQRYDWLRQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO =,, =,,¶V JRDO LV WR EXLOG D QHZ FKDLQ RI
cooperation in international R&D innovation, ecological innovation and 
economic development" (ZII website). They have a relationship with Stanford 
University and many American Silicon Valley enterprises. ZII is attached to 
an independently operated nonprofit organization within Zhejiang University. 
Noteworthy is that The Global Science and Technology Bank and the Venture 
Capital Fund are integrated in the business model of ZII. 
1076
 )LQGLQJV,+DQJ]KRX¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJLPH 101 
 
6.5.2 Job-specific training  
IT capabilities cannot only be developed in the formal education system but also needs 
semi-formal training, i.e. training is complementary to the formal education system. 
In-house and on-the-job training arrangements have become important strategies for 
developing technical and management skills (Xiao and Tsang, 1999). The Decision on 
the Reform and Development of Adult Education (1987) stipulated that job-related 
training should get the highest priority as a tool to develop job-specific skills that 
cannot be provided by the formal educational system. The decision has been 
implemented in various ways: integrated on-the-job training, job-related technical 
drills, short-cycle training classes, thematic lectures and supervised self-study (Xie, 
1994). However, detailed information on the development of job-specific skills is 
absent. Moreover, only a handful of studies looked into the topic of on the job training 
in Chinese organizations. Most of those studies focus on foreign-Chinese joint 
ventures. In order to provide insights into on the job training and HRM practices in 
new private enterprises, I choose to employ data from my sample of entrepreneurs. 
This data provides unique insights into the HRM systems of private software 
enteUSULVHVLQ+DQJ]KRX¶VORFDOEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWTable 6.3 summarizes the main 
features of the firms in our sample. 
 
Table 6.3 ± Features of HRM systems in my sample of software firms 
Feature HRM system % of firms have 
On the job training 40% 
Employees with bachelor or higher 63% 
Use of project teams 70% 
Employee involvement in decision making 34% 
Requirements new employees: 
Skill  47% 
Team player attitude 44% 
Learning ability 33% 
Compensation schemes: 
Use of bonus system 81% 
Use of performance-based pay 46% 
6RXUFHDXWKRU¶VGDWDRQVRIWZDUHHQWUHSUHQHXUVLQ+DQJ]KRX-2008) 
 
First of all, the interviews suggest that private software entrepreneurs have a strong 
µFDSDELOLW\-EXLOGLQJ¶ DQG µOHDUQLQJ¶ SHUVSHFWLYH RQ KXPDQ UHVRXUFH PDQDJHPHQt. 
When recruiting new employees the three most important requirements are skills, team 
player attitude and learning ability. Moreover, over 60% of new recruits on average 
have a bachelor degree or higher. The compensation system also fits a performance-
driven HRM system, 81% of the enterprises uses a bonus system and 46% use actual a 
performance-based pay system. Second, over 70% of the enterprises use cross-
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functional project teams. Project teams here refer to teams with both R&D and 
marketing personnel that is set up for specific projects and only for the duration of the 
project. This suggests that there are many (informal) opportunities for learning across 
functions and on-the-job.  
 Third, what is striking is the relatively high level of employee involvement in 
enterprise decision making, about 34%. To some extent this is related to the smallness 
of these enterprises but more generally it indicates that employees are involved in the 
broader enterprise decisions. On the one hand, this signals trust from higher 
management in the HPSOR\HHV¶ skills and ideas, on the other hand, it promotes 
OHDUQLQJDQGLQWHUDFWLRQDPRQJGLIIHUHQWOHYHOVLQWKHILUP¶VKLHUDUFK\ 
 Fourth, 40% of the firms use on-the-job training. Several features stand out: 
 
(1) The use of training is generally not standardized and works on a case-by-case 
basis or for specific projects. For instance, Firm 22, an online search engine 
software firm, does not provide formal training but has a mentor system that 
allows peer training. Similarly, Firm 6, an ERP software firm, has few regular 
training projects and training programs, the great majority is of temporary nature. 
For instance, after a new software introduction, they might invite experts to 
provide training, as well as collective studying of employees. The company is not 
able to arrange a lot of specialized external training, but they can have some 
business exercises, via external personnel studying new knowledge and 
technology. 
(2) Only in a few cases training has become a part of the HQWHUSULVH¶V Vystem. For 
instance, the development of new software in Firm 52, an enterprise network 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVRIWZDUHILUPLQYROYHGQRWRQO\FRPSDULQJFRPSHWLWRUV¶SURGXFWV
but also investment in specialized training. The entrepreneur asked Microsoft to 
give technical training to several persons in the R&D department. Sometimes, 
firms provide entry-training.  Firm 39, a middleware firm, provides one-week 
training for new employees.  
(3) Sometimes firms will have external training, by a consulting agency. For instance 
Firm 13, a telecom service provider, provides employees with the opportunity of 
getting skill-orientation training and technology training. Another example is Firm 
54, a community management software firm. Over 85% of the employees 
participate in training, every time about 170 employees participate. Most 
important training is in the areas of technology, quality, and interpersonal 
communication. 
(4) In general, entrepreneurs will ask personal friends, such as classmates and 
teachers, to provide training in the company, to save money on formal training 
DJHQFLHV)RULQVWDQFH)LUPDILQDQFLDOHQWHUSULVHVRIWZDUHILUPFDQ¶WSURYLGH
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many outside training opportunities for the employees because of financial 
limitations. However, the management will use their own network to invite friends 
to give lectures and training to employees. Furthermore, the firm organizes 
seminars to discuss and learn from each other. 
 
The interviews suggest that training refers to learning practical skills as opposed to 
academic skills. Trainings are focussed on communication skills, application of 
technical knowledge to business cases and developing skills for problem solving 
ZLWKLQ WKH DUHD RI H[SHUWLVH *HQHUDOO\ WUDLQLQJ LV RIWHQ VHHQ DV D µUHZDUG¶ DQG
intended to motivate employees (cf. Ng and Siu, 2004), while committing them to 
develop certain ± though limited in use ± skills for the firm. Lack of financial 
resources and knowledge about training at the managerial level are the key constraint 
for training in these small firms. Technical training and development of critical skills 
cannot be done (yet) in these small firms. More generally, training on the job in China 
is still in the early stages and oftentimes falls short of the expectations (Ng and Siu, 
2004). The need for training is recognized in the firms in my sample but the 
managerial skills and financial resources do not yet facilitate efficient and effective 
training on the job. 
 
6WXGHQWVDQGDOXPQLQHWZRUNV7KH¶¶%%6 
As mentioned before, Zhejiang University has a strong presence in Hangzhou. One 
way is the involvement of many enterprises with the university. Another way is via the 
university students and alumni networks. A good illustration ± and one of the most 
important institutional mechanisms ± LVWKHµ¶%%6RI=hejiang University. Students 
from the Computer Science College set up the BBS in 1998. It has 9 or 10 main topics 
each with several sub-boards. Every board has one board master that is responsible for 
the content and control of the board. He/she also gives rank/status to posted items. 
There are about 60 board masters in total. The board masters cooperate and discuss 
with each other. The BBS is called '88' because the last two numbers of the IP address 
are 88. It is like a club or community and it even has special T-shirts. During daytime 
4,000-7,000 students/alumni/professors are online using the BBS at the same time. It 
has a Telnet interface. Every student can register for the BBS and keep the account 
forever, also after graduation. The BBS is accessible outside the university network. 
Students manage the BBS and the university provides the necessary infrastructure. The 
university controls/monitors the content of the BBS.  
 7KHWRSLFVDUHUHODWHGWRPDQ\DVSHFWVRIDVWXGHQW¶VOLIHFRXUVHPDWHULDOGDWLQJ 
job searching and entrepreneurship. Companies, usually big companies, use the BBS 
to advertise and to post vacancies. Normally these companies use 'ambassadors', i.e. 
students that are hired or alumni that still have access to the BBS to put messages on it. 
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One of our interviewees masters the entrepreneurship topic. He and other 
entrepreneurs use it to communicate to students but also to test new 
products/technologies. For instance, the latest new software was put on the BBS with 
the request for students to test it and help getting the bugs out. Furthermore, the 
entrepreneurship section contains information, about rules and regulation of setting up 
a company. The entrepreneurs share this information with students and potential 
entrepreneurs. Overall, this strong network connects the university, entrepreneurs and 
students in sharing knowledge and information. 
 
6.5.4 Volume of IT capabilities: Employment and wages  
What, then, is the employment situation in Hangzhou anno 2008? First of all, we see a 
shift in employment towards the tertiary industries of which the IT sector is a part. The 
potential talent pool in Hangzhou is significant with over 250,000 undergraduate 
students, 20,000 graduate students and a high level of IT literacy (World Bank, 2006). 
In total there are 5.1 million working individuals in Hangzhou city. Nevertheless the 
amount of people working in IT related industries is relatively small (2% of total 
employees; 97,200 people). Most people work in the secondary industries, although 
the share of tertiary industries is rising (Table 6.4). 
 
7DEOH(PSOR\PHQWLQ+DQJ]KRX¶VVHFWRUV 
  2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
Primary sectors 17.0% 19.1% 19.3% 22.7% 24.4% 27.5% 
Secondary sectors 45.7% 46.2% 48.1% 40.5% 38.5% 34.6% 
Tertiary sectors 37.3% 34.7% 32.7% 36.8% 37.1% 37.9% 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008 
 
Second, employment is better compensated; both in comparison to the national 
average and over time. When we look at wage development in Hangzhou and compare 
it to the national average, we can conclude that the wages in Hangzhou are structurally 
higher (Table 6.5, next page). Since the reforms started, the wages increased 
significantly from only 597 RMB annually to 31,440 RMB. Until the 1990s, the 
average wages in Hangzhou and the national average where similar (around 2,300 
RMB in 1990). However, especially after 2000, the differences increase significantly. 
It is interesting to compare across ownership forms. It appears that wages in SOEs are 
significantly higher than in collectives or other forms of ownership (private business). 
This can be explained by the fact that private enterprises are dominant and that SOEs 
need to offer higher salaries to attract employees. In Hangzhou, the government or 
state-owned enterprises are no longer the preferred job locations. 
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7DEOH(PSOR\HHFRPSHQVDWLRQLQ+DQJ]KRXFRPSDUHGWR&KLQD¶VDYHUDJH 
 Hangzhou average wages in RMB China average wages in RMB 
 Average SOEs Collectives Other Average SOEs Collectives Other 
1978 597 634 509 - 615 644 506 - 
1980 777 832 660 - 762 803 623 - 
1985 1,266 1,302 1,188 1,287 1,148 1,213 967 1,436 
1990 2,382 2,504 2,078 2,582 2,140 2,284 1,681 2,987 
1995 7,156 7,546 5,604 8,266 5,500 5,625 3,931 7,463 
2000 13,715 15,010 9,660 12,666 9,371 9,552 6,262 10,984 
2005 30,580 39,748 22,794 24,003 18,364 19,313 11,283 18,244 
2006 32,440 43,978 21,570 26,396 21,001 22,112 13,014 20,755 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008. 
 
6.5.5 Local labour market and graduate career patterns. 
What is the actual job market situation in Hangzhou? Information on career 
development in China is just as limited as most of the information on labour and 
employment. However, to get an insight in the labour market for graduated students in 
IT related fields of study, I use new empirical data from a unique data set with first job 
information of over 7000 graduates from Zhejiang University over a period of 10 
years (1996-2005). Even though there is considerable missing data, the suggested 
patterns provide valuable insights. There is no information about how many people did 
not find a job; they are counted as missing information. Nevertheless, the data 
provides insights into the careers of a new generation of young IT professionals.  
 
Where did the graduates get their first job? The data (excluding those who went 
abroad) suggests that most graduates stay nearby: 65% within the province, 18% in 
Shanghai and a small 3% starts to work in the nearby Jiangsu province. Only 4% will 
start to work in Beijing, which is still considered the main place to be for IT industries. 
The other IT centre of China, the Guangdong area, attracts about 10% of graduates. Of 
the people that stay in Zhejiang province, more than 50% work in Hangzhou. Informal 
interviews with about 30-40 Zhejiang University students that were graduating 
suggests that there are two reasons for this geographical concentration. First of all, the 
cultural differences between north and south of China are considered to be significant. 
Especially if the student is originally from the south, it is unlikely that he or she will 
move to Beijing for work and living. Second, the competition in Beijing from Beijing 
University and Tsinghua University students is fierce. Zhejiang University is a good 
university, but still considered to be inferior to Beida or Tsinghua. In sum, there is a 
low level of geographical job mobility (Figure 6.1, next page). 
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Figure 6.1: First job location 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Zhejiang University Alumni Database, (1996-2005) 
 
What kind of job did the graduates have as a first job? First of all, over the 1996-2005 
period on average about 4% of the graduates went abroad. There is no structural 
information as to where these students end up, but informal interviews suggest certain 
preferences: USA. Unsurprisingly the majority of students found a job in a company 
(54%). A large proportion continued studying, 31% of the students (Figure 6.2, next 
page). It is no surprise that the number of PhD students is large. Doing a PhD is often 
seen as a last resort, if no other job can be found. The accumulated academic skills 
during a PhD project are not often seen as a valuable complement to a BSc or MSc 
degree. This suggests that the level and quality of PhD studies is not as high as in 
Western-European of US-American societies. A small proportion of students end up in 
the government (7%) or in specialized research institutes (4%). In contrast to the low 
geographical job mobility, the workplace mobility is high. Both anecdotal evidence 
and data from my interviews suggest average annual labour turnover rates of 20-30%.  
 
How do graduates search for a job? In the absence of survey and statistical data we 
will use anecdotal evidence on the basis of my frequent interaction with Zhejiang 
University students in 2006-2008 to provide insights into the local labour market, in 
particular WKHµMREKXQW¶RIJUDGXDWHVLQWKHODVW\HDURIWKHLUVWXG\,QIRUPDOGLVFXVVLRQ
and interviews suggest that graduates has a strong preference for large foreign firms 
such as P&G, Philips, PWC, Deloitte, GM, Accenture, etc. Typically, each student 
applies to a large number of vacancies at the same time. This can be as much as 30 to 
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50 applications per student. Students apply to a wide variety of functions and jobs, 
regardless of their particular major, interest and motivation. Students generally have 
three ways to find information about job vacancies: 1) job hunting websites such as 
Yingjiesheng, 51job and Hiall27; 2) campus recruitment talks; 3) Zhejiang University 
Graduation Website28. Personal introductions and family or friends at foreign firms 
usually do not give students an advantage. 
 
Figure 6.2: Type of first job 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Zhejiang University Alumni Database, (1996-2005) 
 
The applications involve online registration and tests at job hunting websites and 
offline interviews. As the students all graduate at the same time across China, 
companies have online tests that intend to make a qualitative selection. However, the 
reality is that those tests ± and even the interviews ± are similar across companies and 
years. The students exchange their experiences and even copy/paste screen shots of 
tests onto the university BBS29. Moreover, as these tests are roughly similar, students 
can gain experience by doing more tests at more companies30.  So generally, the use of 
these tests is limited and foreign firms receive large amounts of applications (e.g. 
                                                          
27 www.yingjiesheng.com; www.hiall.com.cn; www.51job.com.cn  
28⌭∳໻ᄺህϮᣛᇐϢ᳡ࡵЁᖗ: http://www.career.zju.edu.cn/cs/ 
29 7KHUHLVHYHQDVSHFLDOZRUGIRUWKLVµOHDUQLQJIURPRWKHUV¶䴶㒣 (mianjing) 
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several ten thousands per firm). Then, whenever a student gets an offer, they will 
continue to apply. Even though most students get one or no offer31, some lucky 
students manage to get 4 or 5 offers and select only at the latest stage the desired offer. 
In sum, this anecdotal evidence suggests that the job searching process for fresh 
graduates in foreign firms is relatively inefficient for both the students and the 
companies. The small number of students that is applying for small private firms, 
government positions or state-owned enterprises face a very different job hunting 
process. Across all these sectors, personal introduction and relationship networks are 
by far the most crucial factor for finding a job. Both the informal interviews with 
students and the interview data of my sample of firms suggest that the so-called 
guanxi-factor is crucial for finding a job in a small private firm, SOE or government.  
 
Summarizing, human capital development has many opportunities and restrictions for 
the IT industries: better monetary incentives for IT and academic jobs; social 
networking within certain sectors; supplementary training organized by companies; 
high reputation of the universities in Hangzhou. However, scarcity of competences, 
low geographic mobility and high workplace mobility and the need for specific 
competences in IT that cannot be provided by the formal education system. 
 
6.6 Private capital accumulation and savings (critical financial resources) 
:KHUH GRHV+DQJ]KRX¶VZHDOWK FRPH IURP"$ FORVHU ORRN DW VWRFN OLVWLQJV SULYDWH
savings, foreign investment and loans suggests that there is considerable private 
capital. First of all, the number of listed companies in Hangzhou reached 50 in 2006, 
an increase of 4 compared to 2005. Of these 50 companies, 40 companies are listed on 
Chinese stock markets and 10 companies are listed on overseas stock markets. Money 
raised through stock markets reached 3.55 billion RMB in the whole year (Hangzhou 
Statistics Online, 2008). Firms that make it to the stock market usually are backed by 
state support (such as the initial IPOs of sina.com for instance on NASDAQ). 
Moreover, most of the stock-listed companies are state-owned or are indirectly 
controlled by government agencies. However, as in Western economies, stock markets 
are not the main sources for investments for most enterprises. In Hangzhou, it is 
private savings and foreign investments that provided the capital for most enterprises.  
Private savings were virtually non-existent at the beginning of the reforms. However, 
the average savings in Hangzhou in 1990 already amounted to 1,215 RMB, which is a 
large percentage of the annual income (60% of 1,999 RMB). This is not only twice the 
national average but also a larger portion of the annual income (cf. China: 41% of 
                                                                                                                                                  
30 Moreover, students confided to use fake names and accounts to take the same test multiple times in 
order to learn how to make it most efficiently. 
31 Unemployment under fresh graduates is high 
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1,510 RMB). Especially the last five years the growth in savings is noteworthy: an 
average 20% increase in average savings per capita (compared to 16% national). In 
2006 a person has on average 38,367 RMB on his savings account, which is more than 
the equivalent of an average annual income (21,367 RMB) (see Table 6.6). 
 
Table 6.6: Savings per capita in Hangzhou compared (RMB) 
  China Hangzhou 
1978 22 41 
1980 40 79 
1985 153 294 
1990 623 1,215 
1995 2,449 5,734 
2000 5,076 12,698 
2001 5,780 14,974 
2002 6,766 18,607 
2003 8,018 24,766 
2004 9,197 28,190 
2005 10,787 33,207 
2006 12,293 38,367 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008 
 
Tsai (2002) argued how important private forms of banking are for entrepreneurs in 
&KLQDWKHUHE\GHQRWLQJWKHOLPLWHGXVHRIµRIILFLDO¶EDQNORDQV/RRNLQJDWWKHEDQNV
in Hangzhou and their loans, I come to the same conclusion. The amount of loans 
compared to the savings or foreign investment volume is insignificant. For instance, in 
2006, total loans amounted to 649 billion RMB, however savings were 16,000 billion 
RMB and FDI was about 1,060 billion RMB. If we compare the value of loans per 
capita to FDI and savings, the differences become even more striking. In 1995, loans 
were still practically non-existent, whereas foreign investment (1,213 RMB) and 
private savings (5,734 RMB) were already significant. In 2006, the difference is large, 
with only 502 RMB value of loans per capita, compared to a value of 8,599 RMB of 
foreign investment and 38,367 RMB of savings per capita. Overall, the role of banks 
as capital providers is insignificant compared to foreign investment and private capital. 
 Furthermore, as can be seen from the data of the last 4 years (Table 6.7, next 
page), only a small percentage of the loans flows to the private sector or innovation 
related projects. Even though the total amount of loans has been increasing 
significantly over the past 4 years, these loans did not reach the private sector. On 
average only 2% of the loans went to private firms and this did not increase over the 
last years. The same holds for innovation funding. It is clear that investments in the 
upgrading of existing technological systems does not originate in bank loans. Private ± 
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and foreign capital is clearly the main sources of investment for private entrepreneurs 
in Hangzhou. 
Table 6.7: Loans in Hangzhou 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008 
 
This general pattern is confirmed in my sample of private software entrepreneurs. 
Most investments come from the entrepreneurs and a select small group of informal 
private investors. This amounts to ± on average ± 57% of investments, usually initial, 
start-up investments. Usually a mix of different sources is used. So, for instance, 
founder¶s capital and later an investment firm or government funds investment. The 
latter is not to be underestimated. On average 21% of investments originates in special 
government funds, often designated for young, private entrepreneurs in specific high-
technology sectors. As to the investment company, usually, after initial success an 
investment firm will provide additional capital, on average 31% of investments. In a 
few cases, 7% of investments, stock listing is the way of capital accumulation. 
 Where is all this capital invested in? The most insightful data on investments in 
Hangzhou are the figures on investments in fixed assets. The Hangzhou statistical 
yearbook provides sectoral data for the reform period. First of all, the agricultural 
sector and other primary industries hardly receive any investments, which is not 
surprising given the relative unimportance of thHVHVHFWRUVIRU+DQJ]KRX¶VHFRQRPLF
development (see previous section). The secondary ± manufacturing ± industries and 
tertiary industries in general share most of the investments until the 1990s. The last 
decade and a half, the tertiary industries start to receive most of the investments. Most 
of the investments flow into capital construction and real estate. Nevertheless, a 
significant amount of investment is put in innovation. Innovation has become a 
µbudget¶ item on the local government agenda, which is also clearly resonated in the 
current official slogan µinnovation to create a harmonious society¶.  
 All in all, it is private savings, not bank loans, that is providing opportunities. 
Moreover, investments are shifting to the tertiary sector, of which the IT industries are 
part. Access to banks and low availability of bank loans are the main restrictions. 
 
 
 
in 10,000 RMB 2003 2004 20005 2006 
total loans 36,869,000 46,511,600 54,256,100 64,960,300 
short term 20,502,000 24,128,300 27,355,700 33,875,900 
medium and long term 13,210,600 17,340,200 21,208,100 25,872,100 
for foreign invested enterprises 716,000 752,200 920,800 940,900 
for private sector 772,900 1,067,700 1,040,400 1,580,300 
for innovation 4,400 232,200 302,200 265,300 
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6.7 Foreign investment (critical financial resources) 
Hangzhou has been strong in attracting foreign investment. Hangzhou was rather late 
in opening up and had low level of foreign investment. Before the early 1990s the 
amount of equal to less than the national average in terms of percentage foreign 
investment of GDP, even though the per capita investment was higher than average. It 
was only after the famous 1992 opening up µPRYHPHQW¶ WKDW Hangzhou started to 
attract large amounts of foreign investment, surpassing the national average largely: 
foreign investment amounting to 22.RI+DQJ]KRX¶V*'3DQGDERXWILYHWLPHVWKH
national average per capita raWLR 2YHU WKH ZKROH SHULRG +DQJ]KRX¶V IRUHLgn 
investment growth rate was 8.2%, compared to the national average 4.8%. Whereas 
the national inflow of FDI in China has been significant, the amount of foreign 
investment reaching Hangzhou in the past years is overwhelming (Table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.8: FDI in Hangzhou compared to China(RMB) 
  FDI as % of GDP FDI per capita 
  China Hangzhou China Hangzhou 
1985 3.7% 3.9% 32 65 
1990 1.9% 2.2% 31 72 
1991 2.9% 2.6% 55 102 
1992 11.4% 22.9% 263 1,140 
1993 16.7% 27.7% 498 2,007 
1994 9.1% 15.8% 366 1,561 
1995 8.0% 9.5% 399 1,213 
2000 3.3% 3.4% 261 766 
2001 3.3% 5.2% 287 1,301 
2002 3.6% 7.4% 342 2,066 
2003 4.5% 10.9% 472 3,572 
2004 5.1% 13.1% 626 5,127 
2005 5.4% 13.9% 766 6,191 
2006 5.0% 16.6% 807 8,599 
Source: Hangzhou Statistics Online, 2008; China Statistical Yearbook Online, 2008 
 
The source of these foreign investments is predominantly Asia, even more than the 
national average (77% compared to 63%). Western European countries play a less 
significant role as foreign investors. It is striking that more than half of total foreign 
investments originates in Hong Kong. It can be largely explained by the outflow of 
Zhejiang businesspersons during the state socialist period to Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
further abroad to the USA. Unsurprisingly, Taiwan and the USA are the second and 
third largest foreign investors in Hangzhou. The Chinese-dominated Singapore is a 
good fourth. As well-documented by Saxenian (2006), these overseas Chinese have 
become significant investors in Mainland China, not only in terms of financial capital, 
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but also in bringing in relevant advanced technologies, management skills and labour. 
Exhibit 6.3 provides an H[DPSOHRIDQµRYHUVHDV¶LQYHVWRULQ+DQJ]KRX=KX0LQ 
 
6.8 Discussion of findings 
Hangzhou has developed a local business environment with distinct features. It is one 
of the most prosperous regions of China in terms of GDP, income and wages. In 
particular FRPSDUHG WR WKH QDWLRQDO µDYHUDJH¶ +DQJ]KRX KDV GHYHORSHG GLVWLQFW
patterns of organization of economic activities. The findings allows us to single out 
key features of three crucial institutional arrangements in Hangzhou: role of the local 
state, skill development and education and the financial system.  
 +DQJ]KRX¶VORFDOJRYHUQPHQWZRUNVµDWDUP¶VOHQJWK¶LHDQRQ-intervening local 
government and private firms as dominant economic actors. The focus is the local 
development strategy is on innovation and entrepreneurship driven by the market. 
Furthermore, Hangzhou is home to technology development zones and incubator parks 
that facilitate the growth of high-WHFKLQGXVWULHVEXWHVSHFLDOO\µFOHDQ¶VHFWRUVVXFKDV
Exhibit 6.3: From Ningbo farmer to Silicon Valley hero 
Min Zhu was born in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. He received his bachelor 
degree from Zhejiang University and in 1985 got an MS in Management 
Science Engineering from Stanford University.  He developed his 
technological expertise at the IBM Scientific Center in Palo Alto, California. In 
1991, Zhu co-founded Future Labs, one of the first companies to produce 
multi-point document collaboration software. Quarterdeck acquired Future 
Labs in 1996, and Zhu went on to co-found WebEx with Subrah Iyar (general 
manager of Quarterdeck ) in 1995. In 2004 he became a venture partner at New 
Enterprise Associates, where he worked practices in sourcing and evaluating 
new investment opportunities with a focus on opportunities in the expanding 
Chinese market.  
On May 13, 2005, Zhu resigned from WebEx and left the United 
States. Cisco Systems would later, in 2007, acquire WebEx for $3.2 billion. In 
September 2005, NEA announced plans to back Chinese venture firm Northern 
Light. The new firm, founded by Min Zhu along with Chinese entrepreneurs 
Feng Deng and Yan Ke, share office space in China with NEA venture partner 
Xiaodong Jiang. In 2005, Min Zhu also founded Cybernaut Investment 
Consulting Company to help Chinese entrepreneurs grow up. 
Zhu Min donated $10 million to Zhejiang University in 2007, and set 
up a non-profit organization, Zhejiang University Innovation Institute (ZII), 
International. Finally yet importantly, he invested in Infoware, a promising 
enterprise software firm that will take the WebEx business model to the next 
level, and which is founded by his son, Zhu Lei.  
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software, services, telecommunications, etc. The service and high-tech industries are 
the dominant industries, driven by innovation and market competition.  
 The skill development and formal education system provide incentives to 
entrepreneurs and become increasingly facilitating for knowledge ± human capital ± 
intensive development: monetary incentives for IT and academic jobs; social networks 
within sectors; elite university; supplementary training organized by associations and 
companies; and comprehensive elite education. However, there is still a general 
scarcity in competences, low geographic mobility and high workplace mobility that 
makes it difficult for employers to commit employees to their firm. Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that the labor market is inefficient in terms of recruiting and 
retaining employees. The labour market has almost no coordination with the absence 
of unions, job agencies and the prevalence of informal recruitment. Moreover, the 
labour market is locally very fluid, i.e. high mobility across firms in the same sector.  
 The financial system is highly biased towards private capital and foreign 
investments. Increased private savings and (foreign) investments in tertiary industries 
provide opportunities while a low availability of bank loans and strong competition for 
private and foreign capital limits the effectiveness of the local financial market. The 
absence of a professional venture capital and banking system makes the financial 
market uncertain and highly competitive. It is likely that the role of informal networks 
for obtaining private and/or foreign capital is large. Whereas the formal banking 
system is highly regulated ± as elsewhere in China ± the informal, private banking 
sector is not transparent and without clear rules of the game. In a sense, the financial 
µV\VWHP¶LVKLJKO\GHUHJXODWHGDQGFRRUGLQDWHGE\PDUNHWIRUFHV+RZHYHUWKHUXOHV
of the market are not transparent but informal agreements between different actors 
(private investors, entrepreneurs, networks of firms and government agencies). 
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Chapter 7 ± Findings 2 
 
Software innovation patterns and three empirical 
cases 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
+DQJ]KRX¶V ORFDO EXVLQHVV V\VWHPKDV D YDULHW\ RI RSSRUWXQLWLHV DQG UHVWULFWLRQV IRU
firms and sectors (Chapter 6). It is useful to repeat my classification scheme of the 
software sectors and their expected innovation patterns in Chapter 2 (Table 7.1). 
Entrepreneurs in these sectors have different constraints on innovation caused by 
market and technical characteristics. These sectoral constraints in combination with 
the opportunities and restrictions in Hangzhou set incentives for innovation. 
Entrepreneurs need to explore new ways to mobilize resources, new ways of doing 
business, new ideas for re-combining productive factors, developing and producing 
new products or more efficient production technologies. The findings suggest that 
Chinese private software entrepreneurs indeed innovate rather than imitate and that 
there are distinct innovation patterns. What type of innovation do Chinese software 
entrepreneurs develop? The general literature sees five types of innovation, however in 
China we find only four: market, product, process and business model innovation. 
 
Table 7.1 ± Characteristics of software sub-sectors 
 Enterprise software Standard software Middleware 
Product/service µ7RWDO-VROXWLRQ¶ Novel product Application 
Customers Few, diverse Many, similar Many, similar 
Cost model Service, sale Sale, licensing User revenues  
Extent of customization High Low Middle 
Innovation pattern Incremental Radical Radical 
Locus of product change Systemic Stand alone Modular  
Expected risks of 
competence destruction 
Limited Considerable  High 
Expected imitation  risks Considerable Limited Limited 
Entry barriers High  Medium Low  
Capabilities Knowledge of full 
process; collective  
capabilities 
Creativity; 
individual 
capabilities 
Coordination, 
individual 
capabilities 
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While identifying patterns provides useful insights in sector-level innovation, the 
mechanisms at the firm level are yet to be explained. In fact, research on innovation in 
China usually stays at the national level (e.g. Liu and Buck, 2007; OECD, 2007), 
explaining developments in innovation systems (Liu and White, 2001) and analyzing 
latecomer strategies and technological catching-up (Li and Kozhikode, 2008). Other 
VWXGLHVIRFXVRQVSHFLILFIHDWXUHVRILQQRYDWLRQGHYHORSPHQWVXFKDV%DWMDUJDO¶VVWXG\ 
of social capital in innovative software ventures in Beijing (Batjargal, 2007) or 
knowledge management in large, successful high-tech firms (Lau, Lu, Makino, Chen 
and Yeh, 2004). Firm level explanations of innovation mechanisms are limited to a 
handful of UHVHDUFKHUVPRVWSURPLQHQWO\4LZHQ/XDQG:LOOLDP/D]RQLFN¶VZRUNRQ
the computer hardware industry (e.g. Lu, 2000; Lu and Lazonick, 2001) and Shulin 
*X¶VZRUNRQ1HZ7HFKQRORJ\(QWHUSULVHV*X$QHPSLULFDODQDO\VLVEDVHG
on extensive fieldwork interviews shows the firm level mechanisms of innovation. The 
chapter concludes by illustrating these with the stories of three entrepreneurs. 
 
7.2 Patterns of innovation: empirical results full data set 
This empirical study investigates different aspects of innovation (Chapter 3): type, 
characteristics and systemic features. The respondents indicated in the interviews that 
there are four types of innovation: market, product, process and business model 
innovation. The interviews show that there are three drivers of innovation: external 
technological development, customer demand and in-house firm initiative. 
Furthermore, it is useful to check how well the empirical findings fit the general 
classification scheme in the literature that distinguishes radical from incremental 
innovation and stand-alone, modular from systemic innovations. The last section then 
discusses the various connections between these features.  
 
7.2.1Type of innovation (full data set)  
Chapter 3 singled out 5 types of innovation: new product and methods of production, 
new ways of organizing the value chain, opening new markets for goods and services 
and new ways to organize business. The type of innovation LQWKLVVWXG\¶VGDWDVHWLV
identified by combining the answers to the following questions iQWKHLQWHUYLHZµ:KDW
W\SHVRILQQRYDWLRQVGLGWKHILUPLQWURGXFH"¶µ3OHDVHVKRUWO\GHVFULEHDQH[DPSOHRI
DQ LQQRYDWLRQ WKDW LV FUXFLDO IRU WKH ILUP¶V GHYHORSPHQW¶ )XUWKHUPRUH WKH DQVZHUV
ZHUHFKHFNHGZLWKSXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHGDWDRQWKHILUP¶VSURGXct, such as websites. 
  
The findings in the full sample of 45 software entrepreneurs suggest that, contrary to 
popular belief, Chinese software entrepreneurs are innovative and see the value of 
innovation as opposed to imitation. Figure 7.1 (next page) shows the types of 
innovation in the full data set: product (50%), market (14%), process (12%) and 
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business model (24%) innovation. Product innovation is mentioned by 50% of the 
respondents. Product innovation here refers to new products and services that did not 
previously exist in the market and addresses a need that existing product could not 
satisfy. A generic example is a new computer game or a new CAD/CAM software 
package32  $ &KLQHVH H[DPSOH LV )LUP ¶V LQWHJUDWHG ULVN PDQDJHPHQW VRIWZDUH
package. This product innovation was developed in response to the liberalization of 
Chinese financial markets and integration in global financial markets. The product 
integrates interest rate derivative products, pricing analysis and risk management in 
one package. CompDUHGWRIRUHLJQVXSSOLHUV)LUP¶VVRIWZDUHGLVSOD\HGDQXPEHU
of advantages: competitive prices, address rapid development of the capacity for the 
most pressing needs, customer service, provide Chinese and English interface, and 
provide risk assessment reports. 
 
Figure 7.1 ± Type of innovation (full data set, Hangzhou, China, 2007) 
 
 
Market innovation is mentioned by 14% of the respondents. Market innovation refers 
to the opening up of new markets for goods and services. This does not necessarily 
refer to fundamentally new products or services but to new to the market environment. 
A generic example is the introduction of computer service software for the real estate 
market. $ &KLQHVH H[DPSOH LV )LUP ¶V LQWHUDFWLYH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ VRIWZDUH IRU
business cuVWRPHUV0DUNHW LQQRYDWLRQZDVXQOHDVKHGE\ WKH ILUP¶VPDUNHW UHVHDUFK
on the current state of Internet development. Over 90% of new sites are found through 
                                                          
32 CAD/CAM systems integrate Computer-aided design (CAD) with Computer-aided manufacturing 
(CAM). Such computer tools and systems assist designers and control the manufacturing process, 
which increases efficiency of the manufacturing process. 
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search engines. However, even when customers intend to buy, they hardly ever contact 
the firm. The software that Firm 56 developed enables websites to talk and 
communicate, make it an interactive website. Combining traditional websites with the 
technology of the immensely popular instant messaging software, Firm 56 develop a 
piece of software that enables interactive websites. This next generation software will 
open up a completely new market for interactive websites.  
  
Process innovation is mentioned by 12% of the respondents. Process innovation refers 
here to new methods of production or delivery of the service. A generic example of 
process innovation is the Java software platform that allows developing software 
DFURVV GLIIHUHQW SODWIRUPV $ &KLQHVH H[DPSOH LV )LUP¶V ¶V TXLFN GHYHORSPHQW
platform on which they can develop software more flexibly and efficiently. The 
software technology competences are inspired by SAP software but derived from 
cooperation with universities. The CEO regularly visits companies who buy SAP 
software and then look how they implement it. Furthermore, they developed 
cooperation with some domestic universities, Zhejiang Industry and Commerce 
University and China Polytechnic University. Interestingly Firm 65 has cooperation 
with Liverpool University for data mining database techniques and entered into an EU 
7th framework bid last year. In short, Firm 65 is improving the development process of 
their software product. 
  
However, it is especially business model innovation that is noteworthy. This type of 
innovation is mentioned by 24% of the respondents. A business model is a structural 
template that influences how a firm transacts with all its external constituents, such as 
customers, suppliers and other parties (Amit and Zott, 2007). Business model 
innovation then refers to novel ways of organizing the organizational framework in 
order to create superior value for customers, as proposed by Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom (2002). Such a framework generally includes the value proposition to the 
customer, key processes and resources and the profit model. Many successful 
companies in knowledge-intensive industries have shown the value of business model 
innovation in US American and Western European contexts. For instance, Federal 
Express, Google, Xerox and Dell were built on business model innovations. A Chinese 
H[DPSOH LV)LUP¶VPRGHORI ORcalizing business information. The firm developed 
network advertisement software that adds value by offering an attractive package and 
by creating maximum exposure of the advertisements.  
 It works as follows: customers rent an LCD monitor that they position at the 
entrance of their restaurant, bar or hotel. When customers rent a machine, they buy the 
right to have their advertisement shown in nine other places that are within walking 
distance. Those nine other customers have their advertisements shown on eDFKRWKHU¶V
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/&'PRQLWRUV )LUP ¶V VRIWZDUH JXDUDQWHHVPD[LPXP H[SRVXUH DQG DQ DWWUDFWLYH
combination of advertisements (e.g. not only restaurants or bars but also several 
different restaurants combined with several different bars). Furthermore, they offer a 
mobile Internet service that allows consumers to find customers in the network that are 
near their geographical position. Two complementary innovations were necessary. 
One innovation is a mobile GPS system, using Bluetooth technology to set up a 
mobile website. Another innovation is a management system that combines a client 
website management system with client databases. The innovations in Firm 50 cover 
many areas of the organization and the way the firm adds value to the customers, i.e. 
business model innovation. 
 
The fifth type of innovation known in the literature, value chain innovation, is not 
found in this sample. One of the reasons is that these firms are too small to be able to 
change and improve processes that span the boundaries of their firm and extend into 
VXSSOLHUV DQG FXVWRPHU¶V ILUPV $ ODFN RI OHJLWLPDF\ DQG EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU GXH WR
newness and smallness hinder these software firms to innovate the value chain. A 
Chinese example of a value chain innovator is Alibaba, a large company (12,000 
employees) with significant bargaining power with its suppliers and customers. By 
providing a dynamic online platform for e-business, they radically changed the value 
chain process. Small software firms are not yet able to innovate the value chain.  
 
The findings suggest that Chinese entrepreneurs see the value of innovation and 
understand innovation in a wider sense. Namely, the types of innovation can be 
distinguished into organizational innovations, i.e. business model and market 
innovation, and technological innovation, i.e. process and product innovation. Looking 
at the whole data set, respondents indicate to have both organizational (38%) ± and 
technological (62%) innovations. This reminds us that innovation is not necessarily in 
technologies, which LVWUDGLWLRQDOO\VHHQDVµUHDO¶LQQRYDWLRQFagerberg, Mowery and 
Nelson, 2007). On the contrary, firms can be innovative in the way they organize their 
business, not unlike Western countries, where successful catching-up historically also 
involved innovatLRQ µSDUWLFXODUO\ RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQDO NLQG DQG ZLWK LQURDGV LQWR
QDVFHQWLQGXVWULHV¶)DJHUEHUJDQG*RGLQKRS,QWKLVFRQWH[WLW¶VZRUWK
VWUHVVLQJEXVLQHVVPRGHOLQQRYDWLRQ)LUP¶VORFDOL]HGEXVLQHVVPRGHOLOOXVWUDWHGWKH
interplay between both forms of innovation. +HQU\&KHVEURXJK¶VVWXGLHVRQ86ILUPV
also suggest that some technical innovation was necessary for firms such as Google 
and Dell. However, the main reason that these firms have grown is that they offered 
customers a new way to do something that had not been offered before (Chesbrough, 
2006). The results of this study show a similar process in Chinese firms.  
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7.2.2 Drivers of innovation (full data set)  
The literature on innovation and drivers of innovation in particular, suggests a wide 
variety of potential drivers, ranging from technologies, employee ideas, customer 
requirements, user innovations to scientific inventions and commercialization of 
university research. Drivers of innovation here refer to the dominant source of ideas 
for innovation; i.e. if innovation is technology-GULYHQLWPHDQVWKDWLQQRYDWLRQLVµVHW-
RII¶ DQG WULJJHUHG E\ GHYHORSPHQWV LQ WHFKQRORJ\ 0XOWLSOH GULYHUV FDQ WULJJHU
innovation at the same time, however, we focused on the dominant, most important 
driver since we are interested in identifying dominant patterns of innovation and its 
drivers. These patterns give us insights into how innovation is triggered across 
different sectors. Practically, in the interview with the entrepreneurs we asked who or 
what initiated the idea for the innovation (question 10) and which factors were 
important for the development of the innovation (question 11). These were open-ended 
questions to the software entrepreneurs.  
  
Figure 7.2 ± Drivers of innovation (full data set, Hangzhou, China, 2007) 
 
 
The interviews show who and what drives innovation for software entrepreneurs in 
Hangzhou (Figure 7.2). The findings in the full data suggest that innovation is driven 
by external technological developments (39%), customer demand (28%) and in-house 
firm initiatives (33%). Technological development µWHFKQRORJ\¶ LV PHQWLRQHG E\
39% of the respondents as the driver for innovation. Technology-driven here refers to 
either developments within the software field or in related fields, mostly computer 
hardware or telecommunications, which more or less force firms to innovate. A 
generic example is the switch to a more advanced programming language (e.g. JAVA) 
as the industry standard that developers are forced to adopt and at the same time opens 
up possibilities for innovation. A Chinese example is )LUP ¶V RQOLQH LQWHUDFWLYH
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games, so-FDOOHGµIODVK-games33¶EDVHGRQQHZ'JDPHWHFKQRORJLHVThe games are 
being exported to Europe, the United States and Australia. Technology is crucial in 
online interactive games, especially in the 3D games business. These technologies are 
not yet as mature as in 2D or TV games. Since no standard or dominant technology 
emerged yet, the technologies change quickly. Game firms need to keep up to hold 
their competitive position. Moreover, the level of technologies used and the standards 
required for the foreign markets are much higher than in mainland China. Even though 
they can never be technology-leaders on an international level, at least they have to 
keep up with the other firms. Therefore, innovation is crucial and driven by 
developments in technology. 
 Customer demand µFXVWRPHU¶ LVPHQWLRQHG E\ RI WKH UHVSRQGHQWV DV WKH
driver for innovation. Customer-driven here refers to those innovations that are either 
required by the customer on the basis of their experiences or the feedback and 
experience of customers is the basis for innovation. A generic example is the request 
from a customer to add certain functionality to the existing product. A Chinese 
exDPSOHLV)LUP¶VVRIWZDUHV\VWHPWKDWFDOFXODWHVWKHPDUNHWYDOXHRIFHOOSKRQHV
LQUHDOWLPHLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHGHPDQGRIFXVWRPHUV)DFHGZLWKKLJKµWXUQRYHU¶RIFHOO
phones and quick depreciation, large businesses do not know how to depreciate cell 
phones on their balance sheets. 7KLVSURGXFW¶V DGGHGYDOXH OLHV LQ WKH IDFW LW DOORZV
business customers to depreciate cell phones continuously at the real value. 
 In-house firm initiative µHQWHUSULVH¶LVPHQWLRQHGE\RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWVDV
the driver for innovation. Enterprise-driven here refers to ideas from employees, 
managers or founders that set the incentives for innovation. A generic example is an 
RQOLQH SLFWXUH VKDULQJ SODWIRUP $ &KLQHVH H[DPSOH LV )LUP ¶V ORFDOLVHG RQOLQH
search engine. The business model of Firm 22 is founded with the idea that common 
people should be able to use the Internet world without knowledge of Web2.0, SNS, 
and networks. The search engine is focused at all the aspects of life: housing, jobs, 
education, food, drink, friendship, etc. They use a matrix with business categories (e.g 
house, car renting and sports) and regions (county level). 
 These findings suggest that there are both external ± and internal incentives for 
firms to innovate. The external incentives (67%) arise from developments in 
technology and demand from customer. This has several implications: technologies 
are apparently developing and being upgraded to the extent that they more or less 
force firms to upgrade firms. Technology thus becomes a driver for upgrading firms. 
Furthermore, customer demand is increasingly sophisticated. At the same time, 
internal incentives (33%) are important compared to external incentives. 
                                                          
33 Games based on flash technology: bi-directional streaming of audio and video. It is also a popular 
method for adding animation and interactivity to web pages. 
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7.2.3 Characteristics of innovation (full data set)  
The literature suggests to characterize innovation patterns along two axes: incremental, 
radical versus stand-alone, modular, and systemic. How do the empirical finings of 
innovation patterns fit in that classification scheme? First, innovations can be 
incremental or radical, depending to what extent the core technology is different 
compared to the technological trajectory in the industry and to what extent the 
innovation involves offering substantially different product/services for customers 
relative to existing products/services in the industry (cf. Chapter 3). The findings show 
that 66% of the innovations are radical. This refers to firms striving for technological 
leadership and to that end innovating radically in technology, business model and 
opening up of new markets. Furthermore, the findings show that 34% of the 
innovations are incremental. This refers to incremental improvement of products and 
processes, upgrading service to customers and introducing more products in the same 
production line. So, Chinese entrepreneurs tend to develop both radical and 
incremental innovations.  
 The assessment of this distinction is made on the basis of qualitative interview 
data. Questions about the innovation process and investments in technology (questions 
8-16) provide information about the technologies used, whereas questions about 
technological base and changes in the industry (questions 37-41) provide information 
about technological trajectories in the industry. Questions about the customers 
(question 32-36) provide information about the preferences and behavior of the 
customers that allows us to asses to what extent the product/service is valued as 
different. Furthermore, we asked the entrepreneurs about the investments necessary for 
innovation and how he assesses the innovation compared to competLWRU¶V. The more 
investments necessary and the more the entrepreneur considers the innovation radical, 
the more radical the innovation is likely to be. Altogether these assessments led to a 
dichotomous categorization of innovation as either radical or incremental.  
 Second, innovations can differ in their systemic features, i.e. from systemic or 
modular to stand-alone. The findings show that 22% of the innovations are stand-alone, 
44% are modular and 34% are systemic. This suggests that Chinese software firms 
have a variety of innovations, ranging from changes in products to changes in whole 
systems of products. In fact, most of the innovations are not stand-alone but are linked 
to other elements of a technology, organization or market. Moreover, the result 
suggests that there is a relatively large variety of innovation found in the software 
industry, across the different sectors. Such variety of innovation begs the question of 
what kinds of capability firms have developed (see Chapter 9). 
 The assessment of innovations in the sample considered two aspects: switching 
costs and modularity. We XVHGTXHVWLRQVOLNHµ'LGWKHILUPKDYHWRFKDQJHWKHZD\LW
SURGXFHVSURGXFWVRUGHOLYHUVVHUYLFHV"¶,IWKHILUPKDVWRFKDQJHWKHZD\LWSURGXFHV
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a product in response to certain technological changes, it is likely that the innovation is 
of a systemic nature, involving widespread changes (as opposed to stand-alone). 
µ3OHDVHH[SODLQZKLFKIDFWRUVZHUHLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKLVLQQRYDWLRQ"¶
If internal factors, such as R&D and marketing project teams, are important for the 
innovation, i.e. if the innovation involves multiple departments, the innovation is 
likely to be of a systemic nature (as opposed to stand-DORQH µ'LG WKH ILUPKDYH WR
make significant specifiF LQYHVWPHQWV IRU WKLV LQQRYDWLRQ"¶ 7KH KLJKHU WKH VSHFLILF
investments the more likely it is that the switching costs for the firm are higher, 
indicating a more systemic type of innovation (as opposed to stand-alone). With 
respect to modularity, we looked at two features: first, whether or not the firm uses 
modules. If not obvious in direct communication, usually one look at the product 
provides enough evidence for the extent of modularity of the product. Second, whether 
or not the firm operates within certain technical standards. If answers to both questions 
are affirmative and the switching costs are relatively low, then it is likely that the 
innovation is of a modular nature. 
 
Table 7.2 - Type of innovation versus characteristics and drivers 
 Market Product Process Business model Total 
Stand-alone 2% 20% - - 22% 
Modular 10% 10% 2% 22% 44% 
Systemic 2% 20% 10% 2% 34% 
Total 14% 50% 12% 24% 100% 
Radical 12% 30% 2% 22% 66% 
Incremental 2% 20% 10% 2% 34% 
Total 14% 50% 12% 24% 100% 
Customer - 24% 2% 2% 28% 
Technology 7% 24% 8% - 39% 
Enterprise 7% 2% 2% 22% 33% 
Total 14% 50% 12% 24% 100% 
 
7.2.4 Connections between innovation type, characteristics and drivers (full data set) 
Beyond static descriptions of innovation in the data set, it is useful to cross-tabulate 
the types, characteristics and drivers of innovation (Table 7.2). More specifically, it is 
useful to connect the type of innovation to its features in term of radical-incremental, 
stand-alone, modular and systemic and enterprise, customer and technology driven. In 
the literature, type of innovation, characteristics and drivers of innovation are strongly 
linked together. The data in the sample show different patterns and suggest that there 
are certain specific connections between driver, characteristics and type of innovation.  
 Modular innovation (44% of total) is the dominant type of innovation in the 
sample of software entrepreneurs. When we look at the type of innovation versus the 
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systemic features of the innovation, we can see more specifically which type of 
innovation is dominant. The findings suggest that the majority of innovations are 
stand-alone - and systemic product innovations (40% of total) and modular business 
model innovations (22% of total). In particular, stand-alone innovations tend to be 
product innovations (20% versus 2% market innovation of total) and systemic 
innovations are usually also product innovation (20% versus 2% market, 10% process 
and 2% business model innovation of total). Interestingly, the majority of modular 
innovations are of the business model type. The findings show that business model 
innovations tend to be modular (22% versus 2% systemic innovation of total), whereas 
product innovations are often stand-alone (20% of total) or systemic (20% of total).  
 Innovation in 66% of the cases in the sample of software entrepreneurs is radical. 
0RUH SUHFLVHO\ EXVLQHVV PRGHO DQG PDUNHW LQQRYDWLRQV LH µRUJDQL]DWLRQDO
LQQRYDWLRQV¶WHQGWREHUDGLFDO (22% and 12% versus 2% and 2% of total), whereas 
process innovation tends to be incremental (10% versus 2% of total). Product 
innovations can be both radical and incremental (30% and 20% respectively of total), 
i.e. there is no strong connection between this feature and product innovation. These 
findings suggest that both organizational and technological innovations can be 
incremental and radical.  
 When we look at the drivers of innovation we see another pattern emerging. 
Whereas product, market and process innovations have a variety of drivers, business 
model innovation is mostly driven by in-house initiatives (22% versus 2% customer 
driven). It is noteworthy that product innovations usually are not driven by such in-
house initiatives but by customer or technological factors (both 24% of total), exactly 
opposite of business model innovation. The findings suggest that business model 
innovation is driven by more internal factors whereas the other innovations are driven 
by external and/or internal factors.  
 
The findings show that Chinese entrepreneurs do not only innovate incrementally; 
making small modifications, but on the contrary also develop radical innovations. 
Moreover, radical innovation is found in stand-alone settings and within modular 
systems. This suggests that innovation in Hangzhou is not limited to certain types but 
indeed takes place in a broad area. Furthermore, considering the diversity of 
innovation types, characteristics and drivers, it is worthwhile to emphasise the 
diversity of innovative activities across the software sectors. It is worth stressing that 
these results suggest that both organizational ± and technological innovations can have 
radical and incremental features. This reminds us of the fact that radical innovation is 
not limited to technologies. Furthermore, the cross-tabulated findings suggest that 
product ± and business model innovations have the most distinct features. Business 
model innovation tends to be radical and modular driven by in-house initiatives. 
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Product innovation can be radical and incremental, stand-alone and systemic and 
driven by mostly external factors (technology, customer). 
  Before we move on to firm-level explanations of innovation, it is useful to first 
go to the sectoral level and investigate whether or not we find specific patterns of 
innovation across the three software sub-sectors.   
 
7.3 Patterns of innovation: empirical results for the three sectors 
The findings of the comparison across the three software sectors suggest that sectors 
show patterns of innovation. Market innovation can be found in both middleware 
(20%) and standard software sectors (17%), whereas there is little market innovation 
in the enterprise software sector (7%). Product innovation can be found in all three 
sectors. Enterprise and standard software sectors show each more than half of their 
innovations in products. The middleware sector on the contrary has more business 
model innovations (53%) which are not very important in the other two sectors. 
Interesting is the fact that process innovation is almost exclusively found in the 
enterprise software sector (29%). It is worth emphasising that the three sectors are 
rather homogenous when we look at the characteristics of innovation (Table 7.3). This 
suggests that the market and technical characteristics of the sectors pose strong 
constraints on the innovation pattern. However, we need to take a closer look at 
innovation within the sectors to assess the validity of that suggestion.  
 
Table 7.3: types of innovation in total data set ± comparison of sectors 
 
Enterprise 
software Middleware 
Standard 
software 
Market innovation 7% 20% 17% 
Process innovation 29% 0% 8% 
Product innovation 57% 27% 67% 
Business model innovation 7% 53% 8% 
Radical / incremental Incremental Radical Radical 
Stand-alone / modular / systemic Systemic Modular Stand-alone 
 
7.3.1 Enterprise software sector 
The innovative activities of the firms in the enterprise software sector can best be 
summarized as extensively customized software work with individual large customers, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. Innovation takes the form of incremental improvement of 
products and processes, upgrading service to customers and introducing more products 
in the same production line. Examples of products are ERP software, risk management 
software, development platforms, e-conference software and electronic maps. The 
findings show that innovations are incremental and systemic. Innovation takes the 
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form of product innovation in 8 out of 14 cases (57%), process innovation in 4 cases 
(29%), market innovation in 1 case (7%) and business model innovation in 1 case 
(7%). Innovation is driven by customer demand in 10 out of 14 cases (71%), 
technological developments in 2 cases (15%) or in-house initiatives in 2 cases (14%). 
It is useful to cross-tabulate the type of innovation and the drivers (Table 7.4). 
 
Table 7.4 ± Enterprise software: drivers versus type of innovation 
 Market Product Process Business model 
Customer - 57% 7% 7% 
Technology - - 15% - 
Enterprise 7% - 7% - 
 
 
Innovation in the enterprise software sector is predominantly customer-driven product 
innovation. Furthermore, a considerable amount of process innovations is being 
undertaken by enterprise software firms both out of necessity of customer demand (7%) 
and external technological development (15%) as from in-house initiatives (7%). 
 
Table 7.5: innovatiRQSDWWHUQLQ+DQJ]KRX¶VHQWHUprise software sector (14 cases) 
Resp radical / 
incr.* 
stand-alone 
/modular/ 
systemic 
Type Driver of 
innovation 
Innovation 
4 incr. Systemic Product customer additional functionality 
6 incr. Systemic Product customer new ERP product 
12 incr. systemic Product customer management control system  
19 incr. systemic Process technology new web scripting engine 
38 incr. systemic Product customer Risk management software 
52 incr. systemic Product customer document engine 
54 incr. systemic Product customer integrated JIS map  
64 incr. systemic Product customer higher functionality e-maps 
65 incr. systemic Process technology development platform 
67 incr. systemic Process customer development platform 
69 incr. systemic Process enterprise platform toolkit 
70 incr. systemic Business 
model 
customer improving business process 
71 incr. systemic Market enterprise e-conference 
73 incr. systemic Product customer web self service 
* incremental 
 
Table 7.5 summarizes per firm the characteristics, type and drivers of innovation in 
addition to providing an example of innovation in the firm. The sector is rather 
homogenous as innovations are all incremental and systemic. The results confirm the 
expectations of the technological regimes literature (Dosi, 1988; Malerba, 2004) that 
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sectors have distinct patterns of innovative activities. Moreover, the patterns show 
remarkable similarity with software firms in Western settings. In Western European 
and American enterprise software firms, previous studies also find innovation of the 
incremental kind, usually systemic in nature (e.g. Casper and Whitley, 2004; Ibert, 
2004). It is noteworthy that even though the majority of innovation is in products, the 
results do not suggest a specific preference, as we find all types of innovation in this 
sector. Therefore in my sample I find a firm that develops new ERP software product 
driven by customer requirements (firm 6), a firm that improves the development 
process by employing a platform toolkit driven by in-house initiatives (firm 69), a firm 
WKDWXVHVDQRYHOZD\RIRUJDQL]LQJLW¶VVRIWZDUHGHYHORSPHQWSURFHVVLQUHVSRQVHWR
customer requirements (firm 70) and a firm that develops e-conference software for 
large customers thereby enlarging their market driven by in-house initiatives (firm 71). 
 The drivers to innovate, in contrast, are predominantly set by the customer. This 
is not surprising given the large extent of customization of ERP and similar types of 
software development. In fact, it is highly risky for enterprise software firms to 
innovate since most customers are not waiting for new innovative solutions. 
,QQRYDWLRQ WKHQ IROORZV FXVWRPHUV¶ GHPDQGV DQG XVXDOO\ LV QRW UDGLFDOO\ GLIIHUHQW
IURP H[LVWLQJ WHFKQRORJLHV DQG KDV WR ILW WKH FXVWRPHU¶V µV\VWHP¶ WKDW LV DOUHDG\ LQ
place. Such system includes the platform and standards that are worked with as a 
radically change of such standards, languages and platforms could potentially result in 
compatibility problems. 
 
7.3.2 Standard software sector 
The innovative activities of the firms in the standard software sector can be 
summarized as mass produced software for large homogenous markets without 
customization of the products and services. Firms strive to be the technological leader 
and to that end innovate radically in technology, business model and opening up of 
new markets. Examples of products are CAD software for urban planning, logistics 
software, online interactive games and data storage software. The findings show that 
innovations are usually radical, whether stand-alone or modular. Stand alone 
innovation, by far, dominates though in 9 out of 12 cases (or 75%). Innovation takes 
the form of product innovation in 8 out of 12 cases (67%), process innovation in 1 
case (8%), market innovation in 2 cases (17%) and business model innovation in 1 
case (8%). Innovation is driven by technological developments in 10 out of 12 cases 
(84%), customer demand in 1 case (8%) or in-house firm initiatives in 1 case (8%).  
 It is useful to cross-tabulate the type of innovation and the drivers. Innovation in 
the standard software is predominantly technology-driven product innovation. It is 
noteworthy that product innovation in the enterprise software sector were exclusively 
customer-driven, suggesting that the same type of innovation can have a very different 
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motivation (though both are external factors). Furthermore, a considerable amount of 
innovations are market innovation, also driven by external technological developments. 
In general, process and business model innovations are scarce. With the exception of 
some product and business model innovations, the majority of innovations are driven 
by technological developments. Table 7.6 shows the connections between type of 
innovation and driver of innovation. 
 
Table 7.6 ± Standard software: drivers versus type of innovation 
 Market Product Process Business model 
Customer - 8% - - 
Technology 17% 59% 8% - 
Enterprise - - - 8% 
 
 
Table 7.7 summarizes per firm the characteristics, type and drivers of innovation in 
addition to providing an example of innovation in the firm. The sector is less 
homogenous with both stand-alone and modular innovations. In my sample I find a 
firm that develops animation software, a stand-alone product innovation driven by new 
customer demands (firm 81), while at the same time, there is also a firm that develops 
office automation software which is modular in nature and focuses on improvements 
at the process level, driven by external technological developments (firm 76). 
However, the majority of firms produce stand-alone innovations, driven by 
technological developments, such as statistical software, CAD software and games. 
 
7DEOHLQQRYDWLRQSDWWHUQLQ+DQJ]KRX¶VVWDQGDUGVRIWZDUHVHFWRUFDVHV 
Resp. radical 
/ incr. 
stand-alone 
/modular/ 
systemic 
Type Driver of 
innovation 
Innovation 
36 radical stand-alone product technology risk management  
42 radical modular market technology wireless value added service 
58 radical stand-alone product technology urban planning software  
60 radical stand-alone product technology Statistical software 
75 radical stand-alone market technology product integration 
76 radical modular process technology office automation 
77 radical stand-alone product technology logistics software 
80 radical Modular Busines
s model 
enterprise office automation system 
81 radical stand-alone product customer animation software 
82 radical stand-alone product technology online interactive games 
83 radical stand-alone product technology data storage technology 
87 radical stand-alone product technology electronic monitoring system 
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,W¶V ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW WKH PDLQ GULYHU IRU LQQRYDWLRQ LV WHFKQRORJ\ 7KLV LV QRW
surprising given the need for these firms to develop a unique and hard to imitate 
product technology. Changes in technology, either from the industry or developed by 
the firm, necessitate innovation by the firm. If the firm does not follow the new 
technology, they will easily loose out in competition. Customers are not very loyal to 
one provider, e.g. of computer games. This suggests peer group competition instead of 
market competition. These customers ZLOOWKHUHIRUHµJRIRUWKHQHZWKLQJ¶ 
 
7.3.3 Middleware software firms 
The innovative activities of the firms in the middleware software sector are non-
customized activities for a mass market. Innovation takes the form of new business 
models, new product line or opening up a new market. All the firms strive to be the 
technological leader and to that end undertake innovative activities that are radical in 
nature, i.e. distinct from existing products and technological trajectories. The 
interviewees indicate that innovative activity is radical and aims at developing a 
VXSHULRU µNLOOHU¶ DSSOLFDWLRQ 7KH EXVLQHVVPRGHO EHKLQG WKH WHFKQRORJ\ LV WKHPRVW
important factor for success. Examples of products are online community software, 
mobile Internet applications, and interactive websites. The findings show that 
innovations tend to be radical and modular. Innovation is business model innovation in 
8 out of 15 cases (53%), product innovation in 4 cases (27%), market innovation in 3 
cases (20%) and no process innovation. Innovation is driven by in-house initiatives in 
11 cases (73%) and technological developments in 4 cases (27%).  
 It is useful to cross-tabulate the type versus drivers of innovation (Table 7.8). 
Innovation in the middleware sector is predominantly enterprise-driven business 
PRGHO LQQRYDWLRQ ,W¶VQRWHZRUWK\ WKDWEXVLQHVVPRGHO LQQRYDWLRQV LQ WKLV VHFWRUDUH
exclusively driven by enterprise, in-house initiatives, similar to standard software 
firms. Furthermore, enterprise-driven market innovations and technology-driven 
product innovations are being pursued. There is no process innovation and none of the 
innovations are driven by existing customer requirements or new customer demand. 
 
Table 7.8 ± Middleware: drivers versus type of innovation 
 Market Product Process Business model 
Customer - - - - 
Technology 7% 20% - - 
Enterprise 13% 7% - 53% 
 
As in the other sectors, the results suggest that the type of innovation is not necessarily 
µERXQG¶WRWKHVHFWRURUFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRILQQRYDWLRQ(YHQWKRXJKRQHW\SH± in this 
case business model innovation ± is dominant, it is not exclusive in the sector. In my 
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sample we find product innovations such as the new stock analysis software driven by 
technological developments and opportunities (firm 45) and market innovations such 
as the interactive website tool developed by firm 56 which opened up a new market 
rather than innovating a product (the technologies and business model already existed 
in alternative forms such as QQ and Taobao) by recombining existing knowledge and 
applying it in a new context.  
 Innovation in this sector seems to be more indigenous, i.e. from new ideas from 
the founders to create new ways to add and deliver value to an existing or new market. 
The findings suggest a strong relationship between the characteristics of innovation ± 
e.g. radical and modular ± and the drivers for innovation ± e.g. enterprise driven. 
Table 7.9 summarizes per firm the characteristics, type and drivers of innovation in 
addition to providing an example of innovation in the firm. 
 
7DEOHLQQRYDWLRQSDWWHUQLQ+DQJ]KRX¶VPLGGOHZDUHVHFWRUFDVHV 
Resp. radical 
/ incr. 
stand-alone 
/modular/ 
systemic 
Type Driver of 
innovation 
Innovation 
13 radical modular market technology wireless platform 
18 radical modular Business model enterprise e-city search platform 
22 radical modular Business model enterprise local search  
28 radical modular product enterprise interactive websites 
34 radical modular Business model enterprise Community platform 
39 radical modular market enterprise mobile GPS  
45 radical modular product technology stock analysis  
46 radical modular product technology embedded mobile 
phone backup  
49 radical modular product technology mobile Internet 
50 radical modular Business model enterprise advertising platform 
56 radical modular market enterprise interactive websites 
66 radical modular Business model enterprise Community platform 
68 radical modular Business model enterprise Portal platform 
78 radical modular Business model enterprise integrated search 
networks  
86 radical modular Business model enterprise pricing information 
 
Summarizing, innovation in the enterprise software sector is predominantly customer-
driven product innovation. The sector is relatively homogenous as innovations are 
incremental and systemic. It is noteworthy that even though the majority of innovation 
is in products, the results do not suggest a specific preference, as we find all types of 
innovation in this sector. Innovation in the standard software is predominantly 
technology-driven product innovation. The sector is less homogenous with both stand-
DORQHDQGPRGXODULQQRYDWLRQV,W¶VZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHPDLQGULYHUIRULQQRYDWLRQLV
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technology. Innovation in the middleware sector is predominantly enterprise-driven 
EXVLQHVV PRGHO LQQRYDWLRQ ,W¶V QRWHZRUWK\ WKDW EXVLQHVV PRGHO LQQRYDWLRQV LQ WKLV
sector are exclusively driven by in-house initiatives, similar to standard software firms. 
As in the other sectors, the results suggest that the type of innovation is not necessarily 
µERXQG¶ WR WKH VHFWRU RU FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI LQQRYDWLRQ ,QQRYDWLRQ LQ WKHPLGGOHZDUH
sector seems to be more indigenous, i.e. from new ideas from the founders to create 
new ways to add and deliver value to an existing or new market. 
 
Until now, the level of analysis was the sector, which provided us with insights in the 
patterns of innovation and connections between type, characteristics and drivers of 
innovation across and within software sub-sectors. However, to gain understanding of 
the innovation process I will now turn to the firm as the unit of analysis.  
 
Table 7.10: summary of three empirical cases 
 RiskSuite InfoStore E-Net 
Sector Enterprise software Standard software Middleware  
Characteristic of 
innovation 
Incremental, 
systemic 
Radical, stand-alone Radical, modular 
Type of innovation Product Product Business model 
Driver of innovation Customer Technology Enterprise  
Strategy First-mover Localization of 
technology 
Localization of 
information 
Response to 
opportunities 
caused by 
Institutional 
change: 
liberalization of 
financial markets 
Local government 
support: 
Development 
Zones, returnee 
support 
Institutional 
incompleteness: 
Information 
asymmetry in market 
knowledge 
HRM focus Employee 
commitment; fluid 
local labour market 
Recruitment due to 
scarcity of skills 
Innovative culture 
due to employee-
driven innovation 
External partners Domestic and 
foreign firms 
Domestic and 
foreign firms; local 
university 
Local government 
and domestic firms 
 
7.4 Three empirical cases 
The three cases34 are illustrations of the innovation processes that were dominant in 
each sector (Table 7.10): customer-driven product innovation of an incremental-
systemic nature for the enterprise software sector, technology-driven product 
innovation of a radical, stand-alone nature for the standard software sector and 
enterprise-driven business model innovation of a radical-modular nature for the 
                                                          
34 The names of the companies and interviewees are not the real names. 
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middleware sector. These three cases also illustrate the three kinds of drivers of 
innovation (i.e. technology, customer and enterprise) and three kinds of characteristics 
(stand-alone, modular and systemic). Therefore, these three cases provide valuable 
insights in distinct innovation processes and are illustrative for the three sectors.  
 
7.4.1 Example enterprise software: RiskSuite (Case 38) 
Mr. Gao founded RiskSuite in Hangzhou to developed applied risk management 
software. The company is founded in September 2004 and it began to operate in 
November. So far there are 20 employees in the company in the Shanghai, Hangzhou, 
Shenzhen and Beijing offices. The investment of the company comes from Mr. Gao 
and partners. The total investment so far is 2 million RMB. They developed the first 
quick development platform for financial risk management in China. This innovation 
provides RiskSuite a competitive advantage in an emerging market. Mr. Gao got his 
competences from Zhejiang University (BSc, MSc International finance), engineering 
and management experience in famous domestic UTStarcom and Eyeball, and 
extensive experience abroad as the assistant-CEO in a Canadian software firm.  
 
Financial risk management is a newly emerging industry in China. After the 
liberalization of financial markets in 2005, firms could start to provide financial risk 
management in addition to the traditional accounting management software. RiskSuite 
responded to these institutional changes and lack of specific bank products by gong for 
risk management products. Most firms are still focused on accounting and not 
financial risk management, which gives RiskSuite a competitive advantage. So far, 
there are no more than five firms like RiskSuite in China. Although this firm is not 
very big it has a taken a leading position in the whole industr\+RZHYHU &KLQD¶V
financial industry also has potential challenges. As it still lags significantly compared 
to international standards, Mr. Gao expects many changes and increased uncertainty in 
the financial markets. To fight off such potential constraints, Mr. Gao tries to develop 
and establish the products of RiskSuite as soon as possible. 
 The company has ten large customers, including the Real Estate Group. The 
biggest project is to manage the National Investment Committee (governmental fund). 
The ComPLWWHHµVELOOLRQ50%LVPDQDJHGE\5LVN6XLWH¶VVRIWZDUH7KLVSURMHFW
will give them a revenue of about 20-30 million RMB. The other big project is a new 
project from Insigma that they are still negotiating. The biggest competitor for 
RiskSuite is Yongyou Software. This company exists for 15 years and it takes a big 
advantage over the firm in terms of scale, investment and technology. It has a good 
brand reputation. But the biggest setback of Yongyou Software is that they have too 
many diversified businesses. They put too much emphasis on the traditional 
accounting field; WKH\GRQ¶WKDYHPXFKH[SHULHQFHLQILQDQFLDOULVNPDQDJHPHQW7KH\
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lack core technology in this field, especially the flexible and quick development 
platform that RiskSuite developed. 
 
The quick development platform for financial risk management is RiskSuite¶s main 
innovation. The product is very specialized and not very easy to imitate. Although the 
company is very small, it is still the number one in the domestic market. With the 
heavy competition, the strength of the competitors is increasing, but they have a one 
year first mover advantage. This innovation acknowledges the importance of financial 
risk management instead of traditional accounting and developments in technology. 
According to Mr. Gao, satisfying the customer¶s requirements is most important for 
successfully developing their new product. Learning from employees, other firms and 
especially foreign companies are the main drivers for innovation. However, Mr. Gao 
stressed that such learning should be done collectively, WKH FRPSDQ\¶V GHYHORSPHQW
process requires everybody to pull together ideas, team spirit is very important. Mr. 
Gao suggested that good human resource management and external business relations 
are crucial for the development of innovation. 
 
Organizational commitment is very important for RiskSuite because they need 
employees who are willing to invest in firm-specific skills and long term relations with 
customers. When they recruit new staff, the most important requirements are hard 
working, responsible and learning ability. At first, the founders preferred to recruit 
from the Finance College and Chinese Medicine College (both not Zhejiang 
University). TKH VWXGHQWV IURP WKHVH FROOHJHV GRQ¶W OLNH MRE-hopping and are pretty 
stable and want to do hard work. But they also have to make sure the students have 
technology ability. So, when they recruit new staff, one group is usually from other 
firms, and some are from the universities. Mr. Gao thinks that the lack of ability will 
constrain the further development of the company. They have in-house training for 
employees. Furthermore, the firm will organize seminars to discuss, learn from each 
other, improve themselves and also supervise. Mr. Gao focuses on collective strength 
and learning for his employees. The employees are mainly in marketing, product and 
R&D because the firm is still in the early phase of the setup, with few managers.  
 RiskSuite has a variety of formal and informal business partners for each 
functional area in the company (i.e. product, technology, customers, marketing, 
service). Business partners are important for distinct purposes. For example: how did 
RiskSuite get the project from Signal? First, the firm believed that their biggest 
competitors are same sized companies. So after the firm pushed the competitors out of 
the industry, finally they found that their true competitor was Friend Software. 
Originally the project manager of Signal wanted to choose Friend because of the 
strength and the reputation. In fact, the project had a large possibility of failure. In case 
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the project fails, the PM has to have a good explanation. If they choose Friend, which 
can give them a good explanation, the project manager is always safe. But if they 
choose RiskSuite, the risk is very big, so once the project fails Signal will take more 
responsibility. Therefore, RiskSuite tried to make Signal realize their specialization 
DQG FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH SURMHFW¶V VXFFHVVThe PM of this project got assurance from 
other projects and business contacts. Finally he chose RiskSuite for the risky project. 
So, RiskSuite finally beat the stronger Friend Software by use of business contacts. 
 The most important technology cooperation is with Microsoft. The goal of the 
cooperation is to draw support from Microsoft for distribution of their own products 
and technology. Moreover Microsoft can also help to expand the market. They have 
been cooperating for over a year and they meet every two or three months. The 
cooperation is on a project basis, they have signed contracts with certain departments 
within Microsoft. The most important reason for choosing Microsoft as a partner is the 
technology of Microsoft. Of course they also have a dominant position, but Microsoft 
itself is not a threat. They will not become competitors in RiskSuite¶s market. 
RiskSuite continues to use their quick and flexible development platform and 
incrementally improves the platform.  
 
The case is illustrative for the enterprise software sector to the extent that RiskSuite 
has developed an incremental, systemic product innovation driven by the requirements 
of customers. RiskSuite has a few large customers which is also typical for enterprise 
software firms. It is noteworthy that even though the driver of innovation is a set of 
requirements from customers, it is also a response to changes in the institutional 
environment. RiskSuite responded to requirements from customers that were caused 
by the liberalization of financial markets. Moreover, the importance of HRM is also 
related to &KLQD¶VVSHFLILFHQYLURQPHQW5LVN6XLWH¶V+50PRGHOIRFXVHVRQFUHDWLQJ
employee commitment to offset the constraints of frequent job hopping of employees. 
In the full data set, employee turnover is on average between 20% and 30%. Lastly, 
external partners are important for fighting of constraints of newness and smallness. 
RiskSuite has developed an extensive network of partners to jointly develop 
technologies. It is worth noting that these partners are both domestic and foreign firms.  
 
7.4.2 Example of standard software: InfoStore (Case 82) 
Mr. Yang is one of the four founders of InfoStore (2006). InfoStore is a software 
company that develops data storage management software. Mr. Yang has a PhD in 
engineering from Zhejiang University and moved from the USA where he had already 
established a software firm, SoftCore. In that case he was the only Chinese founder. 
After 10 years he returned to China with three of his employees from SoftCore in 
UHVSRQVH WR RSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ &KLQD¶V HPHUJLQJ HOHFWURQLFVPDUNHW $fraid of piracy, 
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6RIW&RUHGLGQ¶W VHH WKHVHRSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ&KLQD VR0U<DQJKDG WR IRXQGKLVRZQ
firm. Mr. Yang combines the experience and technological knowledge of SoftCore 
ZLWKORFDONQRZOHGJHRI&KLQD¶VPDUNHWDQGLWVVSHFLILFUHTXLUHPHQWV0RUHSUHcisely 
he used the blue print for the technologies developed in SoftCore but modified the 
technology to local demands ± and to prevent IPR problems with SoftCore - and 
innovated the business model. The firm is located in the International 
Entrepreneurship &HQWUHLQ+DQJ]KRX¶V%LQMLDQJGLVWULFW%LQMLDQJLVWKHPDLQDUHDLQ
Hangzhou of the National High-tech development zone. As returnees, the four 
founders get several benefits from the government in this district, such as office space, 
introduction to VC firms and tax holidays. 
 The data storage software is based on the belief that the most valuable asset of a 
modern firm is not the hardware or products but the information stored on the 
computers. If a laptop of a manager breaks down, you can buy a new laptop, but you 
cannot replace the huge value of the information lost. So their software provides 
storage and protection technology. Furthermore, they offer the possibilities of online 
backups. These are not yet provided by Infocore but can be either on online servers of 
the customers or outsourced to specialised firms. InfoStore provides hardware ± 
appliances such as sets of disk drives and servers ± in combination with their software. 
However, their core technology is the storage management software. The hardware is 
outsourced and standardized. For instance, they sell 100 disk drives with storage 
management software to an Internet firm.  
 They basically aim for two types of customers: high-end big customers such as 
banks and telecoms (especially Internet firms like Alibaba) and local governments, 
SMEs and educational institutions. The high-end customers have large data storage 
requirements. SoftCore focuses on those (international) high-end customers such as 
France Telecom, Alcatel, the US air force, Lufthansa, etc. InfoStore focuses on SMEs, 
Hangzhou local government, hospitals, universities. Basically there is no competition 
in the SME market because their technology is rather complex. Even though they are 
the front of development and are frequently copied, they do not fear their competitive 
position. The sales value of their products range from $2,000 to $100,000 per license, 
so customers do not easily accept imitations but rather go for the original. In the 
beginning they were actually happy that others copied their products because it also 
means that their products are good. 
 
InfoStore has developed several product innovations over the past few years. This year 
they started working on adjusting to make the original technology fit for the Chinese 
market. The original technology is developed for high-end customers by SoftCore. 
However the approach for the SME market is rather different. SMEs generally have no 
resources to spend on ´data storage technology´, let alone that they have full time 
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employees to manage the system. The high-end customers usually have whole 
departments concerned with data storage. So, the high-end software is much too 
complicated and elaborate for the small requirements and knowledge of SMEs. The 
business model they use for SMEs is different from the high-end customers. So, they 
had to innovative their business model and technology. Basically they had to 
downgrade and strip the technology that it becomes simple to use and meet the 
(limited) requirements of SMEs. This process lasted between 6-8 months of R&D.  
 At the same time they were also working on other R&D projects. One of those 
new projects is Continuous Data Protection (CDP). This is not only new in China but 
also new in the world. They also started with the high-end version and then try to 
adapt it to the low-end market. For instance, the original technology cost about 
$100,000 but now they sell this product for laptops for $20. What does this software 
do? Basically the software makes snapshots of the whole system at certain intervals: 
every day, every week, etc. The main problem then is that this is extremely demanding 
for the hardware, i.e. needs a lot of hard disk space. InfoStore developed a new 
technology called ´incremental snapshot´ that is an intelligent storage technology. In 
this way, the software keeps track of the changes made in the files instead of copying 
all the whole system every time. So, every new snapshot only requires very little 
additional space. They have 2 patents for the technology.  
 Lastly they developed a storage area network (SAN). This provides a solution for 
hardware problems. Whereas usually the problem is when to buy what kind of hard 
disk, e.g. 1T or 2T or 10T? You never know what your data requirements will be in 
the future. Every time you replace, let´s say a 1T for a 10T, the whole system needs to 
be transferred. With their SAN this is not necessary. The basic structure of the system 
UHPDLQVWKHVDPHDQGGRHVQ¶WKDYHWREHPRYHVWRWKHQHZGLVNV<RXMXVWSOXJLQWKH
new hardware and it will then work completely as an USB disk. InfoStore has received 
several awards and funds for their innovations:  "2006 Innovation storage enterprises" 
IURP WKH 6WDWH &RXQFLO ,QIRUPDWLRQ 2IILFH DQG WKH ³ ,QQRYDWLRQ )XQG´
=KHMLDQJ¶VPD[LPXPIXQGVRIRMB). The funding plays an important role in 
upgrading the laboratory data hardware equipments and the introduction of high 
technology talent. At the same time, the companies also strengthened and drive 
stronger the confidence of all employees. Also in InfoStore it seems that good human 
resource management and external business relations play an important role.  
 
Recruitment of new employees is rather difficult. Mostly because it is a very new field 
and the company is young and small. The core team ± also in terms of technology ± is 
from the USA. Biggest problem is that there are not many talents in Hangzhou. Mr. 
Yang was rather critical of the quality of engineers in Hangzhou; Beijing and 
Shanghai is much better. So they hire people with at least 6 months working 
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experience and mostly with a master degree. The main requirements are related to 
personality, motivation and active attitude. Keeping the employees is easy. They 
provide a very challenging and interesting environment in which engineers can fully 
developed. They are at the front of technological development. Moreover, all the 
employees own a share of the company. Mr. Yang believes it is crucial that the 
employees also get part of the company and the profit because they are the most 
important asset of the company. There is no formal training in the company. Only 3 
people from the core team have really enough knowledge to train other employees but 
just have too little time to do this. They do use a mentor system where seniors teach 
juniors on-the-job.  
 InfoStore has three important external partners: Zhejiang University, companies 
and the government. They cooperate with the Zhejiang University Software College. 
They are the practice site for students and even have an Open Lab at the software 
college. Furthermore, they still maintain close contact with SoftCore in the USA. They 
are looking for some strategy alliance partners for developing value added service, 
such as IT (hardware) company, network optimization company and some other 
vertical-industry company. Furthermore, the government has a significant influence on 
the industry. However, the policies and attitude of the government are very beneficial 
for innovation. ´Nowhere is the government so good at promoting innovation´, as Mr. 
Yang said. In the USA there is a hands-off approach which gives a lot of freedom but 
in China the government gives a lot of active support in the form of subsidies and for 
instance, cheap office space. Moreover, the government organizes events for sharing 
ideas and communicating with other organizations. Furthermore, the government 
introduces VCs. At the moment InfoStore does not have VC yet, though Mr. Yang 
already finished a proposal. They aim for a foreign VC because they want to have an 
IPO in the near future. In general there are no constraints or requirements from the 
government in return for these benefits. InfoStore continues to improve current 
technologies and explore new areas of development in online data storage business. 
 
InfoStore is illustrative for the standard software firms in Hangzhou because it 
innovates radically. The innovation is a stand-alone new product driven by 
technological developments, as is typical for a standard software firm in this sector. 
Several findings are worth emphasising. This firm is an example of a firm that 
develops high-WHFKQRORJ\ 7KH\ DUH QRW FRS\FDWV RU VORZ IROORZHUV RI µDGYDQFHG¶
LQWHUQDWLRQDOWHFKQRORJLHVEXWVHULRXVLQQRYDWRUV7KHEDVLVRI,QIR6WRUH¶VWHFKQRORJ\
is found in the combination of partnerships with domestic firms, the leading Zhejiang 
University and the foreign software firm SoftCore. The partnership with the Software 
College of Zheda and SoftCore allows them to learn the state-of-the-art technologies, 
whereas the local firms provide local market information. The role of the local 
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government as a facilitator of innovation is also noteworthy. The active local 
government support for returnees, high-tech development zones and the direct 
subsidies and funds for technologies facilitate innovation. The case suggests that the 
current local institutional arrangements provide more opportunities than restrictions 
for innovative firms.  
 Furthermore, the findings suggest the advantages of a localization strategy. This 
firm adopted a general blueprint to the local conditions, responding to opportunities in 
&KLQD¶VHPHUJLQJPDUNHW2QHUHVWUDLQWFDXVHGE\ WKH ORFDOFRQGLWLRQV LV WKH ODFNRI
human resources. The firm indicated to have recruitment problems and not employee 
commitment problems, as in the previous case. The technology focus of this firm 
necessitates high level employees which are in short supply. Creating commitment is 
generally less important for standard software firms. However, considering 
+DQJ]KRX¶V IOXLG ODERXU PDUNHW FRQGLWLRQV ,QIR6WRUH KDG GHYHORSHG D FRUSRUDWH
governance model that involved employees more by giving them shares of the firm. 
This explicit corporate governance model is an example of business model innovation. 
 
7.4.3 Example of middleware: E-Net (Case 18) 
Established by Mr. Zhang in October 2000, E-Net is an investment and software firm 
specialized in Internet and Information Technology. The company presently operates a 
QXPEHURIUHQRZQHG,QWHUQHWVLWHVLQFOXGLQJ&KLQD¶VUHWDLO,QGXVWU\3RUWDOWKHZRUOG
V
first virtual city, trading portal &KLQD¶V only real estate search engine and Chinese 
martial arts and cultural portal. Mr. Zhang started in 2001 with Linkshop, an 
LQIRUPDWLRQ ZHE SURYLGHU LQ &KLQD¶V UHWDLO ,QGXVWU\ /LQNVKRS WDUJHWHG YDULRXV
departmental stores, shopping centres, convenience stores and other related entities. 
Currently, Linkshop has over 100,000 registered members, most of whom are large 
and medium- sized retail operators. The daily visiting traffic reaches up to 1,000,000.  
 However, Mr. Zhang found that serving the retail industry was quite limited in 
terms of customers, market and revenues. E-Net acquired Hangzhou Ren Jia Website, 
previously known as Hangzhou BBS Net in 2003. In August 2004, E-Net invested in 
Hangzhou Aladdin Information & Technology Company that had just one project 
called µ(-City¶and only had a DEMO version of it. +DQJ]KRX5HQ-LD¶V%%6DQGWKH
new E-City project were merged to accomplish the 3D-City project. As a result of the 
LQWHJUDWLRQ RI WHFKQRORJLHV DQG NQRZOHGJH EHWZHHQ WKH WZR FRPSDQLHV WKHZRUOG¶V
first 3-D virtual city - E-City was developed in November, 2004. 
 
The innovative business model localized information to overcome asymmetric 
information. The idea of presenting the entire city in 3D helps the concentration of the 
information and enhances the appropriate allocation of resources.  E-City is a new 
window for the different business aspects ranging from property, entertainment to 
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tourism. Simultaneously, the website is able to offer the other functions: Commercial 
Street Signs, Yellow Pages, Real Estate Application, Search Engine, Communication 
Platform, Simulated advertisement, Development of E-Business, and Website 
Localization. Especially the last feature is noteworthy. Every website has a domain 
QDPHZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHILUP¶VUHDOJHRJUDSKLFORFDWLRn. So, E-City is able to 
bring more visitors to the firm and satisfy consumer demand. 
 
Good human resource management and external business relations also play an 
important role in E-Net. The firm grew a lot the last year and now has over 400 
employees and attracted domestic venture capital. With respect to the strategy of the 
ILUPKHVDLGWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQIRUWKHILUPLVµZKRDP,"¶(YHU\HPSOR\HH
is different and has different goals. He/she will focus on those goals. So how does the 
employee see the firm? As a 3D map firm? Or as a software service provider or 
anything else? This determines the goals and also determines in what respect the 
employee wants to innovate. Since these goals differ between employees the firm 
needs to be flexible. Therefore strategic flexibility is very important. At the moment 
the firm has two main products: licensing product to others and service provision. Mr. 
Zhang sees them as very different with different work teams, working culture, etc. and 
considers splitting the firm into two firms.  
 It is relatively easy to find new employees; they just post a vacancy on the 
marketplace and wait for a long time. In the end there will be always suitable people 
for the company, so growing in terms of number of employees is not difficult. The 
difficult part, however, is to create a company culture with this change from 10 to 120 
employees. The strategic shift from Linkshop to E-City has had major consequences 
for the business model. HRM has to change, management has to change, the 
organizational culture changes. How to accomplish that? Looking how other CEOs 
manage and use social networks to attract capital and knowledge. 
 Mr. Zhang indicated that there are basically two types of social networks that 
matter for the success of his firm. One way is to establish a relationship with the 
government, including the Provincial Economic and Trade Commission, the 
Provincial Department of Information Industry and the Development and Planning 
Commission. The government is now promoting the development of the hi-tech 
industry and informatization, and they can take advantage of this to get funds and 
support from the government. How do they build relationships with the government? 
Via friends, via direct visits and presenting products but also using the Chinese way: 
treating officials to dinner or tea. Their company will help departments like marketing, 
HRM, etc. to get in contact with people working in the same areas. For instance, they 
introduce people from the marketing department to people working in the press, 
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people in the BBS department to people working in Internet Supervision. Compared 
with traditional industries, it is relatively easy to handle social relationship.  
 Another way is to foster relationship with the companies in the same industry. 
CEOs join a club called WEB2.0 and meet with each other nearly every month, talking 
about technology, management and cooperation. For instance, they cooperated with 
Koubei Website and another 100 websites in Hangzhou, both in reciprocal links and 
bundling of products. The general idea is that it is beneficial for all to cooperate, create 
DµEUDQGVWRUH¶DQGHQODUJHWKHPDUNHW7KHFOXE serves managers to jump out of the 
daily affairs and think at a higher level. They brainstorm every time they meet and  Mr. 
Zhang could apply this new knowledge in the operation of the company. 
 The characteristics of IT industry allow such interactive and creative ways of 
maintaining relationships. Next to face-to-face communication, the use of MSN and E-
mail to transmit messages is very efficient and convenient. Moreover, the content of 
the communication is really focused on products, technologies and knowledge. The IT 
industry has grown for less than 10 years and the relationships are quite simple. IT 
industry is still a young industry and there is not much knowledge accumulation, 
especially in managerial experience. Specifically, 0U=KDQJ¶V firm¶s transformation 
was a result of learning from the BLOG of another company¶s CEO. E-Net continues 
to improve their HRM system and expand the E-City product to more Chinese cities. 
 
E-Net is illustrative for middleware firms in Hangzhou as it innovated its business 
model radically, driven by the initiatives from the founder. Three findings are 
noteworthy. First of all, E-Net follows a localization strategy that is a creative and 
innovative way of overcoming information asymmetry. It appears that firms such as E-
Net and InfoStore, which can solve information problems creatively in the Chinese 
market, can successfully operate and grow. Second, one of the key issues for E-Net is 
the management of changes caused by growth in employee numbers. Neither 
recruitment ± such as in InfoStore ± nor employee commitment ± such as in RiskSuite 
± are issues for E-Net, as a strong HR recruitment system and compensation plan is in 
place. The main challenge is to define a corporate culture that allows all kinds of 
employees to be innovative. This suggests that employee innovation is at the core of 
HRM in E-Net.  
 Third, two types of networks matter for E-Net: local government and peer 
industry firms. It is worth stressing that E-Net established relationships with local 
provincial governments, not central or city-level government to attract localised funds 
and support. Furthermore, this government network is far from the political 
networking and bribing as often suggested and/or expected in a Chinese context. On 
WKHFRQWUDU\WKHJRYHUQPHQWLVSDUWRIWKHILUP¶VIXQFWLRQDOQHWZRUNLQZKLFKSHRSOH
with the same function in government and firm cooperate. IW¶V DERXW EXVLQHVV QRW
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political influence. The other type of partner, the local Internet firms, is part of a local 
business association that gathers frequently to discuss business issues. This network 
has only one purpose: to exchange information and jointly solve management 
problems. The extensive use of external partners is a response to a lack of resources ± 
market knowledge, experience, management knowledge, standards etc. ±in 
+DQJ]KRX¶VORFDOHQYLURQPHQW 
 
Summarizing the three cases, entrepreneurs developed distinct strategies for 
innovation in response to distinct opportunities and restrictions in the business 
environment. The three cases differ in their strategies (first-mover, localization of 
technology and ± information). Moreover, the sources of opportunities and restrictions 
are distinct: Institutional change (liberalization of financial markets) in the first case; 
Local government support (Development Zones, returnee support) in the second case 
and institutional incompleteness (information asymmetry in market knowledge) in the 
third case. Two features stand out across all three cases: a focus on human resource 
development and the importance of external partners. The three cases differ 
substantially with respect to the type of HR development and practices (commitment, 
recruitment and culture) and type and use of external partners (domestic, foreign 
versus government, universities and companies). These findings suggest that the three 
firms have developed distinct capabilities for innovation. However, three cases cannot 
be representative for the three sectors. Therefore, it is important to identify capabilities 
and the specific opportunities and restrictions in response to which they are developed 
across all the cases in my sample. The last two empirical chapters of this thesis will 
present the results in terms of constraints on innovation (Chapter 8) and innovative 
capabilities (Chapter 9).   
 
7.5 Discussion of findings 
Chinese software entrepreneurs are innovative. Moreover, it appears that Chinese 
entrepreneurs have a better understanding of innovation than most neoclassical 
economics textbooks. These entrepreneurs do not limit innovation to technological 
innovation but also include organizational innovation. The three sectors show distinct 
patterns of innovation. Innovation in the enterprise software sector is customer-driven 
product innovation. Innovation in the standard software is technology-driven product 
innovation. Innovation in the middleware sector is enterprise-driven business model 
innovation. The results also suggest that the type of innovation is not necessarily 
µERXQG¶ WR WKH VHFWRU RU FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI LQQRYDWLRQ LH ZH ILQG DOO W\SHV RI
innovation across the three sectors with both radical and incremental characteristics.  
 Especially organizational innovation appears to be important as it allows 
entrepreneurs to open up new markets and develop new ways of organizing their 
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business to add value to an emerging group of affluent customers. In other words, this 
reminds us of the fact that innovation is not necessarily technical innovation. 
Moreover, the findings also suggest that both organizational and technical innovation 
can be radical and incremental. Innovation ± radical and incremental ± is not 
exclusively restricted by the often-mentioned weakly enforced legal IPR rights. In line 
with Teece (2006), there are more ways to protect and secure appropriability than only 
the legal patent protection. 
 2SSRUWXQLWLHV IRU LQQRYDWLRQ LQ +DQJ]KRX¶V ORFDO LQVWLWXWLRQDO HQYLURQPHQW DUH
caused by internal and external drivers. The emerging nature of the ICT market causes 
a lot of leeway in trying out and experimenting. Therefore, almost half of the drivers 
for innovation are novel ideas from the firm itself as opposed to changes in 
technologies or customer demands. Moreover, many innovations are responses to 
incentives set by institutional constraints. For instance, firms that can overcome 
information asymmetry ± a key institutional constraint ± have good opportunities for 
innovation, as illustrated by the E-Net case. The evidence suggests the large potential 
of business model innovation. Another example is the deregulation of financial 
markets that spurred innovation in more than one firm. This all suggests that 
institutional constraints ± such as information asymmetry - set incentives for 
innovation, as argued in Chapter 3.  
 The three empirical cases suggest the necessity for these entrepreneurs to be 
innovative in order to survive in an increasingly competitive market place. It is rather 
clear from these cases that imitation and copying of existing software or business 
models will not give these entrepreneurs a competitive advantage. Secondly, the role 
of good human resource management is significant. Human resources are clearly the 
key resources for these firms and it appears complicated to recruit, retain and manage 
the young new employees. It is noteworthy that the emphasis of HRM systems across 
the sectors diverges as different responses to specific institutional constraints of the 
labour market. Furthermore, external partners appear crucial for obtaining business 
LQIRUPDWLRQUHSXWDWLRQµGHSOR\PHQW¶DQGPRELOL]LQJUHVRXUFHV$JDLQWKHLPSRUWDQFH
of external partners is a direct response to a lack of resources in Hangzhou. The 
networks of external partners appear to be both formal and informal and include 
universities, local governments and foreign- and domestic companies. The role of 
political capital is limited; governments have become local actors in business as 
opposed to firms becoming actors in politics. Lastly, the role of the founder and his 
experience and reputation appears to play a significant role in defining a good start of 
the enterprise in terms of knowledge, capital, employees and technology. Chapter 9 
will present what kinds of innovative capabilities the software firms have developed. 
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Chapter 8 ± Findings 3 
 
Technical, market and institutional constraints on 
innovation 
 
µCurrently this industry is really crazy, for instance, last week was a CNII Internet 
industry conference with over 100 companies. There are scores of companies in the 
same industry in China and only five or six of them are strong. («) Last year we were 
really soaring with aspirations, but now the situation is rather grave. Personally I 
hope there will be a freezing winter for this industry [online search engines] because 
that can wash out some companies.¶ 
(Firm 34, April 4th, 2006)  
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this and the following chapter, we will take the firm as the unit of analysis to 
analyse innovative behaviour at the firm level. This chapter identifies constraints on 
innovation caused by the market -, technical - and institutional conditions of 
+DQJ]KRX¶V ORFDO EXVLQHVV V\VWHP 2Q WKH RQH KDQG ILUPV IDFH LQVWLWXWLRQDO
constraints; on the other hand, firms face sectoral constraints. This chapter is 
organized as follows. First, specific sectoral ± and institutional constraints are singled 
out from existing literature. Second, the chapter presents and discusses the results per 
sector based on extensive empirical fieldwork interviews. The next chapter will then 
identify and explain the innovative capabilities that were developed in response to the 
constraints identified in this chapter.  
 
8.2 Constraints on innovation: overview of the literature 
8.2.1 Technical and market constraints 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on technological regimes and innovation 
systems shows that sector with distinct technologies carry specific technical and 
market risks. These set specific sectoral constraints on innovation. The following 
presents an overview of the specifics of this argument. Attempting to keep the results 
comparable to existing studies on sectoral specialization and technical development in 
developed economies we follow Casper and Whitley (2004) by distinguishing two 
types of risks that are related to the technical and market characteristics of innovative 
activities: appropriability risk and competence destruction.  
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Appropriability ± Appropriability summarizes the possibilities of reaping profits from 
innovative activitieV ,Q 7HHFH¶V  IRUPXODWLRQ DSSURSULDELOLW\ZDV GHWHUPLQHG
by a static appropriability regime that was a combination of legal forces and the 
imitability/complexity of the technology. The legal forces comprise of patents, 
copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks and is strongly related to the strength of 
(intellectual) property rights protection in Western developed economies. The 
WHFKQRORJLFDONQRZOHGJHXQGHUSLQQLQJDILUP¶VLQQRYDWLRQLQYROYHVYDULRXVGHJUHHVRI
specificity, tacitness, complexity and independence and thus differs across different 
WHFKQRORJLHV:LQWHU%UHVFKL0DOHUEDDQG2UVHQLJR7HHFH¶VDUJXPHQW
was that in case of weak appropriability regimes firms need to develop complementary 
assets, such as marketing, standards, brands and relationships, to mitigate these risks.  
 More recent studies suggest that the legal protection of property rights is not a 
prerequisite for good appropriability conditions (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al, 2000, 
and Dosi, Marengo and Pasquali, 2006). For instance, the role of supporting 
institutions, as formulated in the National System of Innovation approaches, and the 
role of finances cannot be overlooked in determining appropriability. Moreover, Teece 
(2006) indicates the important role of managerial choice in, for instance, determining 
WKHEXVLQHVVPRGHO,QKLVZRUGVDEXVLQHVVPRGHOµ«LVWKHLQQRYDWRU¶VK\SRWKHVLV
about what customers want and how an enterprise can go about meeting those needs, 
getting paid well for doing so, and hopefully DYRLGLQJORVLQJRXWWRLPLWDWRUV¶7HHFH
2006: 1142). In some cases, great degrees of IPR protection might even deter 
innovative activity due, for instance, to multiple conflicting claims, high litigation 
costs, and user innovations (Dosi et al, 2006).  
 
Competence destruction ± Competence destruction reflects the uncertainty of technical 
development in terms of the technological trajectory taken and market acceptance of 
the innovation. In a general understanding, innovation involves new knowledge or 
new combinations of existing knowledge (McKelvey, 1996). Competence-enhancing 
LQQRYDWLRQµEXLOGVXSRQDQGUHLQIRUFHVH[LVWLQJFRPSHWHQFLHVVNLOOVDQGNQRZ-KRZ¶
(Gatignon et al, 2002: p. 1107), whereas competence-destroying innovation 
µREVROHVFHVDQGRYHUWXUQV existing competencies, skills, and know-KRZ¶LGHP,QWKH
case that innovations require radically new skills, abilities and knowledge in the 
development and production of a product or service, the firm has a high risk of 
destroying existing competences.  
 
These characteristics set constraints on the development of organizational capabilities 
(Hopkins and Nightingale, 2006; Casper and Whitley, 2004; Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1993; Dosi, 1988 Parker and Tamaschke, 2005). They identify some conditions that 
affect the requisite competences, incentives and dynamic properties of the innovative 
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process (Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000; Kaniovski, and Peneder, 2002). 
+RZHYHUWKHUHDUHVWURQJLQGLFDWLRQVWKDWLQQRYDWLYHDFWLYLW\LQ&KLQD¶VFRQWH[WPLJKW
have additional institutional constraints on innovative activities and need to be 
managed by appropriate capabilities as well.  
 
8.2.2 Institutional constraints 
As discussed in chapter 3, capital, labour and knowledge are the key resources for 
innovation. However, private agents in a transition economy face institutional 
constraints on these resources caused by two problems: governance ± and 
underinvestment problems. The former refers to the uncertainty regarding which 
agents are providing constraints on the use of resources, whereas the latter refers to the 
lack of resources. I will discuss both in more detail. 
 
Uncertainty (governance problem) ± China has weak economic institutions as a result 
of the co-existence of socialist institutions and newly created, market-based 
institutions (Krug and Polos, 2004). The institutions are not weak because they have a 
socialist hue, which is traditionally unsupportive of private capitalists, but because 
there are institutions in place coming from both the socialist era and more market-
oriented institutions. Institutions are incomplete and unpredictable in the sense that 
they do not provide a stable institutional frame (Qian, 2000), which would reduce the 
uncertainty emanating from innovation (Krug and Polos, 2004). On the contrary, such 
uncertainty allows greater variety of organizational responses to opportunities and 
restrictions. The risks for competence destruction are then expected to increase 
because of more uncertainty regarding the technological trajectory taken and market 
acceptance of innovation (cf. Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  
 In Chapter 3 we have seen that there is considerable uncertainty regarding who 
provides resources, i.e. who are the key actors. We have seen that there are other key 
actors LQ &KLQD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHJLPH DV D UHVXOW RI GLVPDQWOLQJ WKH VRFLDOLVW VWDWH
economy: local and central state agents, business associations (business groups both 
formal and informal), and foreign investors. However, it is unclear how these agents 
operate and provide constraints. There is geographic and sectoral variation in the 
involvement of these key actors and the constraints they set on innovation, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, competing levels of government might lead to 
ambivalent rules, hybrid institutional arrangements and a lack of transparency; all of 
which increase the uncertainty in the innovation process. 
 Uncertainty also arises when behaviour of key actors changes or has unclear 
implications. For instance, unexpected state policy changes or ambiguous local 
policies may scare investors and inhibit risky behaviour of firms. However, in certain 
new industries policy makers often cannot keep up with the developments in 
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technology and technology might actually dictate policy. Chinese private 
entrepreneurs might exploit such institutional delays and - ambiguity by moving 
around relatively quick and filling niches due to their small size, simple structure, 
agility and risk-tolerance (Tan and Litschert, 1994). However, firms might also resort 
to risk spreading activities like (un)related diversification, developing specific 
business models and strategic flexibility, creating organization-specific capabilities to 
offset imitation risks or develop networking capabilities to spot opportunities and 
UHVRXUFHV FI7HHFH¶VFRPSOHPHQWDU\DVVHWV6XPPDUL]LQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDOXQFHUWDLQW\
sets additional constraints for innovation. 
 
Lack of resources (underinvestment problem) ± Lack of resources affects innovation 
and entrepreneurship in many ways, as discussed in Chapter 3. Entrepreneurship is 
affected by formal institutions such as the quality of commercial code and the strength 
of legal enforcement. Such institutions are mechanisms to reduce uncertainty caused 
by technology, coPSHWLWLRQRUWKHPDUNHW2QHH[DPSOHLV&KLQD¶VZHDNSURWHFWLRQRI
intellectual property rights that depends on the strength of legal enforcement which 
hinders some innovating firms (Lau, Lu, Makino, Chen and Yeh, 2002, IFC, 2005). 
Based on Teece (1986), private agents in China that are faced with a weak 
appropriability regime caused by a weak legal system, are expected to develop 
complementary assets. In the case of brand names, for instance, firms may have to rely 
more on status and collective reputation of the firm instead of legal protection. This 
suggests that private agents in China might actually have incentives to innovate their 
business model (cf. Teece, 2006).  
 Another example is an incomplete labour market. Of course there is the general 
labour scarcity, i.e. availability of qualified labour as opposed to unqualified labour. 
Such shortage will lead to heavy competition n the factor market side. This will 
increase labour mobility and labour turnover in firms. Moreover, skill availability 
problems create uncertainty for employers as to the competences of the employee. An 
unpredictable and dynamic labour market leaves employers uncertain with respect to 
DQHPSOR\HH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRLQYHVWLQRQHMRERUILUPDQGWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLUVNLOOV
How do employers assess their competences (Sako, 1992)? Strategies for attracting 
and keeping employees become crucial. One strategy is to have formal labour 
contracts, however, with incomplete and ill-functioning labour law enforcement, this 
does not provide good guarantees. Then, there are three alternatives: creating 
competence trust (cf. Sako, 1992); develop work arrangements that commit the 
employees to the firm; or use innovative corporate governance models to commit 
employees, all of which increase the costs for firms. 
 Since this study is concerned with explaining the underlying mechanisms at the 
ILUPOHYHOLWLVXVHIXOWRµWUDQVODWH¶WKHODFNRIUHVRXUFHVWRFRQVHTXHQFHVDWWKHILUP
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level. The literature on the liability of newness is relevant here as helps to explain the 
consequences of a lack of resources at the firm level. Studies have suggested a 
QHJDWLYH FRQVHTXHQFH RI µQHZQHVV¶ IRU WKH QHZO\ HPHUJLQJ SULYDWH VHFWRU .UXJ	
Polos, 2004). 1HZQHVV LV RIWHQ VHHQ DV D OLDELOLW\ UHIHUULQJ WR QHZ RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ 
general resource poverty, lack of legitimacy, and weak ties to external actors provide 
them with reduced capacity when competing with established players, i.e. incomplete 
resources (Stinchcombe, 1965; Teece, 1986; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). In Chapter 3, we 
singled out four types of potential limitations for firms: lack of business routines, 
blueprint, market knowledge and legitimacy.  
 
Summarizing, the following set of constraints affect innovative behaviour in China: 
market & technological constraints (i.e. appropriability risks and competence 
destruction) and institutional constraints (uncertainty and lack of resources).  
 
8.2.3 Note on measurement 
The measurement of these constraints is discussed and explained in Section 5.4.3 of 
Chapter 5 but it is useful to summarize the main points. Sectoral constraints are 
assessed by three sets of question about competitors (questions 27-31), customers 
(questions 32-36) and technology (questions 37-41). Institutional constraints are 
assessed by two sets of questions about institutional uncertainty (questions 42-53) and 
lack of resources (questions 54-57 plus questions about the key factors and challenges 
for successful innovation, such as questions 11 and 12). These questions allowed us to 
assess to whether or not firms lack certain resources and to what extent.  
 The intensity of constraints can range from low, limited to considerable and high. 
Low refers to no risks or constraints for the development of innovations (i.e. the data 
suggest that this factor is not identified as a constraint; i.e. no uncertainty arises from 
this constraint and all potential risks are manageable), limited refers to some 
constraints but that are manageable (i.e. the data suggest that it is noticed as a potential 
constraint for innovation but relatively easy managed, which means that the firm does 
not have to make specific efforts to deal with the constraint beyond the natural, daily 
ways of operating), considerable refers to constraints on innovation that require 
specific efforts but are within the scope of the firm to manage, high refers to 
constraints that pose serious risks on the success of innovation and there is a high 
amount of uncertainty as to how to deal with this constraint. In short, the move from 
low to high intensity of constraints corresponds to a move from manageable and 
calculable risks to high uncertainty.  
 The findings are presented as dominant patterns across firms in a sector, i.e. the 
intensity of the constraint and the reasons why these constraints have such intensity 
are reasons found in most of the interviews with firms. The assessment of intensity 
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never relied on one instance or observation in one interview, it is always based on at 
least 2 instances across firms in the same sector. Obviously some firms in the same 
sector may have the same intensity of a particular constraint but for slightly different 
reasons. If so, this is indicated in the following discussion. In general, where possible 
the direct evidence of a reason for a specific constraint is quoted in the discussion and 
illustrated with an example.  
 
8.3 Empirical findings: Constraints on innovation  
8.3.1 Enterprise software  
The innovative activities of enterprise software firms show the following 
characteristics: extensively customized software work with individual large customers. 
Innovation takes the form of incremental improvements of products and processes, 
upgrading service to customers and introducing more products in the same production 
line (cf. Chapter 7). 
 
Table 8.1 - Enterprise software - constraints 
Constraints Intensity 
Appropriability risk High 
Institutional uncertainty High 
Lack of labour resources Considerable 
Lack of knowledge resources Considerable 
Lack of capital resources Limited 
Competence destruction Low 
 
The type of innovative activity in this sector carries relatively low risks for 
competence destruction for four reasons (Table 8.1). Firstly, the interviews suggested 
that there are few sudden and unexpected changes in technology. On the one hand, due 
to the relative unimportance of following state-of-the-art technologies, such as in case 
4, 8 and 50. On the other hand, customers required certain technical changes which 
reduced the uncertainty of adopting a new technology but at the same time increasing 
customer-specific investments, such as in cases 2, 4, 19. For instance, firm 19, a small 
RIILFHQHWZRUNVRIWZDUHGHYHORSHUPHWWKHLUFXVWRPHU¶VGHPDQGWRPDNHWKHWUDQVLWLRQ
from ASP to JSP as a script engine for dynamically generated websites which entailed 
learning new software engineering skills35.  
 Secondly, most of the technical changes in this sector are based on international 
developments that can be followed due to a time lag of the introduction in China. 
Thirdly, firms in this sector extensively customize and integrate products/services for 
FXVWRPHUV¶VSHFLILFQHHGVDVLQGLFDWHGIRULQVWDQFHLQLQWHUYLHZZLWKILUPV
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19, 52 and 54.  For instance, firm 54 develops community management software for 
government departments. The firm cooperates with local government departments on 
so-FDOOHG µLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQ¶ DQG H-government projects that require extensive 
customization. The local government department participates in the development in 
two stages: early in the research stage, where they propose their demands and in the 
second round of software development.  
 Fourthly, the customer base is very stable either as a result of predictable demand, 
such as in firms 4, 19, 50, or as a result of high switching costs for the customers, such 
as in firms 10, 12, 52, 54. Most firms have a few large businesses ± such as Jindu, 
Insigma36 - or local government departments as customers. The firms with government 
customers develop and maintain rather crucial parts of the software system, resulting 
in relatively high switching costs for departments and thus lower political risks.  
 
The potential risks of appropriability, on the other hand, are high in this sector for 
three reasons. Firstly, the core technologies of enterprise firms are relatively simple 
and suspect to imitation, such as in cases 4, 10, 12, 19 and 50. Secondly, the market is 
increasingly competitive due to the low entry barriers: either state-owned firms or non-
state owned firms or a mix, but all are domestic and mostly local competitors37. 
Although there are some foreign competitors on the market, they are not competing on 
the same local market. However, the interviews suggest that foreign competition may 
increase in the near future, such as in cases 6, 19, 38 and 54. Thirdly, all firms in this 
sector were concerned about the protection of their intellectual property rights 
although the interviews suggested that the firms succeeded in developing certain 
complementary competences, which lowers the risks but increases the coordination 
costs with other firms.  
 
In addition to these technical and market risks, the enterprise software firms face 
constraints from the underinvestment in resources. First, locating and attracting 
talented employees is difficult and results in a lack of human resource capacity for the 
firms. For instance, firm 2; a small firm of 30 employees is recruiting at least 11 new 
Java software engineers with mostly BSc and in 3 cases MSc degrees in November 
                                                                                                                                                  
35 ASP = Active Server Pages (developed by Microsoft and released in 1996); JSP = JavaServer 
Pages (developed by Sun Microsystems and released in 1999).  
36 -LQGX5HDO(VWDWHLVRQHRI&KLQD¶VELJJHUUHDOHVWDWHGHYHORSPHQWFRPpanies (http://www.jindu-
group.com/ ,QVLJPD LV RQH RI &KLQD¶V OHDGLQJ KLJK-tech software company based on applied 
research from Zhejiang University with registered capital of over 800 million RMB 
(http://www.insigma.com.cn/index_en.php). 
37  State owned: interviews firms 10, 12; Non-state owned: interviews firms 50, 52, 54, both: 
interviews firms 2, 6 
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DWWKHRQOLQHMREPDUNHWRI+DQJ]KRX¶V(DVW6RIWZDUH3DUN38. The larger firm 52 
is recruiting over 35 new software engineers at the end of December 2006 at the 
Zhejiang Online Talent Market39. Next to an overall scarcity of high quality technical 
employees, there is competence uncertainty. Competence uncertainty refers to a lack 
of standardized competences and skills of employees. As a result of limitations in the 
formal education system and ad hoc in-house training, it is difficult for employers to 
judge the competences and skills of new but also of existing employees (see Chapter 
6). The HR systems in enterprise firms emphasise stable work relations by using of 
formal labour contracts40 and standardized work arrangements. One often used method 
of standardizing work arrangements and increasing employee commitment to the firm 
is by organizing in-house training. Therefore, once appropriate employees are 
recruited, the firms are able to keep them, as a relatively low labour turnover suggests. 
 Second, the fact that these small firms are recruiting so many new employees 
suggests that they have sufficient financial resources. In fact, 10 out of 14 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV GR QRW FRQVLGHU ILQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV WR EH FRQVWUDLQLQJ WKHLU ILUP¶V
development. Only 4 entrepreneurs mentioned that financial constraints might become 
obstacles for future growth, expansion. On the one hand, enterprise software firms 
have generally low requirements for financial resources. Enterprise software 
development usually involves the customer and requires relatively limited investments 
in new technology, as opposed to improving existing technology. Moreover, such 
technological development carries relatively limited financial risks which reduces the 
need to abundant financial resources, such as risk capital. On the other hand, the 
enterprise software firms receive considerable support from the local government in 
terms of funding innovative activities and subsidies for office, equipment and tax. 
 Third, limited market knowledge in combination with a lack of strong brands is a 
source of concern for firms such as 4, 6, 8, 19 and 38 and partly relates to the inability 
to locate and attract talented employees and target customers. Next to that, firms face 
coordination uncertainty. The interviews suggest that there is considerable asymmetric 
information in the market, where government agencies (capital), business (knowledge 
and labour) and universities (labour, knowledge) all have parts of information and 
provide access to key resources. It is noteworthy that the interviews suggest the 
usefulness and wide variety and high quality of university research in Hangzhou, on 
ZKLFKPXFKRI WKH ORFDO ILUPV¶ WHFKQRORJLHVDUHEDVHG(QWHUSULVH VRIWZDUHneeds to 
coordinate these information sources since they need to integrate labour, capital and 
                                                          
38 http://www.espark.net/funcms/espark/zhespark/JobsAndResume/JobsInfo/job_ff8080810e88723d0
10ea2b4d6fb01ad.html in Chinese, last visit December 15th, 2006 
39 http://c410618.zjrc.com/ in Chinese, last visit December 18th, 2006 
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knowledge resources for specific customers in customized products. It is noteworthy 
that there are extensive business networks within the enterprise software market to the 
effect that they function as mobilization mechanisms for resources and information. 
The connections within the network are often formalised in contracts or joint 
development programs.  
 However, these networks are often exclusive, i.e. not collectively accessible by 
any firm. These networks are non-rivalrous but exclusive. A potential alternative 
source for technical knowledge is the foreign firm, however, the entry of foreign firms 
in the strongly localized enterprise software market is slow. Moreover, even though 
foreign firms could provide superior technical knowledge, they lack the expertise and 
experience to meet the requirements of the highly customized and localized enterprise 
software development.  Although the firms are considerably constrained by lack of 
certain resources, the highly competitive environment gives firms enough examples of 
success and failure to learn from. As a result of intense competition there are many 
failing firms and some firms do not have successful firms in the same sector to learn 
from as a result of a niche strategy, as indicated by most firms. Summarizing, the 
underinvestment in labour, capital and knowledge resources are posing considerable, 
limited and considerable constraints respectively. 
 
The uncertainty arising from ambiguous governance of resources ± institutional 
uncertainty ± is high for enterprise software firms. First, many firms face a political 
risk as most of the enterprise software firms have local government agencies as 
customers. Again referring to the type of technical development, the highly 
customized nature of enterprise software development involves specific investments in 
individual customers. In the case of business customers this creates stable business 
relationships based on mutual dependence (or lock-in). In the case of local government 
agencies that have interests beyond economic interests, such specific investments 
carry a political risk. Next, one of the reasons mentioned is that after WTO access and 
opening-up foreign firms get increased attention and supporting legislation that 
hinders the development of local firms, an argument also found in the critical works of 
Huang (2001) and Lardy (1995) on the effects of FDI in China. More specifically, 
local firms are uncertain about how local policy makers will respond to increased 
foreign competition. China generally is behind the international standards that foreign 
firms might require; how will local governments respond?  
 Next, policy changes are unpredictable and unclear in their implications. We can 
GLVWLQJXLVK WZR W\SHV RI SROLF\ FKDQJHV VRIWZDUH SROLF\ FKDQJHV DQG FXVWRPHU¶V
                                                                                                                                                  
40 Even though every employers is obliged by law to use labour contracts, it does not necessarily 
mean that employers follow the agreements in practice. The private enterprise software firms 
GLVWLQJXLVKWKHPVHOYHVE\µWDNLQJWKHFRQWUDFWVVHULRXV¶ 
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industry policy changes. In the former the changes potentially affect the strategy and 
could restrict technology development. However, uncertain changes in policies in the 
industries of the customers are just as important. For instance, firm 38 operates in the 
financial industry and explains that the entry to the WTO requires a lot of financial 
reforms which are rather unpredictable for his firm, giving rise to much uncertainty. 
This implies that preferential policies for software firms alone are not sufficient for 
facilitating the development of this industry. In sum, these firms need to accumulate 
strong but also flexible competences that can handle such environment, without 
destroying their own competences; i.e. increased competence destruction risk.  
 
The interviews allow for a discussion of organizational responses to these constraints. 
We can distinguish at least three different strategies of enterprise software firms. First, 
the development of firm-specific capabilities. Firms try to accumulate technical 
capabilities that are hard to transfer to other firms. Moreover, some firms ± 19 and 38 
± are explicitly building organizational commitment, hiring students that are least 
likely to change jobs frequently. For instance, firm 38 initially recruited only students 
from the Finance College and Chinese Medicine College. However, this strategy made 
it hard to get enough employees with technological abilities and they changed this 
strategy and recruit new staff with the same features from other firms or universities.  
 Secondly, firms built customer specific capabilities: exclusive R&D for the 
customer, fully integrated products and extensively customized products / services. 
For instance, firm 8 developed an equity trade and execution system exclusively for 
their major US customer, which was very successful with an equity trade volume of 
13.1 billiRQ86GROODUVLQ1RYHPEHU7KLUGO\WKHUROHRIWKHIRXQGHURU&(2¶V
personal networks is crucial for attracting customers and maintaining good 
UHODWLRQVKLSV$QH[DPSOH LVJLYHQE\WKHSURMHFWPDQDJHURIILUPµ7KHguanxi of 
the boss and the personal attractiveness (charisma) of the boss played a crucial role in 
WKHVXFFHVVIXOIRXQGLQJRIWKHILUPEHFDXVHKHFRXOGDWWUDFWFXVWRPHUVDQGHPSOR\HHV¶
Most of the interviewees did not specify precisely which type of network was used in 
what situation and for what purpose. 
 
8.3.2 Standard software 
The innovative activities of the firms in our sample in the standard software sector can 
be summarized as mass produced software for large homogenous markets without 
customization of the products and services. Firms strive to be the technological leader 
and to that end innovate radically in technology, business model and opening up of 
new markets (Chapter 6). 
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Table 8.2 - Standard software  - constraints 
Constraints Intensity 
Lack of knowledge resources High 
Competence destruction Considerable 
Lack of labour resources Considerable 
Lack of capital resources Considerable 
Institutional uncertainty Considerable 
Appropriability risk Limited 
 
The type of innovative activity in this sector carries considerable risks for competence 
destruction for four reasons (Table 8.2). Firstly, the developments in technology are 
fast and often require changes in the technologies the firm use. However, most 
important is not matching the state-of-the-art technologies but matching technology to 
the market, such as in firms 17, 42, 46 and 60.  For instance, in cooperation with 
Zhejiang University, firm 42 developed a fast development platform for mobile phone 
games and data storage technology for successful game development. However, these 
changes are market-driven and the success of the firm depends on the marketing 
capability of the firm not the state of their technology. Secondly, the market is the 
main source for uncertainty. The market is new and customers are unfamiliar with the 
products which makes it a highly unpredictable market. Customers often want to try 
out new products and change preferences frequently. Thirdly, customers appear to 
show little loyalty to products although the evidence is inconclusive ± firms 42 and 46 
± mostly because firms find it difficult to say anything about loyalty of customers in 
such new markets.  
 
The potential risk of appropriability, on the other hand, is limited in this sector for four 
reasons. Firstly, the core technology of most of the products ± for instance in firms 17, 
36, 42 and 58 - is developed over a longer period of time with significant capital and 
human resource investments, resulting in a relatively hard to imitate and complex 
product. Secondly, the potential competition in this sector is strong, from both 
domestic and foreign firms, such as in firms 17, 36, 42 and 46. Thirdly, however, the 
current environment is still one with few real competitors which facilitates the use of 
pioneering strategies to create first-mover advantages, such as in cases 36, 58 and 60. 
Fourthly, the risks of a weak appropriability regime seem to be acknowledged by most 
firms. However, such risks are not considered to be of central concern for these firms. 
On the one hand, the firms are very aware of this environment, especially operating in 
the software business so their strategies consider and acknowledge these risks from 
day one and focus on mitigating such risks. For instance by developing complex, hard 
to imitate core technologies and/or create first-mover advantages. 
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In addition to these technical and market risks, the firms face constraints from the 
underinvestment in resources. First, new standard software firms have a relatively low 
legitimacy in labour markets and face a general scarcity of technical employees. 
Considering the attractiveness of foreign firms (cf. Chapter 6) and large firms for 
graduates and experienced employees, new small firms in relatively risky private 
software business do not often provide an attractive offer for job hunters. Small 
VRIWZDUHILUPVODFNUHSXWDWLRQLHEHLQJQHZDQGODFNDFOHDUµHYLGHQFH¶RIVXFFHVV
(i.e. most firms have limited revenues or none at all). Combined with the relatively 
high failure rates of these firms, it is not surprising that the preference of job hunters is 
on stable large (foreign) firms. Especially foreign firms have more legitimacy to 
compete for talented employees. Foreign firms offer better conditions, higher salaries 
and more status. The interviews suggest that attracting suitable employees ± e.g. 
technical specialists ± is one of the major obstacles for developing innovations. In 
contrast to enterprise software firms, standard software firms know how to locate 
human resources but lack sufficient finances and credibility as a suitable employer. 
Moreover, interviews suggest that standard software firms have problems developing 
routines, gaining market insights and developing and managing technological skills. 
One of the consequences is a high labour turnover of an overage 20-30% per year. 
 Second, new standard software firms have a relatively low legitimacy in financial 
markets. The lack of legitimacy plays a role here because the interviews suggest that 
new, inexperienced firms have trouble getting investments. Considering the relatively 
underdeveloped formal financial market, i.e. hard to get bank loans (Chapter 6), 
legitimacy and reputation are important to attract private capital or foreign capital. 
Even though this does result in considerable constraints in the start-up and early 
growth phase, only 3 of the enterprises mention that access to capital might become an 
obstacle for future growth. Standard software firms require large initial investments to 
start and commit themselves to R&D necessary for developing radical, break-through 
innovations. One of the constraints on acquiring these initial investments is the lack of 
diversity in financial sources. Basically, standard software firms have to rely on 
private capital, which is abundantly available and complement it with the funds and 
subsidies they get from for instance Technology Zones. Given their smallness and lack 
of alternative means of finance, the firms face considerable constraints of financial 
capital in the early phases of their history.  
 Thirdly, most firms in the sector have very few similar firms to benchmark or 
LPLWDWH7KH\DUHµGHVSHUDWH¶IRUOHDUQLQJVNLOOVIURPDQ\RQHDYDLODEOHVXJJHVWLQJWKDW
management skills are a key issue, such as in firms 17, 42, 46, 53 and 60. The 
interviews suggest that the firms lack marketing skills, more specifically, the 
management and use of brands. The industry in general is too young and dynamic to 
have built up a collective memory and knowledge of markets, technologies and 
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management. As in the enterprise software sector, extensive informal business 
network operate as informal mechanisms to overcome such constraints. In contrast to 
the enterprise software sector, networks in the standard software sector do not focus on 
mobilization of resources only but also on coordination of resources. The connections 
in the network are both informal and formal. Similar to the enterprise sector, this leads 
to ± an even greater extent of ± exclusive use of certain resources for a specific groups 
of economic agents. It is noteworthy that university research plays a significant role in 
providing knowledge resources, similar to the enterprise software sector. One 
UHPDLQLQJLVVXHLVWKHVFDUFH,35SURWHFWLRQWKDWFRQVWUDLQVILUPV¶VWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQV
In contrast to developed economies, where IPR regimes for standard software are 
relatively strong, firms in China face the issues of weak IPR protection, resulting in 
higher appropriability risks. Summarizing, the underinvestment in labour, capital and 
knowledge resources are posing high, limited and high constraints respectively. 
 
Additional institutional constraints are caused by uncertainty of policy changes. In 
addition to changes in current policies some firms are uncertain how the policy 
environment will respond to the expected increase in competition from both domestic 
firms and foreign firms, a concern also found in the enterprise software sector. 
Moreover, the implementation of policy (changes) appears to strongly affect the 
behaviour of firms. The effect of the policies seems unpredictable due to the local 
implementation of policy. For firm 60, the general implementation of preferential 
policies initially had negative effects due to the lack of support of the local 
government for his firm. Respondent 58 mentions the unpredictable implementation of 
laws, for instance in cases of bankruptcy. 
 The regulations are constantly changing and firms must invest to follow these 
changes. The regulations only appear supportive but ± in combination with high 
implementation costs ± stimulate standard strategies and behaviour of firms. In 
contrast to promoting innovation, it promotes homogeneity in products and 
development processes. The general legislation on standard software seems sufficient 
± in contrast to the lack of a stable general frame in the enterprise software sector ± as 
indicated by the interviews. However, the policies are too general to be useful and are 
more intentions rather than clearly implemented guidelines, as is the case with the 
policy for supporting university student entrepreneurship that actually does not exist in 
practice. Furthermore, the preferential tax policy for software firms has many 
requirements, such as a high annual turnover, which favour large firms instead of 
small, entrepreneurial firms. However, it must be noted that in many other cases, for 
instance in technology policy and market policy, the lack of regulation opens up 
possibility for innovation. In short, the preferential policies often are not implemented 
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WRWKHLUIXOOSXUSRVHEXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHDODFNRIµFRQVWUDLQLQJ¶WHFKQRORJ\SRlicies 
opens up opportunities.  
 
We can distinguish at least two different strategies of standard software firms. Firstly, 
a flexible strategy to exploit opportunities in the market as soon as they arise. We see 
strong market-driven innovation in firms 17, 36, 42, 46 and 53. Sometimes strategic 
redirection involves extending to other locations to be closer to the market and benefit 
from government relationships, as was the case for firms 17 and 42. Furthermore, the 
firms pursue a first-to-market strategy to have first-mover advantages (Lieberman et 
al). Such strategic flexibility is often found in emerging economies (e.g. Wright et al, 
2005; p. 8) and seen as short-term opportunistic behaviour (Manolova and Yan, 2002; 
Tan, 1996) of innovating firms in emerging economies of Eastern Europe and China, 
mostly intended to achieve first-mover advantages (Lieberman et al; Tan, 2001).  
 Secondly, pursued by all standard software firms in our sample: networking for 
human, financial and technical resources. Firms have strong personal networks to 
FRRSHUDWHRQWHFKQRORJ\GHYHORSPHQWHJILUP¶V&(2QHWZRUNRUILUP¶VXVHRI
its connection with Zhejiang University and Insigma Group firms. Furthermore, 
developing and maintaining relationships with government officials is crucial for firms 
46 and 60 to benefit from preferential policies and attract a customer base. In general, 
a strong relationship with the local government, university or any large investor limits 
all kinds of risks considerably, as seen in firms 17, 53, and 60. 
 
8.3.3 Middleware  
The innovative activities of the firms in our sample in the middleware software sector 
can best be summarized as non-customized work for a mass market. Innovation takes 
the form of new business models, new product line or opening up a new market. All 
the firms strive to be the technological leader and to that end undertake radically 
innovative activities. The interviewees indicate that innovative activity is radical and 
DLPV DW GHYHORSLQJ D VXSHULRU µNLOOHU¶ DSSOLFDWLRQ 7KH EXViness model behind the 
technology is the most important factor for success (cf. Chapter 6). 
 
Table 8.3 ± Middleware - constraints 
Constraints Intensity 
Competence destruction High 
Appropriability risk Limited 
Lack of labour resources Limited 
Institutional uncertainty Limited 
Lack of knowledge resources Limited 
Lack of capital resources Low 
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The type of innovative activity in this sector carries relatively high risks for 
competence destruction for three reasons (Table 8.3 previous page). Firstly, the 
developments of software in this sector are strongly dependent on technological 
changes such as such as the transition from 2.5G to 3G platforms for music and video 
applications, and three-dimensional applications in websites, such as in firms 13, 18, 
22, 45, 47 and 51. In general, the development of technology is fast, so fast that the 
university cannot keep up and firms resort to industry coordinated development, as 
illustrated by the so-called Web 2.0 club in Hangzhou with CEOs from the major 
search engine software developers. Whereas the other sectors technology is still 
developed by state institutes and universities, in the middleware sector it depends on 
foreign trends and coordinated industry development.  
 Secondly, the demand of customers is rather uncertain and hard to predict. 
Although the potential market is large, interviews suggest that the customers are very 
young and inexperienced with the Internet, making it hard to predict market 
acceptance. Thirdly, there is much uncertainty about technical standard setting which 
is done by the government instead of the industry (cf. Casper and Whitley, 2004). 
Most recently firms are unsure which 3G telecom standard will be assigned to which 
service provider. They have developed partnerships with state-owned telecom firms in 
order to get access to large markets and information about standards, not for 
coordinating technical development. 
 
The risks of appropriability, on the other hand, are limited in this sector for two 
reasons. Firstly, most firms do not use very complex technologies but complex, unique 
business models. Radical innovative activity in this sector is in terms of opening up 
new market with innovative business models, in contrast to technological innovations. 
)RU LQVWDQFH ILUP ¶V FRPELQDWLRQ Rf an acquired BBS community customer base 
with the E-City brand name ± a popular 3D online digital city plan, also acquired ± is a 
unique model. Firm 22, in contrast, chooses to present itself as a service with 
traditional values and diversity focusing on localized search capacities. Secondly, we 
have to note that most firms expect an increase in foreign competition ± such as 
Google and Yahoo ± that might hinder appropriability of innovation rents, as 
suggested by firms 13, 22, 34, 47 and 48. 
 
In addition to these technical and market risks, the middleware firms face constraints 
from the underinvestment in resources. First, attracting and managing human 
resources is a problem for firms. Consistent with the other sectors, there is a scarcity 
of technical employees. This suggests that there is an overall scarcity of qualified 
labour in the whole software industry in Hangzhou, as expected from the aggregate 
data in Chapter 5. However, it is not considered a strong constraint on the 
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development of innovations. One specific result stands out. As opposed to formal 
labour markets with labour agencies, standardized competences and trustworthy 
education systems, the interviews suggest that labour mobility in the middleware 
sector is efficiently coordinated via informal ± personal ± labour markets. Networks of 
firms keep track of the qualities of their employees and how well they match the 
ILUP¶VUHTXLUHPHQWV,IWKH\DSSHDUPDWFKILUPVZLOORIWHQVXJJHVWHPSOR\HHVWRPRYH
to a firm that is within the partner network. These networks are substantial and include 
several dozen if not more than hundred firms. As far as my data suggests, this kind of 
resource sharing is only found within the middleware market. It is not entirely 
surprising considering the coordinated efforts necessary for innovation and 
development in the middleware business.  
 Moreover, the results for underinvestment in capital goods suggest roughly the 
same as in the enterprise software sector. Only 4 out of 15 entrepreneurs indicated that 
financial goods might pose constraints. The interviews suggest three reasons. First, 
there is a relatively low need of financial capital. As opposed to enterprise firms, 
which need long term commitments, and standard software firms, who need large 
initial investments for R&D, middleware firms are not capital-intensive at all. Second, 
the abundance of personal capital and venture capital suffices to fulfil the capital needs. 
Last, also these firms receive additional local government subsidies in the form of 
office space and tax rebates.  
 Furthermore, there are limited constraints of underinvestment in knowledge. On 
the technology side, firms collectively follow international standards and technical 
developments. The firms are relatively weak in technology development. The 
adaptation of foreign technology with the use of R&D partnerships with universities 
provides the firms with enough technical resources. The middleware firms seem to 
draw on a collective local knowledge of the local business environment. The collective 
dimension of such knowledge is caused by the presence of extensive business 
networks that coordinate business information. Again, these networks are diverse and 
often overlapping, resulting in extensive information distribution among local firms. 
These networks often include major state-owned enterprises such as local telecom 
firms. The majority of firms see the presence of telecom operators in Hangzhou and 
the extensive networks of these middleware firms as a way to mitigate risks of 
uncertain policy changes and standard setting insecurity. For instance, via early 
information sharing, as indicated by firms 39, 48 and 49. Summarizing, the interviews 
suggest limited problems of underinvestment in resources. 
 
The constraints caused by uncertainty are limited as well. The firms are not burdened 
by a large, conservative bureaucracy, can easily establish new networks and expand 
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networks using modern technologies such as e-mail, MSN, QQ and blogs41, have 
enough examples of success and failure in the industry and have limited HRM issues 
due to their smallness. In general, the role of coordinated development and 
cooperation within the industry ± and little involvement of the government ± seems 
larger than expected. Middleware is an emerging industry, with little direct regulation 
(mostly indirect via telecom operators). Secondly, there have been considerable 
changes in policies, such as the earlier mentioned 3G telecom policy and changes in 
media laws that affect firms such as online advertisement and broadcasting firms 26, 
28 and 50. However, the interviews suggest that these policies often follow technical 
changes instead of influencing technical development 42 . Summarizing, little state 
interference, newness and incapability of the government apparatus to follow 
advanced technological changes limit the institutional constraints. 
 
We can distinguish at least three different strategies of middleware firms. Firstly, firms 
in this sector innovate radically in business model or market entry strategy. The 
technical standards are very broad and allow much flexibility in innovation and 
experimentation. These modular systemic features characterize all middleware firms in 
our sample. It appears important to attract a certain customer base ± which is relatively 
difficult ± and then create some sort of lock-in via continuous improvements or 
specific investments. In general, experimentation and managerial opportunism (cf. 
Wright et al, 2005; p. 9) are wide-spread in this sector, as indicated in interviews 22, 
34, 13, 46, 49 and 56. Managers of these firms are risk-takers and appear tolerant of 
ambiguity, which is earlier found in studies on risk taking behaviour of entrepreneurs 
in China by Tan (2001). Such risk-taking behaviour is accompanied by pioneering 
strategies, first-mover-advantages, DQGUDSLGO\FKDQJLQJVWUDWHJLFGLUHFWLRQV)LUP¶V
0RELOH(QWHUSULVH*DWHZD\ILUP¶VSRGFDVWLQJ43 VRIWZDUHDQGILUP¶VQHJRWLDEOH
securities online business are pioneering products that benefit from being first-movers.  
 Second, the interviews with firms 13, 18, 22, 28, 34 and 56 suggest that they use 
networks for knowledge accumulation with other firms in the industry and do not 
necessarily rely on university or R&D institute research. More important, there 
appears to be little connections to the (local) government. Firms 18, 22, 28 are in the 
so-called Web 2.0 club of CEOs and exchange ideas and solutions to technical 
problems. Entry into the club is easy and the contacts between the members are 
frequent but all related to the industry and mostly impersonal. Furthermore, the goal is 
                                                          
41 MSN and QQ are popular free instant messaging computer programs in Mainland China. Blogs are 
user generated websites where entries are made in journal style and often take the form of personal 
online diaries. 
42 Interestingly, most of the interviewees do not worry about (changing) rules and regulations. 
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to create a common stock of brand names and technologies to popularize Internet use. 
Information is often shared via blogs on the websites of the CEOs on which 
discussions take place. Furthermore there are meetings that take the form of parties in 
which new members are introduced and partnerships forged. The personal networks 
are also instrumental in learning management skills from each other. The networks 
usually evolve around the CEO/founder and are often already formed before the firm 
started operations, especially in the middleware sector (compared to other sectors). 
 
8.4 Discussion of findings 
Technical, market and institutional conditions constrain to a varying extent innovation 
of Chinese software entrepreneurs in Hangzhou. Private software entrepreneurs in a 
transition economy face the additional problems of lack of resources and the 
uncertainty of the governance of these resources. The findings in this chapter confirm 
that software sub-sectors have distinct competence destruction and appropriability 
risks, based on distinct characteristics of different innovative activities. I also find 
evidence for the role of institutional constraints. Institutional constraints have diverse 
effects on innovation across distinct software sectors. The differential effects of 
institutional risks might be explained by the differences in required resources for the 
various innovative activities. Not all firms face the same institutional constraints, even 
if they operate in the same institutional regime. Table 8.4 provides a comparison of 
the findings: sectoral and institutional constraints. 
 
Table 8.4 ± Comparison of findings: sectoral and institutional constraints 
Constraints Enterprise 
software 
Standard 
software 
Middleware 
Competence destruction 
Appropriability risk 
Lack of labour resources  
Lack of capital resources 
Lack of knowledge resources 
Institutional uncertainty 
Low 
High 
Considerable 
Limited 
Considerable 
High 
Considerable 
Limited 
Considerable 
Considerable 
High 
Considerable 
High 
Limited 
Limited 
Low 
Limited 
Limited 
 
It is useful to compare the findings with respect to institutional constraints across 
sectors. First, the findings across the three sectors suggest that scarcity of qualified 
labour is a key constraint of underinvested labour resources. However, in contrast to 
the competence uncertainty of enterprise software firms and foreign competition for 
labour in the standard software sector, the middleware sector has developed an 
alternative informal labour market. Second, the findings for capital resources suggest 
                                                                                                                                                  
43 A podcast is a media file that is distributed by subscription (paid or unpaid) over the Internet using 
syndication feeds, for playback on mobile devices and personal computer. 
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that enterprise software and middleware firms have relatively low capital needs, 
whereas standard software firms have strong needs for initial R&D investment. All 
three sectors receive considerable local government support in the form of subsidies 
and tax cuts. Furthermore, where constraints on capital for enterprise - and standard 
software firms arise in the limited availability of long-term finance, middleware firms 
face no such constraints as the provision of personal and venture capital is sufficient. 
Therefore, the middleware firms have a competitive advantage over the other sectors 
and are more likely to be successful in attracting necessary capital resources.  
 Third, the findings suggest that enterprise software and middleware firms lack a 
collective memory and have limited market knowledge as opposed to middleware 
firms. They have an advantage of strongly localized knowledge. Next, all sectors have 
extensive business networks that differ in level of formality and governance 
mechanism. Next, foreign technology plays a role for enterprise software and 
middleware firms but not for standard software firms. Lastly, university research 
appears to be a strong collective resource across the sectors. Fourth and last, 
middleware firms do not face political risks as they operate relatively independent 
from the government as opposed to enterprise and standard software firms. These last 
two sectors have frequent interaction with local government agencies either because 
they are customers or important business partners. However, enterprise software firms 
seem to be most influenced by policy considerations. In general, the enterprise sector 
is more regulated than the other two sectors. The interviews in the other two sectors do 
not seem to indicate that this is a problem but opens up possibilities. Even to the extent 
that technology and market is dictating policy instead of the other way around, as is 
the case in the middleware sector.  
  
The interviews suggest several general strategies that firms in the respective sector 
tend to follow. Enterprise software firms develop firm-specific and customer specific 
capabilities while employing the personal networks of the CEO maintain customer 
relationships. Standard software firms generally are more flexible using networks to 
exploit market opportunities. Middleware firms are even more flexible, usually 
employing first-mover strategies and focus on knowledge resources. These strategies 
are general directions and it is important to understand what kind of capabilities firms 
develop to mitigate sectoral and institutional constraints in order to innovate; be they 
specific for customers, the firm, focused on networks and or for specific strategic 
purposes. The next chapter will show the findings with respect to these capabilities. 
Table 8.5 (next page) summarizes the main strategies to deal with sectoral and 
institutional constraints per sector. 
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Table 8.5 - Strategies for dealing with sectoral and institutional constraints (per sector) 
Enterprise software 
1) Developing firm-specific capabilities that are difficult to imitate: 
technical capabilities and organizational commitment 
2) Building customer-specific capabilities: exclusive R&D, integrated 
products/services and extensive customization 
3) EmployLQJ&(2V¶SHUVRQDOQHWZRUNVDWWUDFWLQJFXVWRPHUVDQG
maintaining relationships 
 
Standard software 
1) Employing a flexible strategy: exploiting market opportunities 
2) Networking for human, financial and technical resources 
 
Middleware 
1) Innovating radically: experimenting with business model or market 
entry strategy 
2) Employing first-mover strategy: pioneering and rapidly changing 
strategic directions 
3) Networking for knowledge within industry 
 
8.4.1 Benchmarking the results 
It is useful to compare my results with Casper and Whitley (2004) because they also 
analysed the connection between institutions and technological risks for the software 
sectors. The managerial constraints seem to follow the general pattern of the software 
industries in Sweden, UK and Germany but for different reasons. Obviously, 
+DQJ]KRX¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJLPHLVGLIIHUHQWIURPWKRVHRI6ZHGHQ8.DQG*HUPDQ\
The key differences are in the coordination mechanisms for critical resources. In 
Chapter 6 I argued that with respect to the labour market in Hangzhou there is a 
general scarcity in competences, low geographic mobility and high workplace 
mobility that makes it difficult for employers to commit employees to their firm. 
Furthermore, the labor market is inefficient in terms of recruiting and retaining 
employees. The financial system is highly biased towards private capital and foreign 
investments. Increased private savings and (foreign) investments in tertiary industries 
provide opportunities while a low availability of bank loans and strong competition for 
private and foreign capital limits the effectiveness of the local financial market. 
Germany on the other hand has a relatively strongly coordinated financial and labour 
market, with powerful trade and industry associations and labour organizations that 
coordinate the labour mobility. $JDLQGLIIHUHQWLV(QJODQG¶VOLEHUDOPDUNHW)LQDQFLDO
and labour markets are largely deregulated and have little room for collective actors 
such as unions.  
 The enterprise software sector faces low competence destruction risks because 
there is high customization but also by following foreign trends. The sector has high 
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appropriability risks due to intense competition but also due to weak IPRs and mostly 
local domestic competition. The standard software sector has high competence 
destruction risks because of the technical uncertainty but also due to the unfamiliarity 
of the unskilled customer. Firms have low appropriability risks because of the 
technical complexity but are also limitedly constrained by weak IPRs. Middleware 
firms indeed face high competence destruction risks due to uncertainty about standard 
setting, but not by the industry but by the government. Lastly, middleware firms have 
low appropriability risks due to complex technology but also face limited constrains 
from weak IPRs. They indeed innovate radically but in business model, often 
following existing technologies developed in the US. In combination with the insights 
from our analysis of liability of newness and institutional uncertainty, this study 
provides insights in how the Chinese software sectors are different from the European 
counterparts (Table 8.6). 
 
Table 8.6 ± Comparing Casper and Whitley (2004, Europe) with this study (China) 
 Enterprise 
software 
Standard 
software 
Middleware 
Constraints This 
study 
C&W 
µ 
This 
study 
C&W 
µ 
This 
study 
C&W 
µ 
Competence destruction Low Lim. Cons. High High High 
Appropriability risk High Cons. Lim. Lim. Lim. Lim. 
Lack of labour resources Cons.  Cons.  Lim.  
Lack of capital resources Lim.  Cons.  Low  
Lack of knowledge resources Cons.  High  Lim.  
Institutional uncertainty High  Cons.  Lim.  
Lim. = limited, Cons. = considerable 
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Chapter 9 - Findings 4 
 
Developing innovative capabilities 
 
9.1 Introduction44 
Chapter 7 provided empirical evidence that Chinese entrepreneurs are innovative. 
Chapter 8 showed how sectoral and institutional constraints pose constraints on private 
software entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs need to develop innovative ways for fighting 
off these constraints. Then the question arises, what are the underlying mechanisms of 
their innovative behaviour and how do they fight off sectoral and institutional 
constraints? The discussion in Chapter 8 suggested a variety of strategies to deal with 
these constraints. This chapter presents an empirical analysis of innovative capabilities 
based on extensive interviews with Chinese software entrepreneurs in Hangzhou. The 
analysis shows that they have developed particular abilities to integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external resources to develop and successfully commercialize 
new products and services (Chapter 3).  
 The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a summary of the 
literature. The third section presents the empirical findings for the full data set, 
showing the antecedent of innovative capabilities and how they add up to five specific  
innovative capabilities. The subsequent sections then deal with each of these five 
innovative capabilities in more detail. The chapter concludes with a discussion.  
 
9.2 Innovative capabilities and their antecedents: overview of the argument 
9.2.1 Development of innovative capabilities 
The development of innovative capabilities depends on the resource base directly or 
indirectly accessible, the nature of the innovative activity pursued and the local 
institutional arrangements. The literature on (dynamic) capabilities emphasizes 
valuable resources as factors explaining firm behavior and performance, stressing the 
(dynamic) capability to innovate (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) and to learn (Fiol 
and Lyles, 1984). Innovative capabilities are firm-specific processes that manipulate 
the resource base of a firm (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece et al, 1997). 
                                                          
44 The preliminary findings presented in this chapter are published in: Greeven, M.J., Zhao, X. (2008) 
"Innovation, competences and the role of knowledge networks in Hangzhou's software industry", in 
P. H. M. Vervest, D. W. van Liere and L. Zheng (eds.), The Network Experience, Berlin. Germany: 
Springer, Chapter 13, pp. 193-211. An extended version is conditionally accepted in: Greeven, M.J., 
Zhao, X. (2009) "Developing innovative competences in an emerging business system: New private 
enterprises in Hangzhou's software industry", Management and Organization Review (Special Issue 
on Creativity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship in China) 
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 The sectoral approaches to innovation show that sectors with distinct technologies 
can be differentiated according to their specific technical and market risks, or 
technological regimes (e.g. Malerba, Breschi and Orsenigo, 2000; Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1993; Dosi, 1988 Parker & Tamaschke, 2005). These characteristics of 
tHFKQRORJLFDOUHJLPHVDQGLWVNQRZOHGJHEDVHSURYLGHUHVWULFWLRQVRQILUPV¶OHDUQLQJ
capabilities and organization and coordination of innovative activities. This thesis 
considers three distinct software sectors representative for three types of innovation. 
Chapter 2 has discussed these issues for the three software sectors under investigation, 
while Chapters 7 and 8 have shown the variety of innovation patterns and technical 
and market constraints on innovation.  
 Comparative institutional approaches to innovation explain how institutions 
govern the development of organizational capabilities. Institutions guide and constrain 
the coordination of various economic actors and the way they solve economic 
problems in terms of the nature of ownership relations, inter-firm connections and 
governing access to critical resources such as labour and capital (Hollingsworth and 
Boyer, 1997; Whitley, 1999). As argued in Chapter 3, institutional regimes have 
distinct patterns of resource provision and distribution and they specify how firms 
have differential access to critical resources. This results in different firm behaviour 
and crucially affects competitive strategies and the development of unique capabilities.  
 ,QVWLWXWLRQDOUHJLPHVLQ&KLQD¶VHFRQRP\KDYHWZRGLVWLQFW features: institutional 
XQFHUWDLQW\DQGYDULHW\RIORFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOV\VWHPV)LUVWRIDOO&KLQD¶VLQVWLWXWLRQV
originate both from the socialist era and market-oriented institutions, which presently 
co-exist (Krug and Polos, 2004). Firms face underinvestment in resources and have 
considerable uncertainty regarding what actor is providing what kinds of constraints 
RQ WKH XVH RI UHVRXUFHV 6HFRQG WKH KHWHURJHQHLW\ RI &KLQD¶V ORFDO EXVLQHVV
environment makes resources location-specific. So, in contrast to most comparative 
institutional studies, which take the nation state as the boundaries of a unitary business 
V\VWHP &KLQD¶V HFRQRP\ LV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ D diversity of business systems at the 
sub-national level asking for a local perspective. Chapter 6 provided a detailed study 
RI+DQJ]KRX¶VORFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJLPHDQGLGHQWLILHGNH\IHDWXUHVRIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDO
regime in which private software entrepreneurs innovate. Chapter 8 discussed what 
kinds of institutional constraints these entrepreneurs have to deal with. This sets the 
frame for understanding the underlying mechanisms of innovative behaviour. Then, 
how do innovative capabilities come about? 
 
9.2.2 Antecedents of innovative capabilities  
Antecedents to innovative capabilities are those organizational processes that provide 
resources (originating in individual, firm or network) to the firm that can give a 
potential competitive advantage in successfully developing and commercializing new 
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products and services. However, these antecedents do not always add up to innovative 
capabilities. Antecedents add up to a capability only LI WKH\DOWHU WKHILUP¶V UHVRXUFH
base to such extent that they generate organization-specific, value-creating strategies 
for innovation (cf. Chapter 3). Specifically, these antecedents should combine and 
deploy resources to generate value and should be able to span and support multiple 
lines of business of the firm, i.e. organization-specific. Antecedents to a specific 
capability are then all aspects of the same capability but refer to different 
organizational processes that together generate organization-specific abilities of the 
firm to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external resources to successfully 
develop and commercialize new products and services (i.e. an innovative capability). 
 To understand how capabilities come about it is crucial to know what their 
antecedents are. In this chapter we will identify antecedents and on the basis of those 
antecedents we will single out the innovative capabilities that firms developed. We 
will investigate the development of innovative capabilities while considering 
institutional - and sectoral constraints. The former is taken into account by studying 
LQQRYDWLYHFDSDELOLWLHV LQ+DQJ]KRX¶V ORFDOEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQW WKH ODWWHU is taken 
into account to presenting a comparative study of innovative capabilities across three 
distinct software sectors. A note on the research method is warranted. 
 
9.3 Empirical findings 
9.3.1 Summary of the research method 
The substantive purpose of the empirical analysis is to identify innovative capabilities 
by singling out antecedents to innovative capabilities. The analysis followed inductive 
qualitative techniques in order to single out those organizational processes that provide 
resources to the firm that can give a potential competitive advantage in successfully 
developing and commercializing new products and services. The analysis involved a 
confrontation of our working theory and the extant literature on innovative capabilities 
and their antecedents with the empirical data (cf. Uzzi, 1997; Krug & Hendrischke, 
2008; Maeki, 1993). This involved the creation of a cross-sector display that indicates 
the antecedents that were unambiguously named by our respondents, similar to Uzzi 
(1997). An antecedent was recorded on the list if it was mentioned by more than one 
respondent. In total 26 different, unique antecedents are mentioned more than one time 
and in total 160 antecedents were mentioned. 
 A more formal analysis of the data analysed the distribution and frequency of 
antecedents mentioned by each respondent. The results indicate that per standard 
software ± and middleware firm, on average, 5 antecedents were singled out whereas 
per enterprise software firm 6 antecedents. The analysis allows checking for the 
distribution of features mentioned per firm and the results indicate that there is no 
evidence for single respondents to mentioning disproportionately many antecedents.  
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 Furthermore, to facilitate the analysis and create an unambiguous understanding 
of these antecedents we assigned weights to each of the antecedents by calculating the 
relative importance of each antecedent by dividing the number of times that a specific 
antecedent was mentioned by the total number of antecedents mentioned. For example, 
RIWKHWRWDODQWHFHGHQWVPHQWLRQHGE\UHVSRQGHQWVWLPHVµJRYHUQPHQWVXEVLGLHV¶
was mentioned (by 6 different respondents). So, government subsidy has a relative 
importance of 4% (6/160) in the total data set. We calculated the relative importance 
of the antecedents for both the total data set and for each sector separately. The 
subsequent analysis rests on the 26 unique antecedents and their relative importance. 
7KHDQWHFHGHQWVPHQWLRQHGRQO\RQFHDUHSXWLQRQHFDWHJRU\µDOORWKHUV¶7KHWRWDls of 
the columns in Table 9.2 (p. 167) add up to 100%.  
 The last phase involved the identification of patterns in the data; i.e. in the list of 
antecedents to single out innovative capabilities. Qualitative inductive techniques were 
used to identify capabilities from the listed antecedents by focusing on those 
antecedents that combined DOWHU WKH ILUP¶V UHVRXUFH EDVH WR VXFK H[WHQW WKDW WKH\
generate organization-specific, value-creating strategies for innovation (chapter 3). 
Following Uzzi (1997) we did a finer analysis of these antecedents and identified five 
innovative capabilities; i.e. five constructs. The fit between these constructs involved 
the grouping of observations ± antecedents ± EDVHGRQD VHWRI DWWULEXWHV LH µILW DV
JHVWDOW¶ 9HQNDWUDPDQ 1989). An exploratory perspective ± inductive theorizing ± is 
necessarily less precise in specifying the functional form of fit, as argued by 
Venkatraman (1989). Similar to the inductive studies of Uzzi (1997) and Hendrischke 
& Krug (2008) and advocated by Maeki (1993) and Whitley (2007), the confrontation 
of the constructs with the theory is more useful than using formal statistical methods 
that reduce data to single isolated observations.  
 
9.3.2 Findings: antecedents and innovative capabilities in three software sectors 
Table 9.2 (next page) presents the importance of each antecedent and how they form 
the basis for a capability. The findings show that the importance of antecedents varies 
across the sectors. Firms in the standard software sector have the most varied set of 
antecedents. For instance, in-house training, communication with external experts, 
organizational reputation and first-to-market strategy. Middleware firms have a more 
external orientation. It is the ILUP¶V reputation in business community, first-to-market 
strategy, CEO personal network for sharing business information and founder 
experience that allows these firms to innovative. Enterprise software firms have an 
internal focus, combining on-the-job training, cooperation with customers for 
developing new ideas and commercializing university research. 
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Table 9.2: Antecedents and innovative capabilities of Chinese private software firms 
 Standard software Middleware 
Enterprise 
software 
Total 
(100%) 
Financial commitment      
private investment 9% 5% 6% 6% 
government subsidies 6% 2% 6% 4% 
venture capital investment 6% 2%  2% 
founder financial capital   3%  2% 
Total 21% 12% 12% 14% 
Organizational integration     
in-house training 3% 5% 12% 8% 
firm-specific technical expertise   3% 1% 
cross-functional expertise 3%  3% 2% 
committed employees  3% 1% 2% 
standardized work routines   3% 1% 
Total 6% 9% 22% 14% 
External knowledge transformation     
founder personal contacts sharing 
business information  14%  5% 
coordination within the local industry   7% 3% 
cooperation with customers  9%  13% 8% 
commercialization of university research   13% 6% 
coordination of technologies with firms 9% 7%  4% 
attracting new employees 9%  6% 4% 
research cooperation with university 9% 3%  3% 
experts outside the firm 3% 3% 1% 3% 
Total 39% 28% 41% 36% 
Reputation development     
standing in the local business community  9% 10% 7% 9% 
reputation for strong technology 6% 2% 1% 3% 
IRXQGHU¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULDOH[SHULHQFH  9% 3% 4% 
membership of industry association 3% 2%  1% 
Total 18% 22% 12% 17% 
Strategic flexibility     
first-to-market advantage 6% 12% 1% 6% 
adaptation to local business opportunities  3% 7%  3% 
imitation of foreign technology  5%  2% 
EHQFKPDUNLQJRWKHUILUPV¶RSHUDWLRQV   4% 2% 
acquisition of other firm for technology  3% 1% 2% 
Total 9% 24% 5% 15% 
All others 7% 5% 8% 4% 
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These antecedents of innovative activities provide the basis for understanding what 
kinds of capabilities are developed. Antecedents to innovative capabilities are those 
organizational processes that provide resources to the firm that can give a potential 
competitive advantage in successfully developing and commercializing new products 
and services. Antecedents are organizational processes that form the basis for 
innovative capabilities if they combine and deploy resources to generate value-
creating strategies and are able to span and support multiple lines of business.  
 Finer analysis show that we can single out five innovative capabilities: financial 
commitment, strategic flexibility, external knowledge transformation, reputation 
development and organizational integration. Financial commitment refers to the ability 
of a firm to commit internal and/or external sources of financial capital for a long-term 
investment to assure collective learning for innovation. Strategic flexibility refers to 
the ability that allows firms to change strategic directions quickly to adapt to economic 
and institutional changes. External knowledge transformation refers to the ability that 
allows the firm to develop, acquire, transform and share knowledge across firm 
boundaries. Reputation development refers to the ability that enables firms to pursue 
innovative goals by developing and HPSOR\LQJ µUHSXWDWLRQDO DVVHWV¶ LQ WKH PDUNHW
Organizational integration refers to the ability to commit employees to the firm and 
contribute their resources to engage in firm-specific learning.  
 It is worth stressing the significant role of external knowledge transformation 
(36%) as opposed to the other four capabilities (14-17%). This capability is important 
across the three sectors, whereas the other capabilities vary considerably in importance. 
For instance, the findings suggest that organizational integration is particularly 
important for enterprise software firms (22%) but significantly less so for standard 
software (6%) and middleware (9%) firms. Strategic flexibility on the other hand 
appears important for middleware firms (24%) but not so much for either standard 
software (9%) or enterprise software (5%) firms. Reputation development is most 
important for middleware (22%) and standard software (18%) firms. The findings 
show that financial commitment is important across sectors and most important for 
standard software firms (21% compared to 12%).  
 It is noteworthy that all five capabilities are important in all three sectors, even 
though the extent of important differs. In specific sectors specific capabilities 
dominate. Standard software firms appear to need financial commitment and external 
knowledge transformation capabilities; middleware firms need external knowledge 
transformation, reputation development and strategic flexibility capabilities; and 
enterprise software firms need organizational integration and external knowledge 
transformation capabilities. Before discussing each of the five innovative capabilities 
in more detail, it is useful to analyse the antecedents that were mentioned only once.  
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9.3.3 FLQGLQJVµDOORWKHUV¶ 
In total 37 unique antecedents were identified but 11 were only mentioned by one time 
µDOORWKHUV¶LQWDEOH2). Those eleven are excluded from the subsequent analysis. A 
closer look at these 11 antecedents suggests that they are random. The 11 antecedents 
range from topics related to strategy and external partners to work organization. Table 
9.3 presents the eleven antecedents that were mentioned only by one entrepreneur. 
However, when we look at what type of software entrepreneur mentioned the 
antecedents, a pattern emerges. The enterprise software entrepreneurs appear to show 
the most uncertainty when it comes to identifying factors for successful innovation, as 
7 of the 11 antecedents were mentioned by them. This evidence suggests that 
middleware and standard software entrepreneurs have a better understanding of what 
makes them successful innovators. The uncertainty of entrepreneurs notwithstanding, 
five capabilities stand out and deserve empirical scrutiny. 
 
Table 9.3 - Antecedent mentioned only once by Hangzhou software entrepreneurs 
Antecedent Sector  
Acquisition of customer base Middleware  
Personal partners for political information Middleware 
Risk diversification strategy Middleware 
Personal relation government Standard software 
Employees' foreign experience Enterprise software 
Stock listing Enterprise software 
Flexible work organization Enterprise software 
Imitation of domestic firm Enterprise software 
Standardized software platform Enterprise software 
Timing market entry  Enterprise software 
Work routines Enterprise software 
 
9.4 Five innovative capabilities: empirical results 
9.4.1 Financial commitment 
Financial commitment enables Chinese firms to fight off government controlled 
sources of finance. It is the ability of a firm to commit internal and/or external sources 
of financial capital for a long-term investment as to assure the collective learning 
necessary for innovation. The patterns in the data indicate the crucial role of diverse 
financial sources in different types of innovative ventures. Four antecedents - private 
investment, government subsidies, venture capital investment, founder financial 
capital - provide firms with financial resources that give a potential competitive 
advantage in successfully developing and commercializing new products and services. 
These antecedents matter in different degrees across the sector, as the frequency of 
mentioning by the entrepreneurs indicates (section 9.3.1). For instance, whereas 
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enterprise software firms tend to have private investment and government subsidies, 
YHQWXUHFDSLWDODQGIRXQGHU¶VLQLWLDOFDSLWDl are more important for middleware firms.  
 These four antecedents form the basis for an innovative capability as they reflect 
organizational processes that combine and deploy financial resources internal and 
external to the firm that allow committed investments in developing and 
commercializing new product and services. In other words, these four organizational 
SURFHVVHVDUHDQWHFHGHQWVWRWKHLQQRYDWLYHFDSDELOLW\µILQDQFLDOFRPPLWPHQW¶LHWKH
ability to commit internal and external resources to the development goals of the firm. 
Similar to the different extent of importance of the antecedents across the sectors, this 
capability matters to different degrees across the sectors. In total 14% of all 
antecedents are related to financial commitment; but especially important for standard 
software sector: 21% of all antecedents mentioned in that sector, compared to 12% in 
both other sectors. Unsurprisingly the standard software sector, characterised by 
radical, stand-alone innovations are in most need of capital. Enterprise software firms 
need fewer investments and can often draw on resources from the customer; whereas 
middleware firms have limited capital needs altogether.  
 Attracting capital becomes a firm specific capability because firms are small and 
require capital to grow. However, capital is not (yet) available on a capital market 
basis, as my findings in Chapter 6 suggest. Therefore, it is an important capability for 
these firms to be able to access capital. It is useful to distinguish two aspects of 
financial commitment: source and use. As discussed in Chapter 8, the main sources of 
finance are still government ± and private capital. Enterprise software firms receive 
the most government support in terms of subsidies and innovation funds. These firms, 
as shown in Chapter 8, pursue less radical innovations and carry fewer risks of 
technologies chosen. Moreover, the stable business relations with customers minimize 
the market risk. Therefore, it is not surprising that most government support will go to 
these relatively stable firms. The more risky type of investments ± such as VC and 
founder capital ± is found in middleware firms. These firms are willing to invest in 
risky ventures with higher risks of technologies and markets.  
 The availability of government funding depends on local government policies. In 
the current policy framework, innovation and software business have high priority 
(Chapter 6), which makes these government funds relatively attractive and stable. 
However, there is a real risk of changing policies, as the interviews suggest. The 
venture capital investments and personal investments depend on the availability of the 
ILUP¶VRZQUHVRXUFHVDQGRUSHUVRQDOQHWZRUNV WKDWFDQPRELOLVHILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV
These kinds of finance are generally morHYRODWLOHDQGUHTXLUHIUHTXHQWµUHODWLRQVKLS¶
maintenance, as suggested by the interviews. Summarizing, access to committed 
financial capital is a key capability. Access to government and personal capital sources 
is sought instead of capital market based finance. 
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9.4.2 Organizational integration 
Organizational integration in the Chinese context is a response to very specific human 
resource management problems: retaining and motivating employees. It is the ability 
to commit employees to the firm and contribute their resources to engage in firm-
specific learning. Firm-specific learning is collective and tacit on the basis of mutual 
interplay between partners. In this study, the organizational integration capability 
refers to collective coordination and learning. Five antecedents - in-house training, 
firm-specific technical expertise, cross-functional expertise, committed employees and 
standardized work routines - provide firms with skills, competences and committed 
employees that give a potential competitive advantage in successfully developing and 
commercializing new products and services. These antecedents matter in different 
degrees across the sector, as the frequency of mentioning by the entrepreneurs 
indicates (section 9.3.1). Whereas in-house training is crucial for most of the software 
firms, it is more important for enterprise software firms (12% versus 3% in standard 
software and 5% in middleware). Furthermore, enterprise software firms have a 
variety of organizational processes that relate to developing committed human 
resources, such as cross-functional expertise development and standardized work 
routines. The interviews suggest that standard software firms tend to focus more on 
developing expertise via training and cross-functional competences. Furthermore, 
middleware firms use training and committed employees to create a strong µVRFLDO¶
organizational culture.  
 These five antecedents form the basis for an innovative capability as they reflect 
organizational processes that combine and deploy human resources to the firm that 
commit employees to developing and commercializing new product and services. In 
other words, these five organizational processes are antecedents to the innovative 
FDSDELOLW\µRUJDQL]DWLRQDOLQWHJUDWLRQ¶LHthe ability to commit employees to the firm 
and contribute their resources to engage in firm-specific learning. Similar to the 
different extent of importance of the antecedents across the sectors, this capability 
matters to different degrees across the sectors. Over 14% of all antecedents are related 
to organizational integration. However they are especially important for the enterprise 
software sector (22%), compared to the standard (6%) ± and middleware sector (9%).  
 This capability is particularly important for developing incremental, systemic 
innovations, such as in the enterprise software sector. Considerable knowledge about 
the whole system is required before a part of the system can be innovated (chapters 2 
and 8). To that end a variety of knowledge, reflected in the employees, needs to be 
integrated and coordinated. Moreover, since enterprise software commonly is 
customer specific and customized, employees need to invest in accumulating firm-
specific skills. The more risky innovative standard software and middleware sectors 
appear to have less need for organizational integration. Innovation depends on variety 
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of knowledge sources which is facilitated by flexible and fluid human resource 
systems. Organizational integration then refers more to coordinating knowledge and 
skills of the employees with the firm-specific skills. 
 The importance of organizational integration as a capability for innovation 
directly flows from the need for internalizing external knowledge, as is the case in 
radical innovations, and/or collectivizing individual personal knowledge sources, as is 
the case in incremental, systemic innovations. In short, organizational integration as an 
innovative capability mostly functions as a coordination mechanism. For the more 
risky ventures this capability is necessary to absorb new technical and business 
NQRZOHGJHRUUHIHUVWRZKDW&RKHQDQG/HYLQWKDOQDPHGµDEVRUSWLYHFDSDFLW\¶
For the less risky, incrementally innovative ventures it is necessary to socialize and 
commit employees to invest in collective knowledge and learning. Summarizing, 
organizational integration is a firm-specific capability that focuses on coordination 
individual ± firm-specific skills.  
 
9.4.3 External knowledge transformation  
External knowledge transformation refers to the ability to import knowledge that is 
neither available in-house nor learned in the formal education system. It is the ability 
to develop, acquire, transform and share knowledge across firm boundaries. Eight 
antecedents - founder personal contacts sharing business information, coordination 
within the local industry, cooperation with customers, commercialization of university 
research, coordination of technologies with firms, attracting new employees, research 
cooperation with university, experts outside the firm - provide firms with technical and 
business knowledge resources that give a potential competitive advantage in 
successfully developing and commercializing new products and services. These 
antecedents matter in different degrees across the sector, as the frequency of 
mentioning by the entrepreneurs indicates (section 9.3.1). Some organizational 
processes are found exclusively in one sector, such as the role of personal contacts of 
the founder in providing business opportunity information for middleware firms (14% 
of middleware firms) and commercialization of university research in the enterprise 
software sector (13% of enterprise software firms). The interviews suggest that 
standard software firms have the most diverse set of organizational processes that 
mobilize knowledge resources across firm boundaries: cooperation with customers, 
commercialization of university research, coordination of technologies with firms, 
attracting new employees, research cooperation with university and hiring experts. 
 These eight antecedents form the basis for an innovative capability as they reflect 
organizational processes that combine and deploy knowledge resources external to the 
firm that bring knowledge resources to the firm that are necessary for developing and 
commercializing new product and services. In other words, these eight organizational 
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SURFHVVHV DUH DQWHFHGHQWV WR WKH LQQRYDWLYH FDSDELOLW\ µH[WHUQDO NQRZOHGJH
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ¶LHWKHDELOLW\WRto develop, acquire, transform and share knowledge 
across firm boundaries. In total 36% of all antecedents are related to external 
knowledge transformation, making it the most crucial capability. These results are not 
surprising and follow other research on Chinese ventures (e.g. Krug, 2004; Peng and 
Luo, 2000; Tsang, 1996; Wang, Lo and Yang, 2004; Van de Ven, 2004). However, 
ZKDW LV VXUSULVLQJ LV WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW DV DQ DFWRU LV µOHIW RXW¶ ,W DSSHDUV WKDW
QHWZRUNLQJ IRUNQRZOHGJH IROORZV µ:HVWHUQ¶ VW\OHQHWZRUNLQJ LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW LW LV
about technical and business knowledge. This is seen by the interviewees as a big 
advantage of this sector. Not only firms and sectors are emerging, also markets and 
government policy is emerging. There is not much experience from the political side, 
which translates into a lack of a bureaucracy that monitors and controls the sectors. On 
the other hand it is also clearly a response to limitations in factors markets, e.g. 
liability of newness (Krug and Polos, 2004). Chapter 6 and 8 have shown the status of 
the limited availability of the resources financial and human capital. 
 The findings suggest that this capability is crucial for all sectors but there are 
considerable differences in the type of knowledge (content), governance mode 
(mobilization / coordination) and level of formality. With respect to content, access to 
external knowledge can refer to both business knowledge (8%) and technological 
knowledge (28%). In the case of business knowledge (8%), this capability refers to the 
use of the personal network of the CEO to share business information. Business 
information here refers mostly to information about new opportunities, market 
knowledge and sharing of solutions to managerial problems. This capability allows 
coordination of resources ± knowledge ± and this is done in an informal way. 
Furthermore, it also refers to the coordination of work ± customer projects ± between 
local firms within the industry. This form of giving projects and recommendations of 
customers to other firms in the industry is also an informal way of resource sharing. 
 Access to technological knowledge (28%) is another activity that this capability 
allows for. There is a variety of activities: cooperation with customers for developing 
new ideas, coordination of technological development within the industry, 
commercialization of university research, recruitment of new talents, research 
cooperation with university to develop new technologies and communication and 
collaboration with external experts. The first two activities refer to coordination of 
resources, be it via informal or formal collaborations (20% of network antecedents). 
The latter four activities refer to the mobilization of resources, mostly in more formal 
ways (16% of network antecedents).  
 These different activities, in terms of governance, content and formality of 
sharing of resources, are used for different innovative activities. My findings suggest 
that standard software development ± radical, stand-alone innovation ± requires a 
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balanced use of variety of external sources, related to technical knowledge 
development and governed in both formal and informal ways. Middleware 
development ± radical, modular innovation ± on the other hand requires those 
activities that result in sharing of business knowledge, which is in line with the 
strategic flexibility capability that allows these firms to search for the right business 
model. Governance of such network assets is predominantly informal. Enterprise 
software development ± incremental, systemic innovation ± focuses on activities that 
enhance cooperation with customers, commercialization of university research and 
accumulation of technical knowledge. Governance of the cooperation is usually 
formalized in contracts as the projects are usually large and tightly connects the 
customer and the software firm in the software development process. 
 ,W¶VZRUWKQRWLQJ WKDW HQWHUSULVH VRIWZDUH ILUPV UHO\RQ IRUPDO QHWZRUNVZKLFK
are less flexible, more rigid but also more stable. Such stability would be an advantage 
in a stable institutional setting, but in this dynamic setting is likely to be a burden for 
learning and development, something that both standard software and middleware 
firms can do. One positive point is that enterprise firms, as do standard software firms, 
focus on building up technical knowledge, which could give them a competitive 
advantage in terms of technologies. Summarizing, external knowledge transformation 
enables firms to coordinate and mobilize external business ± and technical knowledge. 
 
9.4.4 Reputation development  
Reputation here refers to personal reputation as opposed to organizational reputation. 
It is the ability that enables firms to pursue innovative goals by developing and 
subsequently HPSOR\LQJµUHSXWDWLRQDODVVHWV¶LQWKHPDUNHW, i.e. creating visibility and 
credibility as a successful innovator. $ ILUP¶V UHSXWDWLRQ RIWHQ VXPPDUL]HV D ORW RI
information and shapes the ideas of customers, suppliers, partners and competitors. 
Four antecedents - standing in the local business community, reputation for strong 
WHFKQRORJ\IRXQGHU¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULDOH[SHUience, membership of industry association  
- provide firms with reputational resources that give a potential competitive advantage 
in successfully developing and commercializing new products and services. These 
antecedents matter in different degrees across the sector, as the frequency of 
mentioning by the entrepreneurs indicates (section 9.3.1). Whereas standing in the 
local business community is crucial across all sectors, a reputation for strong 
technological competences is more important for standard software firms (6% versus 
 LQ PLGGOHZDUH DQG  LQ HQWHUSULVH VRIWZDUH DQG WKH IRXQGHU¶V SHUVRQDO
reputation matters most for middleware firms (9% versus 3% in enterprise software.  
 These four antecedents form the basis for an innovative capability as they reflect 
organizational processes that combine and deploy reputation resources that increase 
visibility and credibility in developing and commercializing new product and services. 
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In other words, these four organizational processes are antecedents to the innovative 
FDSDELOLW\µUHSXWDWLRQGHYHORSPHQW¶LHability that enables firms to pursue innovative 
JRDOVE\GHYHORSLQJDQGVXEVHTXHQWO\HPSOR\LQJ µUHSXWDWLRQDODVVHWV¶ LQ WKHPDUNHW. 
Similar to the different extent of importance of the antecedents across the sectors, this 
capability matters to different degrees across the sectors. In total 17% of all 
antecedents are related to reputation, but it is more important for middleware firms 
(22%) and standard software firms (18%) than for enterprise software (12%). Standing 
in the business - RUWHFKQLFDOFRPPXQLW\DQGKDYLQJµUHSXWDWLRQDODVVHWV¶HQDEOHVILUPV
to achieve various goals, such as innovation, in the market, by identification of the 
YDOXH RI WKH ILUP¶V SUHYLRXV HIIRUWV E\ H[WHUQDO FRQVWLWXHQFLHV DQG via accumulated 
human ± and social capital in career histories. $IRXQGHU¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULDOH[SHULHQFH
plays a role in radically innovative ventures, such as in the middleware sector, than in 
moderately risky ventures, such as the enterprise software sector. In the latter, the 
collective reputation of the firm is more important.  
 The findings suggest that the firms get their reputation from individuals, either 
founder or employees, not from active reputation building activities, such as 
advertisements. This capability is strongly related to the other capabilities, as it for 
instance, enhances the chances to get access to (government and personal) finance and 
increases the likelihood of being a desired business partner. Moreover, it is a way to 
overcome liabilities of newness because it is easier to convince customers and 
VXSSOLHUV  EXVLQHVV SDUWQHUV RI WKH HQWHUSULVH¶V LQQRYDWLYH DELOLWLHV +DYLQJ D
reputation for being innovative thus reinforces the other innovative capabilities. 
Summarizing, the development of reputation based on individual or collective status is 
a key capability for innovation. 
 
9.4.5 Strategic flexibility 
Strategic flexibility refers to a long-term capability to secure a sustainable position in 
an environment of uncertainty. It is the ability to change strategic directions quickly to 
adapt to changing economic and institutional conditions. The key point is here that 
firms keep their options open given widespread uncertainty. This uncertainty arises 
from an emerging, unpredictable market, changing government regulations and 
JHQHUDO ODFN RI EXVLQHVV H[SHULHQFH RUJDQL]DWLRQDO µEOXHSULQWV¶ DQG FROOHFWLYH
memories in the business environment. The fact that these firms can keep their options 
open is a result of their relative freedom in Hangzhou which provides enough 
opportunities while the restrictions are not constraining, as shown in Chapter 8. 
 Five antecedents - first-to-market advantage, adaptation to local business 
RSSRUWXQLWLHVLPLWDWLRQRIIRUHLJQWHFKQRORJ\EHQFKPDUNLQJRWKHUILUPV¶ operations, 
acquisition of other firm for technology - provide firms with a flexibility of resources 
usage that gives a potential competitive advantage in successfully developing and 
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commercializing new products and services. These antecedents matter in different 
degrees across the sector, as the frequency of mentioning by the entrepreneurs 
indicates (section 9.3.1). Some organizational processes are found exclusively in one 
sector, such as imitation of foreign technology by middleware firms (5% of 
middleware firms) and benchmarking the operations of other local firms by enterprise 
software firms (4% of enterprise software firms). First-to-market advantages are  
found across all sectors but mostly in the middleware sector.  
 These five antecedents form the basis for an innovative capability as they reflect 
organizational processes that quickly combine and deploy a variety of resources 
internal and external to the firm that allow flexibility in developing and 
commercializing new product and services. In other words, these five organizational 
SURFHVVHV DUH DQWHFHGHQWV WR WKH LQQRYDWLYH FDSDELOLW\ µVWUDWHJLF IOH[LELOLW\¶ LH WKH
ability to change strategic directions quickly to adapt to changing economic and 
institutional conditions. Similar to the different extent of importance of the 
antecedents across the sectors, this capability matters to different degrees across the 
sectors. In total 15% of all antecedents are related to strategic flexibility, but especially 
important for middleware firms (24%) as compared to standard (9%) and enterprise 
software (5%). The patterns in our data show how business models reflect different 
strategic orientations for different technical fields or market considerations. Especially 
middleware firms appear to be flexible in their strategic choices, aiming to capture a 
part of the market as quickly as possible and learn skills from every source possible. 
Firms try to establish themselves in market niches and develop a core technology. 
Enterprise firms, on the other hand, focus mostly on learning from local customers and 
are flexible to the extent that they want to meet (changing) customer requirements. 
Standard software firms pursue flexible strategies that allow WKHP WR µMXPS¶ LQWR
opportunities and the firms in our sample behave rather opportunistically. Both the 
behaviour of enterprise software and standard software firms reflect short-term goals. 
Strategic flexibility enables firms to respond to opportunities in an emerging market. 
 These results are not surprising: middleware firms are the youngest, least 
experienced and most volatile firms in the three sectors. This sector did not develop 
really and the firms are still searching for the right way of doing business. The 
interviews suggest that there are high rates of founding and failure, even though we 
cannot confirm this with official statistics. Moreover, the key challenge for most 
middleware firms is to define their core business model. Furthermore, previous 
research on Chinese ventures suggested that private firms generally behave 
opportunistically and have a short-term focus. However, the interviews suggest that 
these firms are experimenting to find the right model and in that sense have a long-
term goal. To reach that goal, the strategy has to be flexible to quickly establish a 
customer base and develop and learn complicated new technologies, either via local 
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industry peers or imitation of foreign examples. Generally, short term flexible ± 
opportunistic - strategies are found in standard ± and enterprise software sectors, 
whereas the middleware firms have long term strategic goal. 
 
9.5 Discussion of the findings 
The empirical comparative case study of 45 software entrepreneurs in Hangzhou 
provides evidence for specific innovative capabilities across three distinct sectors. The 
findings point at five capabilities as particularly important for innovation: financial 
commitment, organizational integration, external knowledge transformation, 
reputation development and strategic flexibility. Table 9.4 shows the main findings. 
 
Table 9.4 ± Findings: Importance of innovative capabilities across software sectors* 
 Standard 
software 
Middleware Enterprise 
software 
Total 
Organizational integration 6% 9% 22% 14% 
Financial commitment 21% 12% 12% 14% 
External knowledge transformation 39% 28% 41% 36% 
Reputation development 18% 22% 12% 17% 
Strategic flexibility 9% 24% 5% 15% 
* The percentages per sector do not add up to 100% because the three sectors miss 7%, 
 DQG  UHVSHFWLYHO\ 7KHVHPLVVLQJ SHUFHQWDJHV UHIHU WR WKH µDOO RWKHU¶ FDWHJRU\ of 
antecedents mentioned only once that do not contribute to an innovative capability. 
 
It is useful to discuss the differences in importance of these capabilities. The 
percentages indicate relative importance, i.e. how important each competence is 
compared to the other capabilities. For instance, the findings indicate that external 
NQRZOHGJH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ  LV URXJKO\ WZR WLPHV PRUH LPSRUWDQW IRU ILUPV¶
innovation potential than the other individual capabilities (on average 15%). In 
essence this means that the ability of firms ± as measured by the antecedents named by 
the respondents ± to transform and use external knowledge is the most crucial 
competence. However, this competence is necessary but not sufficient, i.e. all five 
capabilities are needed for firms to innovate as my evidence suggests that all firms 
across the sectors have all these capabilities. The different levels of importance merely 
indicate how much effort ± for instance in terms of capital investment ± was given to 
the different capabilities for successful innovation. 
 It is worthwhile to point out that the extent to which these capabilities play a role 
varies across sectors. The relative importance of the capabilities varies across sectors. 
For instance, organizational integration is more important (22%) for enterprise 
software firms than for standard software firms (6%). Again, this indicates that firms 
in distinct sectors differentiate their efforts accordingly. These differences in level are 
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directly related to the technical and market characteristics and innovative patterns in 
the distinct sectors, as discussed in the previous part.  
 
9.5.1 Comparison of findings with literature 
Other studies suggest that financial commitment plays a role as a complementary 
resource (Teece, 1986) that enables the firm to profit from core knowledge (next to 
manufacturing, marketing and sales) or as a functional area resource that is relatively 
general in nature and can be applied in most markets (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). 
Lazonick (2004) distances himself from this position by emphasizing the crucial role 
RI ILQDQFLDO FRPPLWPHQW DV RQH RI WKH WKUHH µVRFLDO FRQGLWLRQV RI LQQRYDWLYH
HQWHUSULVH¶ 6HHLQJ LQQRYDWLRQ DV D FROOHFWLYH DQG FXPXODWLYH OHDUQLQJ process, he 
argues that investments in cumulative and collective learning require committed 
finance (Lazonick and West, 1995). This thesis suggest that financial commitment is 
neither a µFRPSOHPHQWDU\¶QRUDµJHQHUDOUHVRXUFH¶EXWRQHRIWKHQHFHVVDU\LQQRYDWLYH
capabilities for entrepreneurs in HangzhoX ,Q OLQH ZLWK /D]RQLFN¶V DUJXPHQW
Hangzhou software entrepreneurs need the commitment of internal or external sources 
of financial capital for a long term assurance of collective learning which is necessary 
for innovation. More generally, it makes sense for these software firms to put financial 
commitment centre stage in innovation development as they are small and have 
limited legitimacy in financial markets.  
 The literature attributes a variety of functions to organizational integration. 
Penrose (1959) already observed that people contribute labour services to their firm as 
WHDPVZKRHQJDJHLQOHDUQLQJDERXWKRZWRXVHWKHILUP¶V- and their own resources. 
Therefore, the willingness of groups of employees to commit themselves to the firm 
and engage in improving firm-specific knowledge determines to a considerable extent 
the development of distinct organizational capabilities (Whitley, 2003). The firm can 
EH UHJDUGHG DV D µFRPSHWHQW WHDP¶ (OLDVRQ ZKHUHPDQDJHUV FRRUGLQDWH DQG
integrate the activities inside the firm. The collective dimension in the theory of the 
firm can also be found in Kogut and Zander (1992) who argued that firms represent 
social knowledge of coordination and learning. In general, the literature agrees that 
organizational integration transforms individual capabilities into collective, firm-
specific skills. My results suggest that the crucial aspect of organizational integration 
LVWKHFRRUGLQDWLRQRIHPSOR\HHV¶LQGLYidual skills and firm-specific skills, as opposed 
to the transformation from individual to collective capabilities. This capability is a 
response to a China-specific constraint, namely how to retain and motivate employees 
to commit resources to the firm in an environment with high labour turnover, weakly 
developed labour markets and competence uncertainty.  
 Prior research on innovation has shown that linkages and collaboration networks 
are crucial for a firm in order to innovate (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; 
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Kogut, 2000). The reliance on external sources of knowledge is often considerable in 
newly emerging industries. The differences between types of partners, the extent of 
knowledge sharing and the extent of integration of information from diverse sources, 
affects how relationships are managed and what types of innovations they generate 
(Whitley, 2002). Especially the literature on inter-firm collaborations has detailed the 
various aspects of networks: structure and content (Adler and Kwon, 2002); 
governance (Grabher, 2004; Nooteboom, 2004); goals and intentions (Hendrischke, 
2004); and scope (Grabher, 2004). The findings in my study suggest that for the 
Chinese case, content, governance and extent of formalization are features that can 
distinguish different types of networks. Moreover, the findings suggest that networks 
themselves are not agents of economic activity. On the contrary, the network 
FDSDELOLW\ HQDEOHV D ILUP WR PRELOL]H DQG WUDQVIRUP UHVRXUFHV DFURVV WKH ILUP¶V
boundaries. These inter-firm connections have certain features, such as content, 
governance, formalization, that influence the governance of resources but by no means 
become agents. The firm remains the key agent that develops capabilities to reach a 
certain desirable goal. This capability is a response to China-specific constraints: 
limitation in factor market, more specifically, asymmetry in knowledge markets. 
 Prior research has shown that innovative or entrepreneurial prominence of firms 
can have several antecedents. On the one hand, reputation arises from the 
identification of the value of WKH ILUP¶V SUHYLRXV HIIRUWV E\ D UHSXWDWLRQ EXLOGLQJ
activities such as advertising and sponsorships (Fombrun, 1996). In a study of the auto 
industry Rao (1994) also found that highly visible events such as winning a quality 
FRQWHVW LPSURYHG ILUPV¶ UHSXWDWLRQ )XUWKHUPRUH UHSXWDWLRQ LV UHODWHG WR WKH ILUP¶V
position in the social structure (Podolny and Philips, 1996). My findings confirm that 
reputation is mostly related to the position of the firm - as a collection of individuals - 
in the wider business community. It is important to note the difference between 
reputation of the firm as a collective entity and the reputation of the founder. The 
importance of this capability makes sense as the firms are small and need to overcome 
legitimacy problems with suppliers and customers. Noteworthy is the fact that the 
capability refers to developing and employing reputation whereas the origin of 
UHSXWDWLRQLVWKHIRXQGHUDQGHPSOR\HHV¶SRVLWLRQLQbusiness communities. 
 Prior research has shown that firms in an environment with high competence 
destruction risks need to be able to change direction very quickly and destroy their 
capabilities in search for the dominant design (McKelvey, 1996). Firms typically 
innovate radically (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) and develop specialized 
complementary assets to mitigate the effects of competence destruction (Tripsas, 
1997). Teece et al. (1997) consider strategic reorientation as a choice among and 
commitment to long-term partners for trajectories of cumulative capability 
development. In contrast, strategic reorientation can also refer to radical strategic 
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shifts from one technology to another or one market to another, depending on the level 
RIILUP¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRLWVHPSOR\HHVDQGH[WHUQDOSDUWQHUVDVZHOODVWKHVSHFLDOLVHG
skills present within technical fields or sectors (Whitley, 2002). In the former, training 
and customer specific knowledge enhance firm-specific knowledge leading to less 
radical strategic shifts (Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1998), whereas as in the latter, 
hiring staff with new skills or acquiring firms with different technical specializations 
PD\LQYROYHUDGLFDOFKDQJHVLQWKHILUP¶VFDSDELOLWLHV=XFNHUDQG'DUE\ 
 The empirical findings suggest that strategic flexibility enables entrepreneurs to 
quickly respond to opportunities while developing a customer base and learning new 
technologies. This capability is crucial for young and small software firms. The more 
VR EHFDXVH &KLQD¶V EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW FUHDWHV RSSRUWXQLWLHV WKDW ILUPV QHHG WR
recognize but also restraints which firms need to overcome (cf. Chapters 2, 6, 8). A 
key difference with existing literature on strategic flexibility is that it is also about 
organizational changes, not necessarily technical changes. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
firms develop both organizational ± and/or technical innovations in response to a 
variety of constraints (Chapter 8).  
 At first sight strategic flexibility and organizational integration appear to be 
contradictory. However, enterprises exactly need both capabilities: On the one hand, 
strategic flexibility allows learning and acquiring new knowledge. On the other hand, 
given their inexperience, limited resources and lack of legitimation, these enterprises 
need to develop capabilities to internalize and collectivize this new knowledge and 
experience. The capability functions as an internal coordination mechanism. Therefore, 
there is a subtle balance and trade-off between flexibility and stability. Perhaps the 
EHVW DQDORJ\ LV 0DUFK¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ H[SORUDWive and exploitative activities. 
)ROORZLQJ1RRWHERRP¶VF\FOHRIH[SORLWDWLRQDQGH[SORUDWLRQHQWHUSULVHVQHHG
to search first for new knowledge, then consolidate this and generalize it within the 
enterprise boundaries to be able to exploit the new knowledge.  
 
9.5.2 Benchmarking the patterns with out-of-sample patterns 
It is worthwhile to compare the patterns of innovative capabilities in the sample to out-
of-sample examples of successfully innovating firms. The work of Lu (2000) and Lu 
and Lazonick (2004) on non-governmental computer firms Stone, Lenovo, Founder 
and Great Wall provides strong evidence for organizational integration and financial 
commitment as crucial capabilities, but less so for external knowledge transformation 
for successful innovation. This difference is explained by the fact that the key source 
of knowledge for these non-JRYHUQPHQWDOILUPVLVWKHVWDWH¶V6	7NQRZOHGJHEDVHWR
which they had unlimited access via their special governance mode with a 
collective/public nature as a result of their origins in the state socialist economy. The 
reputation benefits, exemplified by the ease with which they secured markets, are 
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considerable (Lazonick, 2007). Our private firms on the contrary have to focus on 
external knowledge transformation ± the inputs - LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI VXFK µKLGGHQ
VXEVLGLHV¶$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIUHSXWDWLRQWRVHFXUHQHZPDUNHWV± 
the outputs - then becomes a crucial capability.  
 It is also useful to compare our results with the successfully innovating Huawei, a 
privately established network solutions provider. The key capabilities of Huawei are 
found in the widespread cooperation with key industry players and major universities 
(cf. external knowledge transformation), their own R&D capacity and a strong 
organizational commitment (cf. organizational integration) via teamwork culture, 
bonus and stock options and on the job training (Lau et al., 2002). On a more general 
level, successful knowledge management, which is at the core of innovation, in large 
high-tech firms in China is facilitated by social capital and absorptive capacity (Lau et 
al., 2002). These successful large firms (Huawei, Founder, Lenovo, Stone, Great Wall 
and others) appear to exemplify the importance of external knowledge transformation, 
financial commitment and organizational integration. The importance of reputation 
development and strategic flexibility for the firms in our sample is necessarily related 
to size and experience. Whereas the large firms built upon their established reputation, 
smaller entrepreneurial firms need to build reputation and capture a market using 
strategic flexibility. In sum, benchmarking the pattern of innovative capabilities with 
out-of-sample examples strengthens the reliability of the findings. 
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Chapter 10 
 
Summary of findings and discussion 
 
10.1 Innovation in China: sectors, institutions, resources and capabilities 
This study started with the observation that Chinese entrepreneurs in IT sectors in 
coastal regions are not only able to survive but also to innRYDWHLQ&KLQD¶VWUDQVLWLRQ
economy. Businesses in transition economies face increased uncertainty, opportunism 
and search costs for critical resources and at the same time has reduced incentives for 
anything more than survival, such as innovation. The main question addressed in this 
thesis is: what kind of capabilities for innovation did domestic private entrepreneurs 
GHYHORS LQ &KLQD¶V XQFHUWDLQ WUDQVLWLRQ HFRQRP\" This thesis suggests that 
entrepreneurs developed a unique set of innovative capabilities to overcome resource 
constraints and manage technical and market risks while respecting institutional and 
sector-specific constraints. More precisely, the main thesis is that Chinese software 
entrepreneurs were able to transform external knowledge resources and integrate these 
in the firm while committing investors and employees in order to explore and exploit 
RSSRUWXQLWLHVGULYHQE\QHZWHFKQRORJLHVFXVWRPHUVDQGHQWHUSULVH¶VRZQLQLWLDWLYHV 
 This thesis centers on analysing how and why innovative capabilities are 
developed. Chapters 1 and 3 argued that innovative capability development depends 
on the 1) critical resources directly or indirectly available to the entrepreneur; 2) 
nature of the innovative activity pursued and 3) institutional arrangements in the 
business environment. Innovative capability development depends on the critical 
resources available to the firm while technological conditions affect the requirements 
of critical resources for innovation and institutional conditions affect the availability of 
critical resources. More precisely, firms face specific sectoral constraints ± 
competence destruction and appropriability risks ± in addition to specific institutional 
constraints ± lack of resources and uncertainty about the governance of resources.  
 Then, several goals are addressed by this thesis. The study starts with setting the 
institutional frame for innovation by analysing the features of the key institutions that 
govern and coordinate access and distribution for critical resources for the software 
sectors. Subsequently, the core of the study proceeds to analyse underlying firm-level 
mechanisms that explain the development of innovative capabilities of Chinese private 
entrepreneurs in that institutional frame. More specifically, the analysis aims to: (1) 
identify and explain innovative behaviour of Chinese private firms; (2) identify and 
analyse sectoral ± and institutional constraints on innovation and (3) analyse the 
development of innovative capabilities in response to those constraints.  
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 This thesis presents a detailed comparative analysis of distinct sectors in 
Hangzhou: enterprise software, standard software and middleware. These sectors are 
the three main software sectors in terms of type of software development. Moreover, 
they are sectors with distinct innovation patterns. This allows us to analyse and 
understand innovative capability development not only across the most important 
software sectors but also across different types of innovation. The sample consists of 
45 software enterprises in three distinct software sectors. Data were gathered mainly 
through intensive fieldwork in China. It consists of two long fieldtrips between 2005 
and 2007. The thesis relies on two data sets: in-depth interview data of 45 Chinese 
software ventures and archival data, including company websites and industry news 
triangulate data. This chapter will present a summary of the findings, contributions and 
explanatory power of the thesis. The four sub questions presented in the introduction 
are answered in the four groups of findings in sections 10.2-10.5. 
   
10.2 Findings I: Setting the institutional frame for innovation 
How do institutions govern and coordinate access and distribution of critical resources 
for innovation in the software sectors at the local level (first sub question)? The critical 
resources for successful innovation of private software entrepreneurs (SMEs) are 
capital, labour and knowledge (see Chapters 2 and 3). We can usefully distinguish the 
institutions that govern capital, labour and knowledge as the key institutions for 
understanding innovative capability development in the software sectors: role of the 
state, skill development and formal education system, and the financial system (role of 
private and foreign capital). Before turning to the local level and the features of 
+DQJ]KRX¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVwe will present the general institutional conditions in which 
IT sectors and software sectors in specific have developed in China (Chapter 2). 
 
10.2.1 General institutional frame 
The analysis shows that during the past three decades resources were created and 
PRELOL]HGWKDWIDFLOLWDWHGWKHJURZWKRI&KLQD¶V,7LQGXVWULHVLQJHQHUDODQGVRIWZDUH
in particular. Economic considerations play a more significant role than political 
considerations in increasing private and foreign investments, developing human 
capital and promoting entrepreneurship. Therefore, we can no longer assume 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOWUDQVLWLRQWREHGULYHQE\H[RJHQRXVIDFWRUVVXFKDVµWKHVWDWH¶RUµIRUHLJQ
FDSLWDO¶ 2Q WKH FRQWUDU\ LQVtitutions transform as a result of the interplay between 
endogenous and exogenous factors. These factors at a national aggregate level include 
a redirection of resources and production from state socialist economic agents to 
private domestic and foreign enterprises.  
 First, an increase in foreign investment inflow, a growing ± although still very 
limited ± venture capital market and an increase in private savings as a result of 
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deregulation of foreign and capital policy have boosted investment and competition. 
6HFRQG XSJUDGH RI &KLQD¶V KXPDQ FDSLWDO EDVH WKURXJK D WKRURXJK UHIRUP RI WKH
formal educational system and increased emphasis on on-the-job training in 
combination with imported foreign expertise. Third, promotion and facilitation of 
private entrepreneurship, especially in new high-tech industries. In short, China no 
longer follows a central plan or strong political considerations in distributing and 
coordinating access to resources but a combination of economic and political 
considerations. &KLQD¶V state-controlled reform agenda involved decentralization of 
decision making power and resources to local business communities and - 
governments. The consequences of such transformation cannot be assumed to be 
similar across China. What are the findings for +DQJ]KRX¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW" 
 
Proposition 1: China no longer follows a politically determined plan for distributing 
and coordinating resources. Instead, economic development reflects a combination of 
economic and political considerations. 
 
10.2.2 +DQJ]KRX¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW 
The findings in Chapter 6 show that Hangzhou has developed a distinct local business 
V\VWHPLQ&KLQD¶VQDWLRQDOHFRQRP\)LUVWWKHORFDOJRYHUQPHQWLQ+DQJ]KRXSOD\VD
µEHKLQGWKHVFHQHV¶UROH7KHGRPLQDQWFRQFHSWLRn of the state as a dominant agent in 
China needs to be modified, since the case of Hangzhou suggests that the state allows 
market forces to shape local economic development. The only significant exception is 
the establishment of technology zones which function as institutional mechanisms to 
facilitate the development of high-tech industries for instance via tax reductions and 
provision of telecommunications infrastructure. Following a policy of laissez-faire, the 
local business community dominated by private entrepreneurs flourishes. 
 Second, the findings with respect to skill development in Hangzhou show that 
there are elite universities, good monetary incentives for IT jobs and increased 
professional skills training organized by companies. Zhejiang University belongs to 
the top universities in China and provides the local business environment with a large 
pool of talented employees. Therefore, relatively strong and rich local labour resources 
facilitate human resource development in firms. However WKHUH¶V low geographic 
mobility and high workplace mobility that makes it difficult for employers to commit 
employees to their firm. There is a general scarcity in competences and a weak labor 
market that is inefficient in connecting firms and (potential) employees. A lack of 
coordination via agencies or the local government and the prevalence of informal 
agreements and networks make the labour market ineffective. In fact, the labour 
market is de facto deregulated, competitive and fluid within the borders of Zhejiang 
province.  
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 Third, the financial system is highly biased towards private capital and foreign 
investments. Increased private savings and (foreign) investments in tertiary industries 
provide opportunities while at the same time creating strong competition for private - 
and foreign capital. A low availability of bank loans and ineffective venture capital 
markets limit the efficiency of allocation of capital via the formal financial market. 
Whereas the formal financial markets are highly regulated in Hangzhou, the informal 
markets are not transparent and lack regulations that formally coordinate transactions.  
 
It is striking to find a local business system within the one-party state of China that is 
characterised by high market competition, a non-intervening local government and a 
focus on innovation and entrepreneurship. Using common definitions of capitalism 
DQG PDUNHW HFRQRP\ +DQJ]KRX¶V EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW ZRXOG PHHW PRVW RI WKH
criteria. Private firms are the dominant form of ownership and the service-oriented 
WHUWLDU\LQGXVWULHVDUHIORXULVKLQJDVRSSRVHGWR WUDGLWLRQDOLQGXVWULHV7KHVHµPDUNHW-
OLNH¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DUH HYHQ PRUH HYLGHQW LQ WKH KLJK ZRUkplace mobility of 
employees, strong monetary incentives for high-tech jobs, the presence of an elite 
university and domestic and foreign R&D institutes. TKLV µV\VWHP¶ LV RSHUDWLQJ
without bank loans and stock listings, a labour markets resting on informal networks, 
high labour turnover and uncertainty with respect to the capabilities of employees. 
 ThesH IHDWXUHV RI+DQJ]KRX¶V ORFDOEXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW DUH QRW QHZwe find 
strong evidence for path dependency at the local level. First, the role of the local 
government has historically been behind the scenes due to a large extent of local 
autonomy and a strong local business community. Next, private capital and 
entrepreneurship have played a significant role, even during the high-times of 
FRPPXQLVP1H[W+DQJ]KRX¶VORFDOHFRQRP\KDVEHHQLQWHJUDWHGLQJOREDOPDUNHWV
via overseas entrepreneurs, less due to its natural position.  
 
Proposition 2: Hangzhou¶V business environment, despite being part of the one-party 
state of China, is characterised by intense competition, non-intervening local 
government and focus on innovation and entrepreneurship, indicating a capitalist 
business environment. 
 
3URSRVLWLRQ  7KH GHYHORSPHQW RI +DQJ]KRX¶V EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW shows path 
dependency at the local government level. 
  
10.3 Findings II: Innovation in three Chinese software sectors 
What kind of innovative behavior do Chinese software entrepreneurs show (sub 
question 2)? One of the most significant findings is that Chinese software 
entrepreneurs are innovative. The findings show that Chinese entrepreneurs do not 
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only innovate incrementally, making small modifications, but also develop radical 
innovations. Moreover, radical innovation is found both in stand-alone settings and 
within modular systems. This suggests that innovation in Hangzhou is not limited to 
certain types of innovation but shows strong variety, even within one industry. We 
also identified distinct innovations patterns: Innovation in the enterprise software 
sector is customer-driven product innovation. Innovation in the standard software is 
technology-driven product innovation. It is noteworthy that product innovations in the 
enterprise software sector were exclusively customer-driven; suggesting that the same 
type of innovation can have a different drivers. Innovation in the middleware sector is 
mostly enterprise-driven business model innovation. Business model innovations in 
this sector are driven by enterprise, in-house initiatives, cf. standard software firms. 
 The Chinese software entrepreneurs remind us of 3 things. First, innovation is not 
necessarily technical innovation. These entrepreneurs do not limit innovation to 
technical innovation but also include organizational innovation. About half of the 
innovations are in market and business model as opposed to exclusively innovating 
processes or products. Second, innovation is not restricted to environments with a 
strong protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). Organizational innovation or the 
interplay between technical and organizational innovation provide alternatives to 
VHFXUH DSSURSULDELOLW\ 7KLUG WKH HPHUJLQJ QDWXUH RI +DQJ]KRX¶V VRIWZDUH market 
gives leeway for experimentation. The data supports this claim as almost half of the 
drivers for innovation are novel ideas from the firms as opposed to responses or 
changes in technologies or customer demands. Moreover, many innovations are 
responses to incentives set by institutional factors such as information asymmetry in 
the market and deregulation of financial markets. Hangzhou appears to provide 
incentives for creative behaviour of firms. 
 
Proposition 4: Chinese entrepreneurship reveals a type of innovation that is not only 
technical innovation, but also includes organizational innovation. 
 
Proposition 5: Successful innovation is not restricted to environments with a strong 
protection of intellectual property rights.  
 
As will be shown in what IROORZV +DQJ]KRX¶V EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW SURYLGHV D
breeding ground for creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship and facilitates the 
development of innovative capabilities. 
 
10.4 Findings III: Sectoral and institutional constraints on innovation 
What kind of sectoral and institutional constraints influence the development of 
innovative capabilities by Chinese software entrepreneurs (sub question 3)? As 
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discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on technological regimes and innovation systems 
shows that sector with distinct technologies carry specific technical and market risks. 
In Chapter 8 I distinguished two types of risks that are related to the technical and 
market characteristics of innovative activities: appropriability risk and competence 
destruction. The data in my sample confirm that different sectors carry distinct risks. It 
is useful to summarize the main sectoral constraints for the software entrepreneurs. 
 Entrepreneurs in the enterprise software sector face low competence destruction 
risks because there are high levels of customization of products. Moreover, enterprise 
software firms follow foreign trends and technologies that have been proven to be 
useful and successful for certain software developments. However, the sector has high 
appropriability risks due to intense competition but also due to weak IPRs and mostly 
local domestic competition. Entrepreneurs in the standard software sector face high 
competence destruction risks due to technical uncertainty but also due to unfamiliarity 
with market requirements. Firms have low appropriability risks because of the 
technical complexity of their products but are also limitedly constrained by weak IPRs. 
Entrepreneurs in the middleware sector face high competence destruction risks as a 
result of uncertainty about standard setting by the government. Middleware firms have 
low appropriability risks due to complex technology but also face limited constrains 
from weak IPRs. They innovate radically in business model, while often employing 
simple, existing technologies (usually developed in the US). 
 
To what extent does the institutional environment play a role in the development of 
innovation across sectors? In Chapters 3 and 7 we argued that private entrepreneurs 
have to compensate the underinvestment in labour, capital and knowledge resources in 
Hangzhou while fighting off the uncertainty of the governance of the existing 
resources. In this study we presented a detailed firm-level analysis of the effects of 
these institutional constraints for entrepreneurs. The findings show that constraints 
caused by underinvestment in resources and the uncertainty of their governance for 
private entrepreneurs are different across software sectors in Hangzhou. It is useful to 
summarize the main institutional constraints across sectors.  
 Entrepreneurs in the enterprise software sector face high institutional uncertainty 
because a) they are affected by changing local policies, b) have a political risk as many 
customers are government departments and agencies and c) current foreign policy 
facilitates foreign enterprise software firms at the cost of local firms. Moreover, these 
firms are considerably constrained in their use of labour and knowledge resources: 
they face scarcity of skilled employees, competence uncertainty and a lack of market 
knowledge. Next to that, firms face coordination uncertainty; i.e. considerable 
asymmetric information in the market, where government agencies (capital), business 
(knowledge and labour) and universities (labour, knowledge) all have parts of 
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information and provide partial access to key resources. Enterprise software firms face 
low constraints of limited financial capital availability. Firms have generally low 
requirements for financial resources as technological development carries relatively 
limited financial risks. Moreover, firms receive considerable support from the local 
government in terms of subsidies for office, equipment and tax reductions.  
 Entrepreneurs in the standard software sector are highly constrained in their use 
of knowledge resources. The firms lack marketing skills, especially, the management 
and use of brands. The sector in general is too young and dynamic to have built up a 
collective memory and knowledge of markets, technologies and management 
necessary for the usually complex technologies of standard software development. 
Moreover, these firms face considerable constraints with respect to labour and capital 
resources. The firms have a relatively low legitimacy in labour markets and face a 
scarcity of technical employees. Furthermore, a lack of legitimacy in financial markets 
plays a role because new, inexperienced firms have trouble getting investments. 
Considering the relatively underdeveloped formal financial market (Chapter 6), 
legitimacy is important to attract private or foreign capital. Lastly, these entrepreneurs 
also face considerable risks of institutional uncertainty. There is uncertainty about how 
government agencies will respond to the expected increase in competition from both 
domestic firms and foreign firms. Furthermore, local preferential policies often are not 
implemented to their full purpose and in contrast to promoting innovation, they 
promote homogeneity in products and development processes. 
 Entrepreneurs in the middleware sector face only limited constraints with respect 
to the access and use of critical resources. The interviews suggest that labour mobility 
in the middleware sector is efficiently coordinated via informal ± personal ± labour 
markets, as opposed to formal labour markets with labour agencies and standardized 
capabilities. However, it has to be noted that consistent with the other sectors, there is 
a scarcity of technical employees. With respect to capital resources, there is a 
relatively low need of financial capital for middleware developPHQW DQG WKHUH¶V DQ
abundance of personal capital which meets their limited capital requirements. 
Middleware firms also have limited constraints of underinvestment in knowledge. 
Firms tend to collectively follow international standards and technical developments. 
The adaptation of foreign technology with the use of R&D partnerships with 
universities provides the firms with enough technical resources. The middleware firms 
seem to draw on collective local knowledge of the local business environment to adapt 
technologies and commercialize these successfully. With respect to institutional 
uncertainty, little state interference, newness and incapability of the government 
apparatus to follow advanced technological changes limit the institutional constraints. 
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These findings suggest that the constraints for private agents caused by institutional 
transformation are not similar across sectors. In particular, the underinvestment and 
governance problems have different consequences for distinct sectors. Institutional 
constraints appear not only to constrain the development of competence enhancing 
strategies ± such as in the enterprise software sector ± but also the development of 
particular competence destroying strategies ± such as in the standard software sector 
by increasing competence destruction and appropriability risks. However, innovative 
activities of middleware firms do not appear to be constrained by lack of resources or 
institutional uncertainty. This suggests that institutional constraints are not always 
constraints as such. Considering these different effects, we can no longer assume that 
institutional constraints are similar across sectors because resource and governance 
UHTXLUHPHQWV GLIIHU DFURVV VHFWRUV 7KLV OHDGV XV WR UHFRQVLGHU WKH HIIHFWV RI µZHDN¶
institutions across diverse sectors and localities in China. 
 
Proposition 7: Institutional constraints have different consequences in different 
sectors.  
 
Proposition 8: Institutional constraints set incentives for the development of 
innovation and entrepreneurship. 
 
10.5 Findings IV: Capabilities and institutions 
10.5.1 Capabilities for innovation in Hangzhou 
What kind of innovative capabilities are developed by Chinese software entrepreneurs 
in response to sectoral and institutional constraints (sub question 4)? The findings 
show that Chinese private software entrepreneurs have developed five specific 
innovative capabilities: organizational integration, financial commitment, external 
knowledge transformation, reputation development and strategic flexibility. 
Organizational integration refers to the ability to commit employees to the firm and 
contribute their resources to engage in firm-specific learning. Financial commitment 
refers to the ability of a firm to commit internal and/or external sources of financial 
capital for investment as to assure the collective learning necessary for innovation. 
External knowledge transformation refers to the ability that allows the firm to acquire 
and transform knowledge across firm boundaries. Reputation development refers to 
the ability that enables firms to pursue innovative goals by developing and 
VXEVHTXHQWO\HPSOR\LQJµUHSXWDWLRQDODVVHWV¶LQWKHPDUNHWStrategic flexibility refers 
to the ability that allows firms to change strategic directions quickly to adapt to 
changing economic and institutional changes. These innovative capabilities reflect 
firm-specific abilities to integrate, build and transform internal and external resources. 
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 How are these five capabilities related to each other to form distinct 
configurations? The five capabilities do not represent different components, but form a 
µFRQILJXUDWLRQ¶ RI FDSDELOLWLHV LQ WKLV SDUWLFXODU LQVWLWXWLRQDO VHWWLQJ LH DOO ILYH DUH
necessary for innovation. The connection between the capabilities is that they provide, 
mobilize, transform and combine critical resources for innovation in response to 
UHVRXUFH FRQVWUDLQWV LQ +DQJ]KRX¶V EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW :KHUHDV HDFK FDSDELOity 
forms a necessary condition, separately they are not sufficient to assure the successful 
development and commercialization of new products and services. Therefore, it is the 
combination of these five capabilities that forms a sufficient and necessary condition 
for innovation. This thesis directly follows the empirical result that indeed these five 
capabilities are found across the three sectors in Hangzhou. In other words, the 
entrepreneurs mentioned these specific organizational processes to be crucial for 
innovation in their firms. Moreover, the direct link to resource mobilization connects 
the financial commitment, organizational integration and external knowledge 
transformation capabilities, while reputation development can be understood as an 
underlying organizational process that facilitates and supports the development each of 
these three capabilities. Reputation development is a crucial capability for mobilizing 
capital, labour and knowledge resources. Each of these capabilities is connected to the 
strategic flexibility capability because it is the flexible use of capital, labour and 
knowledge resources that allow the firm to explore innovative opportunities in 
+DQJ]KRX¶V EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW 7KHUHIRUH ZLWKRXW WKH IOH[LELOLW\ RI VWUDWHJLF
directions, firms cannot exploit their other capabilities to the fullest extent. In sum, 
each innovative capability reinforces the other while simultaneously depending on the 
support of the others. 
 However, different kinds of innovations do require different sets of capabilities. A 
different set of capabilities here means that even though all capabilities are necessary, 
the extent to which they are important varies for different kinds of innovations. The 
comparison across the three software sectors does not only allow us to see capability 
development in the main sectors of software development but also ± as indicated in 
Chapter 2 ± allow us to compare distinct types of innovation in relation to capability 
development. Specifically, we can compare three types of innovation, represented by 
the three software sectors, to show that different types of innovation require different 
configurations of capabilities. The dominant pattern of innovation in the standard 
software sector is radical product innovation. The findings suggest that this type of 
innovation required financial commitment, external knowledge transformation and 
reputation development as the most important capabilities. The dominant pattern of 
innovation in the middleware sector is radical business model innovation and required 
external knowledge transformation, reputation development and strategic flexibility as 
capabilities. The dominant pattern of innovation in the enterprise software sector is 
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incremental product innovation and required organizational integration and external 
knowledge transformation as most important capabilities. 
  
Which sectoral conditions determine how important each capability is and which 
institutional conditions set the range of potential capabilities? The comparison of the 
three distinct sectors allows us to connect sectoral conditions to capability 
development. Sectoral conditions determine how important each capability is. We 
have seen that there are two sectoral conditions that shape innovative capabilities: 
competence destruction risk and appropriability risk. The first is assessed by 
uncertainty of market acceptance and uncertainty of investments in technology, while 
the latter is assessed by the risk of imitation. These conditions provide restrictions on 
the development of capabilities. In our study we find that in a sector ± enterprise 
software -with low competence destruction risks and high appropriability risks, the 
role of the organizational integration capability is crucial. In sectors with high 
competence destruction risks, such as middleware and standard software, the role of 
financial commitment (in the standard software sector) and the roles of reputation 
development and strategic flexibility (in the middleware sector) are more important. 
Interestingly, regardless of distinct sectoral conditions, the external knowledge 
transformation capability is crucial in all three software sectors. This suggests that this 
capability is a response to a more important set of conditions, institutional conditions.  
 Institutional conditions affect the range of potential capabilities. More specifically, 
the specific institutional constraints ± on capital, labour and knowledge resources ± in 
+DQJ]KRX¶VEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWUHTXLUHDVSHFLILFVHWRIFDSDELOLWLHV,QRWKHUZRUGV
capabilities need to overcome these institutional constraints. Entrepreneurs in the 
enterprise software sector relied on committing employees to developing firm-specific 
FDSDELOLWLHVDQGLQWHJUDWLQJH[WHUQDONQRZOHGJHLQWRWKHILUP¶VERXQGDULHVLQRUGHUWR
offset the underinvestment of knowledge and labour resources, while mitigating 
institutional ± political ± risks by developing a strong reputation in the local business 
environment. Entrepreneurs in the standard software sector relied on accessing and 
transforming external knowledge and committing investors while pursuing a flexible 
strategy in order to exploit opportunities and offset the underinvestment of knowledge, 
capital and labour resources. Entrepreneurs in the middleware sector relied on strategic 
flexibility, external knowledge transformation and strong reputation as innovators to 
reap the full benefits from an environment of opportunities, lack of constraining 
regulations and exploit competitive advantages relative to other sectors as a result of 
low capital and knowledge needs. 
 How do these sectoral and institutional conditions interact? The interaction 
between the institutional and sectoral conditions can directly be observed in the 
empirical findings. Whereas the institutional conditions very clearly set the range of 
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capabilities, sectoral conditions affect the extent to which these capabilities matter for 
innovation. All five capabilities are important for developing innovations across 
sectors to the effect that these five capabilities are credibly developed within this local 
institutional regime. Moreover, the institutional regime appears to shape innovative 
capability development to a large extent because even across sectors where 
technological and market characteristics are substantially different - and the 
requirements for innovative activities are distinct - we find the same five innovative 
capabilities. These findings support and qualify the roles of technological - and 
institutional regimes. The sectoral conditions determine how important each capability 
is whereas institutional conditions set the range of potential capabilities. Considering 
the link between institutions and capabilities, it is useful to explore in more detail their 
connections between. 
 
Proposition 9: The successful development of innovation is based on the singling out 
of critical resources, such as human, financial and knowledge resources.  
 
Proposition 10: Innovative capabilities are developed for re-configuring critical 
resources in response to changing institutional and sectoral conditions. 
 
Proposition 11: Institutional conditions define the range of credibly developed 
capabilities. Sectoral conditions affect the extent to which these capabilities influence 
particular kinds of innovation. 
 
10.5.2 Capabilities and institutional arrangements in Hangzhou 
A crucial question then is why these five capabilities could be credibly developed in 
+DQJ]KRX¶V EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW :KLFK IHDWXUHV RI +DQJ]KRX¶V EXVLQHVV
environment necessitate and/or allow these capabilities to be developed? The findings 
in Chapter 9 already indicated several connections between capabilities and 
institutions. More precisely, the interviews and data suggest that a specific capability, 
for instance, reputation development, is developed in response to specific institutional 
constraints, for instance, lack of collective market knowledge. To go one step further, 
we can combine the findings from Chapter 6, RQ+DQJ]KRX¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW, 
with those from Chapter 8, institutional constraints, and Chapter 9, innovative 
capabilities, to identify several connections between capabilities and specific 
institutional features in Hangzhou (Table 10.1).  
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Table 10.1 - Connections between capabilities and institutional features in Hangzhou 
Capabilities ,QUHVSRQVHWRLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQGLWLRQV« 
Organizational 
integration: 
x Incomplete labour markets: recruiting and retaining employees 
x general scarcity in competences 
x limited by increased professional skills training 
x weak IPRs: need to build strong organization specific advantages 
x high workplace mobility 
Financial 
commitment: 
x Weak venture capital and banking market 
x Financial system biased towards private and foreign investments 
x Emerging sectors with need for capital, especially for labour costs 
x Preferential policies, government subsidization and tax benefits 
x Strong competition for private and foreign capital 
External 
knowledge 
transformation: 
x Lack of market know how, especially finding customers 
x Limited accumulated knowledge, need for external sources 
x Inexpensive way of learning: elite universities, talents 
x Emerging sector with new technologies and knowledge 
x technology zones and parks 
x Lack of government intervention: knowledge instead of influence 
Reputation 
development: 
x lack of market knowledge, so larger role for reputation 
x LQGLYLGXDOH[SHULHQFHDYDOXDEOHDVVHWJLYHQWKHµQHZQHVV¶ 
x organizational reputation necessary for getting finance, labour and 
knowledge in relatively incomplete labour and financial markets 
Flexible 
strategy: 
x many opportunities in an emerging market 
x lack of established business practices 
x changing (institutional) rules, need to be adaptive  
x weak IPRs, swiftness and first-to-market advantages are significant 
 
+DQJ]KRX¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO FRQGLWLRQV IDFLOLWDWH WKH FUHGLEOH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKHVH ILYH
FDSDELOLWLHV7KHILQGLQJVLQGLFDWHWKDWLQIDFW+DQJ]KRX¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVSURYLGHHQRXJK
capital, labour and knowledge resources, i.e. sufficient available resources at the local 
level. In Chapter 6 we saw that Hangzhou has elite universities, relatively strong and 
rich local labour resources, presence of domestic and foreign R&D institutions, 
professional skills trainings and high availability of private capital and foreign 
investments. However, the mechanisms that link these resources to the software 
entrepreneurs are incomplete and ambiguous. Evidence from Chapters  6 and 8 shows 
that the labor market is inefficient because it lacks coordination via agencies or local 
government, the prevalence of informal agreements and networks, high labour 
turnover and uncertainty with respect to the capabilities of employees. Furthermore, 
there is considerable asymmetric information in the market, where government 
agencies (capital), business (knowledge and labour) and universities (labour, 
knowledge) all have parts of information and provide partial access to key resources, 
i.e. resource coordination uncertainty. Moreover, private entrepreneurs face relatively 
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low legitimacy in labour and capital markets dominated by state owned firms and 
foreign firms. The influence of the local government on the local economy is limited 
and has not resulted (yet) in stable formal institutional conditions that coordinate the 
markets for resources.  
 ,QUHVSRQVHWRWKHVHµPLVVLQJOLQNV¶ILUPVGHYHORSFDSDELOLWLHVWRDFWDVIXQFWLRQDO
HTXLYDOHQWVRIVXFKPHFKDQLVPV$FDSDELOLW\µWDNHVRYHU¶WKHIXQFWLRQRIFRQQHFWLQJ
and coordinating resources, a function that is reserved for institutions in stable 
developed economies. This finding fits our definition of capabilities as they integrate, 
build and transform internal and external resources, i.e. a strong coordination element 
in the definition. It is useful to explore these connections in more detail.  
 
The organizational integration capability is a response to institutional conditions that 
lower the commitment of employees and reduce the motivation to develop firm-
specific competences. For instance, uncertain recruitment, high turnover of employees 
and high workplace mobility lower organizational commitment. Furthermore, limited 
professional skills, scarcity of general competences and a business environment with a 
low protection for specific investments reduce the motivation to develop firm-specific 
competences. The organizational integration capability lowers these constraints as it 
commits employees to the firm and contribute their resources to engage in firm-
specific learning.  
 The financial commitment capability is a response to institutional conditions that 
create emerging incomplete and biased financial markets. For instance, weak venture 
capital and formal banking markets, emerging sectors with high need for capital, 
preferential policies, government subsidization and tax benefits that create an 
incomplete market. Furthermore, the financial system is biased towards private capital 
and foreign investment and therefore has strong competition for private and foreign 
capital. The financial commitment capability lowers these constraints as it commits 
internal and/or external sources of financial capital for investment as to assure the 
collective learning necessary for innovation.  
 The external knowledge transformation capability is a response to institutional 
conditions that create underinvestment in technical and market knowledge. For 
instance, lack of market know how, especially finding customers (business 
knowledge), limited accumulated knowledge and emerging sector with new 
technologies and knowledge. The external knowledge transformation capability then 
lowers these constraints as it allows the firm to acquire and transform knowledge 
across firm boundaries. The external knowledge transformation offsets the 
underinvestment in technical and market knowledge by learning from domestic and 
foreign companies or commercialize university research findings.  
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 The reputation development capability is a response to institutional conditions 
that created low legitimacy for software entrepreneurs in local labour and financial 
markets. The reputation development capability then lowers these constraints as it 
enables firms to pursue innovative goals by developing and subsequently employing 
µUHSXWDWLRQDODVVHWV¶LQWKHPDUNHW 
 The strategic flexibility capability is a response to institutional conditions that fail 
to coordinate an emerging sector with ambiguous rules and regulations and fast 
technical and market changes. For instance, lack of established business practices, 
changing policies, weak protection of investments in stable and long term skills and 
capabilities. The strategic flexibility capability lowers these constraints as it allows 
firms to change strategic directions to adapt to changing economic and institutional 
changes.  
 In sum, these five capabilities are credibly and likely to be developed in this 
particular institutional environment. The findings add insights into the connection 
between innovative capabilities and institutional conditions. 
 
Proposition 12: Innovative capabilities are complementary to those institutions that 
govern and coordinate critical resources. 
 
10.6 A new Chinese model of private-sector driven innovation? 
How does this analysis change our ideas about innovation in a Chinese context? It is 
XVHIXOWRVXPPDUL]HWKHµVWDQGDUGPRGHO¶RI the origins of innovativeness within the 
Chinese context. Previous research mostly stays at the national level, indicating the 
various weaknesses in institutional mechanisms to mobilize critical resources for 
innovation (Liu and White, 2001; OECD, 2007). In Chapters 1 and 3 we have seen 
WKDW &KLQD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO WUDQVLWLRQ OHDYHV firms with a lack of resources, missing 
property rights for resources and an uncertain governance of those resources. As such, 
firms in transition economies face increased uncertainty, opportunism and higher 
search costs for resources (Roth and Kostova, 2003; Peng, 2003; Stark, 2001). Why 
we find innovation in such a context is usually explained by macro-economic 
development such as international investments and technology spill-over, emerging 
private entrepreneurship and increased state support. Studies at the micro level 
indicate the role of interaction with the (local) government and state institutes, 
EXVLQHVV QHWZRUNV WHFKQLFDO DEVRUSWLYH FDSDFLW\ DQG WKH UROH RI µQHFHVVLW\¶ Ior 
enhancing innovativeness of Chinese firms.  
 At the macro level, first, the role of international investments and technology 
spill-over (Liu and Buck, 2007), the inflow of foreign capital and technologies from 
Japan and USA in the late 1990s and returned overseas Chinese engineers (Saxenian, 
2006) are considered important drivers of innovation. Other studies analyze latecomer 
2021
196 Innovation in an uncertain institutional environment 
strategies and strategies for technological catching-up (Li and Kozhikode, 2008), 
implying that innovation in China is about absorbing existing technologies, imitation 
and following other countries and firms. Second, since the mid-1990s a significant 
private sector has emerged in China (Tsui, Bian and Cheng, 2006). Private 
entrepreneurship puts enterprises at the centre of an emerging innovation system that 
increasingly focuses on commercializing newly developed (state) technologies (Gu, 
1999; Liu and White, 2001; OECD, 2007). Third, the role of the state in facilitating 
innovation has often been mentioned. Deregulation of the high-tech sectors, 
liberalisation, tax exemptions and (direct) subsidisations of firms or activities have 
played an important role boosting the performance and innovativeness of the high-tech 
sectors (Lu, 2000; Kreamer and Dedrick, 2001).  
 Firm level explanations of innovation suggest that coordination and interaction 
with the government and state institutes creates a crucial advantage for securing 
technical and financial resources and for getting access to markets (Li and Atuahene-
Gima, 2002; Saxenian and Quan, 2005; Krug, 2007; Wan, 2005). Lu (2000) has 
shown how computer hardware firms used their collective/public nature that allowed 
extensive managerial autonomy, learning from foreign joint-ventures and access to 
state S&T resources. More generally, Stiglitz ( KDV DUJXHG WKDW µFURS VKDULQJ¶
contracts between government and business provide incentives for innovation. Second, 
studies focusing on Chinese innovation and entrepreneurship stress the role of various 
kinds of informal business networks in overcoming the constraints of a weak 
institutional environment (Peng and Luo, 2000; Tan, 2005; Xin and Pearce, 1996). 
The alliances between economic and/or political players can help to overcome 
resource constraints, institutional deficiencies and fill institutional voids. Third, 
necessity is the mother of innovation in China, as recent research on strategic 
decisions in Chinese private ventures has shown (Meyer and Peng, 2005; Tan, 2005; 
Yam, Guan, Pun and Tang, 2004). Opportunity recognition and strategic swiftness are 
important factors for innovative ventures to not only compete with resource-richer 
SOEs, and foreign firms, but also for coping with (in)direct political constraints and 
limitations in resources (Batjargal, 2007; Krug and Polos, 2004). Last, technical 
absorptive capacity of firms cannot be overlooked in facilitating innovativeness, as 
suggested by Wan (2005) and Tan (2005). Especially the absorptive capacity of the 
ILUPIRUIRUHLJQWHFKQRORJ\LVFUXFLDOIRUILUPV¶LQQRYDWLYHQHVV:DQ 
 
In contrast to the studies cited above, the findings on innovation in Hangzhou 
encourages scholars in innovation management to rethink basic elements of this 
µVWDQGDUGPRGHO¶ The key difference to other studies is that we focus on private sector 
driven innovation. Moreover, we combine perspectives on technological and 
institutional change by studying innovation at the firm level. The findings in this 
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research suggest that the origin of innovativeness of private entrepreneurs in 
Hangzhou lies in four factors.   
 Private entrepreneurs gain legitimacy as innovators by building a strong 
reputation of the firm in the local business community. Legitimacy in new markets 
depends on the reputation of the firm, for example to establish viable relations with 
suppliers and customers. As a complementary effect reputation mitigates uncertainty 
and market imperfectness in the whole local business community (cf. Lichtenthaler 
and Ernst, 2006). 
 Private entrepreneurs secure the appropriability of the innovation rents by 
creating organization-specific capabilities. In general, the literature shows that firms 
need to transform individual capabilities into collective, firm-specific skills. Our 
results suggest that the crucial aspect is the coordination and reconfiguration of 
HPSOR\HHV¶ individual skills and firm-specific skills. This capability is a response to 
weak intellectual property rights, high labour turnover and competence uncertainty. 
 Private entrepreneurs mobilize knowledge resources for innovation by employing 
extensive formal and informal business networks that facilitate the reconfiguration of 
critical resources. These networks function as mechanisms to overcome asymmetry in 
information and knowledge markets. More precisely, to find ways for searching for 
business opportunities, the location of critical resources (including financial, human 
and knowledge resources) and the ways to access such resources (for instance, through 
university professors, local investment agencies, state research institutes, etc.). 
Networks connect political and economic actors yet in Hangzhou mostly economic 
actors. In short, the reconfiguration and transformation of knowledge across firm 
boundaries allows firms accumulating the critical knowledge, human and financial 
resources for innovation. 
 Private entrepreneurs attempt exploiting opportunities by being strategically 
flexible, on the one hand, and creating organizational and financial commitment on the 
other hand. Flexibility and stability must not be mutually exclusive. The long term 
commitment of financial and human resources facilitate collective learning necessary 
for innovation. The development of organization-specific capabilities therefore not 
only secures appropriability of innovation rents but also creates a frame for learning.  
  
The four features that describe innovativeness are contingent to sectoral and 
institutional conditions. There is a distinct path dependency at the local level: Whereas 
China still follows a centralized and socialist type of economic development, 
Hangzhou is characterised by competition, entrepreneurship and innovation.  
   Institutional constraints for private entrepreneurs function not similar across 
sectors, which explains why distinct sectors show different innovation patterns. In 
short, in addition to a variety in institutions, sectoral differences matter for 
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understanding innovation in China (and elsewhere ± cf. Malerba, 2004). Lastly, 
FRQVWUDLQWVFDQIXQFWLRQDVµLQQRYDWLRQWULJJHUV¶:KLOHsectoral and institutional risks 
are often considered to inhibit innovation, our study shows that sectoral, 
organizational and institutional risks trigger innovation. 
 
 All in all, the analysis suggests the following dimensions of private-sector driven 
innovation: 
 
x Legitimacy facilitating innovation and learning 
x Steady appropriability of the innovation rent secured by the capabilities to 
reconfigure critical resources 
x Knowledge networking as a way to search for critical resources and as a link 
between the local state and firm interest  
x Searching for complementarities between flexibility and stability 
 
,QVLJKWVIURPWKHµ&KLQDH[SHULHQFH¶ for innovation management 
The key contribution of this thesis is in the field of innovation management. One of 
the key insights is that innovation is possible in an environment with institutional 
uncertainty and limited protection of property rights because, on the one hand, 
institutional uncertainty creates both restrictions and incentives for innovation, and, 
on the other hand, firms are able to develop specific innovative capabilities that 
manage sectoral constraints while fighting off institutional constraints. Conceptually 
this suggests that an explanation of innovation should combine insights from 
capability theories with institutional analysis and sectoral studies of innovation. In 
what follows we will discuss each of these insights.  
 
Whereas literature focuses on technical innovation, using patents, R&D inputs/outputs 
and new products as measures of innovativeness (Fagerberg, Mowery and Nelson, 
2007), this study emphasizes organizational innovation as important. The weakness of 
incremental technical innovation is compensated by radical organizational innovation 
in the form of the capabilities to reconfigure critical resources.  
 
Capabilities matter for innovation. Whereas technical and institutional conditions 
influence the innovation process, it is capabilities at the firm level that explain the 
underlying mechanisms. Three insights stand out.  
 First, the innovative potential of a firm depends on the complementarity of 
innovative capabilities. The five capabilities as examined above (organizational 
integration, financial commitment, external knowledge transformation, reputation 
development and flexible strategy) are not single organizational processes, but form a 
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µFRQILJXUDWLRQ¶ RI capabilities. In contrast to prior research, the analysis shows the 
limits of technology and R&D as the only capabilities for innovation (Lee, Lee and 
Pennings, 2001; Han, Kim and Srivastava, 1998; Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). 
 Second, our findings qualify the roles of technological - and institutional regimes 
in a transition economy and how they can be usefully combined (Lundvall, 1999 and 
Whitley, 2007). All five capabilities are important for developing innovations across 
sectors, credibly developed within one local institutional regime. Institutional regimes 
affect the overall pattern of credibly developed innovative capabilities while 
technological regimes and sectors explain variety. 
 Third, the study contributes to a growing literature on the connection between 
micro-macro level mechanisms (e.g. Whitley, 2003; Hage, 2003; Locke, 1995; Casper 
and Murray, 2003, 2005). The analysis shows that, on the one hand, capabilities are 
being constrained by institutional arrangements (cf. Whitley, 2006), on the other hand, 
capabilities contribute to the building and sharing of critical resources. Moreover, 
capabilities reveal to which extent firms become agents in generating 
complementarities. Capabilities take over functions normally reserved for mature 
institutions, such as coordinating information and knowledge sharing. In other words, 
the results contribute to explaining the co-evolution between capabilities and 
institutions (cf. Krug and Hendrischke, 2008; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). 
 
10.7.1 ,QVLJKWVIURPWKHµ&KLQDH[SHULHQFH¶IRU transition economies 
The analysis shows why we find a wide variety of innovation at the firm and sector 
level despite the joint situational constraints of transition.  The empirical findings of 
the study emphasize the double-faced character of weak institutions: restrictions and 
opportunities (cf. Coriat and Weinstein, 2002; Whitley, 2006). Certain institutional 
features, such as limited access to bank loans, limit the development of enterprise 
software firms, while less affecting middleware firms which therefore enjoy a 
competitive advantage. This finding qualifies research focusing RQWKHµZHDN¶SDUWRI
weak institutions (e.g. Nee, 1992; Stark, 2001; Xin and Pearce, 1996), stressing the 
positive incentives for searching for ways to overcome the weakness. All in all, this 
VWXG\VKRZVWKDWFKDUDFWHULVLQJ&KLQD¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVDVµZHDN¶LVmisleading as 1) the 
effects of institutional change vary across sectors and firms with different resource 
requirements and 2) institutional change can both constrain and provide opportunities.  
  
10.7.2 ,QVLJKWVIURPWKHµ&KLQDH[SHULHQFH¶IRU comparative institutional analysis 
The concepts developed in the comparative institutional literature can be usefully 
employed and modified to explain economic organization and coordination in 
transition economies. More specifically, the general concepts of institutional 
embeddedness (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Granovetter, 1985) and institutional 
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structuring of economic activities (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999, 2006) is 
useful for explaining the economic activity in a changing institutional environment. 
Institutional arrangements follow a certain logic of economic action (Whitley, 1999; 
Deeg and Jackson, 2006). The findings in this study provide strong evidence for path 
dependency in institutions and institutional change and suggest that a historical and 
rich understanding of innovation will lead to better explanations (cf. Lazonick, 2007). 
 One path dependency is the lack of an uniform business environment in China. 
Local business environments with diverging patterns of economic organization and 
coordination shape innovative developments. The variety between local business 
environments is even more pronounced when institutions are weak. Moreover, not 
only regional variety is considerable, sectoral variety is just as significant, contributing 
to the literature on local economic development (Crouch et al, 2004) and sectoral 
systems of innovation (Malerba, 2004). This suggests combining regional studies of 
economic development with sectoral studies (Fagerberg, Mowery and Nelson, 2007).  
 Lastly, the findings suggest an extension of the variety of capitalisms perspective 
WR WUDQVLWLRQ HFRQRPLHV +RZHYHU VXUSULVLQJ LW PD\ EH +DQJ]KRX¶V ORFDO EXVLQHVV
system show features of a local system with intense competition, high levels of 
innovation and entrepreneurship within the Central Communist Party State of China. 
Hangzhou can be characterized as a capitalist city without a functioning democracy, 
financial or labour markets (cf. Tsai, 2008). The study finds strong support for the 
claim that capitalism and market forces can evolve within a variety of political 
regimes. This suggests that the conditions for capitalism as outlined in Western 
economics textbooks need to be revised and need to focus on mechanisms instead of 
conditions to include functional equivalents of institutions in developed economies.  
 
Table 10.2 - Contributions 
Field        Contributions 
Transition 
economies / China 
studies 
- the consequences of institutional transition are not similar across 
firms and sectors: incorporate variety; 
- institutional change: restrictions and opportunities 
Comparative 
institutional theory 
- extension of institutional analysis in transition economy; 
- local business system: value of local perspective; 
- wider variety of capitalism: µFDSLWDOLVP¶ without a functioning 
democracy and formal financial and labour markets 
Innovation 
literature 
- innovation is not limited to technical innovation but also 
includes organizational innovation; 
- weak property rights do not inhibit innovation 
Capabilities 
literature 
- complementarity of capabilities; 
- combination of sectoral and institutional perspectives; 
- co-evolution between capabilities and institutions 
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10.8 Explanatory power 
The VWXG\¶V H[SODQDtory power is constrained by the location, time period of the 
research and sectors. First, the study is done in Hangzhou; for the purpose of this study 
Hangzhou is an appropriate research setting. However, the findings for the sectoral 
development cannot directly be used in other institutional settings. Even though the 
mechanisms are likely to be the same, the extent or type of constraints might differ 
across institutional settings. Therefore, it is expected that innovative capabilities also 
differ in response to different institutional constraints. However, it is likely that the 
mechanisms are similar. In line with Manion (1994), we expect that the lessons learnt 
from local samples can tell us something about mechanisms, or relations between 
variables, even though the local contexts might differ. It must be noted that Hangzhou 
is at the forefront of economic and technical developments and therefore is likely to be 
a benchmark for other regions, which increases the potential generalizability of this 
study. Nevertheless, further research in other localities should validate this expectation. 
Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are candidates for a comparative study but also 
Nanjing and Dalian are important cities for software development.  
 Second, the study is time-bound. Innovation involves creativity, surprise and 
uncertainty. As a newly emerging software industry is dynamic and changing 
continuously, it is hard to predict to what extent constraints, technologies and 
regulations change. Even though I took a process explanation of innovation in the 
software sectors, it remains hard to predict where the sectors will be heading. We 
GRQ¶WNQRZSUHFLVHO\KRZ WKH VHFWRUVZLOO HYROYHEH\RQG WKH WLPHSHULRG VWXGLHG LQ
this project. Nevertheless, the mechanisms that were uncovered at least explain the 
processes and it is unlikely that those mechanisms will change rapidly. New empirical 
studies should incorporate longer time periods and include follow ups of this research 
to see how the sectors developed. Furthermore, the findings should be tested in other 
emerging sectors, such as biotechnology, where the technical constraints are different. 
 Third, the study is limited to successful firms. Successful in this study refers to 
firms that succeed to innovate at least once successfully. However, the explorative, 
inductive nature of our empirical study does not allow for comparing the patterns of 
innovative capabilities of these successful firms with unsuccessful ± in terms of 
innovation ± firms. Moreover, this study did not differentiate successful innovators 
from extremely successful innovators. Lastly, future research should also take into 
DFFRXQWµVHULDO¶ LQQRYDWRUVRUFRQWLQXRXVLQQRYDWLRQDVRSSRVHGWRWKHGLVFUHWHW\SHV
of innovation considered in this study. Nevertheless, this study identified several 
patterns of innovation at the firm level in relation to institutional conditions which can 
form a basis for further research. 
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10.9 Managerial implications 
The suggestion for Chinese entrepreneurs on the basis of the findings in this thesis is 
that they could consider the development of non-technical innovations to exploit the 
opportunities of an emerging market while at the same time developing a set of 
innovative capabilities. Furthermore, Chinese entrepreneurs would best consider the 
variety of capability development across distinct sectors. Focus on developing a set of 
capabilities that give the firm a long term competitive advantage for innovation in a 
particular sector, instead of opportunistic, short term strategies to explRLWµFKDQFHVRI
WKHGD\¶VKLIWLQJDFURVVVHFWRUV7KHLPSOLFDWLRQIRUIRUHLJQEXVLQHVVHVLVWKDW&KLQHVH
firms can be innovative partners for the development of high tech products and 
services in knowledge-intensive industries. Furthermore, foreign businesses should be 
aware of alternative mechanisms of protecting innovations in China, such as extensive 
local embeddedness via local partnerships and the development of organization 
specific capabilities. The implication for policy makers inside and outside China is 
that incentives for innovation can be created in a variety of ways, depending on the 
specific local conditions and histories of development. The most efficient and effective 
set of incentives for innovation are locally embedded. Moreover, policy makers should 
consider both local and sectoral variety of innovation when designing policies.
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Appendix 
 
 
Innovative capabilities of software firms in Hangzhou 
RSM Erasmus University 
 
 
Respondent number: 
Date: 
Name of the firm: 
Website: 
7KHILUP¶VPDLQSURGXFWVVHUYLFHV 
Type/nature of work: 
Area of responsibility of respondent: 
 
 
(I) FOUNDING OF THE FIRM 
 
1. Please describe how the firm was established <open> 
 => idea 
 => source of funding 
 => main challenges 
 => factors most important for successful founding 
 => who owns the firm? 
 => is the owner also the manager? 
 
2. How does the firm try to compete? <open> 
=> competing on quality, costs, first-to-market, innovative leadership?  
  => are the products/services mass market, niche market or extensively customized? 
 => what is the target market?  
 => cost model: how are revenues generated? 
 => how is the product sold and distributed? 
 
3. How many people are currently employed by the firm? 
4. What is the present value of all assets in RMB? 
5. Did the firm have to make any significant specific investments? (please specify the 
main source of funding of each investment) 
 (P) Location; Physical assets; Brand name; Human assets; Investments for   
 specific customers  (dedicated capacity); Mutual understanding with external   
 partner; Trust building with external partner 
 
6. :KDWLVWKHILUP¶VPRVWUHFHQWDQQXDOWXUQRYHULQ50B? 
7. :KDWLVWKHILUP¶VPRVWUHFHQWSURILWLQ50%" 
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(II) INNOVATIVE CAPABILITIES  
 
3OHDVHWHOOXVDERXWWKHILUP¶VLQQRYDWLRQV 
8. Does the firm consider itself a pioneer, good at spotting new opportunities? 
9. What type of innovations did the firm introduce? 
 (P) new products in existing product/service line; entered new product/service line; 
new  process  improvements; new management techniques; new quality controls in 
production, other  
 
For the questions which follow we would like you to focus on one innovation of the firm 
WKDWLVKDVEHHQFUXFLDOIRUWKHILUP¶VGHYHORSPHQW 
 
10. Please shortly describe the innovation <open> 
 => type of innovation (see Q.9) 
 => when? 
 => who/what initiated the idea? 
 (P) customers, universities, new hires, consultants, employees, management, 
academic research, conference visits, industry associations, other firms, other (specify) 
 
11. Please explain which factors were important for the development of this innovation 
<open> 
=> internal versus external factors 
=> finance, employment, knowledge, regulation, marketing 
 (P) in house development (incl. training); developed in cooperation with business 
partners;  purchased; imitation; strong core technology; attracting new personnel; 
strong collective capabilities, experience, new knowledge from conferences and 
seminars; knowledge from academic sources; talking to other professionals; hired 
consultants; other (specify) 
 
12. What were the key challenges for this innovation and how did you manage these 
challenges? <open> 
 
13. Did the firm have to make significant specific investments for this innovation?  
 (P) Location; Physical assets; Brand name; Human assets; Investments for   
 specific customers (dedicated capacity); Mutual understanding between    
 the firm and any external partner; Trust building between the firm and any   
 external partner 
 
14. Did the firm have to attract new personnel for this innovation? If yes, how much and 
from where? 
15. Did the firm get patents for this innovation? 
 (P) Chinese patents, US patents, European patents 
 
16. Are collaborations with external partners necessary for innovation in your firm?  
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External partners 
17. For the following we would like you to focus on all the external business relations 
which are, or have been, especially important to innovation in your firm. This may be 
a business partner, or an individual or organisation important to your firm for granting 
access to finance or other necessary resources, knowledge, social network, etc. Think 
about those business relations without which the development of innovations of your 
firm would be problematic. Please explain why and how each partner is important.  
 
 a) type of partner 
  (P) Other domestic firms, foreign firms, individual, universities, government,  
  banks, R&D institutes, venture capital investors, business associations, other  
  (specify) 
 b) main purpose of cooperation 
  (P) 1) business information; 2) financial resources; 3) labour resources; 4)  
  (technical) knowledge; 5) political/regulatory information; 6) other (specify)  
 c) duration of cooperation (in years) 
 d) frequency of contact 
  (P) 1) daily; 2) weekly; 3) monthly; 4) less often; 5) almost never 
 e) use of formal contract  
 f) why with this partner? Origin/basis of cooperation? 
  (P) 1) family; 2) extended family; 3) classmate; 4) former colleague; 5)   
  teacher/professor; 6) former employer; 7) other professional; 8) other (specify) 
 g) costs / disadvantages of cooperation with this partner 
 h) size of partner (small/large) 
 i) sector (same/other) 
 j) ownership 
  (P) 1) private firm; 2) state-owned; 3) joint-venture; 4) collective owned; 5)  
  foreign invested; 6) other (specify) 
 k) please indicate which of the partners also cooperate amongst each other  
 
Organization of work 
18. How does the firm organize a typical assignment/project? <open> 
=> standard operating procedure;  
=> cooperation across departments;  
=> cooperation across functions 
=> project teams 
 (P) diverse functional backgrounds, changing composition, R&D focused, etc. 
 
19. What are the demographic FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHILUP¶VZRUNIRUFH? 
=> number of university educated employees 
=> number of supporting staff 
=> number of managers 
=> number of temporary workers 
=> labour turnover ratio 
 
20. How do you know you hire good people? <open> 
=> what are the most important requirements for new employees? 
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=> what is the main source of new employees?  
=> does the firm easily attract new employees? 
=> are formal labour contracts used? 
 
21. How do you keep your employees? <open> 
 => What are the main types of compensation / incentives systems? 
(P) fixed salary, bonus system, performance-based pay 
 
22. How important is practical training as opposed to formal education? 
23. Does the firm provide on-the-job training?  
 => how many employees followed a training? 
 => what kind of training? 
 
24. To what extent are employees involved in decision making? 
25. What are the key challenges of the organization of work (HRM) and how do you 
manage them? 
 
26. Please list the 5 most important factors that have been significant for innovation in 
your firm. These factors can be internal or external to the firm. For instance, think 
about on the job training, an important business partner, interaction  with the 
government, attracting new talents, commercialization of research, strong core 
technology, etc.  
 
 
(III) BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
Competitors 
27. Who are WKHILUP¶VPDLQFRPSHWLWRUV" 
=> number of competitors increased/decreased/remained stable? 
=> did the competitors become stronger/weaker/remained the same? 
=> state or non-state competitors? 
=> location of competitors?  
(P) same city, province, national, international 
 
28. Do these competitors often introduce new products/services? Give examples. 
29. &DQFRPSHWLWRUVHDVLO\FRS\WKHILUP¶VSURGXFWVVHUYLFHV" 
30. Do the competitors offer substitute products/services? Give examples. 
31. How does the firm learn about the behaviour of its competitors? <open> 
 
Customers 
32. :KRDUHWKHILUP¶VPDLQFXVWRPHUV" 
=> did number of customers increase/decrease/remain stable? 
=> did their demand increase/decrease/remain stable? 
=> state or non-state firms (in case of business customers)? 
=> principal location of the customers? 
(P) same city, province, national, international 
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33. 'RWKHFXVWRPHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVIUHTXHQWO\FKDQJH"*LYHH[DPSOHV 
34. Are the customers frequently looking for new products/services? 
35. $UHWKHFXVWRPHUVOR\DOWRWKHILUP¶VSURGucts/services? 
36. How does the firm learn about the behaviour of its customers? <open> 
 
Technology and knowledge base 
37. Were there any significant changes in technology or knowledge base since the firm 
started its operations? Give examples. 
=> who/what was the source? 
=> is it related to an international - or domestic development? 
 
38. How important are such changes for the development of your industry? 
39. How important is it for the firm to match these changes? 
40. Did the firm have to change the way it produces products or delivers services? 
41. How does the firm learn about these changes? <open> 
 
The legal and administrative environment 
42. Is it clear who the supervisory (administrative/legal) agent of your sector is? 
43. Are the national/local regulatory requirements straightforward? 
44. Is the amount of regulation and policies to which the firm needs to comply high? 
45. Are there any preferential policies that your firm also benefits from? 
46. Are there any policies that inhibit the further development of your firm? 
47. Do changes in national/local requirements/policies occur often? 
48. How do you keep track of the (changes in) policies and requirements? <open> 
49. $UH\RXFRQILGHQWWKDWOHJDOPHFKDQLVPVVDIHJXDUG\RXUILUP¶VLQWHUHVWV" 
50. How important is (frequent) interaction with the government? <open> 
 
51. $UHDQ\RWKHULQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDJHQWVOLNHWUDGHXQLRQVZRUNHUV¶
associations, business associations important? <open> 
52. How dependent is your firm on state actions and policies? <open> 
53. Would changes in local administration or government pose a threat to the firm? 
<open> 
 
New industry 
54. The software industry is a young and new industry. Can you tell us about the 
challenges en uncertainties of operating in such a new industry? <open> 
 (P) access to finance, attracting employees, reaching customers, learning about 
 competitors, insufficient regulations, other (specify) 
 
55. Can the firm look to and learn from other firms in the industry? 
56. Are there many successful firms that could serve as an example to the firm? 
57. Do you think your firm has enough experience to operate properly? <open> 
 
Challenges 
58. 3OHDVHGHVFULEHZKDWWKHILUP¶VELJJHVWFKDOOHQJHis and how you plan to manage such 
a challenge. <open> 
 
2310
  
 
225 
ᵁᎲЁᇣ䕃ӊӕϮⱘ߯ᮄ㛑࡯ 
 
 
Respondent number: 
Date: 
Name of the firm: 
Website: 
䇋ㅔ㽕ᦣ䗄ϔϟ䆹ӕϮⱘЏ㽕ѻક/᳡ࡵ:  
ӕϮҢџҔМᎹ԰˛ 
ᙼ೼㒘㒛ݙⱘ㘠䋷㣗ೈ˛ 
 
(I) ݀ৌᓎゟⱘᚙމ (10ߚ䩳) 
 
1. 䇋ᦣ䗄݀ৌᓎゟⱘᚙމ. 䇋䇈ᯢ 
 => ЎҔМӮ᳝ᓎゟ݀ৌⱘᛇ⊩˛ 
 => ݀ৌᓎゟП߱ⱘ䌘䞥ᴹ⑤˛ 
 => ᓎゟ݀ৌП߱ⱘЏ㽕ᣥ៬᳝ાѯ˛䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
 => ៤ࡳ߯ᓎ݀ৌⱘ݇䬂಴㋴᳝ાѯ˛䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
 => ӕϮⱘ᠔᳝㗙ᰃ˛ 
 => ӕϮⱘ᠔᳝Ҏгᰃ㒣⧚ᴀҎ৫˛ 
 
2. ӕϮᰃབԩゲѝⱘ˛䇋䇈ᯢ 
=> ೼䋼䞣ǃ៤ᴀǃऴ乚ᏖഎᴎӮǃ߯ᮄ乚ᇐᮍ䴶ゲѝ 
 =>ѻકᰃ䞛প໻ᡍ䞣⫳ѻᮍᓣ䖬ᰃ䩜ᇍᶤ⾡Ꮦഎ䳔㽕䖯㸠⫳ѻ䖬ᰃϾᗻ
 ࣪ᅮࠊⱘ 
 => ӕϮⱘЏ㽕ᅶ᠋ᰃ˛  
 => བԩᅲ⦄ᬊܹ੠߽⍺? 
 => ѻકབԩ䖯㸠䫔ଂ? 
 
3. Ⳃࠡ䆹ӕϮ䲛⫼њ໮ᇥਬᎹ˛ 
4. Ⳃࠡⱘ䌘ѻޔؐᰃ໮ᇥ˄ҹҎ⇥Ꮥ䅵˅˛ 
5. 䳔㽕ϧ䮼䖯㸠䕗໻ⱘᡩ䌘৫˛䇋В՟䇈ᯢ? (䇋㒭ߎ↣⃵ᡩ䌘ⱘЏ㽕䌘䞥
ᴹ⑤)  
 (P)ഄ⚍˗䆒ᮑ˗ક⠠˗Ҏ࡯䌘⑤˗Ў⡍ᅮ乒ᅶ䖯㸠ᡩ䌘˗ӕϮϢ໪䚼ড়԰㗙ⱘ
 ⳌѦ⧚㾷˗ӕϮϢ໪䚼ড়԰㗙ⱘֵӏᓎゟ˄݀݇˅; ݊ᅗ ˄䇋䇈ᯢ˅  
 
6. ӕϮ 2006ᑈⱘ㧹Ϯ乱ᰃ໮ᇥ˄ҹҎ⇥Ꮥ䅵˅˛ 
7. ӕϮ 2006ᑈⱘ߽⍺ᰃ໮ᇥ˄ҹҎ⇥Ꮥ䅵˅˛⿢ࠡ________⿢ৢ_______ 
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(II) ӕϮⱘ߯ᮄ㛑࡯(30ߚ䩳) 
 
䇋ҟ㒡ϔϟӕϮ߯ᮄᮍ䴶ⱘᚙމ 
8. ᙼ䅸ЎᙼⱘӕϮ೼থ⦄ᮄⱘᴎӮᮍ䴶ᰃ㸠Ϯⱘ乚ܜ㗙৫?  
9. ӕϮ೼ાᮍ䴶ⱘ䖯㸠њ߯ᮄ? 
 (P)೼Ꮖ᳝ѻક/᳡ࡵ㒓Ё๲ࡴᮄѻક˗๲ࡴᮄⱘѻક/᳡ࡵ㒓˗ᇍ⌕⿟䖯㸠ᬍ㡃
 䞛পᮄⱘㅵ⧚ᡔᴃ˗೼⫳ѻЁ䞛⫼ᮄⱘ䋼䞣᥻ࠊ; ݊ᅗ ˄䇋䇈ᯢ˅ 
 
ᇍѢҹϟⱘ䯂乬ˈ៥Ӏᇚᡞ䞡⚍ᬒ೼ᇍӕϮ᳝䞡໻ᕅડⱘϔ⃵߯ᮄ㸠ЎǄ 
 
10. ݇ѢӕϮ䖯㸠䖛ⱘ߯ᮄ䇋ВϔϾ՟ᄤ䇈ᯢ  
 => ߯ᮄ㉏ൟ (㾕 Q.9) 
 => ҔМᯊ䯈? 
 => 䆹߯ᮄЏ㽕⑤ѢҔМ? 
 (P) ᅶ᠋ˈ໻ᄺˈ݀ৌᮄ䖯ਬᎹˈ੼䆶Ҏਬˈ݋᳝߯ᛣⱘਬᎹˈㅵ⧚ሖ, ݊ᅗ 
˄䇋䇈ᯢ˅ 
 
11. ાѯ಴㋴೼ᓩ䖯䖭ѯ߯ᮄ䖛⿟Ёথ᣹䖛䞡㽕԰⫼.  
=> ݙ䚼಴㋴ঞ໪䚼಴㋴ 
=> 䌘䞥ˈਬᎹˈⶹ䆚ˈ⊩㾘ˈᏖഎ 
(P)ӕϮݙ䚼থሩ˄ࣙᣀ෍䆁˅˗থሩњৠଚϮӭԈⱘ݇㋏˗䞛䌁˗῵ӓ˗਌ᓩ
ᮄҎᠡ˗Ңⷨ䅼ӮЁ㦋ᕫⶹ䆚˗ᔎ໻ⱘḌᖗᡔᴃ˗ᔎ໻ⱘ䲚ԧ࡯䞣˗㒣偠˗Ң
ᄺᴃ⏴䘧㦋ᕫⶹ䆚˗Ϣ݊Ҫϧᆊ䇜䆱˗㘬䇋੼䆶ϧᆊ; 㸠Ϯᷛޚˈ݊ᅗ ˄䇋䇈
ᯢ˅ 
 
12. 䖭⃵߯ᮄЁ᠔䘛ࠄⱘ᳔໻ᣥ៬ᰃҔМˈབԩ䴶ᇍ䖭ѯᣥ៬?  
13. 䳔㽕Ў䖭乍߯ᮄϧ䮼䖯㸠䕗໻ⱘᡩ䌘৫˛䇋В՟䇈ᯢ?  
 (P)ഄ⚍˗䆒ᮑ˗ક⠠˗Ҏ࡯˗Ў⡍ᅮ乒ᅶ䖯㸠ᡩ䌘˗ӕϮϢ໪䚼ড়԰㗙ⱘⳌѦ
 ⧚㾷˗ӕϮϢ໪ 䚼ড়԰㗙ⱘֵӏᓎゟ 
 
14. 䖭乍߯ᮄ⌏ࡼ䳔㽕ᮄⱘҎ᠟৫? བᵰ䳔㽕ˈ䙷䳔㽕໮ᇥҎ᠟ˈབԩᡒࠄ
䖭ѯҎ˛ 
15. ӕϮЎ䆹߯ᮄ⬇䇋䖛ϧ߽৫?  
(P) Ё೑ϧ߽ˈ㕢೑ϧ߽ˈ⃻⌆ϧ߽ 
 
16. ড়԰೼䆹߯ᮄЁⱘ䞡㽕ᗻབԩ?  
 
 
 
2332
  
 
227 
䇋ҟ㒡ϔϟӕϮଚϮ݇㋏ 
17. ҹϟⱘ䞡⚍೼Ѣ˖ᇍ݀ৌ៪᳒㒣ᇍ݀ৌⱘ߯ᮄ䴲ᐌ䞡㽕ⱘϔѯଚϮ݇
㋏ǄৃҹᰃଚϮӭԈǃϾҎ៪㒘㒛೼Ў݀ৌᦤկ䌘䞥៪݊ᅗ䌘⑤ǃⶹ䆚
੠⼒Ӯ݇㋏ㄝᮍ䴶䍋њ䞡㽕԰⫼Ǆ䇋㾷䞞ЎҔМ䖭ѯড়԰ӭԈᕜ䞡㽕ˈ
བԩ䞡㽕˛  
 
a) ড়԰㗙㉏ൟ 
b) ড়԰ⱘЏ㽕Ⳃⱘ 
c) ᙼ䅸䆚䖭Ͼড়԰㗙᳝޴ᑈњ 
d) ᙼӀᕐℸ໮䭓ᯊ䯈㾕ϔ⃵䴶 
e) ড়԰ᰃ৺ㅒ䅶ℷᓣড়ৠ 
f) ЎҔМ䗝ᢽ䖭Ͼড়԰㗙? ড়԰㓬⬅/෎⸔ 
g) Ϣ䖭Ͼড়԰㗙ড়԰ⱘҷӋ/ϡ߽಴㋴ 
h) ড়԰㗙ⱘ㾘῵໻ᇣ 
i) ড়԰㗙᠔ሲ㸠Ϯ 
j) 䆹݀ৌⱘᗻ䋼 
k) 㢹䖭ѯড়԰㗙П䯈Ёгᄬ೼ড়԰݇㋏ˈ䇋⫼䖲᥹㒓䖯㸠ᷛ⊼. 
 
ড়԰㗙㉏ൟ:1)݊ᅗ೑ݙӕϮ˗2)೑໪ӕϮ˗3)ϾҎ˗4)催᷵˗5)ᬓᑰ˗6)䫊㸠˗ 
    7)⾥ⷨ䰶᠔˗8)亢䰽ᡩ 䌘ᆊ˗9)ଚϮणӮ˗10)݊Ҫ˄䇋䇈ᯢ˅ 
 
Ⳃⱘ:1)ଚϮֵᙃ˗ 2)䌘䞥ᴹ⑤˗ 3)ࢇࡼ࡯䌘⑤˗ 4) (ᡔᴃ)ⶹ䆚˗ 5)ᬓㄪ / ⊩㾘ֵᙃ˗  
  6) ݊Ҫ  
 
ᙼӀᕐℸ໮䭓ᯊ䯈㾕ϔ⃵䴶: 1˅↣໽˗2˅↣਼˗3˅↣᳜˗4˅ϡ㒣ᐌ˗5˅޴Тϡ㾕䴶 
 
ড়԰㓬⬅/෎⸔:1)Ⳉ㋏҆ሲ˗2˅݊Ҫ҆៮˗3˅ৠᄺ˗4˅ৠџ˗5˅㗕Ꮬ˗6˅䲛Џ˗ 
     7˅݊ҪৠϮϨ᳝㘨㋏ⱘҎਬ˗8˅݊Ҫ˄䇋䇈ᯢ˅  
 
ড়԰㗙ⱘ㾘῵໻ᇣ: ᇣˈЁˈ໻ 
 
ড়԰㗙᠔ሲ䚼䮼: ৠϾ㸠Ϯ/݊ᅗ㸠Ϯ 
 
䆹݀ৌⱘᗻ䋼: 1)೑᳝ӕϮ˗ 2)䲚ԧӕϮ˗ 3)⾕㧹ӕϮ˗ 4)ড়䌘ӕϮ˗    
    5)໪ଚ⣀䌘ӕϮ˗6)݊Ҫ 
 
䇋ҟ㒡݇ѢӕϮᓔሩᎹ԰ⱘϔѯᚙމ 
18. ӕϮᰃབԩ㒘㒛᮹ᐌᎹ԰ⱘ? 䇋䇈ᯢ 
 => ᳝ᷛޚ࣪ⱘ᪡԰⿟ᑣ৫˛ 
 => ৘䚼䮼ⳌѦ⣀ゟഄ䖬ᰃড়԰ഄᓔሩᎹ԰˛ 
=> ෎Ѣ㘠䋷ⱘড়԰݇㋏˛ 
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=> ᰃ৺䞛প乍Ⳃ㒘ⱘᮍᓣᓔሩড়԰˛ 
=> 㢹䞛প乍Ⳃ㒘ⱘড়԰ˈ䇋㾷䞞བԩᓔሩ䖭⾡ড়԰ᮍᓣ 
 
19. ӕϮਬᎹⱘֵᙃ? 
=> ᴀ⾥ঞҹϞਬᎹⱘҎ᭄  
 => ㅵ⧚ҎਬⱘҎ᭄  
=> ЈᯊᎹ੠ݐ㘠ਬᎹⱘҎ᭄  
=> এᑈᮄ᢯㘬ਬᎹҎ᭄  
=> এᑈ⾏㘠ਬᎹҎ᭄  
 
20. བԩ᢯ࠄড়䗖ⱘਬᎹ? 䇋䇈ᯢ 
 => ᇍᮄਬᎹ᳔䞡㽕ⱘ㽕∖ᰃҔМ˛ 
 => ᮄਬᎹⱘЏ㽕ᴹ⑤ᰃҔМ˛ 
 => ӕϮ㛑䕗ᆍᯧഄ᢯ࠄᮄਬᎹ৫˛ 
=> ᰃ৺Փ⫼ℷᓣⱘࢇᎹড়ৠ? 
=> ᰃ৺᳝䆩⫼ᳳˈ໮䭓ᯊ䯈˛ 
 
21. བԩ⬭ԣӕϮਬᎹ? 䇋䇈ᯢ 
 =>Џ㽕ⱘ㭾䝀㉏ൟᰃ? 
˄P˅೎ᅮᎹ䌘ˈ༪䞥ˈ㒽ᬜᎹ䌘 
=> ࢇࡼ࡯៤ᴀऴᘏ៤ᴀ  
 
22. ⳌᇍѢℷ㾘ᬭ㚆ˈ෍䆁៪Ꮉ԰㒣偠ᰃ৺᳈䞡㽕˛  
23. ӕϮᦤկ೼㘠෍䆁৫˛ 
 => ᳝໮ᇥਬᎹӮখࡴ䖭ḋⱘ෍䆁?  
 => ҔМ㉏ൟⱘ෍䆁?  
 => ೼㘠෍䆁ⱘ៤ᴀᰃབԩߚᢙⱘ?  
 
24. ਬᎹ೼໮໻⿟ᑺϞখϢއㄪ䖛⿟? 
25. Ҏџㅵ⧚ᮍ䴶Ё᳔໻ⱘ䯂乬ᰃҔМˈབԩএ㾷އ䖭ϔ䯂乬? 
26. ાѯ಴㋴೼ᓩ䖯䖭ѯ߯ᮄ䖛⿟Ёথ᣹䖛䞡㽕԰⫼ (ݙ䚼಴㋴ঞ໪䚼಴㋴)? ↨བ: 
ӕϮ෍䆁˗থሩњৠଚϮӭԈⱘ݇㋏˗੠ᬓᑰ(乥㐕)ⱘ᥹㾺Ϣ㘨㋏; ਌ᓩᮄҎ
ᠡ˗Ңⷨ䅼ӮЁ㦋ᕫⶹ䆚˗ᔎ໻ⱘḌᖗᡔᴃ˗ᔎ໻ⱘ䲚ԧ࡯䞣˗Ңᄺᴃ⏴䘧㦋
ᕫⶹ䆚˗Ϣ݊Ҫϧᆊ䇜䆱˗㘬䇋੼䆶ϧᆊ, ㄝㄝ.  
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(III) ӕϮ⦃๗ (30ߚ䩳) 
 
䇋ҟ㒡݇ѢӕϮゲѝᇍ᠟㸠Ўⱘϔѯᚙމ 
27. ӕϮЏ㽕ⱘゲѝᇍ᠟ᰃ?  
 => ゲѝᇍ᠟ⱘ᭄䞣೼˖๲ࡴ/ޣᇥ/ֱᣕϡব  
 => ゲѝᇍ᠟ⱘᅲ࡯೼˖বᔎ/বᔅ/ֱᣕϡব  
 => ゲѝᇍ᠟ᰃ˖೑᳝ⱘ䖬ᰃ䴲೑᳝ⱘ˛ 
=> ゲѝᇍ᠟ⱘഄऎ˖(P˅ৠϔජᏖˈৠⳕˈ೑ݙˈ೑䰙 
 
28. 䖭ѯゲѝᇍ᠟㒣ᐌ᥼ߎᮄѻક/᳡ࡵ৫˛䇋В՟䇈ᯢ. 
29. ゲѝᇍ᠟ᰃ৺㛑໳䕏ᯧ῵ӓ݀ৌⱘѻક៪᳡ࡵ˛  
30. ゲѝᇍ᠟Ӯᦤկ᳓ҷѻક/᳡ࡵ৫˛䇋В՟䇈ᯢ. 
31. ӕϮབԩњ㾷ゲѝᇍ᠟ⱘ㸠Ў? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
 
䇋ҟ㒡݇ѢӕϮᅶ᠋ⱘϔѯᚙމ 
32. ӕϮⱘЏ㽕ᅶ᠋ᰃ?  
=> ᅶ᠋ⱘ᭄䞣೼˖๲ࡴ/ֱᣕϡব/ޣᇥ 
=> ᅶ᠋ⱘ䳔∖೼˖๲ࡴ/ޣᇥ/ֱᣕϡব   
=> ೑᳝ӕϮ䖬ᰃ䴲೑᳝ӕϮ˄བᵰӕϮⱘᅶ᠋ᰃ݀ৌⱘ䆱˅˛ 
 => ᅶ᠋ⱘЏ㽕ഄഔ˄བᵰᰃӕϮⱘᅶ᠋ᰃ݀ৌⱘ䆱˅˛ 
 
33. ᅶ᠋ⱘأད㒣ᐌব࣪৫˛䇋В՟䇈ᯢ. 
34. ᅶ᠋㒣ᐌᇏᡒᮄⱘѻક/᳡ࡵ৫? 
35. ᅶ᠋ᇍӕϮⱘѻક/᳡ࡵⱘᖴ䆮ᑺབԩ? 
36. ݀ৌབԩњ㾷ᅶ᠋ⱘ㸠Ў? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
 
䇋ҟ㒡݇Ѣᙼ᠔೼㸠Ϯⱘᡔᴃ੠ⶹ䆚থሩⱘϔѯᚙމ 
37. ҢӕϮᓎゟҹᴹˈᙼ᠔೼㸠Ϯথ⫳䖛䞡໻ⱘᡔᴃ੠ⶹ䆚ব䴽৫˛䇋В՟
䇈ᯢ. 
=> ব䴽⑤㞾ҔМ˛ 
=> 䆹ব䴽ৠ೑䰙/೑ݙথሩ᳝݇৫˛ 
=> 䖭⾡ᡔᴃ੠ⶹ䆚ব䴽ᖿ৫˛ 
 
38. ᇍᙼⱘ㸠Ϯ㗠㿔ˈᡔᴃ੠ⶹ䆚ব䴽ⱘ䞡㽕ᗻབԩ? 
39. ᙼⱘӕϮ䎳Ϟ䖭⾡ᡔᴃ੠ⶹ䆚ব䴽ⱘℹӤ䞡㽕৫ˈ᳝໮䞡㽕? 
40. ӕϮӮ㹿䖿ᬍব݊⫳ѻѻક/ᦤկ᳡ࡵⱘᮍᓣ৫˛䇋В՟䇈ᯢ? 
41. ӕϮབԩⶹ䘧䖭ѯব䴽? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
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䇋ҟ㒡݇ѢӕϮⱘ⊩㾘 ੠㸠ᬓ⦃๗ⱘϔѯᚙމ 
42. ᙼᰃ৺⏙Ἦഄⶹ䘧ᙼ᠔೼㸠Ϯⱘⲥㅵ˄㸠ᬓ៪⊩ᕟ˅ᴎᵘ?  
43. ᙼᇍ೑ᆊ៪ഄᮍⱘ⊩㾘㽕∖ᰃ৺⏙Ἦ?  
44. ӕϮ䳔㽕䙉ᕾⱘ⊩㾘੠ᬓㄪᰃ৺ᕜ໮?  
45. ӕϮ㛑৺ѿফϔѯӬᚴᬓㄪ˛ 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
46. ᰃ৺ᄬ೼ϔѯᬓㄪӮོ⹡ӕϮⱘথሩ ? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
47. ೑ᆊ៪ഄᮍᬓㄪᰃ৺Ӯ㒣ᐌথ⫳ᬍব?  
48. ᙼབԩњ㾷䖭ѯᬓㄪ៪⊩㾘˄ঞ݊ব࣪˅? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
49. 䖭ѯ⊩ᕟ⊩㾘㛑໳ֱᡸᙼӕϮⱘ߽Ⲟ৫˛ 
50. ੠ᬓᑰⱘ᥹㾺Ϣ㘨㋏ᰃ৺ᕜ䞡㽕 ? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
51. ੠݊ᅗᴎᵘⱘ᥹㾺Ϣ㘨㋏ᰃ৺ᕜ䞡㽕ˈ↨བᎹӮǃࢇᎹणӮǃଚϮणӮ? 
䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
52. ӕϮ೼໮໻⿟ᑺϞ⣀ゟѢᬓᑰ㸠Ў੠ᬓㄪ? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
53. ഄᮍ㸠ᬓᴎᵘ៪ᬓᑰⱘᬓㄪব࣪ᰃ৺ӮᇍӕϮ䗴៤࿕㚕? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
 
ᮄ݈㸠Ϯ 
54. 䕃ӊ㸠ϮᰃϔϾᮄ݈㸠ϮǄᙼ㛑৺ਞ䆝៥Ӏ೼䖭Ͼᮄ݈㸠ϮЁ⬅Ѣϡ⹂
ᅮᗻ᠔ᓩ䍋ⱘೄ䲒੠ᣥ៬Ǆ䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
 (P) 㵡䌘ǃҎ࡯䌘⑤ǃᅶ᠋ǃゲѝᇍ᠟ˈ⊩㾘ⱘϡ㾘㣗, ݊Ҫ˄䇋䇈ᯢ˅ 
 
55. ᙼ㾝ᕫ䙷ѯӕϮᰃ䕃ӊ㸠Ϯⱘ乚ܜ㗙˛  
56. 㛑ҢҪӀ䙷䞠ᄺࠄҔМ৫?  
57. ᙼ䅸ЎӕϮ೼㒣㧹ᮍ䴶ᰃ৺ᢹ᳝䎇໳Єᆠⱘ㒣偠? 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
 
᳔໻ᣥ៬ 
58. 䇋ᙼᦣ䗄ϔϟӕϮⳂࠡ᠔䘛ࠄⱘ᳔໻ᣥ៬ˈҹঞᙼ䅵ߦབԩᑨᇍ䖭Ͼᣥ
៬. 䇋В՟䇈ᯢ 
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SUMMARY (DUTCH)  
 
Dit promotie onderzoek bestudeert  innovatie en ondernemerschap in China. Ondanks 
een institutionele omgeving gekenmerkt door onzekerheid en zwakke bescherming 
van intellectueel eigendom kan innovatie goed gedijen in China¶s technologiegedreven 
sectoren. We zijn op zoek gegaan naar verklaringen voor hoe deze  innovatieve 
competenties ontwikkeld worden in een omgeving die innovatie niet lijkt te 
ondersteunen. Het onderzoek is tweeledig: het theoretische gedeelte richt zich op een 
synthese van competentie, institutionele en sectorale perspectieven op innovatie. Het 
empirische gedeelte omvat twee jaar intensief veldwerk in samenwerking met 45 
Chinese ondernemers en Zhejiang Universiteit in Hangzhou. 
 Een van de belangrijkste inzichten is dat innovatie, in de brede zin van het woord,  
prima kan gedijen in een omgeving met institutionele onzekerheid en beperkte formele 
bescherming van intellectueel eigendom. Enerzijds creëert institutionele onzekerheid 
zowel bedreigingen als kansen voor innovatie. Anderzijds zijn ondernemingen in staat 
om specifieke innovatieve competenties te ontwikkelen om kansen en bedreigingen in 
de sector te managen en tegelijkertijd institutionele beperkingen het hoofd te bieden.  
 Dit onderzoek heeft vier specifieke resultaten. Ten eerste, Hangzhou heeft een 
ondernemers klimaat binnen het een-partij stelsel van China dat veel gelijkenissen 
heeft met een kapitalistisch systeem omdat het de juiste impulsen aan ondernemers 
geeft om te innoveren. Ten tweede, de Chinese ondernemers herinneren ons eraan dat 
innovatie niet beperkt is tot technische innovatie maar ook innovatie van organisatie 
kan zijn. Daarnaast laten de resultaten zien dat succesvolle innovatie niet beperkt is tot 
omgevingen met sterke formele bescherming van intellectueel eigendom. Ten derde, 
beperkingen gerelateerd aan de sector en institutionele omgeving kunnen een impuls 
geven aan ondernemers om te innoveren. Ten vierde, succesvolle innovatie benut een 
combinatie van competenties die de integratie en transformatie van kritieke bronnen ± 
financieel, menselijk en kennis kapitaal - voor innovatie ondersteunen en versterken.  
 De resultaten van dit onderzoek kunnen gebruikt worden door internationale 
ondernemingen, Chinese ondernemers en beleidsmakers binnen en buiten China. 
Internationale ondernemingen moeten China niet langer zien als de fabriek van de 
wereld maar als potentiële partner voor de gezamenlijke ontwikkeling van innovatie. 
Chinese ondernemers mogen de toegevoegde waarde van het ontwikkelen en 
commercialiseren van niet-WHFKQLVFKH LQQRYDWLHV RP GH PRJHOLMNKHGHQ YDQ &KLQD¶V
groeiende markt te benutten niet onderschatten. Tegelijkertijd stelt dit hun in staat om 
een coherente set van innovatieve competenties te ontwikkelen. Beleidsmakers kunnen 
lering trekken uit het feit dat het creëren van een omgeving voor innovatie op vele 
manieren gedaan kan worden, zolang het lokaal geïnstitutionaliseerd is. 
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SUMMARY (CHINESE)  
         ᴀкⱘⷨおЏ乬ᰃЁ೑ⱘ߯ᮄ੠߯ϮǄ೼⊩㾘ࠊᑺϡᯢ᱄ⱘ㚠᱃ϟˈ
Ё೑ӕϮ⫮㟇ᰃ⾥ᡔൟӕϮձ✊བ☿བ㥐ഄ䖯㸠ⴔ߯ᮄǄҪӀᰃབԩ೼䖭⾡ϡ߽ⱘ
⊩ࠊ⦃๗ϟᓔথ㞾䑿߯ᮄ㛑࡯ⱘਸ਼˛䖭ᰃϔϾؐᕫ᥶おⱘ䯂乬ǄЎℸˈ԰㗙҆䍈Ё
೑ᵁᎲˈ㢅њϸᑈⱘᯊ䯈ˈ೼ᔧഄ᳔催ᄺᑰ˖⌭∳໻ᄺⱘ䗮࡯ড়԰ϟˈ䍄䆓䇗ⷨњ
45ᆊᔧഄ䕃ӊӕϮˈϢ CEOঞϮ⬠㊒㣅Ӏ䖯㸠њ䴶ᇍ䴶ⱘ⏅ܹѸ䇜Ǆ㓐ড়䇗ⷨ㒧
ᵰˈᑊ߽⫼݇Ѣ݀ৌ㛑࡯ǃᴎᵘࠊᑺǃ㸠Ϯ䚼䮼ϝϾ㽕㋴೼᥼ࡼ߯ᮄϞⱘ⧚䆎ˈݭ
៤њᴀкǄᴀ㨫԰ⱘ݊ЁϔϾ݇䬂ᗱᛇᰃ˖೼⊩㾘ࠊᑺϡᯢ᱄ǃⶹ䆚ѻᴗϡফֱᡸ
ⱘ⦃๗ϟˈᑓНϞⱘ߯ᮄҡ✊ᰃ᳝ᕜ໻ぎ䯈ⱘǄॳ಴᳝ϸᮍ䴶ˈϔᰃ⊩㾘ࠊᑺⱘϡ
ᯢ᱄㱑✊ϡ߽Ѣ߯ᮄˈԚг᳈ࡴ▔থњ߯ᮄⱘࡼᴎ˗Ѡᰃ೼ϡ߽ⱘ⦃๗ϟˈӕϮҡ
✊㛑໳ҹব䗮ⱘᮍᓣ㾘䙓㸠Ϯݙ੠⊩ࠊϞⱘ䰤ࠊˈᓔথ݋᳝ᔧഄ੠㞾䑿⡍㡆ⱘ߯ᮄ
㛑࡯Ǆ 
 ℸ໪ˈᴀ㨫԰Џ㽕᳝ಯ⚍থ⦄˖ϔˈ೼ϔܮ⊏೑ⱘЁ೑ˈᵁᎲ᳝ⴔᵕ݊㉏Ԑ䌘
ᴀЏНⱘଚϮ⦃๗ˈ▔ࢅⴔ߯ᮄ੠߯Ϯ㸠Ў˗ѠˈЁ೑ӕϮᆊ䅸Ў߯ᮄϡҙҙᰃᡔ
ᴃϞⱘ߯ᮄˈ㗠Ϩ䖬ࣙᣀ㒘㒛Ϟⱘ߯ᮄ˗៤ࡳⱘ߯ᮄϡձ䌪Ѣ໪⬠⦃๗ᇍⶹ䆚ѻᴗ
ᰃ৺݋᳝ᔎ᳝࡯ⱘֱᡸǄϝˈ㸠ϮϞ੠⊩ࠊϞⱘ䰤ࠊг㛑䕀࣪Ў߯ᮄࡼᴎǄಯˈ䖯
㸠៤ࡳ߯ᮄ䳔㽕ᇍӕϮ݇䬂㛑࡯䖯㸠ড়⧚䜡㕂ˈ䖭䞠ⱘ݇䬂㛑࡯ᰃᣛӕϮᇍ݇䬂䌘
⑤䖯㸠ᵘᓎǃ䕀࣪੠䲚៤ⱘ㛑࡯ˈᑊϨ䖭ѯ㛑࡯㛑໳ⳌѦᬃᣕ੠ࡴᔎǄᴀ㨫԰ᇍଚ
Ϯ⼒ӮЁⱘϝϾᇍ䈵˖໪೑ӕϮǃЁ೑ӕϮᆊ੠Ё໪ⱘᬓㄪࠊᅮ㗙ˈ᳝ⴔ┰೼ⱘ䋵
⤂Ǆ㸼⦄ᮍᓣབϟ˖໪೑ӕϮᅠܼৃҹ㗗㰥ϢЁ೑ӕϮᓎゟ೼߯ᮄᮍ䴶ⱘড়԰ˈ㗠
ϡҙҙᡞЁ೑䰤ᅮЎϪ⬠Ꮉॖ˗Ё೑ӕϮᆊᑨ䆹᳈ࡴ䞡㾚䴲ᡔᴃൟ߯ᮄঞ݊ଚϮ
࣪ˈ೼ℸ෎⸔Ϟ໻࡯ᓔথϔ㋏߫ৃᣕ㓁ⱘ߯ᮄ㛑࡯ˈᣪᥬ㞾䑿೼ᮄ݈ᏖഎϞⱘᴎ
䘛˗㗠ᇍѢЁ໪ᬓㄪࠊᅮ㗙ᴹ䇈ˈ߭ᑨ䆹಴ഄࠊᅰഄ䆒䅵߯ᮄ▔ࢅᴎࠊǄ
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PRIVATE SOFTWARE ENTREPRENEURS IN HANGZHOU, CHINA
The thesis deals with innovation and entrepreneurship in China. Despite an
institutional environment characterized by high levels of uncertainty, innovation thrives
even in the technology-based sectors. The research asks for explanations how innovative
capabilities are developed in such an adverse institutional environment. The thesis is
based on a synthesis of capability, institutional and sectoral approaches to innovation and
2 years of extensive field research in cooperation with 45 Chinese entrepreneurs and
Zhejiang University in Hangzhou. One of the key insights is that innovation, in a broad
understanding, can take place in an environment with institutional uncertainty and limited
formal protection of intellectual property rights. On the one hand, institutional uncertainty
creates both restrictions and incentives for innovation, and, on the other hand, firms are
able to develop specific innovative capabilities that manage sectoral constraints while
fighting off institutional constraints. More specifically, this thesis has four sets of findings.
First, the findings show that Hangzhou has a business environment within the one-party
state of China that is closely resembling a capitalist business environment and provides
incentives for innovative behaviour and entrepreneurship. Second, the Chinese entrepreneurs
remind us that innovation is not necessarily technical innovation but also organizational
innovation and that successful innovation is not restricted to environments with a strong
formal protection of intellectual property rights. Third, sectoral and institutional constraints
on innovation can also set incentives for entrepreneurs to innovate. Fourth, the successful
development of innovation requires a configuration of capabilities that support and
reinforce each other in the integration, building and transformation of critical resources.
The thesis provides insights that can be used by international firms, Chinese entrepreneurs
and policy makers inside and outside of China. International firms should not only consider
China as a factory of the world but as a potential partner in joint innovative activities.
Chinese entrepreneurs should consider the value added of developing and commercializing
non-technical innovations to exploit the opportunities of an emerging market while at the
same time developing a sustainable and coherent set of innovative capabilities. Policy
makers should consider that incentives for innovation can be created in a variety of ways.
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